CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW



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Scope and Mission

The *Czech Sociological Review* is a scholarly review open to discussion of all professional and societal problems, sociological theory and methodology, and the dissemination of the results and interpretation of sociological research. Its attention is directed towards the development of the field and its teaching, and at the same time strives to be useful for solving the practical problems of Czech social and economic politics.

Manuscripts Submission

The editors require an original and two easily readable copies, which do not contain the name or workplace of the author, in order that the reading process will be anonymous on both sides. The accompanying letter should contain a complete contact address, including telephone number. Submission of a manuscript to another journal, while it is under review by the CSR is regarded as unethical.

Manuscript format: Manuscripts must be typed or computer printed (12-point type preferred), double-spaced, with 60 columns per line, 30 lines to an A4 page. The maximum length of research and methodological essays is 20 pages, for reviews it is 7 pages, for news or information 5 pages, and for annotations 1 page.

Editorial decisions: Decisions are generally made within one month from the date your manuscript is received at the CSR office. If your manuscript is accepted you will be asked to submit your final version both on paper and on a microcomputer floppy disk, either in ASCII or Microsoft Word for Windows, MS-Word 5.0, or 5.5. IBM disks are acceptable. The final version should also include a twenty-line abstract and an eighty-line summary, an alphabetized bibliography and basic information about the author.

Introduction to the Issue on Social Policy

Sociological analysis of social policy issues is a new phenomenon in Eastern Europe. The societal transformation has shown that the economic discipline is better prepared to raise important questions and provide their answers, sometimes prefabricated by neoclassical theory. The main corpus of criticism of the system of social guarantees has only come after its actual dismantling and this criticism is lagging considerably behind the larger critique of the command economic system. Theorizing about "social reform" has come only after ample reasoning and speculation concerning the economic reform and after some important steps has already occured. The existing time lag is still great, although the social policy literature studying the East-Central-European problem is growing, largely thanks to Western experts on the topic. [Deacon 1992, Ferge and Kolberg 1992, Ringen and Wallace 1993, *Journal* 1993]

Also focussing on the social issues raised by the transformation is the international project entitled "The Social Costs of Economic Transformation in Central Europe" (SOCO) supported by the Ford Foundation and The Pew Charitable Trusts and organized by the Institute of Human Sciences in Vienna. This program is obviously not only sociological but also economic and deeply policy-oriented. On the basis of a comprehensive analysis of the main areas and actors in social policy, ameliorative policies in the labor market and a social benefit system should be proposed. Two national research teams (the Polish and Hungarian) have already started their work and the other two (Czech and Slovak) will start before the end of 1993 (see Kelly Musick's report in the News and Information section of this volume).

In this issue, we will depict various aspects of social policy as well as various national perspectives. Three of the authors represent national teams involved in the SOCO project: Julia Szalai (Hungary), Radoslaw Markowski (Poland) and Jiří Večerník (Czech Republic). The other authors and topics also deal with to this broad problem:

* In Jiří Večerník's article, social policy is analyzed from various points of view: the two-faced nature of the communist system of "social guarantees," the expectation of social citizenship in the continued absence of a market, and the need to de-institutionalize society and simultaneously establish new institutions. Various models of capitalism (state, liberal and corporatist) are discussed and the various dilemmas accompanying policy-making in transition are shown.

* The Slovak system of social policy is studied in Erika Kvapilová's contribution on a rather pragmatic level. The author surveys the emancipation process of the Slovak system from the Czech, shows its endemic problems and concludes by questioning the harmonization of the short-term goals of social policy with the country's long-term social strategy.

* Julia Szalai, examining the Hungarian government's new program, shows that the "socialist" social policy had several functions, serving simultaneously the preservation and decomposition of the communist order. The ongoing marketization of the system has caused the impoverishment of people living from benefits, but also helped people build alternative pillars for a decent standard of living. She warns of the possibility of social disintegration but also expresses optimism for more integrative development.

* The cross-national study written by Radoslaw Markowski studies the dependence of political attitudes on social policy determinants using a comparative four-country survey. He concludes that these determinants can be seen as good predictors of satisfaction with the political system and of the general vision of political prospects, whereas the scope of popular tolerance and the propensity to join protests manifest only a slight correlation.

* Ivo Možný, using qualitative research methods, shows one possible "new social contract" concluded between the "new" capitalists (who are, in fact, old socialist managers) and "free" labor (but with old paternalistic expectations). The low intensity of industrial conflict is made possible by continuing paternalistic behavior, which is enabled by imperfections in the market.

* The context in which social policy is being developed is sketched by Pavel Machonin's characterization of the Soviet-type social structure. Various (partly complementary) approaches for explaining the stratification of the past and the burden of the remaining legacies of communism are shown.

* In a robust empirical analysis, Petr Matějů describes the struggle of egalitarian and inegalitarian norms and values in a comparative perspective. Whereas in the Netherlands inegalitarian norms are able to resist the challenge from egalitarian ideology, in the Czech lands the capacity for an egalitarian interpretation of distributive justice to challenge meritocratic norms is much stronger.

Although only a modest contribution to the sociological and socio-political debate on social policy and stratification schemes, we hope the issues and topics raised in this issue will continue to be a major concern of all theoretical and empirical, academic and policy-oriented research.

Jiří Večerník

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Escaping from Socialist Paternalism: Social Policy Reform in the Czech Republic

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Abstract: The new Czech social policy system is analyzed from various perspectives: the dual nature of the communist system of "social guarantees," expectations of social citizenship in the continued absence of the market, and the need both to de-institutionalize society and establish new institutions simultaneously. Various models of capitalism (state, liberal and corporatist) are discussed and the dilemmas accompanying policy-making during social transition are shown. A new system of social regulation will crystalize not in revolutionary conceptions and acts, but in gradual changes and adaptations to economic problems and budget constraints as well as to the influence and pressure of Central European surroundings and international institutions. To confirm a wide range of social rights in a materially plundered economy and in a society deprived of a firm moral base would prove to be nothing other than short-sighted populism which would undermine economic and social reconstruction sources even further.

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It is generally agreed that transitions to a market economy must be safeguarded from problematic social consequences. It is necessary to prevent the financial ruin of those who are unable to adapt to the new economic conditions. In order for economic reform to progress, social peace must be maintained. The social democratic tradition of prewar Czechoslovakia and the close proximity of "Social Europe" has prevented the unrestrained capitalism of the 19th century from returning. None of the Czech political parties or movements have called the importance of the social dimension of the ongoing transformation into question -- indeed, the population considers it to be second only to personal security in importance.

An intensive discussion on the transformation of social policy is, however, lacking. In fact, economic reform is being introduced without any explicit idea as to the interplay between the economic and social spheres. Conservative arguments voice a strong conviction as to the efficiency/equality trade-off, maintaining that large-scale social security measures threaten work motivation. Social democratic arguments are based on the effort to hinder an excessive increase in social inequalities and to avoid social disintegration. The state is gradually adjusting

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social legislation to meet the new challenges. Nevertheless, neither the applied approach nor any other theoretically viable approaches have been articulated in more general terms on either the academic or pragmatic political levels. Although the situation in the former Czechoslovakia shares some similarities to those in Poland and Hungary, it is considerably different to that in the West, where social policy issues are focused on both research and policy making.

There are further reasons for the lack of discussion. First, after having been sunk in Marxist-Leninist cliches and in a routine of unchanging social benefits for years, neither academia nor the social political lobby have the appropriate conceptual apparati at hand. Second, any discussion of social policy is likely to be suspect because of the overly "socialist" connotation associated with these problems.[1] Third, given the long list of urgent tasks, such as the introduction of democratic laws and the launching of economic reform, and after the unexpected split of the Czechoslovak Federation and the establishment of a new state, the problem of social policy has not proved to be such a pressing issue. Finally, with regard to the fact that large-scale privatization has not yet taken place and that newly started private businesses have been able to employ a surprisingly high number of people, social problems have not revealed themselves as dramatically as in Poland or Hungary.

This article will examine some problems related to the social security and social support systems currently being introduced. This is primarily a question of origins, i.e. the advantages and disadvantages generated by the policies of the past. There are also the new social problems brought about by the commencement of economic reform and the new challenges coming from the West, to which there are various alternative responses and the multiplicity of dilemmas accompanying them. The conclusion of this article will deal with adaptations and transformations of social institutions and the system of social regulations.

It must be noted that there are no satisfactory "prognostic" answers to questions concerning the concrete forms of social policy in our society. They will crystallize gradually, arising from the day-to-day clashes between political rivals and their economic tactics and from budget constraints and international requirements. Social regulation will always be a compromise between social ambitions and economic potential. It is, however, important to open and continue the debate and provide it with efficient conceptual machinery.

1. The legacy of "real socialism": the two-faced nature of social guarantees

Social policy in communist Czechoslovakia had two faces. It proclaimed itself to be universal and based on both work and state generosity. When the constitution of

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1) As Johan De Deken made clear -"The Leninist regime effectively discredited anything that makes even the most moderate allusion to socialism." [De Deken 1992: 21] Similarly, Zsuzsa Ferge showed that because of the past, social policy is the weakest part of socialist party activity. [Ferge 1992: 210]

1960 pronounced Czechoslovakia a "socialist" state, everybody had the right to free health care and pension benefits. The main tool of this universal system was the right to work, a right which was not only nominal (as stressed in communist ideology) but "actual." Everyone could be a member of the "working class" (or the "associated class of cooperative farmers") and, as such, could benefit from the "advantages of socialism." The state/party took care of its citizens and provided them with the necessary care. Benefits were relatively high in comparison to incomes. Communist Czechoslovakia was a state without unemployment, without visible wide social disparities and without official poverty.

However, the system was principally totalitarian: everyone was under lifelong control. Wages, pensions and any other benefits acted as perfect instruments for party/state control of the population. It was not work productivity but length of employment, loyalty to the regime, and work in more favored branches which decided one's social security. A part of the population (especially older pensioners) was distinctly marginalized because the relationship between benefits and wages became more and more disadvantageous, with pension benefits becoming barely sufficient for basic necessities.

The key aspects of social policy within the totalitarian system are universal (compulsory) employment and (state) control, not universal social generosity and solidarity. Work is not a right, but a duty and a mechanism for controlling the citizenry. The strongest quality common to both the economic and political structures was that they both encouraged the subordination of the population to centralized power. The universal (and in real terms inferior) state social benefits controlled people's futures. The total opacity of pension financing was supposed to make manifest, from the paternalistic point of view of the "good ruler," that the state provided generous gifts to all people. Regulations neither specified methods of distribution, nor when to increase old benefits or introduce new ones.

Generally speaking, however, the population did not view the system as a totalitarian system of control. It was partly perceived as a continuation of pre-existing social democratic traditions, as an extension of prewar social policy and an expression of the classless traditions of Czech society. Benefiting from this tradition and bombarding people with propaganda, the state/party was able to convince the population that the "guarantees" of the socialist system were preferable to the insecurities of capitalism. State paternalism was advantageous for a large part of the population, especially for the original supporters of the communist party, i.e. the lower strata of the working class and a section of the agricultural sector. Step by step, other parts of the population learned how to use the system as the whole. In replacing work with employment and education with credentials, the dissolution of wage differentiation within the economy and the expectation of life-long state care became elements of the new way of thinking.

At present, both interpretations of social policy, are shaping people's expectations and their reactions to political decisions, thus reflecting this two-faced nature. On the one hand, the emancipatory attempt and courage of part of the population to rely on their own capacities can be seen. On the other hand, the habitual paternalistic expectation of universal state care is evident. On the one

hand, efforts both to remove the state from its former monopolistic position within the economy and society and to limit its role to a necessary minimum are in motion; on the other hand, attempts to maintain its functions and reproduce the power of state bureaucracy still persist.

2. New problems: their pragmatic and systemic levels

The beginning of the economic transformation has brought with it a number of social problems. Firstly, price liberalization has led to a general decrease in incomes' purchasing power and thus exposed part of the population to poverty. Secondly, the reduction of the state bureaucracy and the beginning of the privatization of large-scale enterprises has caused unemployment, a hitherto unknown phenomenon. Beside the "old poverty," which endangered large families and the oldest pensioners in particular, a "new poverty" arising from unemployment or the low adaptability of some households to the new conditions is emerging. Only a fraction of Czech households is able to mobilize alternative economic sources, move to the expanding segments of the labor market, obtain secondary incomes, profit from old or newly acquired real estate, etc.

Under the communist regime, the status of work inevitably decreased as the links between ability, performance and reward weakened or even disappeared. Success in the competitive labor market requires some of those dispositions and abilities which were methodically suppressed: competence, training, adaptability and mobility. Now, only about 20% of the population is convinced their education is suitable for the present market conditions. As far as unemployment is concerned, however, the level in the Czech Republic is still very low (having fallen below 3% as of mid-1993), but its future rate will be influenced by contradictory tendencies. In the near future, we can expect a certain increase in lay-offs as a result of the privatization of large state firms (and a consequent reduction in "social employment") as well as the establishment of Western corporations which are trying to control some markets and reduce domestic production. On the other hand, the increasing activity of new domestic and foreign firms as well as that of the service and informal sector will considerably increase the demand for labor.

By causing unemployment and inflation, the economic transformation inevitably also produces poverty. Poverty in "socialist" Czechoslovakia was hidden and socioeconomic research on it was prohibited. There are as yet no official data on poverty. According to the "Economic Expectations and Attitudes" surveys, the poverty rate is higher in absolute terms (based on official minimum income) than in relative terms (based on EC poverty standards), and much higher in subjective than in objective terms. The poverty line was newly established in November of 1991 and valorized in March 1993. According to official estimates, the percentage of households falling below the poverty line does not exceed 2%. According to our surveys, it is only slightly more. In subjective terms, about 10% of Czechs consider their households to be "definitely poor." A higher and slowly increasing number of households estimates their subjective minimum income to be higher than their actual (declared) income. In January 1993 about 30% of Czech households but only about 25% adults and children fell into this category. This is a result of the

higher proportion of single pensioners among those who subjectively consider themselves poor.

Unemployment and poverty are heavily concentrated among Roms (Gypsies). Following a 1965 government decision, the Communist regime intensified its effort to liquidate their separate and autonomously managed villages in Central and Eastern Slovakia and forcibly dispersed Roms throughout the whole of Czechoslovakia. A consequence of this artificially provoked migration was the complete destabilization of this nation and the creation of social-pathological centers in many Czech cities and towns that impulsively absorb further contingents of unadapted Slovak Roms. These are consequently centers which generate fear and crime, destroying houses and surroundings. The Rom unemployment rate is much higher than that of the rest of society, due to their low level of training and work reliability. Also, the percentage of Rom criminality is much greater and has developed into whole sectors of organized crime (prostitution and smuggling). Considering their extremely slow pace of adaptation and their expansion by migration and high fertility, Roms present a serious social problem.

These emerging or increasing social problems challenge the system of social security and assistance. Under the Communist regime, all social guarantees were anchored within the work sphere. The administrative allocation of work was inseparably tied up with social guarantees. Wages were equalized because their function was to support the reproduction of a loyal but undifferentiated working mass at the lowest possible cost.[2] Hence, on the one hand, wages functioned as an "employment benefit" for those who would have dropped out of the job market due to low productivity or the low quality of their work, while on the other they functioned as a minimum support for hard-working people who actually deserved much more. Firms built apartments and ran kindergartens, and everyone could claim a pension because of his/her former employment. Essentially, it was a single, uniformly controlled and targeted system.

The economic transition has started to untangle and differentiate this system. First of all, the obligation both to work and employ has vanished and a real labor market has come into being. The state no longer administers work, but is obliged to determine a minimum wage, take care of the unemployed and support new occupational opportunities. Health insurance and pensions, formerly financed from the state budget, are becoming independent and are being transformed into independent (but state-guaranteed) funds financed by employers and employees alike. Social policy institutions are also becoming independent of the production sphere and more removed from the state budget; social insurance is starting to work on a mixed-budget fund and on a private basis. In sum, social policy is changing its bearer and its institutional structure: the dependent worker is being replaced by the independent citizen and the opaque party/state administration is being replaced by defined public, private and charity institutions. According to the

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2) The function of wages for the mere reproduction of workers under socialism has already been discussed by the author in connection with the hypothesis demonstrating the principally exploitative character of "real socialism." [Večerník 1991a]

present government's strategy, the economic transformation should be associated with a shift away from the paternalistic state and the de-motivation of "social guarantees" toward a more efficient and better targeted social policy.

The transition of the system conceals two large problems or dilemmas. The first is related to the rooted character of citizenship while the second is connected to the problem of institutions.

T. H. Marshall [1964] described the historical process of the formation of modern society. In the 18th century, citizens' rights established individual freedom, in the 19th century political rights were established. The establishment of social rights characterizes the 20th century, i.e. "liberating the individual from want." This sequence is, however, reversed in the formative processes of postcommunist societies. Paradoxically enough, the only aspect adopted from the communist past by both the population and state institutions is the last item in the sequence. The "social guarantees" of the past were proclaimed to be a certain form of social citizenship (despite their fundamental totalitarian substance, productive basis, and marginalizing effects) and are still treated as such. Whereas everybody should know that the dependency of individuals on the state has to be severely decreased in the market system, the maintenance of social guarantees ensures people's trust in the new regime.

Regarding institutions, it is possible to say that communist society was over-institutionalized. Institutions controlled all spheres of life, replacing market mechanisms, moral norms, communities, associations and informal movements. They acted as extensions of the "center" with their individual branches very closely connected by official and hidden links. The logical reaction to such a situation is to attempt to de-institutionalize the society and create space for spontaneous processes. However, tearing apart the integrity of the existing political-economic-social mechanisms implies an urgent need for new functional institutions. Under the conditions of a normative vacuum and an "associative wasteland,"[3] the newly gained space for freedom is hard to fill with positive and spontaneous collective activity. Individual actions, if controlled by the simple survival instincts inherited from communism, can often have destructive effects. When the "visible hand of the party" loses its universal power and the growth of civil society is slow, the necessity arises of filling the vacuum with a number of mutually independent institutions which will simultaneously demonstrate and ensure plurality within the social structure.

Both dilemmas (the preference for social citizenship over political citizenship and the need for new institutions in a milieu of disintegrating power structures and decaying normative chaos) can only be solved at the price of permanent compromise. Righting the anomalies remaining from communism cannot be done immediately. One of the compromises is, of course, the social compromise, i.e. finding the road from paternalistic care to individual responsibility that is neither socially harsh or nihilistic nor contributes to the further disintegration of society.

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3) The term was used by Claus Offe when discussing the total absence of the institutions of civil society and networks in post-communist countries. [Offe 1992]

3. The types of capitalism: theoretical or real challenges?

After the fall of communism, everyone called for political democracy and a market economy. This initial general enthusiasm (partly honest, partly feigned) is gradually being replaced by a plurality of opinions. People are starting to recognize that there are, in fact, not one but many types of "capitalism" and that its concrete form will be gradually shaped by the conflict between different political currents and economic strategies. The levels of how far the state can withdraw from the economy differ and there are different ways of smoothing out the state/market relationship. Here we will consider these issues under the delineations of state, cooperative and liberal forms of capitalism.[4]

State capitalism

State capitalism springs from different traditions, some of which are more liberal and pragmatic, while others are more socialist and egalitarian. The "social liberalism" of the classical economy (J. S. Mill) leads to the Keynesian concept of state interventionism and to Beveridge's social system. The socialist branch, arising from Fabian thinking and social democratic policy, became the basis for the Scandinavian type of welfare state but was also abused by the totalitarian type of "real socialism". Here the state modifies capitalism through various active policies [Putterman 1990]: it a) prevents market failures (monopolies, externalities, the inability to provide public goods), b) redistributes incomes from market participation, c) accomplishes macroeconomic stabilization through operations aimed at the labor and capital markets (Keynesian policy), and d) intervenes to the benefit of specific economic orientations (industrial policy). State intervention should be both independent and legitimate -- a difficult task to achieve. The first path can easily lead to authoritarian and bureaucratic power, the second to lobbyism and the parcelization of state activities and sources. Within the domain of social policy, state capitalism corresponds best to the "social-democratic welfare state" based on full employment, wherein the state cultivates an active labor market policy and functions as an important employer. [Kolberg, Esping-Andersen 1992]

Corporative capitalism

Corporative capitalism is conceptualized according to two orientations, one of which derives more from a community perspective, the other from a class perspective.[5] In the first instance, it is interpreted according to Durkheim's conception of solidarity, the Christian democratic doctrine or Saint-Simon's associationalism. Unlike the concept of the "autonomous economy, operating according to its own coherent logic, independent from the rest of human social life" [Block 1985: 19], the economy is understood as being naturally embedded in civil

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4) In this section, we rely mostly on Ian Gough's classification scheme and descriptions. [Gough 1994]

5) Liberal neocorporativism, in contrast to authoritarian corporativism (based on a pre-industrial society divided into estates), is based on the complex web of sector and class interests in a society characterized by high social mobility. [Aleman 1990:139]

society. In order to function, a market economy requires trust and cooperation among the main interest groups in society, as well as their active participation in political negotiations. In the second instance, it is based upon Marx's conviction that class divisions exist within society and that politics is the expression of economic interests. The rational solution for workers is to follow a strategy wherein they respect the interests of capital. [Przeworski 1986]

With social partnerships and negotiations among the collective actors as their base, different interests can be harmonized either through compromise or through their redefinition. With this "third way," new institutions for negotiation and networks of social partners can be created and both market and state mechanisms can be replaced. But the question remains: to what extent can all the different interests be represented and realized? Corporatism can easily degenerate into interest cartels, particularism and clientelism. It can marginalize and exclude groups that are not represented (the youth, the elderly or the disabled, as well as certain occupational categories such as free-lancers). This "selective corporatism" resolves short-term conflicts but at the same time contributes to the creation of new fields from long-term conflict. [Aleman 1990] Corporatism ensures an effective social policy supported by social insurance and universal social help.

Neoliberal capitalism

Neoliberal or "minimally regulated" capitalism combines liberal and conservative elements results in a "free economy and a strong state." This "New Right" program, which attracted attention in the 1970s and 1980s, opposes both state and corporative capitalism. It posits that everywhere and constantly, the failure of the government is more likely and more dangerous than the collapse of the market. State intervention can be neither rational (it is impossible to express the will of dispersed participants), nor universal (it is necessarily controlled by lobbies); it causes the disintegration of the market and is thus counterproductive. State policy is inevitably clientelist when various groups influence the government and put forward specific claims and ideas. It is more likely, defenders of liberalism say, for the state to put forward particular rather than universal interests. The state bureaucracy necessarily tends to find routine solutions according to rules laid out in advance, and tends to strengthen its own position instead of building up well-founded and targeted projects. That is why the state tries to decrease its own powers (through deregulation, de-etatization, privatization, tax cuts) while at the same time trying to weaken the role of other institutions (trade unions, occupational associations, etc.) In liberal capitalism, state social policy is limited to the safety net, which functions as a last resort for individuals and can effectively cause marginalization and stigmatization. In the Esping-Andersen typology, it is called a "residual welfare state." [Esping-Andersen 1990]

* * *

The idea of "building capitalism" according to a consistent theoretical concept is just as unrealizable as the idea of "building socialism" according to Marxist-Leninist ideology and the long-term plan. The models presented above are, however, used as patterns and strategies. They form expectations in the population, in the

programs and activities of political parties and in the prospective intentions of governmental bodies. To give clear preference to any single one of them is almost impossible. Given its prewar traditions, the Czech Republic can be counted among those countries such as Austria and Germany with corporative organizations. In view of its heritage and the problems of the present transformation, it could, however, easily be attracted to some of the variants of state capitalism. The necessity of cutting ties to communist paternalism is reorienting the country toward neoliberal capitalism with a minimal amount of state participation. Today, elements of all three models are present and there is no doubt that they will continue to mix in the future. The character and power of the social actors will influence the relative proportions of liberal, state, and cooperative elements in this interplay.

Development following an entirely different political path is also possible. The communist regime left behind a deeply rooted egalitarian psychology, considerable state guarantees for households and a "repressed social structure."[6] This can lead to various arrangements that connect state authority with populist policy. This reveals itself when a promised generous social policy wins the support of important sections of the population, so that social policy can hide behind a social democratic or corporative shelter. It must be stated that although this authoritarian-populist compound corresponds well to the character of the previous regime and, represents for a significant part of the populace a way out of the chaotic impasse of the transition, it does not seem that it can have a truly great impact in the Czech Republic, where historical experience of this type is non-existent (unlike in neighboring Poland and Hungary). Nevertheless, we should be aware of such an alternative.

4. Alternatives and limits of change

The radical change in vocabulary does not fully show what it means to create new forms out of old content or to actually cut ties with the past. The dominance of social claims in the temporary value spectrum and the need to both de- and re-institutionalize society are simply manifestations of a generally paradoxical and confused situation in which there are several available alternatives to basic choices. Here we will describe a few of them.

1. Among the favorite slogans of "real socialist" leaders were: "we can only distribute what we produce" and "to provide social benefits we have to earn money first." Today, a routine budget approach is applied and should be respected. This means that money for the social sphere must be saved in production or that a social policy which economizes more will allow a more intensive financing of economic modernization, either directly (through state support) or indirectly (through lower taxes for entrepreneurs). Such static antagonism opposes the dynamic view [Offe 1993] that investments in the social

[6]) The term is from Zs. Ferge who means by it a situation in which structural forces cannot act normally, being limited by barriers intentionally created by the communist ruling class. [Ferge 1993]

sphere are investments in human capital and social peace and, because of this, even deficit budgeting can be allowed. From the neoclassic and liberal perspective, social policy is a factor outside the economy, whereas from the socio-economic and corporative perspective it is an integral constituent of economic life. Generally speaking, a socially satisfied population and a secure labor force generate increased long-term benefits in productivity and reliability.

2. The economic rule of an efficiency/equality trade off was formulated many years ago [Okun 1975], according to which personal effort input grows when income is directly proportional to output. It implies that the work motivation is undermined when incomes are equalized. According to neoclassical rules, wages must also be downwardly flexible in order to motivate entrepreneurs to employ less effective workers and decrease unemployment. That is why both minimum wages and ceilings on them are unacceptable. The reverse side of this coin is the argument that human work is primarily a social activity [Polanyi 1957] and that financial reward is only one of many compensations taking various forms of a fundamentally social character. The process of ensuring and rewarding work should respect principles of justice and must support, not undermine, the social integration of society.[7]
3. There is no unified hypothesis or theory to guide the growth of capitalism in postcommunist countries. One opinion classifies the current movement as "political capitalism"; capitalism is being created without well-established bourgeois classes and their interest associations. It is being created from the top by the new elite according to its own plan; "old apparatchiks turn into new entrepreneurchiks." [Staniszkis 1991] It is hard to accept that the new regime is coming into being in a social vacuum, more aptly put the old organizational structures and social relations are in a phase of metamorphosis. Instead of a transition, what is happening is rather a transformation in which newly-introduced elements are combined with adaptations, new arrangements, permutations and reconfigurations of existing organizational structures. [Stark 1992: 300] Instead of the "non-system" and institutional vacuum formulated by political science, and instead of utopian economic projects based on the theoretical possibility of choosing the new system freely, the actual sociological perspective is one of a transformed continuity of the old (parallel) structures and interiorized (informal) routines. More than a consistent architectonic project, then, it is an amateur "bricolage" of various elements, as David Stark puts it.
4. Up to now, a general consensus in favor of democracy and a market economy, as well as both political and economic rights and freedoms, has prevailed. In reality, these relationships are not so clear. Looking at the history of capitalism, the

7) Fred Block considers today's fashionable dilemma between capitalist accumulation and social policy to be very unfortunate. On the basis of Polanyi's argument on the "embeddedness" of economic activities in the social structure, he shows that "the growing centrality of the 'human factor' means that social policy could now come to the forefront of the social reconstruction process. In an epoch in which the production of wealth now depends on human problem-solving capacities, the complex of policies through which societies shape human development becomes central to economic efficiency." [Block 1985: 28-29]

liberty and independence of economic actors has historically preceded political democracy. New demands on the part of capital accumulation do not always have to be legitimized by democratic procedures, as new classes of entrepreneurs can arise from former elites. It is even conceivable that it was exactly these elites who brought about the fall of the communist regimes for their own economic benefit. [Možný 1991, Mink, Szurek 1992] How these people will behave as participants in the market economy can be questioned. As an example of the "tunnel effect" (in A. Hirshman's formulation), Claus Offe pointed out that opening of democracy and the establishment of a market economy can cause a mutual "blockage," that democracy can block privatization and marketization. The market economy will then fail to distribute properties and this failure could lead to such accumulated dissatisfaction that democracy will be replaced by populist authoritarianism. [Offe 1991]

* * *

Such argumentation concerning these contrasts is clear only on the theoretical level, that is from various theoretical perspectives. In a rapidly changing social reality, however, neither reliable criteria of behavior nor convincing indicators of results are strong enough to bring any clear solutions to such academic discussions. We cannot withstand the attraction of self-fulfilling prophecies nor the deliberate choice of applicable arguments in such a chaotic reality. The choice is made mostly on the political level and the only question is whether the route taken by the transformation is the manifestation of a particular or individual political will or if it is paved by the interests of actual social actors.

5. The actors: political parties, the state and the population's expectations

Dismantling communism brings about a situation completely without precedent in which all variables are unknown. Actors in the changes are newly defined (or define themselves), as are their interest fields and proposed aims. Political parties are gradually profiling themselves according to social policy and formulating their programs in this field. The state is reacting to new problems and trying to meet the requirement of adjusting the social system to the market model. Furthermore, other institutions - associations of entrepreneurs, trade unions, occupational organizations, etc. - are also claiming to represent the new social groups and vying for attention.

If political party programs are compared, only two basic approaches can be found. On the one hand, the approach of the fathers of economic reform, the conservative Czech parties ODS (Civic Democratic Party) and ODA (Civic Democratic Alliance), stress the "market without attributes." Their approach to social policy is based on a combination of universal social insurance and means-tested social support. Well targeted rather than universal social benefits are emphasized when referring to the residual welfare state, as is the principle of subsidiarity: "the basis for any activity is the individual, the family and the locality. The state is the last resort for the citizen. Social policy should be de-etatized as much as possible in favor of the local associations." [Svoboda a prosperita 1992: 16] On the other hand, OH (Civic Movement) and ČSSD (Czech Party of Social

Democracy) give priority to the "social market economy," referring more, however, to the German and Austrian social democratic model than to the Scandinavian one. LSU (Liberal Social Union) and KSČM (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia) require much more generous allowances and the regular indexing of all wages and social benefits. The left wing of the political spectrum does not use the discredited Marxist categories but the Keynesian interpretation of significant state intervention. The Christian parties ČSL-KDU (People's Party, Christian Democratic Union) are still searching for specific social programs ("the trampoline instead of the safety net"), while stressing community and voluntary organization.

Both left and right wings agree on the essential harmony of democracy and market economics (but not on where priorities are to be given), on the necessity of economic reform (but not on its form and speed) and on certain unavoidable "social costs" of the reform (but not on their acceptable range). Each political party's orientation is crystalizing, with every decision on benefits, taxes or wage regulation being made pragmatically.

The presumably conservative government is not pursuing a consistent social strategy.[8] Obviously it is not autonomous in its activity, being directed not only by political parties but also by pressure from international institutions, and not only by leading personalities but also by routine bureaucracy. Bob Deacon has made an interesting point concerning the different and contradictory influences of foreign institutions. On the one hand, the IMF and World Bank require a minimum safety net. On the other hand, the International Labor Office proposes implanting social rights as far as possible, or to base the new system on a social citizenship enabling flexibility within the new market.[9] From one point of view, the Tripartite Commission is condemned as an institution that maintains trade unions' bureaucratic staff in power. Yet from another point of view, it is being established as a means of maintaining of social peace. Further, the Economic and Social Committee of the European Parliament has been in sharp opposition to those who would like to introduce a market economy without the adjectival attribute "social." There is a gulf between the influences of the international institutions resident in the USA, "the thinking of which in the field of social policy draws on an American

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8) Some examples: the government continues to liberalize all prices and equalize opportunities for everybody but keeps rents in former state-owned houses (for one-third of the population) at a ridiculously low level. On one occasion, pension benefits are proportionally increased by the same percent, the next time by the same amount of money. The Minister of Labor and Social Affairs prepared a law on additional insurance based on a corporatist principle (funds ruled by employers, with their contributions included into costs), which was then transformed by the government into one based on a citizenship principle (fully individual insurance with state guarantees and contributions).

9) I have already expressed reservations to proposals to introduce a "basic income" in Czechoslovakia or in the other postcommunist countries as a good solution for social policy. As an universal and unconditional benefit "basic income" would have destructive consequences for the state budget, in the conditions of surviving psychology of the paternalistic state and badly functioning financial and social institutions. [Večerník 1991b]

individualism," and the European institutions, "in which social policy has a corporative and social democratic character." [Deacon 1992]

Trade unions claim to represent the "working people" in tripartite commissions, however their public support is not so clear. Even though 76% of our respondents consider trade unions necessary for the positive functioning of society, only 62% think that their activity stimulates democratic development and only 57% that the activity of trade unions is helpful to the national economy. Only 59% of trade union members know about the activity of their own specific organization, and the level of their activity is even lower. Most members stay in the trade unions out of inertia rather than out of a necessity to defend their interests. ["Economic Expectations and Attitudes", June 1991]

Along with governmental and trade union bodies, associations of employers, professionals' chambers and community organizations are emerging. The pace of their formation and utilization in everyday political life is, however, slow. People are re-learning how to live under democratic conditions and share the pragmatic democratic struggles. Following empirical surveys, we can see a gradual crystalization of their attitudes and an increasing consistency of their perceptions of society and the expected role of the state.

It is quite understandable that the expectations of the population are not yet clearly defined. During the revolutionary period of November 1989, people expressed a readiness to tighten their belts. Everyone outwardly accepted the necessity to economize strongly in order to compensate for forty years of economic devastation. In the beginning, there was a real forum for presenting liberal thoughts and attracting people with them. At the same time, however, most people were unable to imagine an economy without state supervision. Our survey (Table 1) showed that people agreed with the statements supporting both "total freedom for private businesses" and "state control of the economy". These overall positive but unfortunately also contradictory attitudes are gradually being replaced by less positive and also less contradictory ones. Fewer people think today that private businesses should be given total freedom or that the state should intervene in the economic sphere. These positions are more crystalized and reflect the gradual polarization of opinion.[10]

Nevertheless, expectations from the state remain high: over half the population believes that the state should control prices to a greater extent, should guarantee work for everybody, should find a flat for every family that cannot find one for itself and should also limit the increase of wages to prevent inflation (Table 2). Moreover, 21% of respondents in the Czech Republic (and 25% in Slovakia) think that the state should clearly define ceilings on the amount of

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10) In May 1990, 80% of respondents who decisively agreed on total freedom for private businesses also agreed with a state control of the economy (50% "definitely yes," 38% "rather yes"). In June 1992, the number was 20% lower (29% "definitely yes", 32% "rather yes"). While in May 1990, the first statement (freedom for businesses) corresponded only weakly with the axis of political "right-left," while in June 1992 both statements were clearly correlated with this axis. ["Economic Expectations and Attitudes"]

money an individual can earn. The analysis shows that in June 1992 consistent attitudes were minimal and that not even 20% of the population professed a clear right-wing orientation. This 20% showed itself to be better educated and better-off, from the Czech lands, and ODS or ODA voters (Table 3). The crystalized left-wing position has, however, an even weaker representation, since support for state intervention is usually accompanied by a more or less strong acceptance of a market economy. A substantial part of the population's attitudes are characterized by ambivalence. It is more often the combination of positive outlooks (expectations of the free market and the strong state), and less negative opinions (a refusal of both the freedom of the market and state intervention.)

The same is true of the choice between a "market without attributes" and a "social market economy" (which are used more often as political slogans than as actual social political alternatives). It is worthy of note that this issue has divided the population in two.[11] Groups of respondents inclining to one or the other variant can only be described to a certain extent in demographic, social, economic, political or territorial terms (Table 4). As the data shows, any hypothesis stating that the social structure supports a definite choice would be premature.

Surveys show that the "social market" alternative is much more closely connected with authoritarian and protectionist attitudes, although the liberal alternative does not completely exclude them. As shown in our survey, the populist-authoritarian variant is more acceptable to older people, those from smaller localities, and with lower education and income. It was also mildly preferred by the Slovak part of the population.[12]

Without a doubt, the socio-political scene is already prepared for new social actors in the form of social groups and movements representing property, professional and local interests. Nevertheless, while some of the new interests and activities call for the formation of associations (which are, however, not keeping to their mission), the vacuum is only being filled hesitantly due to the ambitions of political leaders.[13] The repressed social structure, however, can be quickly reformed (or radicalized) by the similarity of individual fates, common problems and the need for collective action.

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11) The data from June 1991 show that 5% of respondents would prefer the socialist regime that existed until November 1989. 48% chose a "market without attributes" and 47% a "social market economy."

12) In June 1992, the question "Would it be better for our country if discussion about various ways of solving the present situation were replaced by a strong-handed government and if somebody were to clearly say what to do?" was answered as follows: 22% of respondents "definitely yes", 34% of respondents "rather yes." The question: "Do you think that it is necessary to protect our nation from foreign influences?" was answered "definitely yes" by 25% of respondents and "rather yes" by 41% of respondents.

13) An example of the first situation is the privatization of the apartments which has led to the establishment of a "Union of Tenants" on one hand and "Union of House Owners" on the other. An example of the second situation is the hasty founding of parties with insignificant membership that claim to represent "interests which are yet to be born."

6. Adaptation of the social policy system or implementation of a new type?

From a normative and institutional perspective the start of a new social policy system does not mean a complete break with the communist past. The reform also incorporates elements of the pre-war system - a branch of the Bismarckian corporatist social state based on class-divided insurance and basic state benefits. Czechoslovak social security was nominally based on insurance, but the funds were "nationalized" after 1948. From that point on, benefits were revenue-financed. Today the system is gradually being based on independent insurance funds again and the structure of benefits is being reformed. New benefits have been introduced, namely unemployment benefits and a subsistence minimum as means-tested state benefits, and further regulations for increasing existing benefits (pensions, parental benefits) according to inflation are being introduced. The system is gradually and continuously being changed. Proposals to reconstruct the benefit system entirely in a revolutionary manner (by introducing concepts like Basic Income or Negative Income Tax, for example) have been rejected.

Social security benefits are developing in three directions: social insurance, state social support and social assistance. The new system of social insurance, launched in 1993, includes its de-etatization and the establishment of independent funding. Instead of full revenue financing, the state will act merely as a guarantor. This system should also stimulate the establishment of complementary pension systems based on citizenship. State social support includes targeted and differentiated aid for households whose incomes are over the poverty line but which fall into certain situations of financial hardship. The system aims to contribute to their survival but not to fully cover newly emerging costs. The construction of benefits is derived from a minimum income level (the official poverty line). Social assistance is oriented towards households with incomes below the poverty line and is aimed at the highest possible level of de-centralization. The regulations and administration have to ensure better targeting and means testing: only those who are not able to overcome financial hardship themselves will be eligible. In order to make social assistance more flexible for households in need, a new, more effective network of institutions providing social support is to be built up.

The social benefit system and employment services will be gradually improved, completed and developed, with their purposes subject to political tailoring and their budget more or less constrained by economic possibilities. Both the social-market approach (from the social democratic heritage) and the residual welfare state (from a rather conservative background) are now supported by fundamentally equally strong arguments.

An extensive social policy, based on the role of social citizenship and its material underpinning, is especially strongly supported by the social democratic traditions of prewar Czechoslovakia. It is also supported by the attractive models of Austria and Germany as representatives of the "soziale Marktwirtschaft" or "demokratischer Sozialstaat." In addition, there is the strong influence of another legacy, i.e. that of the deep-rooted experience of the social guarantees system-

established by the former paternalistic state. As previously shown, people have great, scarcely fulfillable expectations of the state. Hence, the claims they make are influenced by their former experience of paternalistic care. The change in the economic mechanism encourages considerable hopes for the future, but also presents considerable problems for the present. Social policy acts as a buffer which enables people to wait: "it lowers the danger of vicious circles - first in an economic sense, insofar as social policy stabilizes purchasing power; secondly in a political sense, insofar as social policy reduces the conflict level in the society." [Vobruba 1992: 6] Social peace is a strong argument in the hands of trade unions and a powerful weapon for the political opposition.

The residual (conservative) social policy is in motion because at present it is necessary to renew individuals' responsibility for their own fate and well-being, a responsibility which was systematically wiped out by communist paternalism. It is necessary to divide the tangle of economic and social guarantees, i.e. "to eliminate the still preserved intermingling of the social and economic criteria of distribution" [Hartl, Večerník 1992: 170] or in other words to eliminate "the connections among the economic, political and social functions of the state." [Kolarska-Bobinska 1992: 63] To entrench too great a measure of social beneficence during the period directly after communism would mean assuming the risk of falling into two kinds of traps: to be exposed to the danger of continuing individual irresponsibility and the danger of perpetuating state paternalism. Also in favor of economizing on social policy are actual budget constraints. During the economic transformation, when tax and social institutions are not efficient, generous social benefits cannot be financed by taxes which are not collected.

Currently, the social system can neither turn completely to the "left" (to the universal scheme based on social citizenship), nor to the "right" (to the residual system only selectively filling out private insurance.) The matters being discussed are the various types and levels of benefits rather than the system as a whole. Hence, the problems are seen only through budget constraints: ever-tighter budget limitations are forcing the government to cut expenditures and realize a less generous social policy. "The best social policy is the right economic policy," said Václav Klaus quoting Ludwig Erhard. [Klaus 1993] That is why minimum benefits have been increased less than what would correspond to the greatly increasing cost of living. Furthermore, the duration for provision of unemployment benefits has twice been reduced. Therefore, some benefits originally meant for the whole or parts of the population regardless of income level are now being tested.[14] A certain part of the active labor market policy has also been discarded by the new Czech government.

The character of the future social regulatory system will not crystalize in revolutionary conceptions and acts, but in gradual changes and adaptations to economic capacities and budget constraints, as well as to the influence and

14) A concrete example is the state benefit which compensates for the loss of food price subsidies. This benefit was made available to everyone after the removal of price subsidies in mid-1990. Now it has been transformed into a means-tested benefit.

pressure of the Czech Republic's Central European surroundings and international institutions. The system will have a mixed character and will combine elements from various systems. Four important areas will act as checks and balances on one to another.

First, it is necessary to maintain the precarious balance between efforts to compensate fully for the rising cost-of-living with benefits and impulses that could undermine the transformation, and the need for increasing economic efficiency. This concerns prices and labor costs (rising wages will better cover subsistence needs but undermine the comparative advantage of low labor costs with possible inflationary stimuli) as well as the relationship between the economically active and non-active part of the population. (Until now, pensions rose more rapidly than wages, thus causing a deterioration in the relative income position of families with children.)

Second, there is a real need to be aware of a certain distinction between the target system (which respects the character of the society and region) and an instrumental system (which creates conditions for reaching the target system.) In other words, one should take the specific nature of the transformation period into consideration. Whereas the target system will probably be one based on universal social citizenship (a sort of social market economy), the instrumental system should lie in a more economic social regulation. Here the state should function primarily as a last resort institution and benefits should have the maximum motivational capacity for the labor market. However, there is no gulf between the different types of social policies and the system can gradually adapt to new capacities and aims.

Third, the same is true of the distinction between patterns coming from the West and the possibility of applying them according to systemic and budgetary policies. If we are exposed to strong argumentation in favor of work "decommodification," then Western patterns are only acceptable after extensive "marketization" and the introduction of hard budget constraints even to individual life choices. In fact, the very first step is to depoliticize both labor and social security, i.e. to remove the confusing global character of state involvement and to clearly separate the market and state, economic and social factors, and distribution and redistribution. This concerns mechanisms, institutions, and the value principles of an individual's behavior. Only after that will it be possible to consider the newly existing relationships between people, the social economy and the social status of labor.

Fourth, there is the problem of social structure and the formation of civil society. If the communist system intentionally crushed all informal social ties, the emerging market system in no way functions in the opposite sense. Due to the newly appearing ownership relations, labor market and financial hardship, the atomization of the society is continuing and new selections and dividing lines are

emerging.[15] Civil society is being established under very crude conditions and the imbalance between the economics-based and moral-based social structure is striking. Social policy should, then, support the creation of intermediary networks and institutions - "between the state and the individual in order to guarantee civilized competition and conflict regulation" [Gaas, Melvyn 1993: 28] - as well as protect against the disintegration of the society and establish mechanisms of social inclusion.

It seems clear that the confirmation of a wide range of citizens' rights in a materially plundered economy and in a society deprived of social ethics would result in nothing more than short-sighted populism which would further undermine the sources of economic and social reconstruction. It also seems clear that there should not be a sharp difference between the target and instrumental systems, between the "original" and "other" Europe (Jacques Rupnik's term), or the market economy and civil society. The government must rely on dynamic social groups and offer acceptable social compensation to those whose guarantees were undermined and whose prospects remain unclear. At the same time, it must support integrative institutions and encourage the creation of a rich social infrastructure.

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15) One should recall Amitai Etzioni's dictum that "the more people accept the neoclassical paradigm as a guide for their behavior, the more their ability in a market economy is undermined." [Etzioni 1988: 257]

Tables

Table 1. Some opinions on private business and the role of the state (% answers "definitely yes")

	May 1990	December 1990	June 1991	December 1991	June 1992	January 1993
A. "Capitalism represents the only possible course for our future development."						
Czech Republic		18.2	20.3	19.1	19.5	14.2
Slovak Republic		10.9	10.4	7.3	9.2	9.7
B. "Private entrepreneurship should be given complete freedom."						
Czech Republic	49.7	45.8	40.0	28.3	33.6	25.8
Slovak Republic	37.3	33.5	27.6	19.1	20.2	17.2
C. "There should be an absolutely open space for foreign firms in our country."						
Czech Republic	17.1	22.5	19.3	15.9	16.6	10.0
Slovak Republic	13.0	10.9	12.0	8.8	9.8	10.2
D. "Even under the new conditions the economy should be under state control."						
Czech Republic	52.0	39.7	39.0	37.3	29.2	28.6
Slovak Republic	53.9	42.7	38.7	41.4	31.5	31.4
E. "It is right that capable and competent people have a lot of money, even millions."						
Czech Republic	40.3	47.3	49.5	45.0	47.4	41.8
Slovak Republic	34.3	35.2	32.5	25.0	28.7	26.4
F. "Differences in wages and salaries should increase."						
Czech Republic	57.8	55.5		46.9	43.4	35.2
Slovak Republic	48.0	43.9		31.9	29.1	22.4

Source: Surveys "Economic Expectations and Attitudes," 1990-1993.

Table 2. Some opinions on liberal values and the role of the state (%)

	definitely yes	rather yes	rather no	definitely no	Total
1. "In your opinion, should the state increase its administrative price fixation?"					
Czech Republic	15.6	32.1	34.8	17.5	100.0
Slovak Republic	22.1	41.7	27.6	8.6	100.0
2. "The state should provide a job for anybody who wants to work."					
Czech Republic	24.8	38.3	24.0	12.9	100.0
Slovak Republic	38.0	40.4	16.4	5.2	100.0
3. "In your opinion should privatization continue quickly, regardless of the danger that property will fall into the wrong hands?"					
Czech Republic	8.1	19.7	39.4	32.8	100.0
Slovak Republic	3.4	17.2	45.3	34.2	100.0
4. "Do you think that the state should provide housing for every family which is unable to find it?"					
Czech Republic	18.2	44.7	27.2	9.9	100.0
Slovak Republic	25.1	43.8	22.1	9.0	100.0
5. "Do you think that existing provisions and social policy measures, i.e. benefits, family allowances, and contributions, are presently satisfactory?"					
Czech Republic	5.7	26.3	41.4	26.6	100.0
Slovak Republic	3.3	12.1	43.3	41.4	100.0
6. "Do you think that the state should command some entrepreneurs to lessen the prices of their products?"					
Czech Republic	18.5	30.0	29.1	22.5	100.0
Slovak Republic	27.4	37.2	23.2	12.3	100.0
7. "Private entrepreneurship should be given complete freedom."					
Czech Republic	33.2	34.6	25.0	7.2	100.0
Slovak Republic	19.9	33.2	34.6	12.3	100.0
8. "It is right that capable and competent people have a lot of money, even millions."					
Czech Republic	44.2	34.2	13.9	7.7	100.0
Slovak Republic	27.5	34.9	21.8	15.8	100.0
9. "The state must cease all intervention in the functioning of the market."					
Czech Republic	16.2	35.1	39.9	8.7	100.0
Slovak Republic	12.4	33.1	39.9	14.5	100.0
10. "Only an individual can be blamed for his/her poverty."					
Czech Republic	16.2	30.5	36.2	17.0	100.0
Slovak Republic	8.6	17.8	40.3	33.3	100.0
11. "The people in our country most often get rich in an unfair way."					
Czech Republic	33.6	44.3	19.5	2.5	100.0
Slovak Republic	38.0	45.4	14.1	2.5	100.0

Source: Survey on the "Economic Expectations and Attitudes," June 1992.

Table 3a. Factor loadings of some opinions on liberal values and the role of the state
(Varimax rotation)

		FACTOR 1 (strong state)	FACTOR 2 (strong market)
1.	control prices	.635	-.357
2.	provide employment	.743	-.199
3.	quick privatization	-.319	.498
4.	provide housing	.710	.053
5.	sufficient benefits	-.475	.110
6.	lower prices	.663	-.264
7.	freedom to business	.009	.794
8.	millions to the best	-.262	.633
9.	no intervention	-.096	.690
10.	everybody responsible	-.325	.528
11.	wealth not legitimate	.476	-.210

Table 3b. Clusters based on the factor scores

	FACTOR 1 (strong state)	FACTOR 2 (strong market)	N=
CL1	-.866	1.091	349
CL2	1.145	1.304	231
CL3	.659	-.120	670
CL4	-.939	-.293	479
CL5	.149	-1.504	306
			2035

Table 3c. Correlations of clusters to some social characteristics

	CL1	CL2	CL3	CL4	CL5
Gender	-.063*	-.011	.034	.002	.031
Age	-.064*	.031	.018	-.068**	.084**
Education	.155**	-.088**	-.139**	.107**	-.032
Left/right	.365**	.066*	-.211**	.053*	-.221**
Wealth	.136**	.014	-.086**	.011	-.058*
Size of locality	.041	.004	-.015	.032	-.061*
Czech/Slovak	-.171**	-.018	.134**	-.084**	.116**

Source: Survey on the "Economic Expectations and Attitudes", June 1992.

Table 4. Preferences of a social market or a pure market economy

Question: *"Do you generally prefer an economy: 1. as a social market with a high degree of state intervention; 2. as a free market with minimal state intervention".*

1. social market (47%)	2. pure market (48%)
Women (56%) ***	Men (54%) **
Persons over 60 (62%) ***	Persons under 30 years (55%) **
	Persons 30-39 years (53%) *
Elementary school (64%) ***	University (59%) ***
Peasants (60%) *	Professionals (56%) *
Manual workers (54%) *	
Agriculture (54%) *	Manufacturing (53%) *
	Banking (65%) *
Wealth to 200 th. (60%) **	Wealth over 1 million (66%) **
Salary to 2500 (58%) ***	Salary over 7500 crowns (73%) ***
Political parties:	
ČSSD (79%) ***	ODA (64%) **
KSČM (90%) *	ODS-KDS (71%) ***
HZSD (57%) ***	
SDL (78%) ***	
Localities to 5000 (55%) **	Cities over 100000 (54%) **
Slovak Republic (57%) **	Czech Republic (51%) **
"definitely feel poor" (67%) **	"definitely do not feel poor" (66%) ***
"cope with difficulties" (65%) ***	"cope easily" (69%) ***
"definitely fear unemployment" (66%) ***	"definitely do not fear unemployment" (54%)**
"definitely should rule with a strong hand (57%) **	"definitely should not rule with a strong hand" (66%) ***
"definitely is necessary to protect the nation against foreign impacts" (68%) ***	"definitely is not necessary to protect the nation against foreign impacts" (77%) ***

Source: Survey on the "Economic Expectations and Attitudes", June 1992.

Statistical significance:

*** < 0.001
** < 0.01
* < 0.05

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Social Policy in Independent Slovakia

The Present Situation and Perspectives for the Future

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Abstract: The article is a description of the present social policy in the Slovak Republic and a deliberation of the long-term possibilities for social strategy development in one of the youngest European countries. The independent Slovak Republic is coping with many economic, political and social problems. In this paper we are trying (1) to describe the problem of implementing social reform whose main purposes are a) to separate financing of social and sickness insurance from the state budget; and b) to create new social security system whose fundamental elements should be state social support, social assistance, and social insurance, and (2) to answer the question: What could be the long-term goals and possibilities of social policy development in Slovakia?
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Introduction

During the debates on the "inevitability" of the division of Czechoslovakia into two independent states, the "specificity" of both the Czech and Slovak Republics was an often-used argument. The notion "specificity" expressed two different conceptions.

First, it delineated the differences in the economies. There were visible differences in the industrial structures of the Czech and Slovak Republics. In Slovakia the advanced weapon industry represented a large portion of industrial production. As a result of its conversion, economic performance has decreased and unemployment greatly increased in this part of the former federal state. In July 1993 the unemployment rate was about 2.6% in the Czech Republic, while in Slovakia it was around 12%. Some Slovak economic experts expect an 18% unemployment rate by the end of 1993. Unemployment, homelessness and the crime rate are not only expanding rapidly, but constitute the main social problems in the Slovak Republic.

Second, there were also differences in the political sphere. A difference in political orientation was apparent between Vladimír Mečiar's political movement (HZDS) and Václav Klaus's party (ODS) -- the leading political powers in the Slovak and Czech Republics. They differed in their views on how *fast* and in *what sequence* the central planning regime should be transformed into a market economy. Moreover, Mečiar stressed building a "social market system" while Klaus preferred a market system "without any attributes." These differing approaches to solving the problems of the transformation in Slovakia were formulated before the country's split in the Program Statement of the Slovak government from July of

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1992. The Slovak government declared the need to place *equal* emphasis on both economic and social reform. It is worth mentioning, however, that political declarations and reality are two different phenomena. Until recently the Slovak government had not made specific the general items of its Program Statement, and had not clearly articulated the long-term aims of the transition and the tools to be used for attaining them.

Today it is more than evident that implementing and balancing economic and social reforms is a highly demanding process which, on one hand, presupposes close cooperation between ministries, and on the other, a high level of cooperation between the government, the opposition and other non-governmental bodies. In addition, one has to realize that balancing economic and social reforms is far from easy when economic performance is declining, the social structure is changing and new interest groups are emerging.

In this paper we would like to pinpoint and identify some important facets of the social transformation in Slovakia. We will pay special attention to the following:

- identifying the fundamental problems of Slovakia's social strategy;
- comparing the particular attempts aimed at solving these problems at the former federal and the present national levels;
- considering the long-term possibilities for social policy development in Slovakia; and
- issues concerning the harmonization of the short-term goals of Slovakia's social policy with the long-term social strategy of the country.

1. Are there any differences between the present social strategy in Slovakia and that of the original federal scenario?

1.1. Policy proposals

The Slovak Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, and the Family has recently produced a document entitled *The Strategy for Social Reform in 1993*. The Strategy should have served as a basis for the "different" approach to solving specific social problems in Slovakia, especially in the spheres of a) unemployment, b) household incomes, and c) the social security system.

The Strategy, however, does not offer positive solutions for Slovakia's increasing *unemployment*. Instead, it declares that the budgeted financial resources (500 million Slovak crowns) are not sufficient to combat the expected growth rate in unemployment to 15.4-17.4% by the end of 1993. To quote the Strategy: "It is no use talking about *active* employment policy or even about employment policy at all when the amount of available money drops below this level." [*Stratégia* 1993: 12] Neither do the proposals for improving *household incomes* offer any new ideas: the need to amend the Minimum Living Standard Act, as well as to adjust the minimum wage to meet the rising cost of living, are mentioned and the government is also called on to introduce new and simplified rules for wage control.

Two illustrations of the present situation in this area are that household incomes in Slovakia are about one-tenth of those in the EC countries, and that about 50% of all household expenditure goes to food and clothing. [National 1993]

Finally, important changes are expected in the *social security system*. The fundamental elements of the new system are state social support, social assistance, and social insurance. The main feature of the first two is the *individual direction* of benefits, which should reflect the deepening social differentiation in the society.

State social support is intended to be a system of rates representing the financial participation of the state in solving certain "state recognized events" in the lives of people and families with children. This should involve child allowances, parental benefits, loans for young families, students, the elderly and disabled, as well as contributions to housing, funeral benefits, delivery benefits, etc. The structure of these "state recognized events" is still in flux, and the final proposal should be worked out by the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, and Family in October 1993. The important point here is that state social support should be provided to *all citizens* of Slovakia irrespective of their incomes. There is a tendency to diminish the number of "state recognized events" in order to minimize social expenditures in the state budget.

Social assistance will be directed primarily toward ensuring social support in cases of an acute shortage of income. A very important precondition for providing social assistance is the definition of "need." A person is "in need" when he or she "is not able to secure his or her basic living conditions, and the protection of his or her rights." In other words, when he or she is not able to secure a legally accepted minimum standard of living. The main objective of this aid will be, however, not only to guarantee a living standard at the level of a public social minimum, but also to *encourage* people to search for ways to overcome their unfavorable living situation. The proposed social assistance program, therefore, includes not only "passive" financial aid on the part of the state, municipality and voluntary (non-state) bodies, but other means such as counselling, social and legal protection, social assistance services, and material aid.

The social insurance system (the system of short-term hospital insurance benefits, and long-term old-age pension insurance benefits) has recently been partially introduced.[1] One can hardly say, however, that the effect of this change has been unambiguously positive; we will therefore pay closer attention to this point. Moreover, social insurance is an important means of extending *social rights* within society, and this is a crucial question, especially for societies undergoing transformation.

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[1]) Retirement insurance benefits include old-age pensions, orphans', widows' and widowers' pensions, invalidity benefits, and seniority benefits (benefits for length of service). Hospital insurance benefits include sickness benefits, maternity benefits, contributions for pregnant women and financial support for persons looking after an ill family member. There is also a compulsory health insurance scheme, in which the benefits cover general health services and preventive medical care, specialized hospital care, medical care for persons requiring constant help or attendance and medical care for infertile women.

1.2. The new insurance system: its conception and institutional arrangement

In January 1993 the National Insurance Company Act was introduced, with the twin purposes of separating the financing of social insurance from the state budget and setting up a compulsory national scheme of sickness, hospital and retirement insurance. According to this Act employees, employers, individual entrepreneurs, and the state should make payments to independent sickness, hospital and retirement funds. At first glance the Act promises an extension of social rights. The reality, however, is much more complicated. Initial experiences have already shown that the Act has many defects, but here we will pay attention to only the most apparent.

Although the National Insurance Company (NP) came into existence on January 1, 1993, its Board of Representatives (which should have been its executive body) was not appointed until February. The second meeting of the Board (in March) did not adopt the Statutes of the NP, which means that more than three months after the NP was established, the fundamental requirement for its functioning was not fulfilled. Furthermore, as of this writing the NP's information system has not been built up to the necessary level. Many experts, including those of the World Bank who visited Slovakia in July 1993, often mention this problem.

However, the Act's *conceptual defects* are much more dangerous. During the first two months of 1993 many small entrepreneurs returned their entrepreneurial licenses. This was a direct result of the implementation of the National Insurance Company Act and a new tax system *simultaneously*. Insurance payments were too high for new entrepreneurs (see Table 1), and the new taxation system was not very favorable for them either.[2] The simultaneous launching of these measures resulted had an unintended consequence -- instead of supporting small enterprise development, a number of small entrepreneurs were liquidated.

Table 1. Payments to Health, Hospital, and Retirement Funds

	health insurance	hospital insurance	retirement insurance
employees (% of last month's income)	3.7	1.4	5.9
employers (% of last month's income)	10.0	4.4	20.6
individual entrepreneurs (% of last month's income)	13.7	5.8	26.5
state (% of minimum wage)	13.7	5.8	26.5

Note: The state should pay for other, non-earning groups of the population such as children and students, pensioners, unemployed people, prisoners, etc.

Source: National Insurance Company Act, Bratislava 1992.

2) Already towards the end of March the government had to adopt the *Statute*, which lists conditions for an income-tax exemption for small entrepreneurs.

After launching the Act, whose main purpose was to *separate* the financing of insurance from the state budget, the government adopted supplementary measures. According to these measures, all financial means administered by the National Company Funds should once again be placed in the state budget. To explain this decision the government stated that it was an inevitable step in stabilizing the Funds, for which the government is responsible. At the very beginning there were doubts whether or not the stabilization of the Funds was really the main objective of the Act, and whether the government's amendment would really only be in effect until the end of July. The amendment could have been pursuing a quite different aim -- to keep the state budget in balance and, through this, to give Slovakia better access to important international financial and monetary institutions, such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund.[3] Reality confirmed these doubts. In July the Slovak Parliament passed an amendment to the State Budget Act for 1993, which included an extension of the period during which the financial means of the National Insurance Company Funds will be included in the state budget to the end of year.[4] This was accompanied by a 10% devaluation of the Slovak Crown (effective July 10). Both of these measures were aimed at lowering the state budget deficit.

1.3. General conclusions

All that we have described above shows that no *salient* changes in the social policy of independent Slovakia have occurred during the last nine months. There is virtually no visible difference between the original federal scenario and the present approach of the Slovak government to "social strategy issues." In fact, the government has not repudiated the "federal approach" based on the statement "*first* we have to built up markets and *then* we can pay attention to issues of social development." It seems that there is no real will to search for ways that would enable simultaneous restructuring in both the economic and social spheres. Economic and social reforms are *not* seen as having the same importance. Social reform is reduced to changes in the social security system, household incomes, and employment - aimed at establishing the "social reconciliation" of the society.[5] It is, however, beyond the scope of this paper to search for all the possible reasons for which this may be so, and render exhaustive criticism of such an approach. Instead we will look at the possibilities for social policy development in Slovakia.

2. What are the long-term possibilities for social policy development in Slovakia?

If we are seeking the answer to the above-mentioned question, we must take a great number of facts into account, including:

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3) In which case the National Insurance Company (and, when all is said and done, the citizen) would insure the present government.

4) The same rules were adopted for the Employment Fund, which also should have been independent of the state budget.

5) In our opinion, equating the importance of social and economic reforms presupposes seeing social reform as creating a new quality of life. This very general statement is explained further in the following pages.

- the current economic situation in Slovakia and its development prospects;
- the political situation in Slovakia, its stability and overall direction, including a certain "legacy" in view of the relationship between the individual and the state;
- the economic, social and political development of Europe -- in both the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and in Western European countries.

If we take these and other facts into consideration,[6] it is more or less apparent that social policy *must* undergo a substantial reform in both its content and its institutional background.

One can assume that this reform will not be "radical" in relation to the speed of change. At the same time one can suppose that for two reasons this reform will not simply be an application of already existing or theoretically substantiated social policy models that have developed in advanced capitalist countries. Firstly, the mechanical application of social policy models functioning within developed capitalist countries to the conditions in our country would not be appropriate. These models arose in an evolutionary way in democratic countries with advanced market economies. This would not be the case in our country, where a market economy and democracy, the inevitable prerequisites of a developed social policy, are only nascent. Secondly, any model of social policy is only an abstraction, and is changeable over time. The general economic recession, mass migration, increases in long-term unemployment, changes in patterns of behavior and other phenomena will lead to social policy modifications and adaptation to new conditions.

However, if we admit that these models involve certain *strategies* of social policy, it becomes useful to identify a few important factors. First, one can suppose that, despite considerable limitations on social policy resources (financial, institutional and others), the *residual welfare model of social policy*[7] will not prevail in Slovakia in the long term. The main reasons behind this assertion lie above all in the legacy of views of the state's functions in society and in a European tradition that emphasizes solidarity and social justice.

Second, *the industrial achievement-performance model of social policy* stresses the importance of social welfare institutions representing a supplement to the economy and according to which social needs should be satisfied on the basis of merit, work performance and productivity. This model presupposes an advanced market economy as well as a developed institutional basis for satisfying social needs. It is based on the idea that a market economy is a natural constituent of civil society and potential tensions between the market and the state will be solved by means of negotiations among the various social partners. However, here the danger arises that during these negotiations the important interests of some social groups will not be respected satisfactorily if at all. This could lead to long-term social tensions or even outright conflict, and thus jeopardize the stability of the

6) For example the fact that no social policy, as a relatively independent decision-making process, existed under the previous regime.

7) Here we rely on R. M. Titmus's classification of social policy models [Titmus 1974].

country's development. In choosing a strategy for social policy, this fact must be taken very seriously.

Third, *the institutional redistributive model of social policy* supports providing universal services separate from the market on the basis of need. Here an important role is played by the state, it becomes the decisive subject of social policy and an important distributive and redistributive force with the same potential strength as the market. Within this model the greatest emphasis is placed on *full employment*, which is implemented by means of an active state employment policy which itself employs a considerable amount of people. This model has been achieved in its most developed form in the Scandinavian countries, especially Sweden.

Although this model has worked successfully for several decades and has brought about a considerable extension of citizens' social rights, as a *real strategy* in our country it could be met with some resistance, especially on the part of developing entrepreneurial circles. The point is that the countries where this model has been applied have paid for their advanced welfare with high taxes which "disadvantage" high income groups in society. The adoption of this strategy, despite whatever positive results it would bring in the extension of social rights, could in some respects run counter to the goal of supporting small enterprise development. This kind of model, in our opinion, also requires the state to maintain a strong position and, as such, stands in sharp contrast to current tendencies which deprive society of the functioning of state influence.

What we have said so far about the possibilities for forming a social policy strategy in Slovakia has been more or less "negative," that is to say it is an explanation of what the social strategy will *not* look like. At the same time this means it will be necessary to search for new approaches stemming from our own traditions, experiences, present possibilities and expectations as well as from the more clearly formulated goals of social policy. In other words, existing models of social policy can serve as a source of inspiration, but it is necessary to refrain both from copying them mechanically and copying institutions and particular measures that can only work successfully within these models.[8] Further, in our view it would be an over-simplification to say that social policy in Slovakia will be a "combination" of particular elements taken from various types of social policies. In some ways, as we have tried to suggest, it will be necessary to look for a *new* strategy.

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[8]) This is quite an important point. There have been some attempts to introduce specific foreign insurance schemes in Slovakia. For example, the German health insurance system is labelled "the best of all for us." However, the analyses of many experts show that it would be a great mistake to implement this policy because the German scheme is only able to work efficiently under advanced market economy conditions and a relatively stable and low unemployment rate. This is not our situation. The adoption of such a scheme in Slovakia would lead to an uncontrolled increase in the costs of medical care and, in the end, to its total collapse.

The new strategy should reflect and support the fact that there is an advanced (educated, skilled, experienced) human potential in Slovakia. This is our "comparative advantage" and should be used for building a modern and progressive society with all the relevant attributes in Slovakia. This refers not only to a functioning market system, but also a socially just system that respects the human dignity of each individual, and enables people to develop to the full extent of their capacities. In searching for this strategy it would, therefore, be dangerous to subscribe to the notion that the *final* goal of the transformation consists of building up a functioning market system. The point is that in this case social policy would *invariably* remain derivative and second-rate, and social needs would once again be reduced to economic needs.[9] In our opinion, the shift towards the creation of modern *civil society* (with advanced social rights), rather than the supporting means of a *market system*, should be the core of Slovakia's new social policy. The social policy of the country, however, is not moving in this direction.

2.1. An attempt at a positive formulation of social policy elements

We have said that it would be dangerous to reduce the goals of the transformation simply to building up functioning markets. That is why we must always bear in mind that the transformation has both an economic and a social dimension, and the latter cannot be understood solely in terms of solving the unwanted impacts of economic reform on the "social sphere." If social reform is to be tantamount to economic reform in reality as well as in rhetoric its *goals* must be more clearly formulated.

The "final" goals of economic reform are the creation of markets and their separation from the state.[10] The analogous aim in social reform would be the separation of the state from the social sphere, better expressed as *civil society*. The development of all kinds of rights -- civil, political and social [Marshall 1964] -- would in this case be the main objective of social reform, along with the protection of the above-mentioned rights from unlawful state intervention.[11] The formation of civil society is a long-term historical process, the content of which is the protection of the individual's *fundamental civic freedoms*, his or her *political rights*, and his or her *social rights* -- including the right to earn his or her living in a freely chosen occupation, the right to social security, social assistance, and so forth.

Civil, political, and finally social rights have progressively developed in advanced capitalist countries. Social rights are potentially contradictory to market expansion, and can illuminate the existing tensions between the market and civil society [Titmuss 1974]. The fundamental problem of transition (not only the

9) Walter Korpi, the well-known Swedish theoretician, often stresses that the role of social policy should not be to compensate for the negative outcomes of "imperfect market functioning," but rather to *modify* the functioning of markets.

10) This means a need to distinguish between *markets* and the *state* as different social institutions with different functions in society.

11) This distinction does not mean that the state will not be responsible for the "social sphere" of the society. Here we would like to express the need to define the functions and competencies that the state should fulfill within civil society.

transition in the former "Eastern Bloc," but also within the "transforming" Western European countries) is the means of removing this tension and balancing the economic and social spheres of society.

Many authors argue that simultaneously satisfying the requirements of both the market and civil society is not possible; this is why they occasionally adopt extreme solutions. One extreme solution is to *fully regulate the market*, so that the social rights of all citizens are protected. This is, however, very often implemented to the detriment of political and civil rights (as was the case in the former Eastern Bloc countries). Another radical proposal results in the preference for a *free market* and basic civil rights, especially the right to private property. We rejected the first solution during the "Velvet Revolution" of November 1989. The second solution has, at least rhetorically, been rejected by the present Slovak government, and is moreover contradictory to the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, which includes the basic principles of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.[12]

However, there is a third solution: the separation of market criteria from the criteria of social rights[13] and the attempt to balance them. This option is the most complicated, but also appears to be the only viable one, even given the inner contradictions.

An important part of accepting this approach is a redefinition of notions such as social justice, solidarity, etc., and choosing certain *ethical* criteria that would be the basis for the principles of the distribution and redistribution of resources in society,[14] and the implementation of social rights.[15] That means that issues connected to the just distribution of resources and the implementation of social rights constitute the content of the strategic options for a social policy aimed at the development of civil society and its detachment from the state. The

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12) One should keep in mind that the Slovak Republic is a member of the Council of Europe. The Social Charter is one of the most important documents of this institution, and is more or less a "condensation" of the "standard" social rights developed in Western European countries during recent decades. After ratifying the Social Charter, Slovakia will be fully responsible for pursuing policies that ensure these rights and principles in practice.

13) The basic principle of the functioning of markets (the principle of supply and demand) is of an "impersonal" nature. Social rights, however, are based much more on *ethical* criteria.

14) There are some well-known maxims of fair redistribution, such as:
- an equal share for each individual,
- to each individual according to that individual's ability,
- to each individual according to that individual's needs,
- to each individual according to that individual's effort,
- to each individual according to that individual's productive contribution.

Each of the above-mentioned maxims is connected with a particular ethical concept. Moreover, each ethical concept has its own understanding of such notions as need, equality, justice, etc.

15) Full implementation of social rights presupposes not only their *formal* guarantee, but their *actual* fulfillment as well. For example the *formal* right to a freely chosen occupation is not the same thing as the *actual* possibility of finding it (especially under the conditions of economic recession and rising unemployment).

distribution of resources and the ensuring of social rights are inseparable from one another. It would therefore be a great mistake to simply reduce social policy to the "just distribution" of the resources produced by the economy. The point is that there are various social policy criteria, and if they are not counter-balanced with extensions of social rights, they cannot guarantee the formation of *civic equality*.

3. Harmonization of the short-term goals of social policy with long-term social strategy

It is fair to say that discussions concerning the long-term goals and strategies of social development are not very popular in Slovakia at present. On one hand, this is connected to the fact that there is a need to solve the *burning* social problems of the transformation and, on the other, it is related to the fact that considerations of "long-term goals" remind many people of the ideology and central planning of the previous communist regime. In our opinion, however, these considerations are of paramount importance because (1) they provide an idea of what future developments in the society could look like, and (2) they make it possible to take *immediate* steps to harmonize particular aspects of economic and social policy on the basis of certain principles.

In our view, the following short-term goals are high on the list of priorities for Slovak social policy. The first is the creation of a social safety net that will compensate for the *immediate* negative impacts of the economic reform on the population. The second goal is the creation of a new system of social insurance that complies with a market economy. The third and final primary goal is the creation of new instruments for the social protection of the unemployed.

As far as these issues are concerned, it is necessary to distinguish between a social safety net and social insurance; if this is the case, then each of these items has its *own instruments* and means of functioning and is intended for *different* groups of people. [Rys 1993] The solutions to these current social problems, however, should not contradict the accepted strategy and long-term goals of social reform. Otherwise the threat of social disintegration arises, as a result of the insufficient harmonization of the short- and long-term goals of the reform, in other words as a result of haphazard solutions to *burning* social problems and their relation to the long-term social development of our society.

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Social Transformation and the Reform of Social Security in Hungary

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Abstract: One of the most important developments in the recent history of social policy has been the multiplication of the functions of social security. This process has contributed to both the maintenance and the gradual erosion of the initial roles of social policy during the last period of the state-socialist order. The rapid increase of central expenditures on social security has been in close connection with the dual interests of the central party-state in keeping income distribution under strict central control and, parallel to that, in creating space for a liberalization of access to personal disposable incomes of the households. At the same time, the increasing weight of social security as one "branch" of the central state budget has created serious conflicts in the period of economic crisis, leading to strong claims for cuts. However, the efforts made towards implementing this have sharpened the "competition" among those involved to profit from the unavoidable redefinitions of the existing schemes, while it also contributed to a substantial increase of poverty at the other end of the social scale.

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Some months after the free parliamentary elections of April 1990, the new government announced its comprehensive and ambitious program for the first, three-year long phase of "transition." The introduction presented the following priorities:

> "The fundamental and all-embracing endeavor of the government is to carry out systemic changes in the economy. Thus, the program envisages the creation of a new, viable market-regulated economy. It should replace the malfunctioning order of the last forty years, which was based on administrative intervention and the repressive care of the state, and was featured by external isolation. The experiences of successful West European countries should be utilized in the process of creating the new economy, suitably adapting the lessons to the given Hungarian conditions. This new order will be an up-to-date European *social market economy*,[1] based on the

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1) The term is principally identical with the notion of the *Soziale Marktwirtschaft* in German economic literature. It should be noted, however, that the concept beyond the attribute "social" is unclear and much criticized by the liberal opposition. The adjective has several -- partly contrasting -- meanings and connotations in Hungarian: a) It might refer to the notion of the (classical) welfare state, implying universal rights, a wide range of well-developed social services, extended entitlements for a number of decent benefits, a significant share of *public* (neither state, nor private) properties and control, etc. b) It might *equally* mean the opposite, since the term "social" also has a "welfare"-connotation in Hungarian language. In this reading, the "social" market economy program means the drive to create a *free* market (with as little

primacy of private property, and be integrated into the world-market." [*The Rebirth...* 1990]

Given the principal values of the social welfare-side of marketization outlined in several chapters of the above-cited program, and repeatedly mentioned by the new politicians of the governing parties[2] in their public speeches and writings, one wonders why the notion has remained so hazy until now, and why practically no intentions have been shown of going beyond its rhetorical advocacy. In fact, it has been a striking feature of the past few years that the actual steps taken in the name of transformation have been restricted to the narrow concepts of "*productivity*" and "*efficiency*," excluding all consideration of the social implications of the process.

The dominance of short-sighted arguments is even more striking in relation to the core issue of transition, namely in the new (though hesitant) introduction of regulations on the conversion of existing *property relations*. The numerous official and semi-official programs published recently on "privatization"[3] have one characteristic in common: when speaking about the necessary transformation of "socialist" ownership, they hardly ever go beyond claims for raising the short-term returns in the strictly defined "productive" spheres of the economy. In this context, the necessary designation of new owners of the capital in public infrastructure turns out to be a secondary issue. Here and there, some vague and unelucidated ideas are set afloat regarding the desired future distribution of wealth represented by the institutions currently in the hands of the local governments or the faceless "state" in health care, education, services for children or the elderly, etc. The lack of comprehensive ideas on their "denationalization" (i.e., on the reduction of the overweight of the state via far-reaching property changes) is all the more problematic, since they represent (according to some estimations) roughly 40-50 per cent of the entire national wealth.

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presence and intervention as possible from any "external" agents); in other words: any help following non-market rules should be solely targeted to the poor, and such help should be offered only on the *fringes* of the system. c) It also might point to the frequently emphasized peaceful character of transition, implying that transformation should not be too rapid, thus some "social"-ism should and could be preserved. In this reading, the message is a compromise between the former and present rulers: although the necessity of reducing the over-weight of the state is unanimously acknowledged, "socialist" responsibilities would be kept in the hands of the state, with all the implications for the relative stability of the given positions in the state bureaucracy and public administration. (The latter interpretation is reinforced by the fact that the former ruling party, i.e. the Hungarian Socialist Party also gives outstanding priority to the "social" aspect of marketization in its program.)

2) The new government is set up on the basis of a coalition of three parties: the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the Smallholders' Party and the Christian Democratic Party. It characterizes itself as the trustee of "national" and "universal Christian" values. It occupies a center-right position on the spectrum of political orientation.

3) This inaccurate concept is intended to embrace all property-transforming activities, regardless of whether the potential owner is (or will be) a private person or a collective, and whether the form of ownership can be related to designated individuals at all. The word "privatization" is increasingly used as a synonym for all kinds of changes in property relations.

Does this mean that there have been absolutely no changes in these spheres of "public consumption?"[4] Or, are the actual processes too anarchic, spontaneous, unregulated and chaotic to come up for rational discourse? Or, does the "silence" indicate that there are no social or political forces aspiring to became the ultimate owners of the wealth in question? Or, on the contrary: does the public "neglect" of the issue perhaps show that they have been drawn *more* under state control than ever before?

These questions seem to be crucial, even if they are not raised very frequently these days.

The present paper has the modest aim of introducing a historical outline into their discussion. It will attempt to demonstrate that "denationalization" of the institutions and services in question had already started long before the open collapse of the socialist order. Their quasi-marketization was an organic part of the slow erosion of state socialist rule, making the Hungarian case quite peculiar within the recent history of the East-Central European region. In this sense, the developments of the 1980s can be regarded as straightforward *antecedents* of the transformation of public consumption, having not only decisive impacts on the main socio-political features of the currently ongoing changes, but also determining the scope and future shape of the country's social policy. This is why it is quite difficult to tell precisely *when* Hungarian society actually began its move from "classical" socialism toward a market-regulated socio-economic order. The unclear nature of "transition" is a distinct feature of the process: the so-called "systemic changes" of 1988-90 were rather the *completion* of earlier hidden developments than the revolutionary onset of the radical structural transformations of the future. The slow decomposition of the old rule holds true as much for the macroeconomy (including the institutions and services of social policy), as for the independent and non-state-regulated economic activities of thousands of private households.[5]

The paper will attempt to demonstrate the participation and role of social security in this process of erosion. It will be argued that the most important development in this respect has been the multiplication (and accompanying two-sidedness) of its functions in the last 10-20 years, serving simultaneously the *preservation* of the state-socialist order and its gradual *decomposition*. This peculiar role developed in close relation to the *dual* striving of post-1956 Kadarism to both reconstruct the totalitarian post-Stalinist order after the defeat of the revolution, and to find a viable compromise between the rulers (oppressors) and the ruled (oppressed). The (mis)use of social security services in the interests of central state power, of state-run (though slowly and partially emancipating) firms and of the

4) The phrases "public infrastructure," "non-productive spheres of the economy," "institutions and services of public consumption" and "funds of social benefits in kind" have been used in the literature up until now to refer to the *same* segment of "socialist" economy. For the sake of convenience, I will adhere to this tradition, and use them as synonyms in the historical analysis below. When any *special* phrase has importance in the given context, I will give a closer description.

5) Pertaining to the latter aspect of the prehistory of the transition and the hidden restructuring in property relations, see Vajda. [1991]

employees in their activities *outside* the direct control of the state will be presented here. The typical conflicts between their partially coinciding and concurrently contrasting interests will be analyzed in the light of the final outcomes that have led to the serious and general crisis of social policy institutions. In the concluding part, I will attempt to outline some of the most dramatic consequences of the current crisis. I will demonstrate that "hidden privatization" has led "logically" to the practical exclusion of the most defenceless social groups and the weakest clients from access to even a limited segment of the services. Thus, the process has had a major contribution to the recent boom of poverty. Without purposeful interventions, the continuation of uncontrolled spontaneous "privatization" ultimately might threaten the success of transition itself: it might lead to an effective disintegration of Hungarian society within a short time.

The multiplication of functions and the two-sidedness of Kadarist social policy (Some hidden changes in use, power and control)

As mentioned above, the gradual erosion of the "classical" system of social policy, the slow evolution of new "quasi-owners" of social services *beneath* the unchanged surface and *within* the given framework of "socialism" was closely connected to the political characteristics of the post-1956 era. The continuing attempt of party politics in the Kadarist period (1957-1988) can be summed up as the ongoing search for a delicate compromise between the full rehabilitation of ("human-faced") totalitarian rule, and the society's drive for individual autonomy and freedom. In other words, the basic systemic features of socialism were preserved, while they simultaneously went through a significant reinterpretation during the last three decades. Organization from top to bottom, centralized authority and the direct administration of social and economic life was not changed. Neither were its implications for continued extensive industrialization, compulsory full employment or interventionist economic management modified. What was new about the revised concept of totalitarianism was, however, a gradual introduction of restricted individual freedom within an extremely limited scope of choices. It did not mean more than a few concessions. If individuals successfully conformed to the conditions dictated from the top, they "earned the right" to find back-door ways into educational institutions, to change their jobs, to make (partial) use of their firms' equipment "at home" in their private economies, to move to more urbanized settlements if they could afford it, etc. However, these concessions turned out to play a crucial role in the above-indicated later structural changes. The actual developments in social policy can be understood in relation to them. In order to make the picture of past-1956 gradual departures clearer, let me briefly describe its most important "classical" characteristics.

As is commonly known, during the establishment of the socialist planned economy the new system abolished social policy in general. All its traditional institutions were cast away as the requisites of overthrown capitalism. At the same time -- and this was the essence of its self-contradiction -- the "socialist" planned economy was considered be the main trustee of social rationality and social good. It followed, then, that each and every segment of the economy and society, of

private and public life, became imbued with "social" considerations as their central intention. In this sense, we can say that the elimination of social policy was accompanied by an "injection of social policy" into the entire system. All this happened not as an ideological mistake or because of the "encroachment" of Stalinist voluntarism, but because it belonged to the very essence of the totalitarian system.

The cessation of social policy and its identification with the centralized planned economy remained an unchanged and inbuilt element of the system also after 1956. Planned economic control, its associated political processes, full employment forced by the devaluation of the labor force, the redefinition of social membership by binding it to employment, quantitatively satisfactory health services (defined as "allowances in addition to wages") and social security's degradation to a "budgetary branch" under direct party-control all meshed as inseparable gears, and served the social transformation program intended and controlled by the central power.

The political aim of forced economic development reduced the satisfaction of social needs to simply a means, i.e. to the means of maintaining the artificially low wage level, which represented the most important and most durable source of centralized surplus. The "principle of residues" of social objectives, accompanying the 40 year history of socialism, arose as a result of this. Following directly from the logic of the centrally controlled planned economy, it seemed sufficient to administratively decree equality of access to social remunerations. Within the system of all-embracing "planned control," the declaration of rights seemed to be identical to an automatic guarantee of their realization. The most important counterpoise to the still artificially depressed wages were the so-called free social benefits in kind and those centrally redistributed social security benefits in cash, which covered the entire "socialist" workforce.

The fundamental function of centralized income redistribution followed, however, from structural determination: the extreme concentration of resources was needed and simultaneously legitimized by referring to economic necessities. Given the daily reiterated central dependency of all the institutions, no other way seemed feasible to operate and finance the economy itself. Thus, nearly 60% of the national budget, concentrated on some 80% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has repeatedly flowed through the economy - in the form of donations, subsidies and supports - all in order to keep it alive. Therefore, it becomes understandable how for more structural reasons the "social budget" (the source of health services, culture, education, etc. defined as "free" statutory benefits and the source of the entire social security system) repeatedly found itself in a hopelessly residual position in a competition with even more pressing needs. In such a situation, the functioning of the social sphere was controlled not by any social principles, but by permanent scarcity: the available money, means, investment and labor force had to be concentrated where they were needed most.

Nevertheless, some important shifts *within* the unchanged structure of residual social policy slowly emerged from the early 1970s onwards, helping the above mentioned drives to find compromises with the society in silent opposition

to its rulers. The direct challenges for some cautious modifications followed from the worsening economic conditions of the late 1960s, which led to the introduction of quite significant (though ambigous) reforms in the administration of the economy in 1968.[6] As is already well-known from the vast literature on the successes and failures of "new economic management," this reform was aimed at loosening the rigidity of central directives and control by giving more space to the spontaneous drives and diverse motivations of economic actors. The role of "particular" (as opposed to "all-societal") interests was gradually acknowledged, both on the ideological and on more practical levels. The accompanying socio-economic element of the program was the recognition of "individualism" as the main incentive of the producers for increased economic achievement. Thus, the newly introduced measures deliberately sought to give a more pronounced role to material stimuli in the name of "differentiating earnings according to performance."[7] However, the actual rise in earnings was seriously limited by the centrally defined and strictly controlled outflow of wages.

The two contradictory drives represented a permanent (and irresolvable) clash between "marketism" and "planning." Though economic growth and better productivity were the desired political goals of the regime, the "old" regulations depressing personal incomes could not be given up for the structural reasons outlined above. The day-to-day resolution (or, more accurately, mitigation) of the continuous conflicts and clashes between then was found in two "innovations" of the system: (a) in the gradual acceptance of the second (informal) economy based on people's work over and above their regular participation in the formal, state-controlled sphere of production; and (b) in the opening of the gates of the social security scheme as an additional source of personal disposable income and as an institution to channel social tensions through its "multifunctional" use. Before turning to a more detailed description of the later developments,[8] it should be noted that these innovations also served the search for compromises of a more general political character indicated above. They nicely fit into the ambitious socio-political program of "raising the standard of living," declared subsequently by central Party organs as the fundamental commitment of the socialist regime to its citizens.

As pointed out earlier, however, the achievement of the much emphasized goals did not imply the deliberation of the outflow of cash-incomes. Instead, a marked *shift* between the "targets" of social spending was introduced. In concrete terms, the expenditures from the state budget in in-cash social security benefits

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6) The scope of this paper does not permit a detailed analysis of these antecedents. It should be noted, however, that these reforms were the first experiments in the history of the East-Central European socialisms to combine "planning" and the "market."

7) Needless to say, the actually increasing differentation of wages/salaries did not follow the logic of any "measurement" of performance (not to mention that it was even theoretically unrealizable in a number of activities). The declaration of the new principle merely served the ideological goals of squeezing the new policy into the preserved Marxist frames.

8) I will not discuss in details the developments of the second (informal) economy here. [on this see Vajda 1991, Harcsa]

were increased,[9] while the *aggregate* share of funds for "public consumption" as a whole remained in the residue position outlined above. It was a logical consequence of reform within an unchanged structure: the necessary prioritization of everyday running of the economy did not cease in the meantime, thus leading to a *constant* yearly ratio that *had* to be devoted to the "productive" spheres, and not permitting *any* rise on the "non-productive" side. In this way, the proportion of *total* spending on social service *and* social security *together* remained much the same throughout the two decades after 1968, representing roughly one-third of the total budget. The result was a relatively (later even absolutely) decreasing share for the in-kind spheres of public consumption: services such as health care, education, personal transport, etc. suffered from the seemingly "technical" shifts in expenditure. The real victims, however, were their users, who had to face all the consequences: increasing inequalities in access, an unstoppable deterioration in the standards and quality of the services, the permanent overcrowding of all the relevant institutions as well as chronic shortages in even basic deliveries and fundamental facilities. In addition, all these negative experiences were compounded by frequent administrative interventions of a paramilitary character, which served as fire-fighting directives intended to cope with the sometimes heated conflicts which the authorities always considered only "temporary" or "transitory."

Although the political decision to increase the available resources for private consumption by simply curtailing those in public services had serious drawbacks, the decision unintentionally facilitated "useful" processes pointing toward a slow marketization of the economy, accompanied by relatively long-lasting improvements in its overall performance.[10] Hidden marketization also concluded with the emergence of quasi-owners of the services in question. Here I will outline some of these developments.

First, the social security-scheme underwent an expansion (both through the introduction of new types of benefits[11] and by extending entitlements[12]), thus

9) Let me present some telling data about these shifts: while spending within the social security "branch" represented 11 percent of the state budget in 1963, its share had already increased to 15 percent by 1980. It is even more informative that the ratio of in-cash benefits within public consumption expenditure grew from 48 percent in 1970 to 60 percent by 1980. Because of this, the contribution of in-cash benefits to the average monthly disposable income of an "average" Hungarian household has also been rapidly increasing: it represented 11 percent of all officially registered earnings in 1967, 20 percent in 1977 and ca. 25 percent in 1987. (See the Statistical Yearbooks and the publications of the subsequent Income Surveys by the Central Statistical Office in 1967, 1977 and 1987.)

10) The key to the full understanding of these surprising achievements can be found in the deeply-rooted socio-historical drives of Hungarian society to complete the interrupted embourgeoisement process via the re-opened pathways after the mid-1960s. [See Szalai 1989]

11) The most important of these was the introduction of the child care grant in 1967. Initially, the grant was a job-protected, flat-rate benefit helping mothers to stay at home with their babies until the latter turned the age of three. The scheme was modified in 1985 by introducing an earnings-related child-care fee that can be received for the first two years after childbirth. Meanwhile, the original grant was preserved to extend the mother's (or the father's) temporary exit from employment for a third year.

creating a significant field of play for "socialist" enterprises both to increase their independence from the rigid regulations of the dictated wage and employment policies and to build lasting "buffers" in their daily operations that protected them against direct state intervention. In this respect, the sick-leave scheme and disability pension turned out to be the most usable means in their hands. Since the costs were covered by social security, the enterprises could "play" with the financial consequences. Central wage regulations permitted them to hide the wages of those either on sick leave or in the process of applying for a disability pension. In this way, they could create considerable temporary "savings" in their wages by reporting these people as being among their actual employees. The sums remained with the firm, and could be freely used to increase the earnings of those really working, without breaking the rules based on *aggregate* wage expenditures and stricken by heavy taxation and related sanctions in cases of excess. As time passed, the deliberate "planning" of the average yearly number of those on social security (on maternity leave, on child-care grants, on sick-leave, etc.) became an organic part of the employment and income policies of *all* the "socialist" workplaces. "Local" incentives (premiums, even temporary wage increases) were covered by those planned savings, initiating both, better productivity and employees' loyalty.

Second, social security not only helped and financed local incentives, but also offered utilizable channels for the more adaptable and flexible use of the workforce. Since all the components of production were at the mercy of uncontrollable external conditions (ultimately driven by unforeseeable central political decisions), the simultaneous adaptation to supply and demand often meant facing insurmountable difficulties. The oscillation between shortages and sudden overflows of raw materials, equipment, unmarketable products etc. was among the fundamental features of socialist economies that had to be mitigated, even if not somehow resolved. The "classical" method of self-protection for the firms was to store all components (including workforce). This led to tremendous waste and could no longer be financed without facing the threat of bankruptcy amid the new circumstances of the reform. Manpower, however, was an exceptional component, since the firms had to meet the preserved "socialist" requirements of compulsory employment. Social security helped here as a way out of the trap. The local costs of employment obligation could be reduced and better productivity attained on the enterprise level by sending temporarily superfluous employees on sick leave, or negotiating their early retirement through the disability pension scheme. When they were needed again, part-time employment (permitted only for those on social security, but strictly prohibited for "ordinary" employees) could be offered to them. They often got back to the same place, to the same position, doing the same job, (though with some lightening of the time-schedule, conditions and duration). In this way, flexibility and increased adaptation to the market could be achieved.

12) The number of those entitled to various benefits was automatically raised in part by the steady extension of employment. However, modifications to the regulations in the 1970s to embrace formerly excluded groups (e.g. the self-employed or free-lance professionals) also worked in this direction.

Third, all the employers' ambigous measures described above often matched the drives of employees. As has been pointed out in several analyses [Kolosi 1989; Farkas, Vajda 1988; Szalai 1993], there was a wide range of motives at work in their attempts to reduce their contribution in the workplace, while simultaneously expanding it in the second (informal) economy. A mere "material" or "consumerist" explanation would be too simplistic here. True, the informal economy (based mainly on the cooperation of the extended family) provided an opportunity for an increase in household income, flexibly adjusted to meet its varying needs. However, the silent struggle for autonomy, the slow elaboration of alternative paths for promotion and even for market-based enterpreneurial routes of social mobility, the search for self-respect to counterbalance the humiliation that people experienced through the harsh exploitation and overt "dictatorship" practiced in their "official" workplaces etc. were equally important factors in the massive participation in informal production.

It should be emphasized that probably the most significant and lasting outcome of these processes is that through the gradual expansion of informal production, people started to build their lives on two pillars: one in the formal and the other in the informal segment of the economy. As a result of this, a new way of life crept into Hungarian society, and two distinct clusters of motivations dominated people's daily activities. In other words, people's lives were determined by the simultaneous involvement in two contrasting sets of relationships. Their *formal social membership* was dictated by the acceptance of subordination and "wage-worker" behavior, while their *success and promotion* depended on the strength of their self-protective *citoyen* values, enterpreneurial activities and "private" aspirations within informal networks and non-institutionalized formations. In the combination and co-existence of the two pillars, these contrasting sets of relationships were helped and supported by the "innovative " use of social security.

The case of rapidly expanding retirement constitutes a clear example: in accordance with international trends (though for markedly different reasons), people in Hungary tend to give up their employment (i.e. their participation on a full-time basis in the state-controlled spheres of the economy) some years earlier than present regulations on retirement would suggest. In recent years, 19 percent of all male pensioners retired below the age of 60, i.e. under the formal age. However, the increasing rate of early *retirement* does not cover the increasing rate of early *withdrawal from work*. On the contrary: the overwhelming majority of pensioners (both, those who have retired early and those who retired at the "ordinary" retirement age) usually work either in various "branches" of the informal economy or take up part-time employment to supplement their pensions, but usually (as already mentioned) with much more flexibility and much better working conditions than they had before. Therefore, when speaking about the geared or conflicting interests surrounding retirement, the two concepts of *employment* and *work* should be strictly separated. It is important to note that people's participation in *employment* has been reduced *for the sake of* expanding their participation in *work*. This statement is clearly demonstrated by Table 1 below. Even the most

comprehensive data[13] show that the performance of the inactive population (overwhelmingly composed of pensioners) has dramatically increased, which is perhaps the most important change that has taken place during the period in question. The table reveals very impressively how families have started to "build" the stable existence and wide acceptance of the second economy into their long-term strategies, and to plan and economize the work and participation of their members, tending to follow an optimal division between the two economies. This "optimalization" was heavily supported, even *subsidized*, by the extensive take-up of accessible social security benefits.[14]

Table 1. Workfund of the society (yearly, in millions of hours)

	1977	1986	Rate of increase between 1977 and 1986 (1977 = 100)
Time spent in workplaces of the first economy	9984.5	9296.3	-7
Small scale agricultural production of			
- active earners	1737.5	1896.6	+9
- inactive population	632.0	1137.0	+80
- dependants	384.8	375.7	-2
House-building activities (in informal economy) of			
- active earners	266.9	374.7	+40
- inactive population	33.7	79.6	+136
- dependants	21.0	17.2	-18
Total	13060.4	13177.1	+1

Source: Time-Budget; Changes in the Way of Life of the Hungarian Society According to the Time-Budget Surveys of Spring, 1977 and Spring, 1986. CSO, Budapest, 1987.

One can conclude that the "reinterpretations" of the functions of social security outlined above point in the same direction. Given the two-sidedness of "socialist" political and economic frameworks, actors have gradually tended to utilize the services as their *own*, thus developing behaviors, attitudes and mechanisms necessary for a potential *overt* change in existing property relations. The hidden

13) The calculations are based on the findings of the latest countrywide representative time-budget survey of 1987. This also gives us an opportunity to follow long-term changes by comparing information on participation rates and durations with the data of a similar survey run by the CSO in 1977. [See several publications on the two time-budget surveys, especially *Time-Budget* 1987 and *Changes* 1990]

14) Corresponding conclusions can be drawn from a detailed analysis of the changing (and fluctuating) utilization of child-care and sickness benefits.

long-term decomposition and erosion of the scheme has to be taken into account as an explanatory factor in understanding the heated contemporary conflicts surrounding the future of social security.

Several interest groups claim that Hungary should give up the idea of comprehensive and compulsory social security and should substitute for it with a regulated network of enterprise-based insurance schemes.[15] They argue that the present system is extremely expensive and wasteful; it works as a disincentive for vibrant capital investments benefiting the new enterpreneurs, while failing to help the services' clients. Firm-based insurance schemes would be much cheaper and, in their view, express the mutual interests of employers and employees. (As far as the non-employed part of the society is concerned, they argue for "targeted" welfare assistance and services for the poor, which would be financed by taxes and be run by the state.) Another proposal (pointing to the opposite direction) is to convert the currently state-dominated scheme to meaningful *public* ownership: social security should be run and controlled on a tripartite basis, representing employers, employees and the state.[16] With regard to the financing of the system, these programs argue for a more just distribution of contributions, and claim that the social-security scheme of the *future* should be a Western-type public investment fund. It should, therefore, get a share of the still "frozen" wealth of the society, i.e. it should be delivered by utilizable *properties* in the "privatization" process. [see Kopatsy 1990 for detailed arguments]

The proposal of the present "owner" (i.e. the government) is rooted in its primary interest of reducing state expenditures and divesting itself of a number of responsibilities. The publicized ideas represent a typical compromise: the present scheme of social security should be "cleared" of its (confused) functions, while "classical" contribution-based tasks should be visibly separated from "social policy." The former should be met by the "new" scheme, while the latter should be the obligation of separate special authorities. In concrete terms, the scheme should be converted into a national pension fund and a health insurance fund, while all other services (i.e. support for families with children, aid for the handicapped and disabled, services for the elderly, etc.) should be delivered by decentralized, community-based schemes, financed both by local and central taxation and complemented by a greater variety of activities on the part of charity organization and voluntary non-profit agencies, associations, etc.

While the *future* outcome of these struggles is as yet unclear, the *actual* latest developments in social security point toward potential lasting compromises between the strong interest groups at the expense of the most defenceless layers in society. All the drastic changes in the structure of social expenditures -- justified by the necessary restrictions on spending from the state budget -- have similar impacts

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15) The claim is very popular among the "new" enterpreneurs, and it is widely propagated by their chambers, associations and by the Party of Entrepreneurs.

16) This idea is supported by the new free trade unions and is also outlined in the programs of some of the new parties. (For the most detailed version, see the Program of the Federation of Free Democrats.)

in this regard. Due to an "economizing" of the resources of central redistribution, pensions, child benefits, sickness payments, etc., have not been adjusted according to the rate of inflation: while consumer prices rose on the average by 29 percent during the twelve months between June 1989 and June 1990, the average value of the child care grant per child was only 24 percent, that of the child care fee only 20 percent and that of the family allowance only 14 percent (!) higher in 1990 than the had been a year earlier. [*Statistical...* 1991] This loss in valve has become an important factor in accelerating the impoverishment of those living mainly from in-cash benefits: pensioners, families with dependent children, people who are chronically ill, etc.

These recent drastic cuts in the name of the withdrawal of the once omnipresent state have been accompanied by a new ideology: "targeting." The argument is well known from the history of social policy: since universal benefits do not diminish inequalities in take-up and access, there should be more concentration of the (scarce) resources on those really in need. Thus, there has been a significant shift in the structure of public spending: universal schemes have been replaced by a number of means-tested programs in attempting to establish "more just" distribution. However, the actual outcome has not justified the technocratic expectations: instead of a decrease in income differentials, the intensified "competition" for the limited resources has brought about a substantial growth of inequalities in take-up and in the per capita value of assistance, while many of the most needy among the poor have been effectively squeezed out of all forms of financial support.

These developments are by no means the "inseparable" and automatic by-products of marketization, rather they follow from a certain -- dogmatically neoliberal and shortsighted -- interpretation of it.

As the paper attempted to demonstrate earlier, it was the very process of a slow and gradual "liberalization" of the market which helped great masses of Hungarian society gain some distance from and some self-protection against the actual crisis of the state-controlled, formal economy in the last phase of socialism. It was their participation in the market-related production of the informal economy which enabled them to build up (at least partly) alternative pillars of everyday livelihood. The dual arrangements then assisted not only in compensation for the accompanying unavoidable financial losses of the economic crisis, but even promoted the conversion of previously acquired skills and experiences into measurable material advantages amid the post-1989 process of systemic transformation.

Many of the restrictive recent interventions adopted in the name of marketization have led, however, to the creation of a "secondary class" of Hungarian citizenry. On the grounds of a number of sociological investigations, one can give a historically rooted description of the evolvement of their current situations.

The most defenceless dominant groups can be found among the late successors of the once proudly elevated and mobilized landless peasantry, which

provided the fundation for early socialist industrialization. They are those whose preceding generations had based their lives and aspirations on the incentives, orientations and regulations of the 40 years of "socialism." Responding to the challenge of industrialization, they moved to urban settlements; they helped their children acquire qualifications which seemed to be favorably applicable in a "socialist" economy; they gave up their peasant roots and traditions even in their ways of life by occupying the large, closed housing estates built "for them," etc.

In the period of chronic economic decline (throughout the 1980s), they also turned to more "private" solutions in their attempts to cope. As can be seen from Table 2 (a presentation of some comprehensive data on trends in income distribution between the first and second half of the decade), many of them tried to mobilize the "general" protective methods of the majority. They also intensified their work in the second economy (though they probably had access to the worst jobs within it), and tightened the informal family network by a more regulated and "targeted" internal redistribution of the increasingly insufficient resources. The table demonstrates these efforts and their failures. It clearly indicates that "individual" techniques could not prevent the acceleration of impoverishment anymore: more and more among the disadvantaged families fell back into extreme poverty by the end of the decade.

The political turn in 1989-90 ultimately questioned all their previous efforts at their most fundamental level. The late grandchildren of the once elevated peasant-workers suddenly found themselves on the side of the hopeless losers. Instead of getting support and assistance to a successful adaptation amid the radically changed conditions, they became the betrayed symbols of earlier failures and the incurable remittances of a dead-end past. The greater majority of them lost the very foundation of living -- employment -- from one day to the next, and besides facing unresolvable financial crises, they became also confronted with the psychological burdens of all-around degradation.

If these broad layers of the once "new" urban working class had been gradually "forgotten" in the late decades of socialism, then they started to suffer full "disenfranchisement" in the new democracy. The formerly marked inequalities within Hungarian society have developed to apparent disintegration during the past few years.

In the light of its historically rooted character, any arguments about the "automatic" dissolution of this kind of massive disintegration through the spontaneous momentum of economic growth seem to be ill rooted and illusory. The (hopefully near) end of the country's current economic crisis might lead to a rise in incomes, and thus the majority will certainly regain the material stability of everyday life.

However, economic growth in itself will be insufficient to halt those processes by which the current Hungary is falling apart. Although the material side of poverty might also be eased by a turn to economic prosperity, nonetheless, the irreversible consequences of the lasting degradation of the poor would thus require deliberately designed and well-established programs of societal policy. Such

programs should start with the rehabilitation of social membership in the full sense of the term, and should adjust all their measures to a serious recognition of human dignity.

Table 2. Changes in the composition of personal disposable incomes in poor and in better-off active households in 1982 and 1987

A. Percentage ratio of household incomes

		Below the subsistance minimum (poor households)	Above average (better-off households)
First economy	1982	58.6	70.7
	1987	57.4	63.0
Second economy	1982	9.3	16.5
	1987	10.7	24.7
In-cash public benefits	1982	31.0	12.2
	1987	30.6	11.4
Family transfers	1982	1.1	0.9
	1987	1.3	0.6
Together	1982	100.0	100.0
	1987	100.0	100.0
Percentage ratio of persons in households	1982	10.3	31.0
	1987	13.5	47.3

B. Increase in monthly incomes between 1982 and 1987 from various sources
(1982 = 100)

	First economy	Second economy	In-cash public benefits	Family transfers	Together
poor households	132	155	133	160	135
better-off households	149	250	156	251	167

C. Monthly earnings of "better off" households as a percentage of earnings in poor households from various sectors

	First economy	Second economy	In-cash public benefits	Family transfers	Together
1982	207	305	68	93	172
1987	233	491	79	146	313

Source: Calculations based on data from the 1982 and 1987 CSO Income Surveys

Otherwise, even in the longer run, poverty and social disintegration will remain. Without purposeful intervention, the legacy of the socialist past and its harmful recent accentuation will not conclude in the much hoped-for eloquent development, but in a Third World-type reproduction of the conflictious co-existence of affluence and dramatic misery.

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An Attempt at a Non-Economic Explanation of the Present Full Employment in the Czech Republic

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Abstract: In the command economy full employment lent legitimacy to the political and social system of despotic socialism by providing social security for everyone. New political elites are now facing the problem of how to reconcile economic rationality with full employment. Two case studies of large privatized factories support the hypothesis that the new (capitalist) owners (mostly the former managers of these state-owned enterprises) are seeking the legitimacy of private ownership in a similar way. Low social distance and open access to the managerial class for sons of blue collar workers in the old system makes a social contract possible in which the owners feel responsible for full employment and workers perceive the new managers (owners) as delegates. A low intensity of industrial conflict characterizes the Czech economy thus far and the attempt to establish a sort of paternalistic capitalism can be seen.
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1.

Full employment was a defining attribute of the Soviet-type socialist countries. Unemployment simply did not exist, that is, not in the statistics. In Bohemia and Moravia, i.e. the Czech part of Czechoslovakia, unemployment did not exist in real life, either: from 1939 until the collapse of the communist system in 1989 continuously the Czech economy was characterized by a markedly higher demand for labor than the market could supply.

Communist governments had two main reasons for maintaining full employment. First, full employment gave legitimacy to the regime. It was the ultimate proof that even "real" socialism could provide a more humane social arrangement than capitalism. For the older generations, the comparison with the traumatic experience of mass unemployment during the Great Depression in the 1930s provided a valid argument for communism. For the younger generations that lacked that experience and were particularly strongly attracted to the consumer riches of neighboring countries, full employment acted as compensation for the drab selection offered by the socialist market. State propaganda was eager to inform citizens that the affluence shown in the shop-windows of the capitalist world hid the permanent anxiety of the employed that they might lose their jobs to casual visitors, and that there were many jobless people, even though you would not, of course, meet them in shops. Any references to the social welfare systems that were gradually established in Western Europe in the postwar era were taboo and only evidence of the negative effects of unemployment, which were easy to find in their

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most dramatic form (beggars, suicides of unemployed people, etc.) in the Western press, was systematically presented in order to create a repulsive image of the destitute unemployed. While verbally rejected and mocked, this propaganda, just as with any publicity campaign, had a surprisingly strong effect on the deeper levels of consciousness. The targets of the campaign were, of course, not aware of it.[1]

The second reason for the maintenance of full employment under the communist regime concerned the very essence of the function of despotic socialism. No well-informed observer could overlook the fact that full employment was the most effective tool of total control over the population. It is not true to say (at least in Central Europe) that the backbone of the despotic socialist state was formed by police control; all the police had to do was control those marginalized dissidents who had proved themselves immune to the stick-and-carrot strategy of (obligatory) full employment. The entire population was, economically speaking, fully dependent on a monopoly employer -- the government. Moreover, the whole social benefit system hinged on employment. Those who "excluded themselves from the work process" (i.e. were not employed by the state) were treated as non-persons by the state. In his discussion of social policies, Jiří Večerník correctly noted that: "The key to the explanation of social policy in the totalitarian system is the universal character of (obligatory) employment and (state) control, in other words not a universal character of social magnanimity and solidarity. To work was not to exercise one's right, it was an obligation and, at the same time, a control mechanism." [Večerník 1993: 127] In addition to adding legitimacy and the coercive functions (together with other practical reasons), full employment also served the bureaucratic need for a detailed listing of all resources in the planned economy.

All of these reasons, however, lay outside considerations of economic rationality. In fact they operated against it. The system was aware of this. For a long time, it was convinced that it could afford to pay this price for stability. In any case, there was no other way out. With growing economic pressure, however, the system became alarmed and began to investigate the gap that had developed in the nationalized economy between the real labor absorption capacity, as it would appear in an unregulated labor market, and the full employment necessitated by ideological and power imperatives. An analysis commissioned by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1983 from the Institute for Philosophy and Sociology of the Academy of Sciences revealed that that gap constituted about 25% to 30% of the average work force in the national economy. The report classified hidden unemployment into three noteworthy categories: 1. unemployment at workplaces during working hours; 2. unemployment outside workplaces during working hours; and 3. performing jobs at workplaces the non-

1) Among certain parts of the public, this propaganda had a paradoxical effect: by assuming the communists were utter liars, many Czechs built up an image of an unemployed person as one who lives through the winter at a ski resort and spends the summer in idle leisure on permanent fishing holidays. The unemployed, in this construction, even went to collect their benefits in their own cars.

existence of which would not negatively affect the performance of the economy. [*Sociální* 1983]

In real figures this represented two to three million people. Such a multitude outside any political control in the streets was a nightmare for the politicians of the post-1968 "normalization." When the methodology included the performance of workers during the time when (and if) they were actually doing their work, rather than the ratio of non-working to working hours, the results were even more dismal. Comparing the situation with that in capitalist economies of industrialized countries, namely Germany, France and Belgium, P. Kysilka calculated the relative over-employment in socialist Czechoslovakia to be 65%, 62% and 67% respectively. [Kysilka, in Mlčoch 1988] These analyses demonstrated that state-guaranteed full employment, although effective as a tool of mass coercion, led the system into economic disaster. Needless to say they were never published, but the rulers had this information on their desks. They faced an insolvable dilemma, which is why they accepted the collapse of their system, passively and resignedly. They saw that the dilemma was fatal.

2.

The new post-1989 politicians, if they had not directly dreamed of "unpolitical politics" and were not in their heart of hearts loyal to the socialist dream of a country without any dominance or exploitation, were determined to base their power on radically new mechanisms of dominance. Across the entire spectrum, however, from those on the conservative right through to authentic socialists and to former communists who have not lost faith in the system and simply want to modernize it, are those who have deeply internalized the experience that command-driven economics led the old regime to bankruptcy. Therefore, regardless of whether they had announced the neo-liberal model of zero state intervention in the economy or the "big welfare state" of the Scandinavian type as their goal, they were convinced that the free market had to be the basic economic mechanism of the new system and private proprietorship its fundamental premise. The left only adds that it is not the only premise.

This, however, has pushed the new politicians toward the old dilemma. Again, they are facing the problem of how to reconcile economic rationality with full employment. Is it possible to open up the economy to allow the free operation of market forces and ensure the sovereignty of new economic entities' ownership rights and, at the same time, avoid unemployment?

The long experience of the EC economies hardly offers positive encouragement, and Czech governmental economists are facing incomparably harder economic and social limits. Along with a ruined economy full of redundant employees, the new political elite inherited from the old elite its nightmare, but in a different form. The need for stability, now in the form of "social peace," seems to be an imperative as much for the re-establishment of capitalism as it had been for the "peaceful building of socialism." Now as then, the real threat presented by the large segment of disloyal population looms over the social system. For the old regime, the enemy was represented by former capitalists (and, later, by the

invincible entrepreneurial spirit of the general public). Today it is former communists and a similarly unshakable "mentality of demands" which aspires for the unattainable level of social security to which the broad spectrum of society grew accustomed during forty years of life in a paternalistic state.

The general public as well as the new political elite are -- and have been -- convinced that the road to capitalist consumer society (and the welfare state) requires passage through the "valley of death:" there is no avoiding at least temporary unemployment. White-collar workers read articles in the daily papers and know that the average unemployment rate in the part of Europe to which the new country would like to belong as soon as possible has been fluctuating around 10% for a long period of time. Blue-collar workers do not know any statistics, but neither do they need to: they can see an obvious surplus of labor all around them.

The Czechs seem to be well informed on this topic. They cherish fewer illusions than other populations in similar circumstances. An international comparative study of responses to the new situation after 1990-91 among the populations of nine post-communist countries indicated that 92% of Rumanians saw democracy as something akin to "more job opportunities, lower unemployment." Ninety per cent of respondents in Bulgaria expressed the same sentiments and even in Hungary, which has been relatively open to the West for more than ten years, this opinion is shared by 74% of respondents. The Czech Republic is the only post-communist state in which less than half of the population has these expectations (48% according to the ERASMUS Research Report [Kende 1993]).[2]

It is important to note, however, that although Czechs expect the fifty-year period of full employment to come to an end this does not mean that they are willing to reconcile themselves to it. Václav Havel expressed the attitude of the majority of the population when, in his first speech as the newly-elected first non-communist president of the Federal Republic of Czechoslovakia, he said that we were heading towards a democratic society and free-market economy, but it is up to the government to prevent unemployment. How the government was supposed to achieve that end remained unspecified.

Rational economic calculation identifies such a request for what it is: wishful thinking. The development of unemployment during the years of laying the foundations for a market economy, however, seems to be a victory of wishful thinking over economic reality. Contrary to all expectations and unlike all the other post-communist countries, the Czech Republic has successfully maintained artificial employment for a full one-third of its workforce in the three years

2) The cited research was conducted in the summer of 1991. We can assume (because the expected unemployment still has not arrived) that among Czechs a continuously higher share of the population is becoming subject to the illusion that unemployment will somehow miss us. Given the promises of the government and its claims that all is going well and will continue to go well, there may be genuine surprise when the harsh realities of the transformation begin to hit home.

following the collapse of its planned economy.[3] In spite of the collapse of the COMECON market (which previously received 80% of Czech exports), and in spite of an economic recession in the Western European markets in which the Czech economy is seeking new opportunities under particularly difficult conditions, the unemployment rate in the Czech Republic is less than 2.6% (see Table 1 and Figure 1.)

Table 1. Unemployment rates (in percent)

	Czech Republic	Slovak Republic	Hungary	Poland
1990	0.8	1.5	1.7	6.3
1991/I	1.7	3.7	3.0	7.3
1991/II	2.6	6.3	3.9	8.6
1991/III	3.8	9.6	6.1	10.7
1991/IV	4.1	11.8	8.5	11.8
1992/I	3.7	12.2	8.9	12.1
1992/II	2.7	11.3	10.1	12.6
1992/III	2.6	10.6	11.4	13.6
1992/IV	2.6	10.4	13.5	13.6

Source: Bulletin of the Czechoslovak Federal Statistical Office, Prague, 1992

For 40 years, the structure of the national economy was mutilated to suit the needs of the Soviet empire; an unnaturally high proportion of heavy industry geared to arms production was concentrated in a few regions.[4] Even with a low mean unemployment, it was only to be expected that in some regions structural unemployment would rocket to catastrophic proportions (in the former East

3) I am writing here about the Czech economy, not the Czechoslovak. I am led to this for historical and structural reasons. Historically, the Czech economy and the Slovak economy grew from different initial conditions, were built in different ways and were based on different national mentalities. There were periodic attempts to cover up this fact, but during every crisis of the past half-century Slovaks have put forth a claim for sovereignty and independence (and in the Second World War even temporarily succeeded in this). The final recognition of this national difference was the peaceful break-up in 1992. For the last three years of the federation, which led to the condition being analyzed here, an ambiguity between the bonds and interdependences of the two economies was characteristic. On one hand, a common federal environment was created on the macroeconomic level, while on the other hand two absolutely independent Ministries of Industry managed, respectively, Czech and Slovak enterprises. No federal Ministry of Industry of Commerce existed, nor did there exist a federal Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, and the legislative regulation of intervention into social affairs was only handled at the level of the republics. I give priority to this equivocation to use it as a reference point for developments in the Czech Republic and those in Hungary and Poland: a comparison with Slovakia would involve a new independent variable into our analyses. Such a comparison, undoubtedly of the greatest importance, deserves and demands a separate study.

4) In the Czech lands (in Northern Moravia and in Northern Bohemia) in the 1950s and 1960s and in Central and Eastern Slovakia in the 1970s and 1980s.

Germany, unemployment has exceeded 50% in some places). Of course there are some differences in the unemployment rate within the Czech Republic, but they are much smaller than might have been expected. The remarkable thing is that the highest unemployment is not affecting industrial areas but backward agricultural regions where part of the local population lives on a barter economy and uses unemployment benefits as a welcome opportunity to improve their budgetary position.

Here we are witnessing an interesting paradox: while other post-communist countries expected more job opportunities from democracy and experienced instead higher unemployment, the Czech Republic expected higher unemployment as an indispensable part of the market economy but has enjoyed practically full employment.

3.

How can we explain this paradox, or at least the Czech part of it? We could choose one of the two explanations offered by the economy: (1) the redundant workforce is being absorbed by dynamically developing private businesses, particularly in the service sector; or (2) the market economy is not yet really functional because the so-called "large" privatization has not progressed far enough to truly institute market behavior in large companies, most of which are still state-owned.

Both arguments are valid, and explain an economically significant part of the situation. However, comparison with the nearest post-communist economies (i.e. Poland and Hungary), shows that an equally significant part of the situation cannot be explained in these economic terms. In those countries the private sector has developed equally, if not more dynamically. In fact, both Hungary and Poland are ahead of the Czech Republic in this respect. Their private sectors are at least equally developed, but their development began much earlier and are backed by much stronger capital resources. Even when we take the rate of economic reform, the progress of privatization and the extent of the market environment for the larger economy into consideration, the comparison between these three countries (although very difficult to make) does not fully support the claim that the pace of the privatization of big industrial companies in the Czech economy is slower than in Poland or Hungary. The extent of state intervention in the three countries is also roughly comparable. In spite of an approximately 25% drop in industrial production compared with 1989, the Czech Republic has nevertheless managed to keep the unemployment rate close to 2.5%, while Hungary and Poland face double-digit figures.

The economist could certainly offer other, more sophisticated explanations for these differences, but while they might help reduce the unexplained portion of the difference they will not provide all the answers. I believe that it is worthwhile also to consider some non-economic explanations, although they may tend to elude an empirical approach and run the risk of remaining in the realm of conjecture.

We have already touched upon one of these non-economic reasons, namely the inherited nightmare of the risk of breaching social peace, which ties Czech politicians' hands and forces them to bend over backwards to maintain full

employment although they, too, are beginning to pay the price in a partial loss of economic efficiency. By tapping new resources inaccessible to communist governments (for instance, profits from the tourist industry have increased more than tenfold) and dormant reserves in human resources, by decreasing military spending and reducing some of the senseless expenses of the communist regime, and through strictly restrictive budgetary policies, it has been possible to avoid deficits in the state budget. The government thus has the necessary financial resources at its disposal and can afford to pay for social peace, just as the governments of the previous regime did. The remains of the command-economy still give the government enough economic power to do just this. Although it is a right-wing coalition government headed by the neo-liberal economist Václav Klaus, the 1993 budget re-allocates 46.3% of the gross national product. For comparison, the last communist budget for 1989 re-allocated 54.8%.

The present right-wing government in the Czech Republic is, first and foremost, a pragmatic one. It has set the pace of the reforms very carefully (today nobody even mentions "shock therapy" anymore) in order to make them "socially acceptable." Its employment policies are also carefully monitored to prevent them from undermining social peace. By postponing the Bankruptcy Bill and intervening in the question of corporate debt, the government has delayed and diluted the inevitable wave of bankruptcies of inefficient companies. By spreading the inevitable bankruptcies over a longer period, it has been successful in ensuring that new jobs in the private sector are being created fast enough to absorb the labor that has been made redundant elsewhere.

The rationale for these economic measures is not economic but political. The present policies of the government coalition made up of parties calling themselves, without exception, right-wing -- and their objectives do make them genuinely right-wing parties -- are only neo-liberal in their public proclamation. In private conversations, leading government politicians admit to a discrepancy between the vocabulary of their public speeches and their practical political measures. One of the deputy ministers in the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs expressed the logic of his ministry in a private conversation by saying:

> We must claim that everybody has to look after himself now, that state paternalism does not exist any longer. But we are a government in a country where people have not been allowed to take care of themselves for forty years. At the same time, we must keep the social safety net very high. If we admitted that, everybody would start relying on it again and the changes would progress even more slowly. [Personal discussion with the author in the spring of 1991]

4.

The question of whether the government can afford, or how long it can afford, this attitude remains unanswered. It may help to ensure social peace but the need to maintain social peace at all costs finally spelled economic disaster for the old regime.

The answer to this question cannot be found on a macro level. The responses from companies and the behavior and success (or failure) of their managements will decide whether the decision for "dosing" harsh economic reality, selected in view of maintaining social acceptability, will lead -- as a reform process both too long and vacillating -- to economic macrobankrupcy, or -- as too radical a change -- to a collapse of the social consensus on such a scale that it will also mean economic and ultimately also political collapse. The risk of the restoration of command socialism through democratic elections is not merely a theoretical possibility in the post-communist countries.

We have tried to make a contribution to the search for answers to these questions by conducting case studies of two privatized Czech companies, DOMUS and MECHANICA.[5] Due to the method used, namely case studies and semi-structured and deep interviews, the results are of a limited heuristic value. The field investigations were made this spring and results are still being processed; therefore only preliminary conclusions can now be drawn. Nevertheless I wish to point out several aspects and discuss their possible implications.

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5) Cover names. The research is part of an extensive project, which is coordinated and sponsored by the United Nations Research Institute in Social Development. The plants were selected to represent the two most widespread types of successful privatization projects. A plant to be called "MECHANICA Corporation" (4,500 employees) was transferred to private ownership in the first wave of coupon (voucher) privatization. In 1992 it was transformed into a joint-stock company whose shares were divided as follows: 88 per cent went to many different shareholders (actually represented by privatization investment funds) and to a smaller degree (8 per cent) sold at an advantageous price as participation shares, the rest going to the Restitution Fund and the National Property Fund. The plant called the "DOMUS Factory" (2,500 employees) is part of a corporation that was also transformed into a joint-stock company, but a decisive block of shares (64.5 per cent) was acquired by six private persons who have thus become the plant's key owners. Shareholders from voucher privatization received 25.5 per cent of the shares. Relevant information was collected in 72 semi-structured interviews at the MECHANICA Corporation and 40 similar interviews in the DOMUS Factory. Respondents for these interviews were randomly selected from the categories of workers, white-collar employees and management. This was done in a multiple selection process (organizational unit and respondents within). The second source of information for this study was a set of unstructured interviews with the directors and managers of these plants.

What we seem to be lacking in our selection of plants, however, is an unsuccessful response to the ongoing political-economic change: a type of plant apparently doomed to bankruptcy that finds itself in a state that is usually called pre-privatization agony. This often means that a plant has been privatized by the most direct of methods, that is, through theft. Nobody will therefore be surprised that under such circumstances access to such plants has been denied. Indeed we could hardly expect to be given the chance of peeping under the covers of this process. Sociological research cannot compete with criminal investigation authorities, even though the latter have likewise been trying to shed light on such processes, albeit large without success. However, as indicated by the macro-economic data quoted earlier, this particular mode of privatization does not constitute the main method of the process in the Czech Republic.

First, over the course of several months during 1991 both companies lost 60% - 80% of their customers. DOMUS was a monopoly manufacturer of products that were marketable only in the protected domestic socialist market. With the liberalization of international trade and prices, that market totally collapsed. MECHANICA exported 60% of its production to the Soviet Union and its customers were no longer solvent. Both companies were successfully transformed. Within a year, they managed to establish themselves in the world market and restore their production almost to their previous levels. In both cases, they were managed by the same people who managed them in the final years of the command-driven economy. In both cases, the companies received support from a former "capitalist connection." In privatization, DOMUS was purchased by six people: five of them were former top managers from the socialist company, and the sixth was a son of the former founder and owner of the company, which had been confiscated by the state forty years before. This "junior," who is almost seventy years old today, had established his professional career in the trade as a teacher at a university in Slovakia, where he had gone to escape the vigilance of the confiscators in Bohemia. He gradually began to attend international trade fairs and seminars, and thus he restored and further developed his international contacts. With this "social capital" he joined the management of the new comapany. In Germany he successfully applied for credit to lease modern technology which they repaid with their production, and he won a large order from a major Swedish company. MECHANICA was privatized by the coupon method. It is, however, also managed by its former management and the former deputy manager was elected new general manager. This company is also eighty years old. Unlike DOMUS, which was a family enterprise, MECHANICA was a joint stock company before nationalization and has now reincorporated itself. Even under the former government, it successufully managed to avoid the communist marasmus and kept a high level of corporate culture, influenced to a certain extent by its long-term co-operation with the Baťa enterprises. Modernization and changes in export orientation were already being prepared by the management before 1989. The political change only freed their hands to set up a wholly-owned subsidiary in the USA with the assistance of an emigrant from 1968. When wholly-owned subsidiaries were founded in Singapore and Kiev, the company was already well established on the world market.

In these case studies we could discern what we might call the "grandparent advantage" of the Czech economy. Forty years ago, the area of the present Czech Republic was a developed industrial territory, where the GNP per capita was twice as high as in neighboring Austria. Today, it is the other way around, but industrial production traditions have deeper roots here. Compared to Slovakia, Hungary and Poland, invisible structures in managerial culture are still alive, as are many sixty year-old "juniors" of former industrial entrepreneurs. After his first visit to Eastern Europe as vice-president, George Bush remarked that it was still possible to see the boundary at which the Industrial Revolution stopped on its way through Europe. That boundary seems to be still visible in the Nineties.

Second, neither of the firms responded to the critical situation in their sales by massive lay-offs. The production of DOMUS practically stopped for several months and the company laid off workers who had reached retirement age and those with term contracts, but the number of other workers made redundant was kept to a minimum. Although it required unjustified optimism, the companies managed to keep their entire workforce necessary for an immediate restart of production on the original scale. However, this was not simply a question of economic strategy. Deep interviews with managers revealed their paternalistic attitudes towards their employees, including feelings of responsibility to guarantee them jobs.

In the course of the transformation in property rights, their paternalistic responsibility attained a new dimension. For forty years, private ownership of the means of production was illegal in this country and also became (due to persistent propaganda) illegitimate. The managements of production companies, however, wielded so much operational power that they considered themselves virtual owners of the companies they managed: there was no owner who would have the power, or desire, to exert control over them. The disruption of the old system was accelerated by the (unreflected) desire of the management to change their authorization to run the companies into full ownership rights. [for more details, see Možný 1990] As those rights are being legalized in the process of privatization, they are also becoming transparent. What was hidden is now visible. The need to make them legitimate has not disappeared, on the contrary, it has become in a way even more intense. It is one of the paradoxes of the transformation that the society being established here is one in which property is legitimized by performance. However, performance which guarantees the attainment of the decisive advantage of a large owner in this process has nothing to do with the performance of the Protestant ethic or even with economic rationality so far. One of the ways in which new owners are trying to legitimize their rights is by their paternalistic attitudes and by caring for guaranteeing employment rights for their workers.

Third, a new form of the social contract, which is behind every labor contract, is being proposed by the workers. In the old regime, workers not only exchanged guaranteed employment for tolerance of domineering practices on the part of the establishment [see Keller 1993 and Potůček 1993] but also their low performance for limited opportunities of consumption: they pretended to pay us, and we pretended to work. Workers themselves could see that these dubious exchanges exhausted the very essence of the system and led to its collapse. They felt intuitively and with an increasing urgency that by permitting their own corruption, they contributed to a situation in which there soon would be nothing left with which to corrupt them. They too have a vested interest in social change: they offer the new system a higher intensity of labor and responsibility at work, but they require better opportunities for consumption (i.e. higher wages) and guaranteed employment. The guaranteed jobs should come immediately, while the higher standard of living may come a little later (a realistic assessment tells them that the level of their production does not justify any increases yet), but soon, nonetheless.

Managers are expected to provide work that they can do and enough profit for the company to allow wage increases as soon as possible.

Workers are not sympathetic to those who have been laid off: the old system has destroyed workers' solidarity. (Contrary to the case of Poland, solidarity in confrontation with the owners was not the factor that brought the changes in the Czech Republic.) They, however, indicate that workers (should they be made redundant on a massive scale) know how to organize themselves and may come to question the legitimacy of the management. They will remind the people in managerial positions that they are "old structures" that were pardoned by the revolution only in return for a pledge of high performance. After all, the present general managers were voted in by the workers. Corporate management finds itself in a situation similar to that of the government, only a rung or two lower: it is being pressured into guaranteeing economic rationality without social sacrifices.

Fourth, the relationship between the managers now becoming the legal owners of industrial plants and their working-class employees is not assuming the forms of traditional class antagonism, social distance or two polar parties in industrial negotiations. Our deep interviews with workers and managers alike indicate that managers are perceived as the workers' delegates -- and that they themselves feel that way to a certain extent. Since the destruction of property relationships in 1948, entry into managerial positions for working-class sons has been easier than in any other industrial society. A significant proportion of working-class families has placed their children there and family relationships have been maintained. With regard to life styles, no gap ensued between managers and workers, as there was no income basis that would allow it. The ratio betwen the upper and lower deciles of income was 1:2.5 and thus the Czechs developed a society with the least income differential among all COMECON countries. (In this bloc income differences were much lower than in capitalist industrialized countries [Večerník 1989] and still the Czech society was perhaps the most equalized.) A retreat from paternalistic responsibility would be considered (on both sides) intergenerational treason.

According to our findings, the advantageous constellation of the above described circumstances (and perhaps a few others, but a discussion of those would perhaps be premature) have contributed to the relatively successful and surprisingly painless transformation of the Czech economy and society. They also help explain the current low level of unemployment. It remains to be seen to what extent this is only a short-term advantage, a postponement of the inevitable conflicts and slumps that lie ahead, or whether these factors will continue to develop in the direction outlined above over a longer period of time, and that what is emerging in the Czech Republic is a European modification of paternalistic capitalism.

These are some preliminary conclusions from our research project, presented as a hypothesis which will have to be tested by future analysis and further research. It will soon be tested in real life by the ongoing developments in Czech society. In any case, we believe that the extra-economic reasons of economic

phenomena such as the unemployment rate deserve attention as a part of the study of the tremendous social changes taking place in post-communist societies.

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Social Policy Determinants of Political Attitudes

A comparison of Four East Central European Societies

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Abstract: The paper is aimed at presenting - in a descriptive manner - some results of a comparative East-Central European research project focused on the political consequences of the changes in the social safety nets in the region. Social policy determinants of selected political attitudes - important for their impact on overall popular support and, consequently, stability of the new democratic regimes - seems to be important only for two phenomena: satisfaction with the political system and general visions of political prospects. This is true both for the region as a whole and for each of the four countries. Despite the fact that several causes of the described phenomena are quite similar throughout the region, certain pecularities are obvious and interesting to interpret from cultural, social and strictly economic points of view.

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The transformation process that began in 1989 in Eastern Europe can hardly be compared to any other recent historical event, both in its scope and in the simultaneous multidimensional change taking place in almost all spheres of social life. Many authors have pointed out that the logic of radical economic change and democratic procedures are to a certain extent contradictory. Not to repeat the already numerous elaborations of this problem [Przeworski 1991; Offe 1991], let us merely point out here that despite great variance in evaluating detailed aspects of the particular paths of transformation in the East-Central European region, some general problems remain the same. One of them is that while rapid marketization and privatization is favoring a few, most citizens - 'cognitively' unprepared for the changes -- are losing a lot, especially in terms of social security broadly understood. A challenge for the new regimes, among many others, is thus the scope of popular support they can "expect" from their citizens. Social and political stability in these countries is a *sine qua non* for any further development towards an institutionalized democratic, market-oriented social order.

The vicious circle starting with political transformation and continuing with decisions on the implementation of radical economic reform has high social costs, which may or may not lead to social unrest but nevertheless exist as a threat for those who rule and may therefore slow down or de-radicalize economic reform. This may lead to poor economic performance and consequently to those regimes' loss of legitimacy. In this article a modest effort is made to present one dimension of this general problem, namely the links between selected political attitudes (some treated as behavioral dispositions or declarations of readiness to act politically in a

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certain manner) and a broad scope of factors describing the evaluation of social policy issues broadly understood. The presentation is based on quite extensive empirical data and the author will deliberately avoid an in-depth, "explanatory" interpretation of the comparative results.

Data Description

The source we use here is the survey *Political Conseqences of Dismantling Social Safety Net in East-Central Europe*, initiated and financed by the Institute for East-West Studies, Praha-New York which was carried out in Poland, Hungary, and the former Czechoslovakia and completed in 1991.

The main dependent variables are the above mentioned political attitudes. Of the many factors utilized in our survey describing the political profile of an East-Central European in 1991, we will focus our attention here on four factors which - even without describing the theoretical assumptions underlying them at this point - seem to be quite obvious indicators of political stability and system legitimacy, and seem to be in accordance with the common sense understanding of the latter term, quite an important condition in an empirical research:

(1) The Propensity to Join Protests (REBEL) index consists of five items describing possible behavior in case of "strong disagreement" with governments' policy. It starts with a moderate form of protest, namely "signing leaflets..." and ends with more radical ones: "organizing a road blockade..." or "organizing hunger strikes..."

(2) The Satisfaction with the Political System (POLSYSAC) index measures the general social mood towards the "way democracy functions in a particular country," the political system and the incumbent government (for a more detailed analysis, see [Toka 1992].) Irrespective of the particular item used to describe the level of satisfaction with the new regime, Poles and Hungarians in the fall of 1991 occupied an intermediate position between the highly dissatisfied Slovaks and the most satisfied Czechs.

(3) The Political Involvement (POLINV) index, might well be called an index of "public affairs involvement," depending on the notions of politics and public affairs one uses. The empirical construct is comprised of "interest in politics" and "active participation at the local level" indicators. Both of these are highly correlated throughout East-Central Europe (significance -.01.) Other data - omitted in this paper - indicate that at the time of our survey, we noted very low or moderately low electoral participation in Poland and Hungary and high or very high in Slovakia and Bohemia/Moravia. However, as indicated by the results of the analysis of variance of the discussed item concerning participation in the solving of local problems, it is the two former Czechoslovak Republics' citizens (mostly Czechs) that reveal the lowest participation indicators at the community level (eta = .20).

(4) Finally, the last dependent variable, the Political Prospects (POLPROS) index, refers to the evaluation of the near political future, which taps the optimism/pessimism dimension.

An effort will be made here to identify the determinants of the above four political factors in each of the four countries. The notion of "determination" in this case means simply the possibility stepwise regression analysis gives for the interpretation of various influences between numerous variables, with the possibility of selecting their "direct" influences.

Among many possible "explanatory" factors treated as determinants of political attitudes, we concentrate on broadly understood social policy issues, partly including economic and socio-psychological issues (for details see the "Table of Indexes.") The relationship between social policy and political stability in East-Central Europe is full of contradictions. In practice, none of the region's governments were free to implement economic changes that would cause severe threats to its citizens. Being aware of the impact of social perceptions of new legislation concerning the social safety net, politicians have restricted their visions and wishes to the perceived "tolerance capacity" of the population.

Finally, we will broaden our interpretation by adding to these social policy factors some purely sociological "stratification" factors, that is: age, level of education, position, per capita household income and respondents' individual income. While the relationship between these stratification factors and political attitudes is very interesting in itself, here we will focus solely on their impact as additional factors intercorrelated with social policy factors. That is, we would like to control for socio-demographic influences in order to avoid interpretations of artefacts and reveal the latent links.

Background Description

Before we turn to the relationship between social policy issues and political attitudes, let us glance over other important comparative data collected by our surveys. First of all, there are differences between individual East-Central European societies considering their opinions, attitudes and beliefs towards social policy issues. In general, one may say that:

(1) Regarding economic expectations for the near future, Czechs were the most and Poles the least optimistic among our four nations in the fall of 1991. Hungarians and Slovaks were in this respect quite similar and did not differ much from the Polish average (for more details see [Toka 1992]).

(2) Only a few items were devoted to the evaluation of the past socialist reality. The main result to be mentioned is that despite criticism of the current regimes, East-Central Europeans' attitudes towards them are more positive than towards the former ones: again the greatest acceptance of the current regime was found among the Czechs - almost 70% declared the present regime better than the Communist one. Poles and Slovaks shared the same view in slightly lower proportions, 51% and 43% respectively. The significant difference comes with the Hungarians, of whom only 31% would agree with the above assessment, whereas 39% would oppose it.

(3) One of the main causes of dissatisfaction, anomie and withdrawal from public life in socialist societies was that perceptions of growing inequalities were hardly

explainable. In other words, the inequalities themselves did cause dissatisfaction, but only to a certain extent. Unclear "rules of the attainment game," the clique-like, ascriptive principles of getting ahead in life, were the real cause of the dissatisfaction. The question then is whether the perceptions of the determinants of getting ahead changed after the fall of the Communist regimes, in particular whether personal achievement and, more generally, meritocratic principles are perceived as the main ones for life success. The short answer is that inhabitants of Bohemia and Moravia tend to believe in more meritocracy in their new social life (.46 deviation from grand mean of variance analysis), and to some extent Slovaks and Hungarians as well (.07 and .06 respectively), whereas Poles occupy the opposite pole (-.70). (More details of this problem can be found in Matějů and Tuček [1992].)

(4) Strictly political factors, namely trust in the government and satisfaction with the political system, reveal quite large variance across the region. Again, almost 45% of Czechs declare trust ("complete" or "moderate") in their government, while the other three nations have only twenty to twenty-five percent confidence in their respective governments. With respect to satisfaction with the political system, inhabitants of the Czech lands were again definitely the most satisfied (31%), while 22% of Poles, 19% of Hungarians and only 12% of Slovaks were satisfied with their systems.

Political Attitudes Interlinks

Before we move to the determinants of political attitudes, we will devote some attention to their mutual relationships. Table 1 shows the simple correlations within the group of our main dependant variables.

Table 1. Correlations within the group of dependent variables

		POLSYSAC	POLINVOL	POLPROS
REBEL	PL	-.142**	.171**	-.139**
	CZ	-.135**	.147**	-.088*
	SL	-.196**	.227**	-.136**
	H	-.157**	.178**	.7**
POLSYSAC	PL	.	.049*	.513**
	CZ	.	.050*	.526**
	SL	.	-.019	.507**
	H	.	.092**	.561**
POLINVOL	PL	.	.	.110**
	CZ	.	.	.158**
	SL	.	.	.002
	H	.	.	.137**

Explanations of signs:
** significance below .01
* significance between .01 and .05
significance over .05

The common phenomena for East-Central Europeans is that those who are satisfied with the performance of the political system (POLSYSAC) and declare their acceptance of it at the same time positively foresee the future outcomes of the system (POLPROS) -- its justice, political stability and the strength of its democratic principles. Another similar feature for the whole region (though weaker in correlation) is that those parts of the population which show lower satisfaction with the political system (POLSYSAC) are to be found more frequently among groups ready to join more or less radical forms of protest in cases of disagreement with governmental policy (REBEL). At the same time, however, the propensity to join antigovernmental protest increases with individuals' political involvement (POLINVOL). This relationship holds true for the whole region, however it is slightly stronger in Slovakia than Hungary or Poland and definitely stronger than in the Czech lands. One should also note that Slovaks differed significantly, especially when compared to Poles and Hungarians, in respect of their much higher readiness to join strikes. Finally, except for Slovakia, we find a moderately positive link between satisfaction with the political system on the one hand and political involvement on the other. Generally speaking, one may say that throughout the region, relationships between the main dependent variables are in accordance with what we know from other parts of the world. The only unexpected result is in Slovakia: the lack of links between the above-mentioned factors and the lack of a significant correlation between political prospects and political involvement. On the other hand, in the Slovak case we observe a slightly stronger relationship between the propensity to join protests and both dissatisfaction with the political system and political involvement.

Social Policy Determinants of the Propensity to Join Antigovernmental Protest

Two indicators of the readiness to join protests (REBEL), namely the willingness to participate in (a) marches and demonstrations and (b) strikes, are significantly different throughout the region (contingency coefficients -.17 and .14, respectively). The following parts of the population in each country are ready to (a) demonstrate and (b) go on strike - Slovakia: 42% and 38%; Czech Republic: 40% and 34%; Poland 33% and 28%; and Hungary: 22% and 21%.

Let us now focus our attention on the main subject of our interest - the role of social policy issues in determining the propensity for participating in this kind of antigovernmental protest. Many different factors influence readiness to join protests in East-Central Europe, but none of them alone nor any of their combinations explain the major part of the phenomenon under consideration here. Social policy factors alone only explain 2.6% in Slovakia to 6.8% in the Czech Republic. It is worth pointing out that these determinants have quite different levels of importance in particular countries; only four factors appear to be important in more than one of them: 1) feeling of alienation (ALIEN); 2) negative evaluation of the state's social policy performance (STATSEC); 3) economically based pessimism concerning one's family prospects (ECADVFAM); and 4) attitudes favoring privatization (PRIVATIZ).

More factors are country-specific. In Poland the main factor contributing to the readiness to join protest is the "threat of welfare services cost increase" (THRSOCWE), explaining almost 3% of the dependent variable variance. This affective factor -- individuals' evaluation of their future capabilities for securing adequate health services, education, housing and the general needs of their dependents -- is practically the only meaningful one. The other three (see Table 2) add only .9 percent further "explanation." An attempt to describe the "joining protest" phenomenon in Poland by adding stratification factors helps moderately. It is only AGE that matters; the younger one is, the more ready one is to join antigovernmental forms of protest. The final total of social policy and stratification variables is an explanation of 6.8% of the propensity to join protests, which means that generally AGE adds about 2.9% variance explanation to the model and this factor reveals the only direct effect. This result, even in relative terms, is a poor one for a model.

Table 2. Social Policy Determinants of Propensity to Join Protest (REBEL) (multiple stepwise regression, last step results)

	PL			CZ			SL			H		
Label	( )	beta	part	( )	beta	part	( )	beta	part	( )	beta	part
ALIEN	4	-.055	-.052							5	.064	.057
BUYINEQ	3	.075	.071									
ECADVFAM				2	-.156	-.151	1	-.167	-.161			
EGALIT										4	-.072	-.062
FAMCENSE				5	.065	.063						
FORCE				4	-.084	-.085						
ILLEG							2	.106	.105			
MERITJUS	2	-.077	-.071									
PATSTAT												
PRIVATIZ				3	.132	.131				2	.096	.093
PRIVWEL							3	.107	.104			
PROGMERI										3	-.084	-.079
STATSEC				1	-.113	-.113				1	-.075	-.073
THRSOCWE	1	.151	.142									
UNDVAL												
WEPOO										6	-.053	-.050
Variance explained		3.9%			6.8%			4.5%			3.5%	

Only variables which enter the equation at the .05 significance level are shown.
Under the column marked "( )" the order of variable entrance steps is indicated.

In the Czech Republic the most important predicting factor seems to be distrust of "the state's social safety performance" (STATSEC), which means a perception of the ineffectiveness of state institutions in the spheres of education, health care and poverty relief. Alone, this factor predicts only 2.5% of the propensity to join protests (REBEL), however when another four variables enter the equation, the

relative importance of this factor decreases (the net effect diminishes), which means that it is partly explained by the latter.

The general conclusion is that readiness to join antigovernmental protests in Bohemia and Moravia is determined to a large extent by two additional factors: attitudes towards privatization and its effects and economically rooted perceptions of one's family's prospects. The latter factor influences readiness to join protests if the prospects for advancement in the future are perceived as poor (ECADVFAM). The way attitudes towards privatization affect the willingness to join protests is more complicated. A certain pro-privatization paternalism is apparent: favoring privatization and a welfare-like solution concerning the role of the amount of unemployment benefits (FORCE) is visible among Czechs. Finally, the vision of the family's role in securing the basic needs of the elderly, children and for those experiencing financial problems (FAMCENSE) influences -- only in the configuration revealed in table 2 -- the readiness to protest. In a way this kind of family-centered view increases the propensity of antigovernmental activity. Generally speaking, Czechs' protest capability is determined mainly by their evaluation of their family's for getting ahead and the family's role in "security" activities (see partial coefficents in Table 2).

The other question we intend to answer is whether and how the social position of an individual influences this kind of protest propensity. For Bohemia and Moravia the answer is moderately positive. It is -- as in the Polish case -- AGE and individual income (INCO) that significantly influence active antigovernmental behavior. The first alone explains almost 7.2% of the readiness to protest and it is, of course, the younger part of the population that declares its willingness to participate. On the other hand, although to a considerably smaller extent, it is determined by lower personal income. Together with stratification variables, this model explains 11.2% of our dependent phenomenon variance. The overall picture thus indicates that it is not only broader social concerns -- with the evaluation of family prospects and labor market problems connected with privatization -- but also the very individual trait (as one may suspect) of personal position in relation to "important others" that are influential (note that it is not household income that matters but that of the individual).

The Slovak case is quite simple as only three factors significantly (but very moderately) influence their protest capability. However, let us recall that the Slovaks are the ones that differ among the four nations in having the widest support for protest activities. The best predictors of their readiness to protest are: (a) a pessimistic evaluation of their family's prospects for getting ahead based on the current economic situation (ECADVFAM); (b) the conviction that individual affluence in the country is achieved mainly by illegal means (ILLEG); and (c) acceptance of social welfare services' "marketization" (MARKWEL). As with the former two nations, in this case as well it is AGE that really matters in determining the propensity to join antigovernmental protest; it alone predicts almost 4.5% of the variance. Let us note that at this stage of stepwise regression the net influence of the MARKWEL factor does not exist, which might mean that there is not a very substantial layer of young people favoring general privatization

and thus favoring marketization of welfare services as well. This is reinforced by the fact that "sensitivity" to health security or educational expenses becomes important only at a certain stage of the life-cycle and/or is a real concern only of a minor part of the population. Finally, one may say that in both parts of the former Czechoslovakia the determinants of potential antigovernmental behavior are quite similar, despite the fact that these models are still unreliable as predictors of this kind of behavior because of their low explanatory value.

Hungarian willingness to protest against unpopular governmental decisions is the most coherent as a model, although it too poor is as a predictor of behavior (3.5% explanatory potential.) Generally speaking, pro-privatization and anti-egalitarian attitudes, a moderate feeling of alienation and distrust of the state's social security performance, and a lack of confidence in meritocratic principles as the common rules for getting ahead in life is the Hungarian "multidimensional cause" of possible protest activities (see Table 2). When we make an effort to place this picture in the social structure, then age and individual income again reveal their influence; the first factor alone explains 9.4% of the entire dependent variable variance. After controlling for the influence of age, the direct effects of favoring privatization, the threat of state security ineffectiveness and the perception of the rule of meritocratic principles diminishes. On the other hand, the influence of feelings of alienation increases, which means that the former three factors are partly explained by age and the latter is a truly independent one, after controlling for the effect of age. The final model, including the two socio-demographic factors, indicates that it is low personal income that directly effects readiness to join protest. Its overall explanatory capacity amounts to 12.1%.

Partial Conclusions

In all four societies social policy issues are (apart from certain deviations from this general rule) poor predictors of the propensity to join protests in cases of disagreement with government policy. Two socio-demographic factors exert considerable influence over protest readiness: age and individual income. In other words, it is the "position" in the life-cycle that determines protest activities. Let us emphasize at this point that young age as a good predictor of protest activities can be, at least partly, explained by the respondents' evaluations of and attitudes towards some of the social policy issues. Contrary to this, low individual income seems to be a quite independent factor, directly influencing the propensity to join anti-government protests. Thus, this phenomenon can be treated as determined to a certain extent by demography or generation, but a deeper search into youths' problems certainly reveals the real content of their higher readiness to protest. It is, generally speaking, both distrust of the state's effectiveness for securing the basic expectations of the population and the threat of the future situation. It concerns one's family as well as the principles ruling public life, namely the privatization process and its consequences, social justice concerning new affluence, and so on. On the other hand, it seems quite astonishing that the other analyzed socio-demographic factors (professional position, level of education, place of

residence and financial position of respondents' household) have no bearing in determinining protest activities. This is true across the entire region.

Social Policy Determinants of Satisfaction with the Political System

As indicated at the beginning of this article, the three indicators of the index of political satisfaction or, if you will, acceptance of the political system (POLSYSAC) are correlated significantly both throughout the region and in particular countries. Moreover, the inter-country differences are similarly irrespective of the factor under analysis. We have found the most optimistic figure for the evaluation of the political system to be "basically sound but needs some improvements" in the Czech Republic, which amounts to 46%, while the respective figures for Hungary, Poland and Slovakia are 42, 26 and 25 percent. As a final introductory remark, let us point out that acceptance of the political system, as expected, correlates significantly but negatively with the formerly discussed phenomenon of the propensity to join protests REBEL (for details see Table 1).

Table 3. Social Policy Determinants of Satisfaction with the Political System (POLSYSAC)
(multiple stepwise regression, last step results)

	PL			CZ			SL			H	
Label	( )	beta	part	( )	beta	part	( )	beta	part	( )	beta	part
ALIEN	3	-.155	-.163	3	-.181	-.203				2	-.217	-.218
BUYINEQ												
ECADVFAM	2	.147	.152	4	.148	.164	1	.213	.255	1	.246	.259
EGALIT										6	-.065	-.066
FAMCENSE	10	.046	.052									
FORCE	7	.071	.082									
ILLEG				7	-.075	-.083						
MERITJUS				5	.111	.121	6	.111	.112			
PATSTAT							7	.059	.066			
PRIVATIZ	6	.095	.107				5	.145	.159	7	.052	.059
PRIVWEL												
PROGMERI	1	.171	.179	2	.130	.134	2	.164	.171	3	.133	.145
STATSEC	5	.110	.126	6	.099	.122		.173	.194	5	.127	.141
THRSOCWE	4	-.113	-.111									
UNDVAL	9	-.061	-.063	1	-.263	-.278	3	-.169	-.186	4	-.117	-.128
WEPOO	8	-.054	-.057									
Variance explained		28.6%			37.2%			28.3%			30.3%	

Only variables which enter the equation at the .05 significance level are shown.
Under the column marked "( )" the order of variable entrance steps is indicated.

Our concern here is with the way social policy issues determine this satisfaction. To start with a general remark, it is necessary to indicate that these issues are much better predictors of regime acceptance than of readiness to join protests. They

"explain" about 30% (in the Czech Republic even 37%) of the dependent variable variance.

The first general comment is that the importance of the following factors is common throughout the whole region:

(a) a positive evaluation of one's family prospects (ECADVFAM), based on the "present economic situation;"

(b) a perception of progress towards more meritocratic principles determining life chances (PROGMERI);

(c) an assessment of states' social security performances as effective (STATSEC);

(d) a conviction that the government does not undervalue the provision of social security to the population (UNDVAL).

In three of the four countries two additional factors are important in determining popular attitudes towards the new regimes, namely favoring privatization (PRIVATIZ) and the more psychological factor of lack of alienation traits (ALIEN). This picture contains "categorically" different factors, i.e. alienation on the one hand, and on the other the evaluation of the economy, which are perceived both from the position of the individual (family prospects) and from the macro-perspective, i.e. attitudes towards privatization. It is also important to note that all of the above-mentioned factors except alienation are descriptive and evaluative. Among the most common factors, normative expectations (declarations of "how it should be") and emotional statements (indicating fears and challenges) are missing. Together with the lack of alienation features, this indicates that regime acceptance is to some extent determined more by cognitive than affective factors, which if true sounds promising, especially in the case of these infant democracies.

Regime satisfaction has some specific determinants in each country. In Poland the mixture of factors indicates that regime acceptance is contingent upon the positive evaluation of ones' family affluence (WEPOO) and, consequently, lack of fears concerning future increases in the costs of welfare services (THRSOCWE). In addition, the family-oriented safety net index (FAMCENSE: in case of troubles, rely mainly on family assistance) helps us understand that, at least to a certain extent, satisfaction with the new regime is determined by, broadly understood, a satisfactory family life. Despite this peculiarity, the whole model for Poland includes 11 factors explaining 28.6% of political system satisfaction (see Table 3.) However, the first two -- progress towards more meritocratic principles (PROGMERI) and positive evaluation of family prospects (ECADVFAM) -- predict almost 19.4%, and the former alone 12.9%, of the dependent variable. Finally, the most influential direct impact is revealed by a positive attitude towards privatization (PRIVATIZ) and the acceptance of a radical, anti-welfare, activating unemployment policy (FORCE) on the one hand, and the combined effect of trust in the state's social safety performance (STATSEC) with a lack of alienation traits (ALIEN), on the other.

The most impressive explanation of regime acceptance is found among the Czechs. A mere seven factors predict 37.2% of this attitude. The only peculiar

influence -- a characteristic solely of Bohemia and Moravia -- is a rejection of the statement that effective enrichment is only possible in an illegal way (ILLEG), indicating that politically satisfied Czechs believe in the justice of the economic transformation practices. In this case, however, the important point is that all of the crucial factors shown in Table 3 exert a direct effect on regime satisfaction and, at the same time, are highly intercorrelated and overlap each others influences. One should note that the main factor, the positive assessment of the government's social security provisions to the population (UNDVAL), alone explains more than 22% of the dependent variable (see Table 3.) The second factor entering the equation, progress towards meritocracy (PROGMERI), adds another 6% to the model, but then its relative influence systematically drops (see Table 3 beta coefficents.) This indicates that among Czechs the evaluation of meritocratic progress in public life can to a large extent be derived from the other factors constituting the presented model. The biggest drop in its influence occurs when the following two factors enter the regression equation: (1) acceptance of meritocratic justice concerning incomes (MERITJUS), which among others shows that the revealed dependence between POLSYSAC and PROGMERI is not accidental; and (2) lack of fears concerning a future increase in social welfare costs (THRSOCWE). Generally speaking, Czechs' regime acceptance seems to be determined mainly by the evaluation of the state's social policy performance and the scope of meritocratic principles' influence upon public life.

It is interesting to see how satisfaction with the political system is differentiated nationally within the same state - within the former Czechoslovakia. While the models for both parts of the former federation resemble one another, the differences are worth noting. First, in Slovakia feelings of alienation (ALIEN) and concern with unjust transformation practices (ILLEG) are completely absent as potential causes of regime dissatisfaction. Second, there are differences in the perception of the state as a paternalistic social warrant (PATSTAT) is an important factor. Third, as in the Czech lands, the direct effect of all factors included in the model is higher than their combination with the others. However, the main explanatory variable is the positive evaluation of family prospects based on the economic situation of the country (ECADVFAM), which alone contributes 12.7% to regime acceptance prediction. Fourth, in Slovakia regime acceptance is partly contingent upon the stratification traits of individuals; first of all age, then education and (to a certain extent) professional position, with the older, more educated and those occupying managerial positions being satisfied with the new political system. In this case, one may speak of the two-fold influence of age: first, that it has a partial independent effect of its own (after controlling for the other factors in the model, above all pro-privatization attitudes and higher education); and second, that the general influence of age (together with all other possible correlates of age) is a rather poor predictor of regime satisfaction (the "pure" correlation coefficent with POLSYSAC is only .08, the final step "partial" coefficent is .18.) The overall model explains 28.3 percent of Slovak regime support. The factors included in it reveal that the acceptance of the new system will depend mainly on its effectiveness in solving social problems, in safeguarding the

meritocratic rules for getting ahead in life and its efficiency in contributing to family well-being and prospects for the future. Emphasis should also be placed on the fact that the determinants of satisfaction with the political system in Slovakia are determined mainly by factors which are "evaluative descriptions" of reality and not affective or normative declarations.

The Hungarian model of the discussed political phenomena resembles the previous one particularly closely, with two exceptions. In Hungary the feeling of alienation (ALIEN) and the attitude towards egalitarian policies (EGALIT) contribute to the prediction of regime support. In the case of alienation, of course, the causal arrow flies the other way as well, nevertheless feelings of alienation alone explains almost 16% of our dependent variable. Half of this influence can be explained by the first and main factor, namely the evaluation of family prospects (ECADVFAM). The final model indicates that satisfaction with the new regime, which is lowest in this country, seems to be determined more than in the other countries of the region by individual normative visions of, and attitudes towards, macroeconomic changes and the evaluation of personal chances within this transformed economy (see Table 3.) On the other hand, the more descriptive evaluations of current social safety performance UNDVAL and STATSEC are of moderate importance, explaining relatively more after controlling for other factors. In the Hungarian case, adding the stratification variables to the equation improves the fitness of the model by some 3 percent, to 33.1%. Among these the most influential is older age, which has a direct effect on the residual variation of regime support separate from the influence of the other factors in the model. Additionally, the influences of age and alienation are, to a large extent, separate influences. In other words, it is an "inter-generational" alienation that can hardly be attributed to any age group that effects regime support in Hungary.

Partial conclusions

In East Central Europe, attitudes and evaluations of social policy issues explains about one-third of the satisfaction with the new political system. As indicated above, there are both peculiar factors and common ones. The country-specific influences are not very strong if one analyses them from the "content" point of view. It is important to emphasize, however, that factors affecting satisfaction with the political system might differ in their ontological character, i.e. differ between those factors that describe and evaluate the current reality and those that reveal the normative visions of reality. This seems to be important.

The crucial question here is: "What other than social policy issues influences the discussed phenomenon?" The first group is a purely economic one: the problem of changes in individuals' wealth and income since democratization started. The data from the same study, presented elsewhere [Toka 1992], indicate that decrease in material wealth has by far the largest effect on political satisfaction after controlling for other influences. The experience of unemployment, whether one's own or that of a member of one's close family, determines a .14 point lower mean score on the index of political satisfaction, but its direct effect is rather poor. Comparing the subjective assessment of past and

future "economic" experiences and prospects, we should note that the latter are definitely more important. On the other hand, people in East-Central Europe also differ in their past political affiliations and more broadly in their evaluation of the socialist past. Generally speaking, the attitudes towards and assessments of the situation in these countries around 1975 show that people with positive, "sweet" memories of the past tend to be more critical and dissatisfied with the new political system. It should also be emphasized that former communist party membership did not have any significant effect on this. Taken together, attitudes toward the political past should be treated solely as a factor moderating satisfaction with the new democratic regimes.

Social Policy Determinants of Political Involvement

The significance of involvement in politics is of the utmost importance in the new democracies both for the citizens themselves and for the overall legitimacy of the system. A detailed analysis of its determinants has been presented elsewhere [Markowski 1992], so here we will focus only on the most general traits of the picture. In all four countries social policy issues are poor determinants of this kind of involvement; they explain only from 2.0 to 8.5 percent of the dependent variable.

The description that follows will be a negative one, that is, it will depict political indifference. Among the factors under consideration, only egalitarian attitudes, feelings of alienation and (with the exception of Slovakia) perceptions of unjust practices for new enrichment decrease the readiness to participate in public affairs. The specific important factors for each country can be summarized as follows:

(a) In Poland a negative assessment of family prospects, a lack of confidence in the state's social security performance, the threat of the marketization of social welfare service, and anti-privatization attitudes determine people's apathy towards political problems.

(b) In the Czech lands the particular influences upon citizens' indifference are revealed by the rejection of what we call the "social inequalities in purchasing" (BUYINEQ) and the perception of progress towards greater meritocracy (PROGMERI) in the country. The impact of the latter taken by itself is almost nonexistent. Only after the removal of other factors' influences is some .01% added to the predictive value of the model.

(c) The Slovak case need not be interpreted, as social policy issues do not explain political indifference at all.

(d) In Hungary, two factors connected with the evaluation of one's financial capabilities (THRSOCWE and WEPOO) seem to be of relative importance, although their directions are different. The negative assessment of respondents' family wealth effects withdrawal from political involvement, while on the other hand the threat of an increase in the costs of social welfare services contributes to higher political involvement. We should add, however, that the latter dependency is true only within the variable configuration presented in Table 4. In

other cases people afraid of increases in welfare costs are more frequently to be found among the politically apathetic part of the population.

Table 4. Social Policy Determinants of Political Involvement (POLINV) (multiple stepwise regression, last step results)

	PL			CZ			SL			H		
Label	( )	beta	part	( )	beta	part	( )	beta	part	( )	beta	part
ALIEN	4	-.079	-.074	2	-.122	-.116	3	-.077	-.076	2	-.115	-.103
BUYINEQ				3	.088	.084						
ECADVFAM	3	.066	.063									
EGALIT	1	-.139	-.125	1	-.122	-.111	1	-.085	-.084	1	-.190	-.170
FAMCENSE												
FORCE												
ILLEG	6	.062	.057	7	-.064	-.059				4	.061	.057
MERITJUS												
PATSTAT												
PRIVATIZ	5	.059	.056	6	.074	.072						
PRIVWEL	2	.084	.081							6	.049	.049
PROGMERI				4	-.111	-.100						
STATSEC	7	.055	.055									
THRSOCWE				5	-.103	-.094				5	.060	.057
UNDVAL							2	.100	.098			
WEPOO												
Variance explained		4.9%			8.5%			2.0%			7.6%	

Only variables which enter the equation at the .05 significance level are shown.
Under the column marked "( )" the order of variable entrance steps is indicated.

The phenomenon of political involvement is more strongly determined throughout the region by socio-demographic factors than was the case in the previously described political attitudes. More importantly it is purely "achieved status" factors (level of education and professional position) that predict a considerable portion of political involvement variation. Both factors are obviously highly correlated, so a vast part of their influence overlaps. Nevertheless, in all four societies it is the level of education that matters more than managerial position; taken alone the former factor explains from 4.5% in Slovakia, through almost 6% in Poland and the Czech Republic, up to 8.1% in Hungary. Of course, higher education's impact upon political involvement can also be explained by more detailed social factors, primarily by pro-privatization and anti-egalitarian attitudes.

Social Policy Determinants of Political Prospects

This index (POLPROS) consists of broadly understood indicators of politics (see Table of Indices.) It measures the general attitude toward the future of each society, not only its political subsystem. Such factors as perceptions of the near future (within two years, i.e. to the end of 1993) social justice, assessment of the

probability of mass eruptions of discontent and a weakening of democracy are all strong correlates of political stability and the previously described attitude of satisfaction with the political system (POLSYSAC). Let us recall that the correlation between these two indices was the highest (see Table 1) and considerably exceeded 0.5. In a case with such a high correlation the suspicion that both indexes measure the same phenomenon might be reasonable. In fact, many of the same factors are responsible for political regime acceptance as for optimistic political prospects. The most important in the region as a whole are:

(a) a lack of alienation features;
(b) a perception of progress towards meritocracy;
(c) a positive assessment of family prospects;
(d) a positive evaluation of the state's social security performance; and
(e) a conviction that the incumbent government is caring for the population's social security provision.

Table 5. Social Policy Determinants of Political Prospects (POLPROS) (multiple stepwise regression, last step results)

	PL			CZ			SL			H		
Label	( )	beta	part	( )	beta	part	( )	beta	part	( )	beta	part
ALIEN	2	-.157	-.165	3	-.154	-.174	5	-.118	-.132	1	-.215	-.216
BUYINEQ										7	.058	.066
ECADVFAM	5	.106	.113	5	.102	.112	6	.101	.106	2	.184	.193
EGALIT										5	-.174	-.158
FAMCENSE												
FORCE	10	.048	.056									
ILLEG	7	-.084	-.087									
MERITJUS				4	.086	.091	3	.137	.144	10	.053	.051
PATSTAT	9	-.052	-.057									
PRIVATIZ				8	.049	.058						
PRIVWEL	8	.052	.058									
PROGMERI	3	.120	.122	7	.075	.082				4	.157	.171
STATSEC	6	.104	.118	6	.093	.113	4	.121	.138	6	.078	.089
THRSOCWE	1	-.173	-.171	2	-.215	-.225	1	-.230	-.232	3	-.156	-.170
UNDVAL	4	-.133	-.138	1	-.231	-.238	2	-.188	-.194	8	-.052	-.048
WEPOO										9	-.045	-.051
Variance explained		30.6%			37.3%			25.7%			33.4%	

Only variables which enter the equation at the .05 significance level are shown.
Under the column marked "( )" the order of variable entrance steps is indicated.

If we now concentrate on differences between the groups of independent variables shown in Tables 3 and 5, we note the following items. First, except in Hungary the most important determinant of political prospects (POLPROS) seems to be anxiety about an increase in social welfare costs (THRSOCWE), which alone predicts from about 14 percent of the variance in Slovakia and Poland to 20% in

Bohemia and Moravia. It is important to recall at this point that this factor as a determinant of regime acceptance (POLSYSAC) is important only in Poland. Second, attitudes towards privatization did matter in the case of satisfaction with the political system, but do not (except in the Czech Republic) in the case of political prospects. Third, in all countries of the region, the evaluation of incumbent governments' care for social security provisions influences both political phenomena under consideration here, but among Czechs and Slovaks this factor affects the perception of the political future definitely more strongly than in the other two societies (alone they explain 22.8 and 11.6% of the variance, respectively).

Finally, if we focus on the peculiarities of the determinants of political prospects in each country, it seems that besides the points indicated above, emphasis should be placed on the following:

(a) In Poland, unlike in the other three countries, the relatively important factors in constructing the explanatory model for optimistic political prospects are the lack of suspicion that enrichment in the country is possible mainly by illegal means (ILLEG), acceptance of the commercialization of social welfare services (PRIVWEL), confidence in the state as the main guarantor of social security (PATSTAT) and acceptance of a radical, anti-welfare, activating unemployment policy (FORCE). In other words, the more a person is market-oriented and confident in the state's role as guarantor of both basic social rights and a just micro-economic policy, the more likely he or she is to perceive an optimistic political future, and it is, of course, vice versa for the pessimistic vision.

(b) Hungarian optimism concerning this matter was determined -- apart from the common important influences found elsewhere in the region -- mainly by anti-egalitarian attitudes (EGALIT), acceptance of the -- as we term it -- "social inequalities purchase" (BUYINEQ) and conviction of the relative affluence of one's own family (WEPOO).

(c) Based on what we see in Table 5, there is nothing particularly peculiar to emphasize about the Czechs or Slovaks. In both cases, optimistic political prospects are explained by more or less the same group of factors that are important for the whole of East Central Europe and listed above.

Finally, one should note that, quite unexpectedly, the phenomenon that is ontologically located in the future -- prospects of a country's political development -- is not determined by normative descriptions (visions of how things should be), but mainly by the affective components of attitudes (anxieties, deeper mental dispositions like alienation) and to some extent by subjective descriptions of the current reality. As indicated in Table 5, the models for each country differ in their "explanatory capability," ranging from 25.7% in Slovakia to 37.3% in the Czech Republic. With the addition of socio-demographic factors the models do not improve significantly, except maybe for that of Hungary, where the age factor exerts a strong net effect (optimistic political prospects are revealed by older groups of the population) and improves the model by 2.2%. In the other three countries the direct effect of age is visible as well, however it is not as significant as

in Hungary. It is worthy of note that East-Central European youths are pessimistic about the near political future. In addition to the previously presented relations between younger age and readiness to join radical forms of protest and dissatisfaction with the new regimes, the political mood among the younger parts of the population can be described as potentially explosive.

Concluding Remarks

Social policy factors can be treated as good predictors of two out of the four political phenomena analyzed here. Satisfaction with the political system and the general vision of political prospects are considerably determined by issues which are either pure social policy and welfare matters or are their close economic and socio-political correlates. On the other hand, one of the most crucial political problems of the new democracies, the scope of popular tolerance for the (more or less expected) failures of the incumbent governments, measured in our survey by the "propensity to join protest" index, can hardly be explained by our list of social policy issue factors. Relatively more is added to the understanding of protest activities when we look at its causes from a more structural perspective, but even in this case factors of "achieved status" (educational level, professional position, etc.) do not matter at all or only slightly. Only the selected "hidden correlates of young age" -- a lack of confidence in the state's role as a guarantor of social security and the effective agent of just principles of attainment in public life -- are significant.

Satisfaction with the political system is determined mainly by broadly understood economic factors and their social policy consequences, but the subjective assessment of the current economic processes matter more than the objective traits of an individual. The vision of an optimistic future concerning politics is strongly related to the current evaluation of politics and regime support. On the other hand, however, dissatisfaction with it does not necessarily increase the readiness to participate in protest activities. At least one can identify social policy factors as being equally responsible for both.

As a final, methodological remark it should be pointed out that many simple correlations of social policy issues and political attitudes are of a vague and spurious character. Especially in the case of "objective" socio-demographic factors, it is useful to look for their detailed "consciousness correlates;" in other words it is the specific features of young age, higher education and managerial position that directly influence political attitudes, not so much broad notions of generational experience or simply "better" knowledge legitimized by official diplomas.

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Table of Indices

Label Content (and questionnaire items):

ALIEN: feeling of alienation in public life (V18 - power elites take advantage of people, V19 - ones' opinions do not count, V20 - individual is left alone).

BUYINEQ: acceptance of the right to "purchase social inequalites" (V36 - possibility to buy a better medical care, V41 - right to buy better education, V49 - one should live in a flat s/he can afford).

ECADVFAM: positive evaluation of family prospects (advancement) (V27 - present economic situation favorable for the family).

EGALIT: pro-egalitarian attitudes (V14 - reduce income differences, V21 - people can earn millions, V26 - differences in incomes and property only small, V47 - all pensions should be equal).

FAMCENSE: family centered security (warranting basic needs) (V44 - old people first of all cared by own family, V48 - child care without state assistance, V55 - family help first in case of financial troubles).

FORCE: acceptance of radical, anti-welfare, activating unemployment policy (V32 - unemployment benefits kept at low level to force people to look for a job).

ILLEG: effective individual enrichment mainly by illegal means (V25 - people get rich here mainly in an illegal way).

MERITJUS: acceptance of meritocratic justice (V21 - it is right that some people earn millions, V22 - people are responsible for their poverty, V24 - competent people should have the possibility to earn a lot of money).

PATSTAT: state as main security institution (warranting basic needs) (V45 - child allowances high enough to cover all expenses of children, V46 - state contribution to the costs of dwellings for the poor, V56 - state help first in case of financial troubles).

PRIVATIZ: pro-privatization attitudes (V8 - favoring privatization of different public institutions).

PRIVWEL: acceptance of social welfare services commercialization (V37 - medical treatment paid directly by patients, V38 - expectation of more paid medical services, V40 - students should pay tuition covering a great deal of their education costs).

PROGMERI: perception of progress towards more meritocracy (V16 - eight items indicating that meritocratic factors (education, ambition, hard work, willingness to take risks) are becoming more important).

STATSEC: positive assessment of state's social safety performance (V52 - state schools provide good education, V53 - sufficient medical treatment in present state institutions, V54 - poor people can rely on state assistance).

THRSOCWE: threat of an increase in the costs of social welfare services (V39 - fears of inability to secure means for necessary medical treatment, V43 - in future may be difficult to secure education, V50 - in future more difficult to

secure needs of children and elderly, V51 - deterioration of housing situation in the future).

UNDVAL: (V58 - present government undervalues the provision of social security to the population).

WEPOO: (V28 - compared to others, own family perceived as poor).

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The Social Structure of Soviet-Type Societies, Its Collapse and Legacy

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Abstract: Soviet-type social systems in East-Central Europe can be characterized by the functional interdependence of totalitarian and anti-meritocratic types of vertical social differentiation. Anti-meritocratic relationships involve strong egalitarian elements operating in favor of less qualified individuals and groups as well as undeserved privileges for the "nomenklatura" and its political supporters. In the history of these countries two important changes occurred that modified their general social characteristics: the defeated attempt at reform that temporarily strengthened the stratification elements which had reached their peak in the 1960s and the emergence of the "second society" in the 1980s. Relevant for a grasp of the substantial aspects of the social structures typical for Soviet-type societies are sociological approaches stressing: a) power differentiation; b) the "second society" as an emerging nucleus of a standard class society; c) neo-Weberian and/or neo-Marxist class categorizations; d) socio-economic status indices revealing social stratification; and e) a multidimensional view of social status accenting status consistency/inconsistency. A brief overview of the reasons for the collapse of communism and of its "legacies" in the case of Czechoslovakia demonstrates the strong influence of this social system on the post-communist transformation.
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By Soviet-type societies we mean European state socialist societies, not the Asiatic, African and Latin-American societies that are ruled by Communists. Non-European communist social systems have substantially different characteristics and functions, due primarily to their pre-industrial versus the European industrial conditions. Among the European state-socialist societies, we will concentrate on the East-Central group, particularly on Czechoslovakia and then the Czech Republic. We will focus on the vertical dimension of social structure, i.e. on problems of social stratification and/or class structure, including their subjective aspects (attitudes, beliefs and value orientations.) We will argue that the specificity of the stratification dimension is the most typical characteristic of state-socialist social structure and that its change is decisive for the present qualitative system change generally called the post-communist transformation. The analysis of our main topic is presented in the parts two through four and introduced by some notes concerning the genesis of the state-socialist system in East-Central Europe in part one. Keeping in mind the significance of this topic for the post-communist transformation, in parts five and six we present a brief overview of the effects of the development of the state socialist structure on the collapse of communism and on the first stages of the post-communist transformation.

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1. Genesis of the Soviet-Type System

One of the assumptions of current social analyses of Soviet-type societies and their present fates is that, at least in East-Central Europe, communism was an enforced regime of oppression. [Dahrendorf 1990] There is no doubt that the influence of the powerful Soviet Union as one of the main victors of World War II, coupled with the presence of the Red Army in nearly all the countries in question, was one of the decisive factors leading to the installation of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe in the second half of the 1940s. It is also clear that in these countries undemocratic and violent means were used in the installation of communist regimes and that massive oppression of political opposition was then applied. On the other hand, one must not forget that large parts of the Eastern and Central European societies sincerely welcomed the liberating mission of the Soviet Union in 1944-1945 and that many people saw in it a strong argument in favor of communism. At the same time, there was a general post-war shift in favor of parties of the left in Europe, i.e. towards Socialist, Social Democratic, Labor and Communist parties. Many in Eastern and Central Europe considered communism to be the solution to the problem of social injustice that clearly existed in pre-war social systems and was in certain ways exacerbated by the German occupation. In some cases, a strong pre-war egalitarian tradition existed in the working class, especially in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia.

In 1946, without the presence of the Soviet Army, over 40% of voters in the Czech lands (Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia) supported the Communists. (This was not the case in Slovakia, where the Democratic Party was victorious.) By 1947, however, undemocratic means were being used in a power struggle, particularly in connection with Prague's centralist intervention that was the main cause of a power shift in favor of the Communists in Slovakia. The use of undemocratic means peaked in February 1948 and in the months following the take over of power. During the following forty years no other free elections enabled the population to express their real attitudes towards the Communist regime. Continuing the practice of intervention begun in 1947 (e.g. in the case of the forced Czechoslovak refusal to join the Marshall plan), the Soviet party leadership and government started immediately after the victory of the Communists to dictate the foreign as well as domestic policy of Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, the Communists received a relatively broad and active level of support for their monopolistic regime from much of society, particularly among the industrial workers and small peasantry.[1]

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[1]) In a public opinion poll from March 1990, after a two month campaign in the mass media depicting the events of February 1948 as a mere putsch by the Communist leadership in Prague and Moscow, 43% respondents agreed with this interpretation. Only a small minority of 5% believed that these events constituted a revolutionary upheaval followed by construction of a socially just society. However, even after four decades of bad experience of communism, 45% of people still agreed that in February 1948 there was a revolutionary upheaval in Czechoslovakia that stemmed from the will of the majority, but was later misused and led to bad ends. (5% did not know, and 2% were of another opinion.) [Archive of the Institute of Public Opinion Research, Prague.]

These concrete historical circumstances have not been brought up in order to justify the foreign intervention, which was quite strong in all the countries in question, or the political pressure and violence used by the domestic victors, in many countries against a clear majority of the population. By no means does this discussion aim to justify the egalitarian background of communism, but wishes only to emphasize the historical fact that, parallel to external pressure and domestic oppression, relatively strong internal social forces also more or less participated in the installation of communist systems in Central and Eastern European countries after World War II. This fact is important for understanding the nature of the social system of "real socialism" and of the serious problems of the post-communist social transformation.

The myth about the Soviet Union as the guarantor of national liberation for Eastern and Central European countries gradually vanished from people's minds as a consequence of the bad experience with its "leading role" within the group of the socialist countries. The same holds for the assumption that communist systems can be reformed on a democratic basis. Both these hopes died in the Czech lands after the Soviet occupation of August 1968, but the egalitarian aspirations of people who supported the installation of the Communist regime nevertheless lived on and became a deeply rooted component of the social and cultural tradition in all former state socialist countries. [Mokrzycki 1992]

2. General Social Characteristics of the Soviet-Type System

Many different approaches and theoretical concepts have emerged to explain the nature of "real socialism" and particularly its class differentiation and/or stratification in sociological terms. This study continues previous attempts to classify these concepts and approaches. [see e.g. Szelényi and Treiman 1991, and Andorka 1992] We believe that the ideologically biased "theoretical" concepts of official sociology in the state socialist countries can be left aside here. It is well known that these "theories" depicted the societies in question as consisting of two non-antagonistic classes of workers and cooperative peasants that, with their "service stratum" - the intelligentsia, were rapidly moving toward social homogeneity. [Rutkevič 1982] An explicit critique of these theories was presented in an article published in this journal shortly after the political changes of November 1989. [Alan et al. 1990] In this connection it was also shown that in the official sociology of the state socialist countries, particularly in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, this kind of "theorizing" ruled without opposition until the second half of the 1980s.

Let us begin then with the most common approach stressing the political aspects of the state socialist system. There is a long tradition of criticism of communism as an undemocratic, totalitarian and bureaucratic system,[2] based on strong historical and also partly sociological evidence. [Inkeles, Bauer 1959] This approach became a part of sociological theory after the publication of Milovan

[2]) Bureaucracy in these discussions is conceived primarily in the Marxian, rather than Weberian, sense.

Djilas' *The New Class*[3] [Djilas 1957]. After the open oppression of the reform movements in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, the assumption concerning the totalitarian character of the social system in state socialist countries was confirmed. The principal components of the definition of Soviet-type totalitarianism are well-known: the absolute political monopoly of the highly centralized and hierarchized Communist Party, which can be termed a "partocracy;" the strong influence of a party, state, and economic bureaucracy with their predominantly irrational; and the ruling and redistributive role of a class-like social group usually called the "nomenklatura." All these traits of the social and political system in the state-socialist countries are indisputable. Certainty about the importance of the power dimension in social stratification and very often the assumption that it represents an axis of a class-like social differentiation grew from this.

Despite the nearly universal agreement about the importance of power differentiation, this knowledge was not rich enough from the sociological point of view. Historical, economic and, some years after the origin of the socialist states, also empirical sociological evidence showed clearly that true egalitarianism (not just one ideologically declared and artificially enforced from above) had to be taken into account. This was particularly true in Czechoslovakia, where the full expropriation of both large and small owners, the policy of promoting people with working class origins and Communist party membership as well as the distribution of rewards in favor of manual laborers and less qualified people peaked in the first half of the 1950s. Czechoslovakia became one of the most egalitarian European countries, which led Czechoslovak sociologists to an open denial of the Stalinist "class approach" and to an explicit critique of the egalitarian and bureaucratic system as the main obstacle to positive developments in society. [Machonin et al. 1969]

From this perspective, it became clear that the processes which led to the formation of a Soviet-type society in Czechoslovakia were based on complementary and mutually supporting antidemocratic and egalitarian motivations and tendencies. The true victors in February 1948 were not only the new bureaucratic rulers, but also relatively broad strata of the less qualified population, primarily but not exclusively manual laborers in certain industries. The satisfaction of the interests of the small peasantry and landless persons who obtained land after the revolution of 1945 and once again after the February events of 1948 also played an important role. The Communists had strong support among the new inhabitants of the borderland who acquired fortunes left there by the transferred Sudeten Germans. Since that time, the redistributive, non-market system of the Czechoslovak economy operated in favor of less qualified, less competent and less productive people. These groups provided social and political

3) One of the most sophisticated sociological analyses following this tradition is Shkaratan's concept of "etacratism", which combines the accent on the power dimension of social status with an analysis of privileges distributed along estate-like or caste-like social strata. [Shkaratan 1990]

support for the new rulers, which became the main source both for the functioning of and a certain kind of legitimation of, the communist system.

With the defeat of the democratic and pro-market reform connected with the 1968 Prague Spring and the consequent "normalization" under Soviet occupation, sociologists needed a more general concept of the nature of the Soviet-type social system. Further empirical and theoretical study showed that the original, relatively narrow bureaucratic stratum consisting of party functionaries and former workers developed into a relatively numerous class-like ruling group, usually called the "nomenklatura." Under the totalitarian system, egalitarianism became an instrument of broad social corruption providing social support for the "nomenklatura." In Czechoslovakia, it operated as "compensation" for the foreign occupation of the 1970s and 1980s. However, the ruling group simultaneously rigidified the unjust tendency hidden in egalitarianism and created a stable anti-meritocratic allocation policy and earnings distribution that operated in their favor as well as that of their political and social allies. Therefore we now see "real socialism" as a totalitarian and anti-meritocratic system with an accent on the functional connection between the two aspects of this concept.

This anti-meritocratism does not mean a negation of egalitarianism. On the contrary, egalitarianism -- operating in favor of less well qualified people[4] -- is in principle anti-meritocratic or, in other words, unjust. (Compare this with Mokrzycki's discussion on socialist privileges as a systemic characteristic of "real socialism" in [Mokrzycki 1991].) On the other hand, anti-meritocratism is also not a synonym for egalitarianism. It also encompasses undeserved upwardly mobile careers, high rewards, authoritarian power positions and other undeserved privileges (often illegal and always immoral) for people with a certain class or political background and/or individual political "qualifications." This final phenomenon means not only Communist Party membership but, in most cases, specific political merits proven by experience. In Czechoslovakia, after the massive persecutions of the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s and again after the defeat of the "Prague Spring" in the early 1970s, the politically "reliable" but (as a rule) incompetent "cadres" were rewarded with the posts of the dismissed, high salaries and other privileges.

In this sense, we can partly agree with Szelényi and Manchin's argument that redistribution in state socialism could lead to an increase in inequality. [Szelényi 1978, Szelényi and Manchin 1987] However, in our opinion, the anti-egalitarian tendencies of the redistributive economy under state socialism did not prevail on a

4) By this we mean in favor of unskilled and semi-skilled workmen rather than skilled ones; in favor of skilled workers rather than non-manual working people (i.e., in favor of manual work as a whole when compared to non-manual); in favor of "productive" rather than "non-productive;" in favor of routine non-manual work rather than the professions; in favor of lower professional groups rather than higher professionals; etc.

large scale. Egalitarianism remained the mass basis of anti-meritocratic value structures.[5]

Thus explained, the anti-meritocratic character of social differentiation in real socialism is closely connected to the nature and basic social functions of communist revolutions and of the social order installed by them. Other important characteristics of the communist social system -- such as the restraint of market relationships and the replacement of many of their functions with the operations of a distributive economy -- cannot be grasped without understanding in whose favor the distribution worked. In this connection, the limited market character of the economy, the abolition of private property (almost total in Czechoslovakia under communism), etc. are only the secondary means used to achieve the primary goal, which consisted of an anti-meritocratic way of distributing occupational positions, incomes, fortunes and privileges.

The egalitarian and anti-meritocratic character of the state socialist system became evident to many sociologists in the second half of the 1980s.[6] Ironically, the awareness of the important role played by "socialist" egalitarianism is increasing, particularly after the crucial political changes at the end of the 1980s and the start of economic reform. (See direct and indirect proofs[7] in [Kende 1992, Kolósi and Róna-Tas 1992, Domanski and Heyns 1992, Večerník 1992a, 1992b, 1993a, and Machonin and Tuček 1992b].) The need for solutions to the actual problems of the post-communist transformation (in this case, the problems of de-equalization connected with radical economic reform) is forcing social scientists to examine the past more deeply because of the unexpectedly high degree to which it is influencing the present and menacing future developments.

3. Historical and National Specificities

The communist system prevailed in the state socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe for over forty years. It is not wise to neglect the history of these social systems, including the different waves in which the main tendency connected

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5) All the data concerning Czechoslovakia, with the partial exception of the late 1950s and the 1960s, show the strong prevalence of egalitarian tendencies in the distribution of rewards under state socialism. [Večerník 1991, Krejčí 1972, and Machonin 1992] The same is valid, in the long run, for Poland [Domanski 1992, Adamski 1990] and for the Soviet Union under Brezhnev. [Gordon 1987] The housing policy in the Czech lands, on the basis of which Iván Szelényi argued for de-equalization processes in Hungary, gave an advantage to workers, technicians in industry, and party and state administrators (including the army and security services) for many years, by assigning them inexpensive state flats. Most professionals had no choice but to participate in housing cooperatives or build their own houses, which was much more expensive. The consequences of this typically anti-meritocratic system are still in operation now.

6) This is clear in the work of Petr Matějů who, as a passionate student of social stratification in the American tradition, could come to no other conclusion than that of a strong critique of the "de-stratification" of the Czechoslovak society. [Matějů 1990]

7) By indirect proof we mean empirical analyses showing that, after the crucial political changes in the years 1989-1990, inequality is increasing in comparison with the past.

with the nature of the communist system came into being.[8] At least two such historical changes introduced certain elements into the social life of these countries which pertain to the issues analyzed in this paper.

The first of the changes came in the late 1950s and lasted until the late 1960s (in Hungary and Poland perhaps until the first half of the 1970s) and was a time marked by reform attempts in the Soviet-type societies. In this period moderate democratization tendencies, with their culmination in the Prague Spring of 1968, were closely connected to some elements of economic and cultural modernization and meritocratization.[9] [Strmiska 1989] These new phenomena brought a limited rise in the stratification elements which were reflected in the Czechoslovak stratification and mobility survey of 1967 [Machonin et al. 1969, Machonin 1992] and later in the Hungarian sociological literature as well. [Konrad and Szelényi 1981] The frustration of the hopes raised by the Prague Spring was reflected in sociological works which presented a sober, critical evaluation of post-war social developments in Czechoslovakia and in other East-Central and East European countries. [Krejčí 1972, Kende, Strmiska 1984]

The second important wave of changes came in the 1980's, and was qualitatively new. From its beginning in Poland, it was clear that the reform attempts of the 1980's were merely an overture to the introduction of more fundamental changes. The struggle for democracy in Poland, the new wave of economic reforms in Hungary, and "perestroika" with its unintentional consequences in the Soviet Union all paved the way for new social arrangements in the state socialist societies. Even in "normalized" Czechoslovakia some important new economic, social, cultural and ultimately political phenomena in unofficial life merged in the 1980s, clearly overstepping the barriers of the Soviet-type system.[10]

The most courageous and theoretically inspirational sociological ideas concerning this period of crucial changes came from the Polish literature, which concentrated on social and political processes [Adamski 1993],[11] and the Hungarian literature dealing with the "second society." [Hankiss 1988, Szelényi 1986, Kolosi 1988] The idea of a meritocratic and more democratic social arrangement discussed in the 1960s was, under the particular conditions of the

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8) In our opinion, the core of the "misunderstanding" inherent in the discussion concerning the results of the Czechoslovak stratification survey of 1969 lies in the critics' attempt to falsify the empirical findings from the 1960s using evidence from the 1980s. This evidence is very important for the recognition of the long-term trajectory of development of the state-socialist societies, but is not fully valid for the specific historical situation of the 1960s. [Boguszak et al. 1990 and Machonin and Petrusek 1991]

9) These new traits were connected with the vision of the "convergence" of capitalism and socialism.

10) The first sociologist who noticed these in Czechoslovakia was R. Roško in his analysis of the domestic work segment. [Roško 1986] An analysis of the new situation, focusing on changes coming from family life, can be found in Ivo Možný's "Why So Easy?" [Možný 1991]

11) The empirically based theoretical contribution of systematic research work of the team of outstanding Polish sociologists from the 1980s has been presented in a synthetic publication edited by W. Adamski. [Adamski et al. 1993]

time, a call for reform, i.e. for a more human form of state socialism, while the idea of the second society clearly aimed at an alternative society based on market principles. The Polish contribution was the model of a democracy without the "leading role" of the Communist party. In accordance with the specific nature of Kádár's economic reforms, the Hungarian approach aimed at connecting the second society with the emerging private economic sector and with the expansion of market relations. In both cases the emerging second society, whether in the economic or political spheres, was gradually at least partly acknowledged or tolerated by official authorities, and sufficiently institutionalized.

Nothing like this happened in Czechoslovakia, as only in the second half of the 1980s some very faint nuclei of officially tolerated individual or family private economic activities appeared. In politics, the small number of dissidents was persecuted, and diffident attempts to renew reform on the basis of the "perestroika" ideology were resolutely refused. In culture, no liberal tendencies were admitted. There were no officially tolerated economic, political or cultural institutions developing activities opposed to the totalitarian and anti-meritocratic system. Nevertheless, in our opinion, the theory of a "second society" can also be applied to the Czechoslovak case. Relatively extensive private economic activities on an unofficial, individual and mainly family basis developed partly with official toleration, and partly in the sphere of the "gray economy." [Roško 1986] Many cooperative managers and some state or communal enterprise managers tried to do business that benefited them personally and often also their subordinates and their "micro-institutions." Most families, having lost hope in the possibility of improving their material and cultural levels on an official basis, shut themselves off from official life and concentrated on creating better conditions and a more attractive life-style for themselves using their own forces. Work at home became one substantial means of achieving a better standard of living. Social conciousness at the unofficial level dissociated itself totally from official ideology, especially after the frustration of hopes connected with the beginning of "perestroika" in the Soviet Union. In general all these phenomena, as described by Ivo Možný [1991], can be viewed as an unofficial, i.e. not macro-institutionalized, second society. The lack of macro-institutionalization was at the microstructural level, where the second society functioned, and was replaced by the development of interpersonal contacts that led to the creation of an extensive social network.

The existence of a "second society," even in the extreme case of Czechoslovakia where it was not officially acknowledged, is very important for the solution to the question concerning the actors in the democratic revolution and in the post-comunist transformation as a whole. Some authors stress the assumed absence of social groups prepared for this role within the communist system [Touraine 1991, Mink and Szurek 1992] and argue that the future of the transfomation processes is uncertain. However, as our analysis shows, even in Czechoslovakia there were social groups who were prepared to actively participate in the restructuring of the society, as well as numerous other groups prepared to accept the coming changes. However, these empirically existing groups are difficult to define using traditional class or stratification categories.

In addition to temporal variations, apparent variations caused by country specificity must also be mentioned. They arise from the different paths taken by individual countries in the time prior to state socialism including, among others, differing levels of industrial maturity, cultural and educational levels, experiences with democracy and different positions and forms of participation in World War II. Varying trajectories during the establishment of communist power and in the period of communist rule (including the timing and forms of resistance) also play an important role. The specific nature of the individual Soviet-type societies in question affected the decline of Communist rule in varying ways that should not be overlooked as important determinants of the ongoing social transformation.

Awareness of historical and country specific variety developed gradually and found expression in the sociological literature. Different "ideal types" historically present in the social structure of Czechoslovak society in the late 1960s were described by the author. Elmer Hankiss presented a highly developed conception of the different organization principles, paradigms and goals operating within the hybrid society of Kádár's Hungary.[12] These and many other similar considerations are examples of the common progress of knowledge: in spite of the intentional character of the genesis and development of the Soviet-type societies, their actual social structure cannot be reduced to one general type of social relationships. Different types of relationships intertwined and operated throughout their historical existence in the state socialist social systems, and all should be seen as influential determinants of the post-communist transformation processes.

4. Primary Principles of Vertical Social Differentiation

The complexity of principles shaping the actual social structure of state-socialist societies became the main reason why vertical social differentiation and

12) See Machonin et al. 1969: 39-45 and Hankiss 1990. It is interesting to compare these two approaches from the late 1960s and from the late 1980s. Machonin's "types of vertical social differentiation relevant for investigating contemporary Czechoslovak society" were: the capitalist type, the dictatorship of proletariat, the bureaucratic type, the egalitarian type and the socialist type (the last being conceived as an ideal democratic society of achievement based on prevailing collective ownership of the means of production.) Hankiss shows how in Kádár's Hungary the conflicting organization principles, paradigms and goals of the "first" and "second" society ("To safeguard and conserve the statist, centrist, one-party monopolistic paradigm and related objectives" vs. "To cautiously advance in the direction of the pluralistic, democratic paradigm and related objectives") led to the emergence of curious economic, social and political hybrids. These include, e.g., quasi-pluralism, the administrative market, the second economy, paternalism, covert participation, etc. The historically later approach is clearly far more sophisticated. However, the main difference lies in the influence of two historically very different situations. In the first case the main conflict was between bureaucratic and egalitarian principles (supported by the residues of the "worker's dictatorship") and the reformist principles of democracy and meritocracy (with the possibility for the restoration of capitalism in the more distand future.) In the second case, the main problem was how to move from collapsing state socialism to a modern society, pluralist democracy, and market economy. Nevertheless, the new historical situation is even more complicated, and the "hybrids" may certainly bring surprises in the subsequent social transformation.

integration cannot be reduced to only one type for explaining the social history of the countries in question. There are at least five "candidates" for the role of the guiding principle of vertical social differentiation in Soviet-type societies.[13] Two are clearly connected with the class approach: for at least certain stages of development, the theory of a politically formed "new class" with a strong position in the distributive mechanism can explain much in this respect, while the theory of the "second society" stresses the emergence (in some countries the persistence and revival) of a classical class structure in Marx's sense, based on ownership of the means of production and wealth. The stratification approach, the third explanatory model, shows that in some periods of development in state socialism the emergence or renewal of meritocratic principles played a limited role.

Apart from these attempts to explain some periods or aspects by purely abstract principles, two other approaches were developed in order to grasp the complexity of vertical social differentiation. The first is represented by a broad spectrum of attempts to use "neo-Marxist" or "neo-Weberian" class schemata in the empirical analyses of "real socialism." They are often used in Western sociology and connected first and foremost with the names of E. O. Wright, R. Erikson and J. H. Goldthorpe. [Wright 1985, Goldthorpe 1987, and Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992] In East-European sociology many sociologists used these commonly understandable schemata in their sophisticated multidimensional statistical analyses of social reality. Better educated official Marxist sociologists tried to develop the prescribed but senseless Stalinistic "class schema" by refining it to suit this model. Typically, these attempts create an *a priori*, theoretically constructed, multidimensional "class" schema, encompassing many criteria that differentiate vertically the occupations. These include types of ownership, wealth, position in management, assumed education and qualifications, income, the non-manual vs. manual work distinction, non-agricultural vs. agricultural work, etc. As was already shown in the 1960s [Rollová 1969], similar schemata explain many aspects of real social life far better than the Stalinist ones, or than oversimplified unidimensional approaches. On the other hand, there are also inherent disadvantages in multidimensional class schemata: a) the reduction of vertical social differentiation to occupation; b) the overestimation of ownership relationships and mainly of the distinction between non-manual and manual labor; c) the *a priori*, non-empirical character of the interrelations among the individual dimensions of vertical social differentiation; and d) the discontinuous character and rather arbitrary determination of class divisions. These characteristics are responsible for the fact that neither neo-Marxist nor neo-Weberian class schemata, which were developed primarily for the conditions existing in advanced capitalist countries, operate equally well as instruments for analysis of state-socialist societies.[14]

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[13]) The discredited Stalinistic "non-antagonistic class" schema, which has never been a serious explanation of the social reality in state socialist countries, is not mentioned here.

[14]) E.g. the Czech participation in some comparative projects using the EGP class scheme led to some barely explainable results hiding obvious differences between our country and some advanced western societies such as Sweden and the Netherlands. [Boguszak 1991 and Matějů 1991]

The second approach, aimed at better reflecting the complex character of vertical social differentiation in the state socialist countries, is based on a multidimensional concept of social status and the consistency/inconsistency of its dimensions. This approach has a long tradition [Lenski 1954, 1966, Wesolowski 1968, Machonin et al. 1969, Kolósi 1984, Róbert 1990, Tuček 1991, Machonin 1991, and Machonin and Tuček 1992a, b and c]. The incorporation of P. Bourdieu's concept of economic, political, cultural and social capitals [Bourdieu 1986] into status attainment research also stresses the importance of the multidimensional approach to social stratification. This improves the analysis of multidimensional vertical social differentiation and mobility in the former state socialist countries at the beginning of their social transformation. [Szelényi and Treiman 1991, and Matějů and Řeháková 1993]

Although the typological approach to multidimensional social status has met with serious methodological difficulties, compared with unidimensional approaches its advantages seem indisputable.[15] Compared with the neo-Marxist or neo-Weberian class approaches, it enables a more flexible coordination of partial status scales and the search for actual, not only assumed strata and classes. Its main advantage is its ability to reveal status inconsistencies along such status dimensions as occupation, ownership, power, income, wealth, material standard of living, cultural participation, etc. Empirical analysis on this topic clearly shows that recognizing the existence of important social groups characterized by status inconsistency is crucial to understanding state-socialist societies, their internal conflicts and cooperation between social groups, social forces interested in the conservation or change of the social system, tendencies important for the future and the potential social actors in the post-communist transformation.

In spite of this critical evaluation of different approaches for the definition of the leading principle of vertical social differentiation in state-socialist countries, we can not reject any of them as totally unjustified. Although it seems likely that the multidimensional status concept (and/or the kindred concept of various capitals) will reveal its advantages after improving its methodology, it is also fully justifiable to apply models analyzing status attainment and mobility in separate status dimensions. Improved quasi-class models, "meritocratic" socioeconomic status indices, and analyses showing the actual role of both the "new class" concept and the classical Marxian class model will also have some explanatory power. The complexity of theoretical concepts and methodological instruments must correspond to the complexity of the subject of study. This will contribute to a better knowledge of the as yet somewhat uncertain future of the countries in question. Some of these models (quasi-class models, socioeconomic status index and Marxian class model) will probably be more productive for explaining further

15) Empirical analysis of the data collected in 1991 showed that the multidimensional status typology has a substantially better possibility of explaining the complex social reality of the beginning of the post-communist social transformation in Czechoslovakia than either the neo-Weberian class schema or socio-economic status indices. [Machonin and Tuček 1992]

phases of the post-communist transformation than they have been in explaining the past.

5. Reasons for the Collapse

Deeper insight into the nature, dynamics and country specifics of the social structures of the state-socialist countries in East Central and Eastern Europe leads to a better general understanding of the causes of the collapse of the communist system in this part of the world in this given historical period. It also makes for a better understanding of the developments in Czechoslovakia in particular. Here we will mainly analyze the case of this country in order to show by historical example the fateful consequences of the long-lasting totalitarian and anti-meritocratic social system.

The defeat of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries in the Cold War and the consequent changes in international power relations certainly played a significant role in this respect. The examples of successful revolts or reform movements in Poland, Hungary and the former East Germany also helped Czechoslovakia considerably, as did the apparent unwillingness of the Soviet leadership to aid the ruling group. However, none of these external circumstances can fully explain the historical process in question. In the end the loss of support from abroad simply revealed the communist system's crucial lack of domestic social and political stability with great clarity.

Keeping in mind the given social and political characteristics of state-socialist Czechoslovakia, it is not difficult to specify those traits in the communist system that provoked the dissatisfaction and even resistance of different social groups and, in some cases, of an overwhelming majority of the population. By the end of the 1980s nearly everyone was disturbed by the long-term loss of national sovereignty. A life with very limited political liberty and few opportunities for economic initiative could not satisfy the majority. The authoritarian handling of the citizenry by a largely incompetent bureacracy was another source of dissatisfaction. It is equally obvious that qualified people could not accept the egalitarian and anti-meritocratic system. Yet other reasons led to dissatisfaction with the centralist practices of the federal administration, both on the part of Czechs and Slovaks. However, national and democratic resistance and democratic or liberal reform attempts had already been successfully "managed" by the communist regime several times in the past, so we must ask (following the Czech sociologist Ivo Možný) the question: "Why so easy?" [Možný 1991] Why so easy in Czechoslovakia (as compared with the difficult political struggle in Poland or the long-term Hungarian endeavor to reform the economy), and why so easy just at the end of the 1980s?

To answer this question we must temporarily abandon the strictly limited field of social relationships. By this, we assume that the most profound internal reasons for the collapse of communism in Czechoslovakia lie in the country's economic, technological and cultural developments. Many groups in the Czech population knew from their own experience that the competition with the advanced capitalist countries had not only been lost in the arms race and in the

field of political liberties, but also in the fields of technology, production, services, standard of living, as well as in the civilization and cultural level as a whole, including life-style. The communist social and political system had been able to stimulate extensive industrialization (with an accent on arms production); it had not, however, been able to modernize an industrial society. Consequently, it was not able to take effective steps towards post-industrialism in the later decades. In other words, the state-socialist social and political structure in Czechoslovakia clearly lagged behind the possibilities that the modern age had opened for the development of civilization and culture. The lack of democratic liberties and particularly the lack of motivation for qualified and competent work (as a consequence of the anti-meritocratic societal arrangement) hindered talented Czechs from taking part in the progress of world civilization and culture typical of the last few decades. People rightly felt a relative deprivation in comparison with their international surroundings. At the same time, they already felt absolutely deprived in comparison with the country's past, even in comparison with some other periods in the state socialist era. In the second half of the 1980s, the general standard of living started to decline even in relatively advanced Czechoslovakia, ecological conditions deteriorated rapidly and life expectancy declined. Most importantly, all these changes for the worse could no longer be counterbalanced by the relative advantages enjoyed by the social strata or classes given preferential treatment in comparison with competent and qualified people. Subsequently, public support for the regime on the part of this group declined substantially.

At the crucial moment in November 1989, politically active groups -- dissidents, people persecuted by the communist regime either in the 1950s or the 1970s, democratic intellectuals and students -- received support from relatively broad social strata prepared for this role by their experience with life in the second society. At this moment, these people (mostly with inconsistent status-patterns) were ready to transfer their attitudes and activities from the microsocial and unofficial level to the macrostructural and give support to the formation of new democratic political institutions. Support came from relatively broad groups of people who felt limited by the totalitarian and anti-meritocratic system in their possible future careers, in further raising their standard of living and in modernizing their life-styles. Even a number of qualified workers joined this movement. However, the decisive factor for the final success was that not only the Soviets, but also the internal social forces that had for decades been socially corrupted by the communist system (including many members of the Communist Party and even the Workers Militia), failed to support the old regime this time. This circumstance seems to be the main reason why the leadership of the Communist Party gave up and handed over power at just that time.

6. Legacy of Communism

Since the communist system operated in the country for more than forty years, consistently had -- even after the Warsaw Pact occupation -- some social support, and did bring certain undeserved advantages to relatively broad social groups, then surely its influence on social psychology and the real behavior of both people and

institutions cannot vanish overnight. Here we are facing a phenomenon that is undoubtedly influencing the course of the post-communist transformation. This is generally referred to as the "legacy of communism." [Mokrzycki 1992, and Rychard 1992] A brief enumeration of the factors subsumed under this notion in the Czech lands shows that the social characteristics of the Soviet-type system, as they were discussed in sections two through four, are surviving the historical existence of the structures that brought them into being and continue to affect the present and future of the countries in question.

The first factor resulting from long-term communist rule and now hampering the course of the transformation has already been analyzed above: the civilization and cultural lag of the Czech lands in comparison with advanced countries. This is not as large as the lag in some other post-communist countries, but it still exists. We can count on many years of substantial and complex modernization of the economy, culture and way of life, all of which will be both difficult and expensive. This civilization and cultural lag has direct social consequences. Czech society, like the others in East-Central Europe, differs from the societies of advanced countries mainly in the branch and sector structures of the working population and also in the major and specialization structures of education. [Tuček 1993a] A higher percentage of people are employed in industry, a somewhat higher percentage in the primary sector, a lower percentage in the tertiary sector, and a substantially lower percentage of people are active in the quaternary sector than in advanced Western countries. As a consequence, we have an extremely high percentage of students majoring in agriculture, mining, occupations in industry and building and in the economic professions (except in education preparing for practical business activities) and a lack of people educated for services in the broad sense of word, particularly in the information technology sector.

This horizontal occupational differentiation has led to the extreme prevalence of manual over non-manual workers (and particularly professionals.) At the same time, it means a small share of people with higher work complexity and a large share of those with lower work complexity. Such vertical differentiation is connected with the corresponding shape of the educational hierarchy. We do not have enough people with tertiary education in appropriate majors and of sufficient quality to meet the needs of further modernization. There is also a lack of people with secondary education in some necessary specializations. On the other hand, the advantage of having a large number of qualified lower-level specialists and of skilled and experienced semi-skilled workers on the labor market should not be overlooked. One must add that the branch and specialization structure of the education of the Czech population is somewhat rigid. This is a consequence of the low level of flexibility in an educational system that for many years was not obliged to adjust its curricula to the changing needs. [Matějů and Řeháková 1993] All of these lags in the occupational and educational structures are a consequence of the conservative economic and cultural policy typical for the communist regime.

The most apparent trait of the social structure of "real socialism" in the Czech lands was the absence of differentiation in the ownership of economic sources. Perhaps the highest degree of nationalization and collectivization of the

means of production and other fortunes was visible in this country. This means that due to the state monopoly in the economy, planning and the redistributive system, for forty years Czechs had nearly no official opportunity to take part in enterprise, to compete, to try to best satisfy the needs of the consumer, etc. Empirical evidence concerning some changes in this field after November of 1989 does exist. [Tuček 1993b and Hampl 1993] However, the modest amount of real change achieved by the privatization process [Tuček 1993a] shows how difficult it is for any of the proposed economic policies to create a new, private system of real decision-making concerning economic capital. This is important evidence of how deeply the etatist approach to management is rooted in the economic system inherited from communism. Contrarily, the attitudes of the population toward private enterprise and competition have changed quite rapidly. This is likely a consequence of the phenomenon we have called the "second society," and of the well known high level of adaptability of the Czech population to new conditions. Unfortunately, a lack of skill in satisfying consumer's needs seems to be one of the harshest legacies of the old system, with its preferences for the "working people," i.e. tradesmen, producers and subsuppliers with monopolistic positions.

Due to the attention we have already devoted to the problems of egalitarianism, it is enough to state here that both egalitarian redistributive practices [Večerník 1993a, b] and egalitarian attitudes [Tuček 1993b] continue to persist. Although things are changing, particularly in the sphere of attitudes, the "legacy of communism" in these fields will certainly be one of the most difficult obstacles to the post-communist social transformation. It should also be noted that the tendency toward striving to gain unjust privileges for people in power and managerial positions did not die with the communist rule; it is continuing to operate under the changed social conditions.

At first glance, the pro-democratic changes in political institutions, behavior, and attitudes have been the most successful. [Hampl 1993 and Tuček 1993b] The totalitarian aspect of the "legacy of communism" is very unpopular and only a very small group of people openly identify themselves with anti-democratic tendencies. Nobody protests against free elections or against a pluralist parliamentary system. On the other hand, however, the not inconsiderable existence of radical political currents on both the left and right [Hartl 1993] and, simultaneously, the existence of some intolerance toward political, ethnic, racial and other minorities [Hampl 1993] show that the "legacy of communism" is still operating in the political culture, although in some cases this intolerance comes this time from the right instead of the left of the political spectrum. Strong elements of bureaucracy (in the Marxian, not the Weberian sense) also continue to operate within the newly created political institutions, in the state administration and in the economic management of state-owned or only formally privatized enterprises. Even some elements of "partocracy" seem to have survived their original communist patterns.

Thus we see that the "legacy of communism" is relatively alive and significant in all important spheres of societal life: in the level of technology and culture, in economics and politics, in the social structure, and in the attitudes and value orientations of the Czech population. On the other hand, traditions, habits and

value orientations typical for the "second society" are also continuing their existence and are rapidly developing in the new conditions. In any case, the legacies of both communism and the potential or actual opposition to it are undoubtedly influencing the present social and political situation in the Czech Republic. These legacies are competing with other foreign and domestic influences and will continue to play an important role in the post-communist transformation, and this not only in the Czech Republic.

PAVEL MACHONIN *led a team that in 1967 carried out the first representative sociological survey on social stratification and mobility in Czechoslovakia. (The results of the survey were published in 1969 in the book* Czechoslovak Society.*) After an enforced break in research activities, he returned to his work at Charles University in 1990. At present, he is working at the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences. His main research field is the ongoing social transformation of Czech society. He has published a new study* Czechoslovakia's Social Structure on the Eve of the Prague Spring 1968 *(1992) and a number of articles in the Czech Sociological Review.*

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SUCH A CLEVER POPULATION! THEY HAVEN'T EVEN ANSWERED ONE OF OUR QUESTIONS!..

JAROSLAV KREJČÍ

SOCIETY IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

This text is a brief introduction to what may be described as integrated social science. It studies the structure and development of individual societies with respect to the close interconnection of the cultural, political and economic aspects of social life. Particular attention is paid to the changing relevance of these aspects in historical time and geographical space. In the United States a substantial part of this subject has been introduced into university curricula as a comparative study of civilizations. After increasing specialisation has made of the humanities a fragmented field in which the basic features and trends tend to escape due attention, some acquaintance with the global approach to social science may be particularly useful.

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From Equality to Equity?

The Czech Republic Between Two Ideologies of Distributive Justice

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Abstract: The principle objective of the paper is to uncover the interplay between egalitarian and inegalitarian norms and beliefs about distributive justice during the post-communist transformation in the Czech Republic. Two theoretical perspectives, namely the "split-consciousness" theory (Kluegel and Smith) and the theory of dominant and challenging norms of distributive justice (Della Fave), are applied in a comparative analysis of egalitarian and inegalitarian inclinations in the Czech Republic and the Netherlands. Results from multisample recursive and nonrecursive structural equation models suggest two major conclusions. First, in accordance with the thesis on "winners" and "losers" in the post-communist transformation (Matějů and Řeháková), in the Czech Republic as compared with the Netherlands the struggle between egalitarian and inegalitarian ideologies is strongly related to one's position in the social stratification system. Second, the capacity of inegalitarian distributive norms to resist the challenge from egalitarian ideology is much stronger in the Netherlands than in the Czech Republic, where, on the contrary, the capacity of an egalitarian interpretation of distributive justice to challenge meritocratic norms is much stronger.

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Introduction

After four years of the unprecedented historical experiment set in motion in Eastern Central Europe in 1989 there is no doubt that the temporality of the crystallization of a new stratification system in these countries is different from the temporality of changes in the constitutional system, political system or economy. [see e.g. Sztompka 1992, Dahrendorf 1991][1] As shown both by classics in social stratification research [Parsons 1954] and scholars who have been studying social development in post-communist countries [Offe 1991, Dahrendorf 1991, Sztompka 1992, etc.], every stratification system has its normative roots ("paramount value system" - Parsons), regardless of whether it has been created in accordance with

*) Direct all correspondence to Petr Matějů, Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1. E-mail: mateju@cspgas11. This research received support from several sources. The Czechoslovak survey was made possible by a grant from the Grant Agency of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences in Prague (grant number 82801). The author of this paper also received a grant for participation in the International Social Justice Project from the Central European University (Research Support Schema). The Dutch survey was supported by the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs.

[1]) In this respect, Sztompka [1992] argues that the deeper we go, the more time is required, and -- using Dahrendorf's illustrations -- he calls this phenomenon "the dilemma of three clocks" ("the hour of the lawyer," "the hour of the economist," and "the hour of the citizen"). [Sztompka 1992: 15]

the dominant distributive "ideology" or as a specific response to it. Regardless of their origin, commonly held values, norms, and historically developed patterns of beliefs establish typical motivations and corresponding social behavior, typical strategies for life and economic success. These strategies, in turn, contribute to the reproduction of social relations and the existing stratification system. Dahrendorf's prediction that these deeply ingrained and internalized factors of social behavior need more than sixty years to change [Dahrendorf 1991] may seem too pessimistic, but he may be closer to the truth than implicit assumptions that values, beliefs, norms and patterns of behavior are changing as rapidly as political systems and economic mechanisms.

Accordingly, there are two principal dimensions in which sociologists monitor and analyze changes in social stratification in Eastern Europe:

a) the dimension of objective changes: the development of inequality, changes in patterns of occupational mobility, the development of the mobility regime, changes in the roles of factors leading to economic success, etc.;

b) the subjective dimension of social stratification: the perception of change and beliefs about stratification, the perception of inequality and its roots, beliefs about the principal factors of economic success, the perception of social and distributive justice, etc.

In other words, in order to understand the changes in Eastern Europe, research on the subjective dimension of social stratification is at least as important as the analysis of various objective processes. There are at least two strong reasons why the analyses of beliefs about distributive justice are especially important in post-communist countries. First, all studies analyzing the development of inequality in these countries [Večerník 1992, Matějů 1993a, 1993b, Domanski and Heyns 1992, etc.] show that income inequality is rapidly increasing. Second, inequality is rarely perceived without being considered in terms of justice or fairness, especially in systems experiencing a deep change in the stratification order and in the underlying value system. The post-communist transformation is undoubtedly a kind of systemic change in which inequality is increasing along with the change in the principal criteria of allocation and distribution of income and wealth.

To the degree that social and economic groups in a given country share different or even opposing beliefs about distributive justice, the legitimation of a current political order is undermined and the potential for political conflict is heightened. In order to understand the political landscape of a post-communist society, the study of beliefs and equality and inequality norms is extremely important. Among the issues of primary importance is the crystallization of a new dominant distributive ideology. One of the most important theoretical questions to be asked in this respect is "What are the principal dimensions (ideologies) underlying the perception of distributive justice in post-communist countries?" From the point of view of policy-makers, answering this question may aid in understanding the development of "legitimation" in post-communist countries, and in locating in a given social space typical bearers of social tensions or potential political conflicts.

Following these ideas, this paper tries to answer the question to what extent a renewed meritocratic and inegalitarian interpretation of distributive justice has already disintegrated the egalitarian norms that dominated the distribution of income and wealth for more than forty years.[2] The second important question in this respect is how this transition between the two major distributive ideologies is linked to the transformation of the social structure and to changes in the process of stratification in formerly communist countries. Both from the point of view of the theory of the post-communist transformation and that of policy it is valuable to assess what social attributes predict rather egalitarian orientations, and what social characteristics stand behind rather inegalitarian and meritocratic interpretations of distributive justice. Asking this question implicitly assumes that there are two relatively well distinguished and consistent distributive ideologies beyond popular beliefs about distributive justice. However, as this assumption may not necessarily be true, particularly in post-communist countries, it should be verified empirically.

It is widely accepted that the former Czechoslovakia was one of the most egalitarian countries in the Soviet bloc. However, the egalitarian inclinations of the Czech population have deeper historical roots than solely the installation of communist rule and its corresponding ideology in 1948, which of course contributed the most to the disintegration of meritocratic norms in of income and wealth distribution.[3] Furthermore, since 1989 the Czech Republic has ranked among those countries with the most rapid acceleration in the transition to a market economy. These factors are due both to the strongest political obstacles to any profound economic reform before the collapse of the communist regime, and the relatively consistent economic policy of the current government. For all these reasons the analysis of the transformation of ideologies underlying beliefs about distributive justice in the Czech Republic should show typical patterns of the transformation of beliefs about distributive justice much more sharply than in other formerly communist countries.

In order to minimize the danger of speculative interpretations and conclusions, a comparative strategy was chosen for the analysis. The choice of the Dutch society for comparison had both practical and theoretical reasons. Regarding practical reasons, both Czech and Dutch data were available from the

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2) We agree with Weselowski and Wnuk-Lipinski [1992] that communist leaders officially created a specific "socialist" version of meritocratic ideology ("*each according to his work*"), but in fact this model was never put into practice. Instead the combination of peculiar criteria of "merit" and the corruption of potentially "pro-revolutionary" social strata by income preferences created a strongly egalitarian distributive system, legitimized by the ideologically forced goal of narrowing the differences between classes before they would disappear entirely.

3) There are at least two other historical roots of Czech egalitarianism: the strong protestant reformation movement in the 15th and 16th centuries with its especially profound plebeian and egalitarian interpretation of social justice, and, second, the lack of a Czech national nobility and aristocracy due to forced re-Catholicization after 1620, this being associated with the expropriation of the lands of members of the Czech Estates, who represented the opposition to Habsburg rule in Bohemia.

International Social Justice Project (ISJP).[4] As for the theoretical reasons for this choice, Czech and Dutch societies show similar egalitarian (welfare) inclinations, as various analyses show. [Peschar 1990, Bakker, Dronkers and Meijnen 1989, Jansen, Dronkers and Verrips 1989, Matějů and Kluegel 1993] Furthermore, it is likely that the similarity between the two countries regarding popular beliefs about distributive justice has similar historical roots in their especially strong reformation and protestant movement, though -- as mentioned above -- this was disrupted by the forced re-Catholicization of the Czech lands after 1620.

Methodologically, the above mentioned historical and political circumstances, which show both the marked similarity and dissimilarity of the two countries, make for quite a strong analytical position that allows a "systemic" interpretation of present cross-national differences in the ideologies underlying the popular interpretation of distributive justice. In other words, in the Netherlands the continuous presence and natural historical development of capitalism, historically rooted in a strong reformation movement, stands in substantial contrast to the forty-year long disruption of the historical evolution of capitalism by the period of communist rule in the Czech lands. Thus, there is reason to believe that the Czech-Dutch comparison will provide an extraordinary opportunity to test the effect of socialism on otherwise historically similarly rooted ideologies underlying beliefs about distributive justice, as well as a chance to monitor the effect of the historical restoration of capitalism in a Czech society characterized by deeply ingrained inclinations towards an egalitarian interpretation of distributive justice.

Theoretical background and previous research

In the recent literature, two major approaches to beliefs about distributive justice and corresponding ideologies can be traced: macro-social theories and explanations, and socio-psychological approaches. For the analysis of the development of distributive justice beliefs in Eastern Europe, we may learn from both of these theoretical avenues.

The majority of macro-social explanations are based on the assumption that in every society at least two competing ideologies of distributive justice exist in parallel: a dominant ideology and challenging one. [see e.g. Berger et al. 1972; Deutch 1975, Habermas 1975; Walster and Walster 1975; Della Fave 1980, 1986a, 1986b; Ritzman and Tomaskovic-Devey 1992, Shepelak 1987] These theories also predict that these two ideologies find different levels of support from different social strata or classes [Della Fave 1986a, Ritzman and Tomaskovic-Devey 1992, etc.] -- those occupying higher positions in the stratification and having more favorable life-chances are expected to support inegalitarian norms of distributive justice, while those with lower positions and less favorable life-chances are expected to prefer rather egalitarian norms of income and wealth distribution.

[4]) The International Social Justice Project (ISJP) includes 13 countries: Britain, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, East Germany, West Germany, Hungary, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Slovenia and the United States. In addition to receiving national funds, this project was supported by The National Council for Soviet and East European Research (USA).

However, due to the high complexity of the phenomenon and the corresponding requirements this imposes on survey data, there have only been a few attempts to test these macro-theories empirically. The recent Ritzman and Tomaskovic-Devey paper [1992] proved the existence of the two ideologies as well as their different social grounding in the United States. They, indeed, reached the conclusion that in the US the inegalitarian (equity) norm is in the position of a dominant ideology (showing general acceptance by all social strata), while egalitarian norms -- as a challenging ideology -- find support mostly from individuals with less favorable life-chances. Another study, based on a much larger international data set from the ISJP project [Matějů and Kluegel 1993], has shown the existence of the two ideologies and the same pattern of social support in other Western countries (Germany, Great Britain, Japan, the Netherlands, and the USA).

Wegener and Liebig [1992] used more historically and culturally based argumentation in their attempt to define primary and secondary distributive ideologies in different social systems (USA, West Germany, East Germany). They identify the differing social backgrounds of the two ideologies and reach conclusions that, in our view, do not contradict Ritzman and Tomaskovic-Devey's findings. They conclude that in the USA "functionalism" (rooted in the equity principle) is the primary distributive ideology regardless of class position. However, in West Germany, where "statism" is a primary ideology, members of service class (higher professionals, managers and administrators) favor functionalism more than non-service class members. Also significant for our study is their finding that in East Germany the data do not provide conclusive evidence as to which is the primary and which the secondary ideology. "East Germany, being a society in transition, does not exhibit the specific patterns of normative and rational justice ideologies typical of either a welfare or a meritocratic society." [Wegener and Liebig 1992: 16]

It is not surprising that these studies show a generally strong negative correlation between latent constructs representing the two ideologies, proving that they indeed represent well defined, competing, and largely opposing norms of distributive justice. However, this is not the case in former communist countries. There, due to the transitional situation, these two norms show much weaker negative correlations, which indicates that the two distributive ideologies are not yet well crystallized. [see Matějů and Kluegel 1993]

Regarding correlations between the egalitarian (equality) and inegalitarian (equity) principles, social-psychological theories predict the co-existence of the two competing norms not only at the societal level, but also at the level of individual consciousness. [Halle 1984; Hochschild 1981; Huber and Form 1973; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Lane 1962; Mann 1970; Sennett and Cobb 1972] Specifically, the so-called "split-consciousness" perspective [Kluegel and Smith 1986] proposes that a dominant ideology (justifying the privileged status of higher social strata and elites by means of media, education and culture) and potentially challenging beliefs (derived, on the contrary, from day-to-day struggles to make do with limited resources) may coexist without any necessary force toward change. They may

simply occupy separate places in a person's consciousness; in Lane's term [1962] "compartmentalized," or following Sennett and Cobb's terms [1972], working class individuals may maintain "divided selves." Because these two types of beliefs stem from different sources, people may rarely bring them together in their consciousness, thus never activating a potential challenge. The presence of such an ambiguity and duality in popular thinking about distributive justice may have important political implications. It implies that in societies where it is particularly strong there is a large "swing vote" regarding policy concerning economic inequality. The study of this phenomena is especially important in formerly communist countries because the existence of this -- often "unconscious" -- duality provides a strong potential for volatility in the politics of distribution and redistribution.

In our analysis we follow both these theoretical perspectives. We use the split-consciousness perspective to predict the weaker consistency of popular definitions of egalitarian and inegalitarian norms of distributive justice in the Czech Republic and their seemingly "schizophrenic" relationship. We assume that, in general, individuals in post-communist countries are simultaneously exposed to a strong new dominant anti-egalitarian ideology and equally strong economic hardships associated with profound economic reform, which may elicit egalitarian sentiments. We also make use of the theory of "dominant" and "challenging" ideologies, particularly to formulate hypotheses concerning differences in support for each of the two major competing ideologies of distributive justice from social groups sharing different life-chances in the course of the transition to a market economy.

In formulating hypotheses concerning social differences in support of different distributive norms we also consider the results of the analysis of data from the Czechoslovak stratification survey "Transformation of Social Structure - 1991" [Matějů 1992a], which clearly show that the Czechoslovak population is far from consensus on the answer to the question of whether or not the post-communist transformation is bringing more social justice. In fact the population is split in two: about half of the population (55%) shares the view that the post-communist transformation has brought more social justice, while the rest (45%) is rather skeptical, and complains that there is less justice than before the collapse of the communist regime. This analysis also pointed out the existence of two large groups of the population that share quite opposite views on the post-communist transformation. It seems, indeed, that the post-communist transformation has its own typical "winners" and "losers" according to one's position in the former "redistributive" system. [Matějů 1992a, Matějů and Řeháková 1992]

One of the principal characteristics of state socialism was an extensive redistribution, which was used as a principal instrument of the so-called homogenization (equalization) of society, and -- of course -- also as an important instrument in the collective corruption of the lower social strata. The gradual dismantling of redistributive practices during the post-communist transformation makes those who actually profited from socialist redistribution (people with the lowest education, bureaucrats, individuals politically committed to the previous

regime, etc.) the "losers" in the transformation, and -- quite understandably -- those who were relatively discriminated against (individuals with the highest education, professionals, the self-employed, etc.) may feel themselves the "winners" of this historical game. These two groups show a tendency to exaggerate the negative or positive aspects of the transformation respectively, and -- as suggested by the theories discussed above -- both these large groups of the population tend to generate their specific distributive ideologies. According to the relevant theories, it is very likely that the "winners" and those who profit from the transformation participate in the creation of the dominant ideology, while the "losers" and all those who feel in danger share a "challenging" one.

The existence of winners and losers in the transformation process makes the issue of the perception of changing inequality especially important for sociologists and political scientists studying developments in post-communist countries. As already argued, there is a fundamental relationship between the perception of inequality and the legitimation of a new and still rather fragile social and political order. As Wesolowski and Wnuk-Lipinski [1992] rightly argue, the sufficient legitimacy of a political and social system can only be established if distributive principles are accepted not only by those whom these principles favor, but also by those whom they do not favor. [Wesolowski and Wnuk-Lipinski 1992: 89] Put simply, if there is a large group of individuals who find themselves in a relatively deprived position on account of the existing distributive principles, then the social system can develop the sufficient level of legitimacy necessary for political and social stability only with great difficulty. In accordance with the assumption that duality and ambiguity in popular thinking about distributive justice may prompt an unpredictable "swing vote" situation, these two authors also argue that a certain psychological instability regarding major norms underlying the perception of inequality may be used by populist political movements (either on the extreme left or the extreme right) to de-legitimize the current government or even the whole socio-political system. Consequently, for political scientists and politicians themselves, sociological research addressing questions of the legitimacy of existing patterns of inequality in Eastern Europe and the crystallization of distributive ideologies should be considered a much more important source of information than has actually been the case so far.

Hypotheses

The hypotheses set up for this comparative analysis make special use of the operationalizations of relevant theories provided by Ritzman and Tomaskovic-Devey [1992] and Matějů and Kluegel [1993]. Specifically, we share both the idea of the bi-dimensionality of the structure of beliefs about distributive justice (equality vs. equity) and the hypothesis predicting a weaker link of support for inegalitarian norms to stratification-related experience than for egalitarian norms. Questions may be raised about the applicability of both the "split-consciousness" and the self-evaluation perspective to post-communist countries during the transition period. Generally, one may question whether or not a dominant ideology exists at this stage of the development. Had this study been done before 1989, one

would certainly argue for the dominance of an egalitarian ideology. As argued in the introduction, it would be naive to assume that at the time the survey was conducted (June 1991) the new inegalitarian (equity) ideology was already well defined, well crystallized and strong enough to serve as a deeply ingrained dominant ideology of distributive justice as we see in a majority of Western countries. It would also be naive to assume that the "old" egalitarian ideology has already taken on the position of a weak "challenging" distributive ideology, supported only by those who share relatively unfavorable life-chances in the current social and political circumstances.

Regarding the differentiation of social support for the two competing distributive ideologies, we assume that in Western capitalist countries inegalitarian norms are widely held by their populations, both because of common socialization within quite stable socio-economic circumstances and the experience of more or less successful capitalism. However, in post-communist societies rather mixed feelings are present. For the majority of the population, the era of state socialism was one of relative ease -- though in rather modest economic conditions and a repressive political system -- that was associated with strong feelings of social guarantees and state paternalism. On the other hand, it was clear how devastating such an egalitarian and anti-meritocratic system was for the economy. Certainly in the Czech Republic as well as in other post-communist countries, equity norms now held by elites as necessary for making the transition from failed socialist to market economies are serving as a kind of "new ideology" legitimizing the transformation itself. Therefore, we may expect uniform, and in many cases perhaps also superficial acceptance of inegalitarianism. However, though some people in post-communist countries may have experience on which to base a rejection of egalitarianism, most have little if any experience on which to evaluate equity beliefs. The combination of competing ideologies, poor economic conditions and specific and strong social and economic mobility implies that the ambiguity in beliefs and norms about equality and inequality will be more pronounced in the post-communist Czech Republic than in the Netherlands.

From the above discussion, at least three operational hypotheses may be derived. The first concerns the distinctness of popular definitions of underlying distributive ideologies:

H1: Due to the transitional situation, we predict more ambiguous and less consistent popular definitions of the two underlying ideologies of distributive justice in the Czech Republic as compared with the Netherlands.

In the Czech Republic, in light of the transition between two different systems of legitimation and the profound transformation of the stratification system, and the changing life-chances of social groups and strata, the egalitarian and inegalitarian ideologies are not seen as in opposition as often as in Western capitalist countries, including the Netherlands, in which -- for reasons discussed above -- we may expect stronger support for welfare-state policy and weaker inegalitarian orientations than in other Western countries. From this assumption two other hypotheses may be built:

H2: The (negative) correlation between egalitarian and inegalitarian norms (ideologies) of distributive justice will be much weaker in the Czech Republic than in the Netherlands.

H3: In the Czech Republic the ideology of equality is more strongly affected by stratification-related experience (unfavorable life-chances) than in the Netherlands, where it has stronger support from different social strata.

From the assumption that there are typical winners and losers in the post-communist transformation, the hypothesis may be formulated that:

H4: As regards the Czech Republic, those who belong to higher social strata (especially people with college or university degrees, members of the new entrepreneurial class, etc.) and those whose life-chances gradually increase as egalitarian ideology and policy is being dismantled, strongly oppose egalitarianism. In the Netherlands, where both market and welfare principles have been present for decades (though not in a balance that may be interpreted as perfect), higher status people (especially people with the highest educational credentials) support egalitarian (welfare) rather than inegalitarian (equity) norms of distributive justice.

The last hypothesis concerns the mutual causal relationships between the two ideologies. In accordance with all that has been said so far about the two ideologies and their support from different social strata we may predict that:

H5: Disregarding differences in social support for different ideologies, the inegalitarian distributive ideology in the Czech Republic is quite universal but rather weak in terms of its capacity to resist the potential challenge from a still quite strong and powerful egalitarian ideology. In the Netherlands the power of the two principal ideologies to resist each other is more or less in balance.

Data, measures and methods

The data analyzed in this paper come from the Dutch and Czechoslovak surveys conducted in 1991 under the International Social Justice Project (ISJP).[5] The Dutch survey was made in 1991 (June-November) on 1,783 respondents by the University of Amsterdam (Telepanel). The method used for the Dutch survey was a self-administered computer-assisted questionnaire. The Czechoslovak survey was made by the Institute of Sociology of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences and STEM (the Center for Empirical Studies) in 1991 (June-July) on 1,181 respondents by standard face-to-face interview. For the comparative analysis only individuals living in the Czech Republic were selected (810 out of 1181 cases). Both the Czech and Dutch files were reduced to include only those respondents who reported a

5) Each country team participating in the ISJP administered on a nationwide random sample an identical questionnaire prepared by the international research team. The international merged data set contains 17,386 cases, with the average sample size per country being about 1,300 cases. The highest number of cases came from West Germany (1,837) and the lowest from Japan (777).

permanent job at the time of the survey.[6] After this selection there remained 462 cases for the Netherlands and 375 cases for the Czech Republic. These numbers would be a very restrictive factor for traditional statistical methods based explicitly or implicitly on cross-classifications, but they are sufficient for structural equation modelling.

The comparative analyses are based on two sets of variables: a) "endogenous" variables capturing respondents' beliefs about the just distribution of income and wealth, and b) "exogenous" socio-demographic variables.

To represent the two principal underlying ideologies of distributive justice ("egalitarian" and "inegalitarian") six items were selected from the questionnaire:[7]

EQSHR: "The fairest way of distributing wealth and income would be to give everyone an equal share."

WNEED: "The most important thing is that people get what they need, even if this means allocating money from those who have earned more than they need."

PAYFM: "How much influence should each of these factors have in determining the level of pay for an employee?" Item selected: "The size of the family the employee supports."

KEARN: "People are entitled to keep what they have earned -- even if this means some people will be wealthier than others."

WORKH: "People who work hard deserve to earn more than those who do not."

PASSW: "People are entitled to pass on their wealth to their children."

There were several other possible indicators of egalitarian or inegalitarian sentiment in the survey. In accordance with the approach chosen by Matějů and Kluegel [1993] we have limited our attention to these six items for two reasons. First, these items do not mix two different dimensions of the evaluation of justice: a) basic or general egalitarian or inegalitarian orientations, and b) concrete measures regarding the means of achieving "just inequality" (e.g. the option of paying for education, responsibility, difficult conditions, etc.) Second, we assume that three egalitarian items (EQSHR, WNEED, PAYFM) measure adherence to three major but not entirely identical principles of egalitarian distribution: (1) the principle of "equality of outcomes" (EQSHR), (2) an abstract or general need principle (WNEED), and (3) a specific need principal, based on the family as a distributive unit (PAYFM). [Deutsch 1975]

The three inegalitarian items (WORKH, KEARN and PASSW) measure adherence to the equity principle (WORKH) and to two slightly different

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6) Actually this reduction of a sample size is a logical consequence of the listwise deletion of missing values if variables such as the income from the main job, socio-economic status, and employment-status are included.

7) To facilitate orientation in the results, the original scales of variables EQSHR, WNEED, WORKH, KEARN and PASSW (1 "Strongly agree" to 5 "Strongly disagree") and the original scale for the variable PAYFM (1 "A great deal" to 4 "None") were reversed before the analyses were performed.

expressions of the principle of entitlement (KEARN, PASSW), which is a key aspect of notions of inegalitarian justice.

There are six "exogenous" variables in the structural model.[8] AGE is in years, and SEX is coded such that 1 = male and 0 = female. Some of them require explanation. COLLEGE is a dummy variable with a value of one for respondents who reported having a tertiary education diploma. Another dummy variable (SELFEMP) distinguishes the self-employed and entrepreneurs from employees. To measure personal income we use only income from the respondent's job(s). To allow cross-national comparability, INCOME was recoded from the original monetary units of each country to income deciles (defined within each country). RIGHTOR is the respondent's self-identified position on a left-right political continuum (with 1 representing the extreme left and 10 representing the extreme right).

With the exception of political self-identification, these variables represent what are called "life chances," i.e. factors that shape people's opportunities to share in the valued goods made available by a society. [Dahrendorf 1979; cf. Ritzman and Tomaskovic-Devey 1992] In our context, each of these variables is of interest because they potentially relate to perceived prospects of benefiting from different distributive justice principles. We include political self-identification in order to examine the political-ideological shaping of preference for egalitarian or inegalitarian principles. We suspect that one of the consequences of the newly crystallizing political culture in post-communist countries is that political self-identification shows a rather weaker link to adherence to distributive justice principles, though beliefs about distributive justice are very likely among the key political issues distinguishing major political orientations in Western countries.

Confirmatory factor analysis was used to assess underlying ideologies. A recursive structural equation model was then applied to estimate the simple causal effects of the exogenous socio-demographic variables on the two underlying ideologies. The parameters of the nonrecursive model were then estimated to evaluate simultaneous direct causal relationships between the two ideologies.

As both ordinal and continuous variables entered into the analyses, input correlation matrices for both countries contained three different types of correlation coefficients: polyserial correlations (when one variable was ordinal and the other continuous), polychoric correlations (if both correlated variables were ordinal) and standard product-moment correlation (when both variables were measured on the interval scale). Furthermore, because of the violation of the assumption about normal distributions of variables (in fact all observed dependent variables violated this assumption), we were unable to apply either the Maximum Likelihood (ML) or Generalized Least Square (GLS) methods for testing the statistical fit of individual models and estimating the parameters. (Both standard

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[8]) Originally there were nine "exogenous" variables in the model, To avoid multicolinearity, three variables were excluded: a socioeconomic index for the respondent's and his/her father's job, and a dummy variable distinguishing higher professionals or managers from other occupations.

errors and likelihood-ratios assessing the overall fit of the model may be underestimated in these methods if variables entering the analysis deviate from normal distribution.) For the above reasons the Weighted Least Squares (WLS) method suggested in these situations was applied. [see e.g. Jöreskog and Sörbom 1988] The program PRELIS [Jöreskog and Sörbom 1986] was used to produce the three types of correlations (polychoric, polyserial and product-moment) and to compute the asymptotic variances and covariances requested by WLS method. The models were then tested and parameters estimated by LISREL 7. [Jöreskog and Sörbom 1988] All other computations were performed by SPSSX and/or SPSS for Windows.

Instead of visual comparisons among models estimated separately for each country, multi-sample analysis was applied, in which one model may be tested simultaneously on a number of covariance (correlation) matrices representing different populations or groups. This permits testing both the general fit of the model (for all groups) and -- by imposing various equality constraints on parameters -- the similarity or dissimilarity of individual parameters between groups.

Results

To begin with, we present the simple distributions of political "left-right" self-identification (RIGHTOR - Figure 1) and the distributions of the six observed endogenous variables (EQSHR, WNEED, PAYFM, WORKH, KEARN, PASSW - Figure 2). These distributions illustrate empirically one of the initial theoretical assumptions, namely that there is an apparent similarity between the Czech and Dutch populations concerning political orientations and beliefs about the just distribution of income and wealth. Figure 1 confirms that the Dutch and Czech populations do not differ as far as the left-right political orientations are concerned, and that in the Dutch population there is even stronger support for the "moderate left" than in the Czech population, where -- for obvious historical and political reasons -- at present the "strong right" political orientation is more popular. However, if we compare the simple distributions of agreement with statements expressing various "just" rules for the distribution of income and wealth, we notice only minor differences in preferences for these rules. The exception is the role of a specific entitlement principle connected with "family size" (PAYFM), which is clearly one of the "state-socialist" principles of distribution that people still openly claim as "just" and "fair", regardless of whether they call for more meritocratic principles of distributive justice or not.

The other explicitly egalitarian principles (WNEED - a general entitlement principle, and EQSHR - the ultimately egalitarian principle) do not get stronger support from Czechs than from Dutch people. As far as the inegalitarian rules (WORKH, KEARN, PASSW) are concerned, both populations show very much the same distributions.

Figure 1: Left-right political orientation



Figure 2: Agreement with individual statements about distribution rules



Percentages of "Somewhat agree" and "Strongly agree"

In order to test the above hypotheses, which try to go beyond the phenomenological similarity of egalitarian-inegalitarian orientations in the two countries, three models were tested: a) a measurement model for the two major underlying ideologies of distributive justice (Diagram 1 and Table 1), b) a structural recursive model for the six "exogenous" variables (Diagram 1, Table 2), and c) a structural nonrecursive model for the evaluation of mutual causal relations between the two endogenous variables (Diagram 2, Table 3).

The measurement model for a confirmatory factor analysis of beliefs about distributive justice is displayed on the right side of Diagram 1. In accordance with the theoretical assumptions, there are two underlying distributive norms (ideologies) in the model which were supposed to "generate" the joint distributions of six observed endogenous variables: i.e. the egalitarian norm (EQUALITY) and the inegalitarian one (EQUITY)[9]. To test the hypothesis H1, all factor loadings were initially constrained to be equal between the two countries, and only errors of measurement and selected correlations between errors of measurement were allowed to vary across nations. This highly constrained model returned a very unsatisfactory fit ($\chi^2/df > 2$), mostly because of very strong contamination of the inegalitarian norm (EQUITY) by the typical egalitarian rule of distribution "WNEED" ("people should get what they need") in the Czech Republic.[10] Rather than freeing this parameter (factor loading), a virtually identical solution was chosen consisting of freeing two correlations between errors of measurement (EQSHR-WORKH and PAYFM-WNEED) in the model for the Czech Republic. This theoretically more justifiable solution led to a very significant improvement in the model fit ($\chi^2 = 14.88$ for $df = 1$), and to the conclusion that, indeed, this contamination is significant (both freed correlations between errors of measurement are statistically significant). It is also important to notice that both the Czech and Dutch populations show a significant inclination to impose some "welfare" principles onto purely meritocratic rules of distribution. (See the positive and significant correlations between errors of measurement for WORKH and PAYFM.)

As shown in Table 1, such an improved model shows an excellent fit for the data from both countries. The results displayed in Table 1 also confirm another theoretically relevant initial assumption concerning the level of "crystallization" of the two norms of distributive justice, i.e. that the two distributive norms oppose one another less sharply in the Czech Republic than in the Netherlands (-0.490 vs. -0.613).

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9) The labels for latent endogenous variables (EQUALITY, EQUITY) should not be interpreted in any specific theoretical context. They are just abridged labels for latent variables, which - given their content - may also be labeled EGALITARIAN ORIENTATION and INEGALITARIAN ORIENTATION.

10) The modification index for loading of this variable from EQUITY reached 12.6 with suggested loading 0.424.

Diagram 1: Recursive structural model



Diagram 2: Nonrecursive structural model



D1&D2.PRS

Table 1. Parameters of measurement model for EQUALITY and EQUITY - A multisample analysis

	The Czech Republic		The Netherlands	
	EQUALITY	EQUITY	EQUALITY	EQUITY
a) Factor loadings (LAMBDA) - common metric standardized solution				
EQHSR	.697@	.000	.697@	.000
WNEED	.168*	.000	.608***	.000
PAYFAM	.314***	.000	.314***	.000
WORKH	.000	.524	.000	.524***
KEARN	.000	.781	.000	.781***
PASSW	.000	.679	.000	.679@
b) Correlations between factors (PSI)				
EQUALITY-EQUITY	-.490***		-.613***	
c) Correlations between errors of measurement (THETA-EPS)				
EQSHR-WORKH	.183*		.000	
PAYFM-WNEED	.149*		.000	
EQSHR-PASSW	.104		.104	
WORKH-PAYFM	.112*		.112*	
d) Statistics of model fit (for multisample analysis)				
N of cases:	462+375=837			
df:	14			
χ^2:	7.51			
χ^2/df:	0.54			
p:	.913			
GFI (goodness of fit index):	.998			
RMR (root mean square residual):	.032			

*	.05> p >.01
**	.01> p > .001
***	.001> p
@	fixed parameter

Having such strong evidence for the existence of the two underlying ideologies[11] and taking the improved measurement model as a "background definition" of the two latent variables for subsequent analyses, the parameters of the recursive model were estimated to assess the direct causal effects of exogenous variables on the two latent constructs.

Diagram 1 displays the recursive structural model for the two latent endogenous variables and six exogenous variables. There are three sets of exogenous variables: three relevant indicators of one's position in the stratification system (COLLEGE, SELFEMP, INCOME), one indicator of the respondent's political orientation (RIGHTOR), and two instrumental demographic variables

11) We should add that, similar to the results presented by Matějů and Kluegel [1993], the attempt to force the model to accept only one underlying concept, which would practically mean the rejection of the "split-consciousness" theory, failed -- the program showed the "inadmissibility" of the model for further computations.

(AGE, SEX). In accordance with both initial assumptions and the results from the separate estimation of the measurement model (Table 1), the recursive model allows the estimation of the correlation between error variances of the two latent variables. Table 2 gives the parameter estimates for this model. First, the model returns satisfactory fit (the ratio of chi-square to the number of degrees of freedom is below 2, the GFI index is very high and the root mean residual is far below the suggested critical value).[12] Second, even without a detailed inspection of the individual effects of exogenous variables, it is clear that the EQUALITY "counternorm" is more strongly linked to one's position in the system of social stratification than the EQUITY norm (see coefficients of determination). Nevertheless, there are also interesting differences between the two countries. First, in accordance with theoretical expectations and with hypothesis H3, the egalitarian orientation is more a stratification-related norm in the Czech Republic than in the Netherlands (r^2: 0.406 vs. 0.355). Second, direct causal effects show that, in the Czech Republic, egalitarian ideology is much more strongly rejected by higher social status individuals (particularly by people with college or university diploma) than in the Netherlands (-.499 vs. -.162). Third, parameter estimates also show that while in the Netherlands those with higher education are more likely to reject inegalitarian norms, in the Czech Republic, college-educated individuals -- typically the losers in the "socialist redistribution" -- far more strongly support inegalitarian principles of distributive justice (-.165 vs. .339).

It is also valuable to note that correlations between the two latent constructs did not decrease evenly after the inclusion of exogenous variables: in the Czech Republic the correlation between error variances dropped to 12% of its original size (from -.490 to -.060) and has lost statistical significance, while in the Netherlands it dropped to only 33% of its original size (from -0.613 to -0.205) and remained highly significant. This result is of theoretical relevance. Though the theories discussed above suggest that the two distributive justice norms are linked to one's position in the system of social stratification, they also predict that -- if these norms are well crystalized -- first and foremost they represent different and opposing principles. The recursive model suggests that in the Czech Republic the "struggle" between the two ideologies is almost exclusively mediated by one's position in the system of social stratification, while in the Netherlands it has its autonomy, as predicted by political theories.

12) A traditional chi-square-based likelihood ratio shows the imperfection of the model, but as the number of cases increases this criterion is less likely to show satisfactory fit. In such situations other measures are recommended. [see e.g. Wheaton et. al 1977, Byrne 1989] Both recommended criteria (RMR and χ^2/df) show quite satisfactory fit.

Table 2. Parameters of recursive model - A multisample analysis

	The Czech Republic		The Netherlands	
	Dependent variable			
	EQUALITY	EQUITY	EQUALITY	EQUITY
a) Direct effects (GAMMA) - common metric standardized solution				
AGE	.007	.000@	.138*	.000@
SELFEMP	-.209	.116	-.121	.018
INCOME	-.198	-.154	-.077	.239
COLLEGE	-.499*	.339	-.162*	-.165
RIGHTOR	-.400***	.247***	-.431***	.323***
SEX	.000@	-.209	.000@	.103
R^2	.406	.167	.355	.154
b) Correlations between EQUALITY and EQUITY (PSI)				
r	-.060		-.205***	
c) Statistics of model fit (for multisample analysis)				
N of cases:	462+375=837			
df:	66			
χ^2:	95.65			
χ^2/df:	1.45			
p:	0.010			
GFI (goodness of fit index):	0.988			
RMR (root mean square residual):	0.057			

*	.05> p >.01
**	.01> p > .001
***	.001> p
@	fixed parameter

To evaluate the interplay between the two ideologies parameters of a nonrecursive model were estimated (Diagram 2, Table 3). Firstly, the nonrecursive model shows as good fit as the nonrecursive one, though two other parameters were fixed to zero: the effect of education on EQUITY in the Czech model, and the effect of education on EQUALITY in the Dutch model. Thus this model may be considered an acceptable alternative representation of the causal relationships between exogenous and endogenous variables. Secondly, parameter estimates of the nonrecursive model show that, indeed, the two ideologies are in very different mutual causal relationships in the two compared social systems. Once simultaneous causal effects between the two latent constructs are allowed[13] the contrast between mechanisms generating very similar distributions of distributive justice items

13) As shown in the table, in order to keep the model identified, this step required the fixing of additional parameters by setting them equal to zero. Several preliminary test have shown that the only admissible solution was to fix the effect of college education on EQUITY in the model for the Czech Republic and the effect of college education on EQUALITY in for the Dutch model. As well, the error variances of the two latent constructs had to be constrained to be equal between the countries, an assumption that wasn't in fact far from the truth (cf. values of R^2 in Table 2).

becomes more evident. The model reveals that the contrast between the two countries consists both in the effects of stratification-relevant variables on the two endogenous variables and in the causal links between the two latent constructs. In the model for the Czech Republic, the negative effects of education and self-employment on EQUALITY further increased (from -0.499 to -0.889, and from -0.209 to -0.746), whereas these parameters did not change significantly in the model for the Netherlands. Another relevant change occurred in the direct effects of political self-identification on both latent variables. While in the Netherlands both these effects increased by the same factor (1.4), in the Czech model only the negative effect of right-wing orientation on egalitarian norms increased (from -0.400 to -0.454), while the positive effect of this variable on inegalitarian inclinations virtually disappeared (from 0.247 to 0.012). In our view, this result also supports the assumption that in the Czech Republic the struggle between the two ideologies is less a matter of a relatively autonomous political orientation than a direct consequence of the evaluation of both previous ("socialist") and present ("transitional") life-chances. This assumption may also help in the interpretation of the striking result that income in the Czech Republic apparently plays quite an opposite role than in the Netherlands. Estimated correlation matrices (displayed in the Appendix) tell us quite a different story: income shows weaker correlations with the two latent variables in the Netherlands than in the Czech Republic, where the negative correlation of income with EQUALITY and the positive correlation with EQUITY are very high. As the model shows, the solution to this puzzle lies in the role of education. If higher income is associated with higher education (college diploma), then support for EQUITY and rejection of EQUALITY have one strong factor in common: feelings of opening opportunities if the role of egalitarian principles in the distribution of income weakens. Consequently, if we control for the strong effects of education and self-employment, higher income is very likely associated with one's previous position, either directly or indirectly through various "conversion" strategies. [see e.g. Matějů 1993, Matějů and Řeháková 1993] Having taken these underlying relationships in account, the reversal of the effect of income may be effectively explained.

With regard to the objectives of this paper, the remaining two parameters of the nonrecursive model, i.e. the direct simultaneous causal effects between the two ideologies, are the most important. While in the Netherlands the inegalitarian norms of distributive justice show a strong capacity to resist potential "temptations" or "attacks" from the egalitarian interpretation of distributive justice (-0.400), this capacity is still almost non-existent in the Czech Republic (-0.077). On the other hand, among the Dutch population the tendency of egalitarian inclinations to challenge existing meritocratic rules is not very strong (-0.296), while among the Czech population the egalitarian interpretation of distributive justice still represents quite a strong challenge for the rising inegalitarian and meritocratic interpretation of distributive justice (-0.498).

Table 3. Parameters of nonrecursive model - A multisample analysis

	The Czech Republic		The Netherlands	
	Dependent variable			
	EQUALITY	EQUITY	EQUALITY	EQUITY
a) Direct effects (GAMMA, BETA) - common metric standardized solution				
AGE	-.131	.000@	.144*	.000@
SELFEMP	-.746*	-.123	-.101	.017
INCOME	.251***	-.274	-.115*	.318
COLLEGE	-.889***	.000@	.000@	-.157
RIGHTOR	-.454***	.012	-.257**	.221*
SEX	.000@	-.329	.000@	.230
EQUALITY	.000	-.077	.000	-.400*
EQUITY	-.498	.000	-.296	.000
R^2	.753	.339	.583	.383

b) Statistics of model fit (for multisample analysis)	
N of cases:	462+375=837
df:	68
χ^2:	102.67
χ^2/df:	1.5
p:	0.004
GFI (goodness of fit index):	0.987
RMR (root mean square residual):	0.057

*	.05> p >.01
**	.01> p >.001
***	.001> p
@	fixed parameter

Conclusions

The question of primary theoretical importance we set for this paper was whether "split-consciousness" theories and theories predicting relationships between dominant and challenging ideologies have merit for the study of the post-communist transformation, particularly for the explanation of a transition from egalitarian to inegalitarian principles of distributive justice.

Returning to the initial five operational hypotheses, some general conclusions can be drawn:

1. The Czech-Dutch comparison, similar to other recent studies [Ritzman and Tomaskovic-Devey 1992, Matějů and Kluegel 1993, Wegener and Liebig 1992] has proved the merit of split-consciousness theories, namely their common assumption that there is no simple "equality-equity" continuum, but rather overlapping, though principally opposing, patterns of beliefs about distributive justice. Furthermore, the split consciousness perspective may help in the understanding of the transitional situation in post-communist countries. In accordance with this perspective and other assumptions concerning the post-communist transformation, the analysis verified the initial assumption that the

Czech population would show less consistent popular "definitions" of the two underlying distributive norms than the Dutch population. More specifically, the analysis pointed out that Czechs are more likely to mix typically egalitarian principles with clearly meritocratic rules of distributive justice.

2. The analysis also confirmed that due to the transitional situation the two "ideologies" are less opposed to each other in the Czech Republic than in the Netherlands. Regardless of the internal consistency of the "inegalitarian" and "egalitarian" interpretation of distributive justice, in the Czech Republic the two ideologies and their corresponding judgements are more likely to be mixed-up and interchanged in the face of different life situations. In the Netherlands the two ideologies show both a greater internal consistency and a stronger mutual contrast.

3. In accordance with various theoretical predictions, the analysis shows that the egalitarian ideology is more strongly linked to one's position in the system of social stratification than the inegalitarian norms of distributive justice. Regarding differences between the two countries, hypotheses H3 and H4 were corroborated by the results. Egalitarian distributive ideology is more a stratification-related norm in the Czech Republic than in the Netherlands. In the Czech Republic, higher status individuals and particularly holders of college or university diplomas, who were the typical losers in the "socialist redistribution," tend to vigorously reject the egalitarian interpretation of distributive justice. In the Netherlands, on the contrary, these individuals are more likely to reject inegalitarian norms.

4. In general it has been proven that in the Czech Republic the "struggle" between the two distributive ideologies is almost exclusively mediated by one's position in the social stratification system, while in the Netherlands these two ideologies show a quite autonomous relation of mutual counteraction. One of the most important results of the comparative analysis is the assessment that in the Czech Republic the capacity of inegalitarian norms of distributive justice to resist the egalitarian counternorm is still much weaker than in the Netherlands. On the contrary, the egalitarian distributive ideology remains a strong challenge for the rising meritocratic interpretation of distributive justice.

5. Regarding the creation of the Czech political landscape, two results are relevant. First, the analysis verified that the right-wing political orientation predicts quite accurately the rejection of egalitarianism but -- with other stratification relevant factors being held constant -- it does not predict a tendency towards the meritocratic and inegalitarian interpretation of distributive justice at all. This particular inconsistency is undoubtedly a typical product of the transitional situation characterized by a new political culture still in a period of crystallization. Second, the analysis has revealed that, from the point of view of system legitimacy, the situation in the Czech Republic is not as satisfactory as the results of simple public opinion polls may indicate. Though there is clear and strong support for inegalitarian and meritocratic norms of distribution in the Czech Republic, there is also quite strong evidence that there are two potential sources of instability based on the lack of legitimacy. Firstly, we found evidence of some "psychological instability" [Wesolowski and Wnuk-Lipinski 1992], represented by more ambiguous popular definitions of egalitarian versus inegalitarian norms of distributive justice

than in the Netherlands. As shown by Matějů and Kluegel [1993] this conclusion holds for post-communist countries in general. Secondly, from the point of view of system legitimacy, one of the most important results of our analysis is that the inclination to either the egalitarian or the inegalitarian interpretation of social justice is strongly linked to one's position in the social stratification system. If the theoretical proposition according to which system legitimacy is seriously undermined if the prevailing distributive principles (represented by a dominant distributive ideology) are not accepted by those who are not favored by them is true, we may conclude that system legitimacy in the Czech Republic is still weaker than in western capitalist countries. We found that the autonomy of beliefs about distributive justice in the Czech Republic is very weak, and that the "struggle" between the egalitarian and inegalitarian interpretations of distributive justice is almost exclusively mediated by one's position in the system of social stratification and the corresponding life chances that distinguish quite effectively between "winners" and "losers" in the transformation process. In this respect the latent contest between the two major interpretations of distributive justice present in any social system may -- under certain political or economic circumstances -- take on the form of open political conflict.

In conclusion, we believe that this paper has proven the potential value of the study of social justice beliefs and their dynamics, especially in countries undergoing post-communist transformation. One of the aims of this analysis has been to show that research on the crystallization of distributive justice ideologies may contribute significantly to answering irritating theoretical questions, as well as practical ones concerning the social and political consequences of the differing speeds of the various levels of the historically unprecedented social transformation set in motion in formerly communist countries in 1989. In this respect, it would be extremely valuable to replicate this study some years in the future using updated survey data. Such a replication study would be able to show the real dynamics of the subjective dimension of the post-communist transformation, where the historical clock is running most slowly, and where the most significant potential for social tension and political conflict lies.

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Appendix Estimated correlation coefficients

	EQUALITY	EQUITY	SEX	AGE	SELFE	INCOME	COLL	RIGHT
A. The Czech Republic								
EQUALITY	1.000							
EQUITY	-.514	1.000						
SEX	.270	-.246	1.000					
AGE	-.086	.030	-.023	1.000				
SELFE	-.370	.070	-.388	-.177	1.000			
INCOME	-.564	.218	-.709	.174	.535	1.000		
COLLEGE	-.532	.250	-.121	.209	-.253	.459	1.000	
RIGHTOR	-.410	.256	-.144	-.101	.112	.097	-.060	1.000
B. The Netherlands								
EQUALITY	1.000							
EQUITY	-.712	1.000						
SEX	.157	-.080	1.000					
AGE	.103	.021	-.112	1.000				
SELFE	-.156	.066	.033	.077	1.000			
INCOME	-.155	.130	-.769	.215	-.156	1.000		
COLLEGE	.085	-.111	-.018	.048	-.124	.374	1.000	
RIGHTOR	-.478	.360	-.136	.051	.146	.056	-.205	1.000

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OF COURSE WE HAVE OUR OWN DATA BANK, GRAND DAD! BUT WE DON'T CARRY IT AROUND WITH US!..

S-OBZOR: The Informal Sociological Journal

To write a review of one of the three sociological journals currently appearing in the Czech Republic means at the same time to present basic information about the other two, because only in this way is it possible to clearly show the journal's specific position within the Czech (and Czechoslovak) sociological tradition, its distinct origin, development, its various functions and targets in other sections of the reading public. The "Sociologický časopis" (Czech Sociological Review) is the oldest, and it can be said that it is the official and most prestigious periodical of the professional sociological community. From the time of its origin in the middle of the 1960s, the Czech Sociological Review tried to follow in the tradition of two Czech independent interwar sociological journals -- Brno's "Sociologická revue" (The Sociological Review) and Prague's "Sociální problémy" (Social Problems).

The second journal, the monthly "Sociologické aktuality" (The Sociological News) appeared during the course of the "velvet revolution" as a more or less specialized periodical, offering a precise, theoretically and empirically stable means of sociological understanding to the wider public and especially to the rapidly politicizing groups in the developing civically aware public. In the course of its further development, The Sociological News became the platform for that portion of the sociological community whose members perceived both the need for sociology to have more systematic and above all more constant contact with the life of the society and the need for a constant expansion and intensification of this contact.

The third sociological journal is "S-obzor" (S-horizon), which first appeared in the spring of 1992. In reality, however, it is older and its founders were authors conceptually tied to the -- in many ways unique -- tradition of samizdat publishing, especially of the illegal sociological quarterly "Sociologický obzor" (The Sociological Horizon), whose publishers were Josef Alan and Miloslav Petrusek and whose tenth roughly 100-page volume appeared in the years 1987-1989. It originated during the perestroika-era crisis of real socialism as the organ of the second generation of Czechoslovak sociologists. These scholars had not directly participated in the renewal of sociology in the first half of the 1960s, but had rapidly begun to further themselves professionally until their careers were violently halted in the process of the so-called "consolidation" after 1968 when, as Miloslav Petrusek wrote, "Czechoslovak sociology survived the Prague Spring institutionally, but in no way professionally." ("The Two Renaissances of Czechoslovak Sociology." S-obzor 1.2 (1992) p.7) The appearance of these sociologists' work in samizdat was not so much a protest against the official, ideologically and theoretically bowdlerized analogue to their own field, although this critical motive certainly played an important role in the "dissident" rehabilitation of the sociological community. It was rather an attempt at drafting, under the prevailing conditions in the country at that time, of a new, wealthier and above all more ambitious paradigm of sociology as critical knowledge of society, which could stand beside the more or less tolerated paradigm of empirical sociology (whose attempts at theoretical extention into the theory of social structure, economic sociology, the sociology of culture and of the city, etc. cannot be undervalued), but above all stand against the ruling, empirically sterile, theoretically dead and doctrinaire Marxist-Leninist sociology.

The building of a new paradigm of "critical sociology" went in two directions, characterized by its orientations toward the sphere of the everyday and toward the interpretive understanding of this sphere. In agreement with Tomáš G. Masaryk's recognition that "facts are more dangerous to every government than the most radical ideas," The Sociological Horizon tried to reveal the everyday experience of the average citizen as

the best corrective to the official, ideologically manipulated picture of reality. No less important, however, was that The Sociological Horizon also tried to legimate its position theoretically. More directly put, it tried to legitimate itself by means of already attained sociological knowledge and its standards. However, given the concrete conditions and general situation of the times, this often acted selectively, especially in the most substantial subjects of the so-called "critical sociology." Sociological knowledge naturally played a somewhat greater role here than sociological understanding, which manifested itself (and continues to do so today) in the very concept of criticism itself, in its theoretically and not entirely unambiguous foundation. It turns partly in the direction of social reality, and as such is truly a "critical theory," and partly in the direction of the scientific analysis of this reality, becoming rather "sociological sociology" or a "critique of ideology." Even if the journal was as a whole oriented toward educated lay people interested in social, political and ideological problems who wanted to understand them more deeply, it is possible to argue that this stress on the theoretical components of sociological scholarship -- on "sociological thinking," or as C. W. Mills once called it, "the sociological imagination" -- was and continues to be one of the greatest advantages of the journal.

It is perhaps necessary to clarify - by means of a short digression - the relevence of this theoretical claim on Czechoslovak sociology of that time (and in many cases on present day Czech sociology as well). The function, position in society, possibilities, goals and above all the bare existence of sociology as an independent scholarly discipline was for the forty-five year period of communist rule in Czechoslovakia basically dependent on two factors. They did not want to emphasize polemics, but rather to complement the attention paid by Miloslav Petrusek in his already cited article to the "three part massacre" of Czechoslovak sociology in this century -- after the years 1939, 1948 and 1968. It is impossible to overlook the fact that these dates also signify negative caesurae for other disciplines and that sociology was a fellow victim in the massacres -- notwithstanding differences in individual development -- of philosophy, political science and to at least some extent that of economics.

Sociology's possibilities, like those of the other scholarly disciplines, were primarily dependent on the regime's political interference in the sphere of scholarship, the extent of which varied according to the historical period. All the social sciences, but especially sociology, economics and political science, were systematically ravaged by the philosophic and historical conception of "scientific" socialism, which relied on the conviction that Marxism-Leninism revealed and formulated the laws of society and history and the laws of their functioning and development, such that sociology, political science and especially economic theory were rendered superfluous. Their function, simply put, became to cooperate directly with the Communist Party and its Central Committee. The at base Enlightenment-positivistic illusion that it is possible to tie reason and will, knowledge and action together, that it is possible to unite what is with what should be (meaning uniting *Sein* with *Sollen*), that it is possible to move directly from theory to praxis and from utopia to the present, meant not only the absolute politicization of all spheres of society but was above all the pseudohistorical and pseudoscientific legitimation of the purely ideological claims of the regime on every facet of life. Centralization and the control over social subjects, which changed politics into a mere struggle for power, meant the liquidation of the public sphere and led, fatally, to general and decentralization crises that necessarily deepened at a constant rate.

The utopia of the "new beginning" of 1948 and its absolutism -- as with the majority of revolutions -- began to come into conflict with reality and soon began to exhaust itself. The regime looked for other more subtle organizational instruments and namely new sources of information about real social processes which, from around the time of Nikita Krushchev's rise and criticism of the

so-called "cult of personality", led to the clear rehabilitation of the specialized social sciences -- though they were still contingent and dependent on official Marxist-Leninist doctrine. In Czechoslovakia, where sociology had a comparatively long-standing tradition -- it originated at the end of the nineteenth century and served in an entire set of indisputably important theoretical and practical discussions (see, for example, Tomáš Masaryk's sociological evidence of forgery in the "manuscript controversy") -- these events led to its rehabilitation in the middle of the 1960s, admittedly with relative independence but in the final calculation only one of the "auxiliary sciences" of historical materialism and scientific communism. Sociology's dependence was later reconfirmed in the course of the "consolidation" years of the 1970s and 1980s. All of the above had a significant impact on the conception of the Czech Sociological Review, which was founded in the mid-1960s and represented one of the greatest achievements in the attempt to rehabilitate sociology.

Understandably this specific historical situation made a considerable impact on sociology's self-understanding, its scholarly profile as well as on its own claims, as far as its position and function in society were concerned. The tendency of a great number of Czechoslovak sociologists to understand their discipline as a primarily empirical discipline, and to defend it against ideological interference from the official Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the Communist Party led finally to the confusion of ideological speculation and theory and to a general distrust of theory. It is not possible, however, to understand this empirical tendency exclusively as some kind of delayed reaction to general processes in the "scientific" social sciences, in which an explicit continuing change into "mere" research has been taking place since the end of World War II, with the exception of the "revolutionary" years of the 1960s. It seems to me that the importance of the samizdat Sociological Horizon lies in its attempt to overcome this situational "separation" of the field in the ideological-theoretical subordination and empirical servitude to the government. Partially through its orientation towards theoretical and analytical problems, but also through its orientation toward the description and critical scrutiny of the particular problems of "real existing socialism," The Sociological Horizon brought into the Czech sociological consciousness many tried and tested theoretical concepts (such as the phenomena of social exclusiveness as a defining trait of the totalitarian system, the conception of this system as a "society of retarded time," "nontriadic" -- that is, the analysis of social structure proceeding outside the categories of workers, peasants, intelligentsia, etc.) The strong "non-scientific" bent of the journal can also be seen in the attention devoted to the sociology of culture and especially the interdisciplinary sociological analysis of literary works which gave an account of the reality of "real socialism."

The journal that Josef Alan and Miloslav Petrusek began to publish once again in 1992 under the shortened name S-horizon followed in the footsteps of The Sociological Horizon, with its humanist values, its identification of problems in the general public and civil society, its methodological openness, its stress on the individual person and its orientation toward the wider reading public. As the editors stressed in the first issue: "in the replacement of the word 'sociological' with the abbreviation 'S-' in the title of the journal it is necessary to note a significant shift: the journal wants to be more open to the non-specialized public and to those voices which no sociologist can perceive as a betrayal of his discipline, to the voices of philosophers, anthropologists, political scientists, etc."

This program, as far as one can judge from the already published issues, is at this time fulfilled rather on the level of ideas. Above all, its circle of authors has not yet stabilized, although the fact that "everyone writes everywhere" cannot be seen a drawback only of S-horizon. The attempt to offer a platform and provide information can in some cases lead to the impression of an ambiguity in viewpoints and obscure differences in assumptions or points of departure. Here I

have in mind a definite lack of equilibrium between theoretical and "interested" (even "personal") writing and between popularized sociology and mere critical journalism. A unifying viewpoint is then created as if incidentally by a certainly necessary and sympathetic spirit of critical reflection, which itself is not able to ensure the equal professional level of individual contributions. Their generally wide thematic differentiation and the use of a variety of genres (in the three issues published so far in two volumes it is possible to count seventeen separate headings) can then lead to a feeling of dispersion.

However, the concrete plusses that S-horizon brings with it are more distinct than these somewhat abstract criticisms. At the present time this does not only concern the already mentioned tendency of "theoretizing" the field. The striving to come to terms with the past critically -- for example in Josef Alan's "Stalin's Heritage" (v.1.1), Miloslav Petrusek's "The Two Renaissances of Czech Sociology (v.1.2) and finally the interview with Václav Bělohradský, "What About Our Past?" (v.1.1) -- can possibly be viewed as a means for the self-identification of Czech "national sociology," separated from the rest of the world not by its methods but by its themes, by the individual causality of problems it treats. Worthy of note is the general struggle for sociological enlightenment, which is aimed not only at the interpretation of the great sociological conceptions of such luminaries as Max Weber, Marcel Mishan, and Florian Znaniecky and at drawing closer to the themes of social reality denied for so long (such as the still living problem of chicanery), but primarily at the public "sociological laboratory" of the social and political changes of the current era. Here it is necessary to mention the analyses of the social circumstances and consequences of the "lustration law" for the vetting of former communist regime officials. Miloslav Petrusek's "The Lustration Law and Its Illumination by Sociological Theory" (v.1.1) at the same time serves as an instructive example of "sociological theory in action." Also devoted to a theme close to this is the unconventional article with the long title of "Golden Silence, or the Culture of Denunciation as a Complementary but Functional Social Mechanism of Totalitarian Society," written by J. Premusová (v.1.2). For reference, there are also Jiří Kabele's "The Eastern European Change of Coats" (v.2.1), which turns to the controversial question of who is really profiting from the defeat of communism and Fedor Gál's detailed study in the same issue which discusses "The Czechoslovak Political Scene After the Elections of 1992." Gál moves on the border between sociology and political science and offers liberal values, stressing his view of the changes in the Czechoslovak political scene between these last elections and the dissolution of the republic. While it would be possible to continue this resumé of interesting contributions, these few should suffice in presenting the major themes addressed in the pages of S-horizon.

In conclusion, it is perhaps possible to claim that the virtues of S-horizon can easily be seen as its weaknesses. Informality, unconventionality, colorfulness, openness, interestingness, the quality of welcoming educated lay people, etc. can not only slide into the lack of critical definition we have already tried to point out, but more importantly can also bypass demands for "control, oversight and criticism." The editors know very well that these demands are dependent on the unambiguity of viewpoints, on the "putting examiners into their places," on possibilities of oversight and a wide "horizon." This really addresses the fact that even in the view from true heights a perspective asserts itself that unities various lines, closes openness and overlooks plurality.

Miloš Havelka

A French-Czech Dialogue on the Family

On March 24, 1992 the Commission for Historical and Social Demography conducted a discussion on the European family's past, present and future as a part of the congress "The Heritage of J. A. Komenský and the Education of Twentieth Century Man," the reports of which have been published in book form. French specialists also participated in the discussion, for which Jacques Dupaquier, a leading historical demographer, delivered the initial remarks. He asked questions which dominated the whole discussion: "Should the present-day crisis of nuptiality be considered a family crisis or a nuptiality crisis?" and "Is it really a crisis, or only a phase of historical evolution in which the Christian type of marriage cedes to other forms of marriage with us witnessing a historic change?" Dupaquier also devoted his attention to the relationship between the state and family. He said that it is ambiguous: the state does not want to suppress the family entirely because then it would have to assume the family's role in caring for children, as well as the ill, disabled and elderly. On the other hand, it is striving to strip the family of its political power in order to control and exploit it. In all regimes the state exerts a considerable influence on the creation of the family's future. Irrespective of whether the state admits its official population policy or not, its primarily implements its will indirectly through the tax system.

In her lecture "The Family Crisis" the sociologist Evelyne Sullerot sees the essential dividing line in the evolution of the family in the events of the Second World War. She asserts that the family unit was considerably fortified by the hardships of war and that in fact the foundation was laid for favorable developments lasting another generation, that is, until 1964. She underlined the positive and almost idyllic features of that epoch in which nuptiality and fertility were, indeed, at a very high level. She attributes the causes of this to a continuously low living standard and to the influence of educational and popular scientific literature, which endorsed the traditional family. The second (crisis) epoch in post-war family evolution lasted from 1964 to 1984. The decline in nuptiality and fertility and the concurrent increase in divorce across the whole of Europe was, according to Sullerot, caused by transformations in value scales and public morality. Marriage was generally entered into by two individualistic persons who cared especially for their rights: the couple was preferred to the family, and sexual union to the family bond. At present the third epoch is underway, and in it we can see some signs of change. In Sweden, always a pioneer of later universally adopted patterns of population behavior, both nuptiality and fertility are again on the increase, traditional moral principles are being strengthened and the AIDS issue is forcing greater sexual continence -- in short, the sexual revolution of the 1970s is over.

While Sullerot's entire paper is very well written and includes a number of remarkable comments, as a whole, however, it gives the impression of an educational lecture the primary aim of which is to capture the audience's attention. There is, in fact, a series of quite disputable assertions, due to the fact that Sullerot prefers the impressive paradox to the verified, but less spectacular statement. The time division presented awakens the impression of a well-arranged, clear and adopted scheme in the layman, but when it is more closely investigated it is scarcely defendible, primarily because Europe is too heterogenous an entity and population trends cannot be in such widespread accord. Finally, both nuptiality and fertility in Eastern Europe followed a considerably different evolution. Sullerot overrates the role of marital advisors and educators, as well as that of professional and popular "family" literature. She presented many quotations from it and used it as support for her more general statements (e.g.: "How could they not have been seduced by the life with two roles and two phases, as suggested by Myrdal and Klein in their famous book "Women's Two Roles?") It is doubtful that the mass media exerts such an essential influence on individual behavior in such an important sphere of life. Sullerot also overestimates the revolt of

the late 1960s: "In 1968 many young people believed that they were revolutionaries and even collectivists; out of hatred of capitalism and consumer society ... the communes of young people were flourishing." I do not think they were so numerous. This ephemeral excess never amounted to anything more than passing entertainment for a handful of eccentric intellectuals. No demographic data reflect the slightest influence of this fashion on the behavior of the basic strata of European population.

A different topic was addressed by Antoinette Fauve-Chamoux in her paper "From the Family to the Household in Pre-Industrial Europe (From the Sixteenth to Eighteenth Century)." She pointed out that the composition of the family household evolved in accordance with more or less regular cycles (usually thirty years in length), with stages of increase and decrease. Among those factors influencing family structures, it is necessary to call special attention to the inheritance system, the diversity of which caused the rise of a variety of family types in Western Europe at that time. Generally, however, it is accepted that in terms of household size social differentiation was more visible in the countryside than in the cities. This theme was taken up by Pavla Horská, whose short paper "The Family Group in Czechoslovakia as Seen Through the Eyes of Historical Demography" focused especially on the age of those entering marriage. She says that 17th-century Bohemia, with more than 60% of females married between the ages of 20 to 24 years, represented a dividing line between Western Europe (with a prevalence of later marriages) and Eastern Europe, where women married quite early. In her "Household Structure in Bohemia in 1651" Eliška Čáňová takes advantage of research at the Vamberk and Luby manors. In these localities she found features typical of the Western European family type. In his lecture "Young Families in Czechoslovakia in Light of Data from the 1980 Census" Milan Kučera directs our attention to the fact that the Czech family is in a crisis situation; the nature of the crisis is, however, different than that of the crisis in Western Europe. He devotes his attention to the housing issue, which he sees as the key factor for the foundation of a family. He describes a paradoxical situation in which conception was, in fact, purely purposeful behavior, because it increased the chances of getting an apartment. Even after the acquisition of the apartment, however, the young couple was not able to remove itself from their dependency on parental assistance, with this becoming a disintegrating factor. He sees the way out of this unfavorable situation as being connected to the implementation of a market economy and the intensification of the economic responsibilities and independence of young people. This should also lead to a desirable increase in marriage age.

In her methodically elaborated paper "The Current Czechoslovak Family in the European Context," Jitka Rychtaříková analyzes demographic indicators from the view point of family evolution. She shares the opinion voiced by Sullerot and calls the two post-war decades "the golden age of the family." Through factor analysis she sets Bohemia's and Slovakia's populations among European family types. The result is that the two populations are very similar. However, when Rychtaříková leaves the safe domain of narrowly conceived demographic analysis, she finds herself on rather thin ice. Regarding the impact of the politics of the past regime on the family she states: "the effort to install the eternal social order ... was projected on the immobility of the family form at the beginning of which was the marriage." This may have been true in the 1950s, but at least in the last two decades the situation was fairly different: e.g. the former GDR, one of the most Stalinist regimes, did not care at all for formal and legal marriage; consensual unions were pushed through with ample state support as an entirely equivalent type of partnership. If we do not take into account official rhetoric (in past decades almost silent), the state in other Eastern bloc countries did not invest much time or energy in upholding the institution of marriage either. Especially in Czechoslovakia, the regime in the final period had only one objective --

mere survival -- and did not much care for this or that form of population or family policy. Rychtaříková also mechanically repeats some cliches which (if ever valid) must be investigated more deeply. She claims that "almost 50% of marriages are forced by the pregnancy of the woman." This figure really relates to the proportion of marriages entered into by a pregnant bride. In most cases, however, it can hardly be the result of a casual affair quickly camouflaged by a wedding, as it was (perhaps) in times past. It is more probable that young people have routine sexual intercourse, and reckon with the risk of the woman becoming pregnant. If the woman becomes pregnant, one can hardly say that the marriage was forced; it is probably better to say that this is an acceleration of what had been, in fact, expected.

Jiří Langer also turned to the past. In his paper "The Family Form Between Two Household Types of Pre-Industrial Society in the Western Carpathians" he too investigates the differences between Western and Eastern family types. In Western Europe the major role was played by non-relative components working in the household while in the East purely blood relations were found. Lumír Dokoupil and Ludmila Nesládková elaborated on their regional study "Population Developments in the Ironmongers' Center in the Ostrava Region at the Turn of the 20th Century." They observe the extreme differentiation of population development in this region which was caused by rapid industrial development. They present the little-known fact that the community of Vítkovice was the fastest expanding settlement in Cis-Leithania in the second half of the 19th century. Industrial development thoroughly mixed the national composition of the region: it brought about the immigration of a Polish population and locally also encouraged Germanization.

In her final report "The Evolution of Nuptiality in Czechoslovakia from 1918 to 1988," Ludmila Fialová summarized prior knowledge on this issue. She emphasizes, as did Rychtaříková, that during the existence of the common state the population behavior of the Czech and Slovak population (very different at the state's beginning in 1918) ran parallel. Her observation that this trend was interrupted during the war is very interesting. Under the Protectorate nuptiality was encouraged (especially by the fear of forced labor in Germany), while in Slovakia the effect of this factor was not felt. Fialová also points to a very important phenomenon that existed under the Communist regime: the total homogenization of the society, which had an impact also on demographic behavior. This probably reached the highest degree in the Eastern European bloc in Czechoslovakia. She presents an interesting comparison in her conclusion: she cites the pre-war Czech demographer Boháč, who considered those marriages in which the groom was younger than 25 and the bride younger than 21 to be premature. Fialová suggests that the Czech and Slovak populations will adopt forms from West European family patterns, in particular that of the consensual union.

The whole of this interesting discussion is another result of cooperation of French and Czech demographers spanning more than three decades. It survived, especially thanks to professor Pavlík and dr. Horská, even during periods that were not very favorable for this kind of scholarly contact. This discussion not only transmitted information and suggestions but, at the same time, compared two different scientific approaches. The French school is based on a consistent sociological approach, in which demographic data serve merely as an aid. The Czech participants are, by contrast, first of all demographers. It is important to note that "pure" Czech sociologists were missing from the discussion on this very important sociological topic.

Pavel Vereš



I WOULD LIKE TO CHAT WITH YOU ABOUT OUR AGRICULTURE, BUT I THINK IT'S A WASTE OF TIME...

The Social Costs of Economic Transformation in Central Europe

In 1992 the Institute for Human Sciences (IWM) initiated a long-term research program on the "Social Costs of Economic Transformation in Central Europe" to address the vital social issues of post-communist transformation in the former East Bloc and to formulate policy recommendations for the new democracies. The current situation in Central Europe presents a rare opportunity for the comparative analysis of economic changes, social costs and policy options. This program aims to identify common labor market and welfare responses to the economic transformation and to provide lessons for policy-makers across country lines.

Supported by grants from the Ford Foundation and The Pew Charitable Trusts, IWM has promoted the establishment of independent national research teams consisting of prominent members of the respective academic and political communities. Research teams were first established in Hungary and Poland. Encouraged by their positive reception, and in order to reinforce the comparative nature of the project, IWM then organized teams in the Czech and Slovak Republics. These research teams are intellectually and politically independent. Their composition is balanced in terms of scientific disciplines and in terms of governmental/non-governmental representation.

An important objective of the program is to stimulate an exchange of information between researchers and policy-makers within Central Europe as well as between regional experts and their colleagues from developed and developing countries outside the region. Research teams are encouraged to elaborate a broadly common framework for analysis, investigate similar problems and, where feasible, share methodological approaches. The projects currently underway fall into four areas:

1. Factual analysis of the social problems arising from economic liberalization, with emphasis on labor market problems;
2. Potential preventive policies designed to improve the labor market and thus limit social problems;
3. Ameliorative policies that provide social safety nets and general social support systems such as health and pensions;
4. Changes in the locus of delivery and budgeting of social services, including decentralisation of social policy among levels of government and between firms and other entities.

The Slovak national research team will finalize its project proposals and submit them to IWM by September 1993. Proposals have been submitted to IWM by the Czech team; they cover the following topics of research:

Czech research topics: social costs of economic integration into the world economy; trade unions and the social transformation; wage determination and bargaining during economic transition; political consequences of changing perceptions of social safety and social justice; employment and unemployment - their structure and active employment policy; the role of local actors in social policy; household income, expenditures and their changes; social problems, social policies and social doctrines in the Czech Republic; transformation of social, sickness and accident security into insurance systems and their linkage to security in cases of social distress; emergence of an underclass in the Czech Republic; transformation of the Czech health care system; the role of non-governmental organizations in the era of transformation from a totalitarian regime towards a civic society; trends of changes in social structure - Czech Republic 1945-1993; economic behavior of households in the period of transformation.

The Hungarian and Polish teams have already launched projects on the following topics:

Hungarian research topics: social costs of the transformation of agrarian organizations;

legal aspects of the socio-economic transition; social policy and the state budget; the trade-off between increasing freedom and decreasing existential security; part-time work as a potential means for mitigating unemployment and social tensions; demographic projections and social policies; deprivation and unemployment - causes and cures in crisis areas; working and living chances of people removed from the unemployment benefit scheme; transformation of the health care system; conflicting interests and the transformation of social security; the situation of disabled people, social policies and the labor market; the effectiveness of welfare programs in alleviating poverty; readers and handbooks in social policy; the influence of economic transformation on fertility behavior; aging and systemic change of the social structure; housing policy during the transition.

Polish research topics: current developments and perspectives on community support systems for the socially deprived; decentralizing social policy; the interrelation and redistributive effects of fiscal and social policies in transition; labor force mobility in the labor market; practical policy models of small business development in Poland.

IWM has convened an **International Expert Committee**, chaired by Professor Richard Freeman of Harvard University and the London School of Economics, to support comparative research efforts, coordinate projects and strengthen the political independence of the national teams. The Committee, which met for the first time in Vienna in January 1993, ensures the maintenance of high scholarly standards by research teams.

IWM is responsible for the administration and coordination of the project and serves as liaison between the national research teams and the International Expert Committee. IWM also invites leading members of the national teams to pursue their research in Vienna as Visiting Fellows of the Institute.

Periodic regional workshops are convened to discuss projects already underway and to propose ideas for future comparative research and joint projects. The first of these meetings was held in Warsaw in January 1993 and included participants from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The second, a workshop focusing on the establishment of a joint **Central European Data Base on Social Policy**, was held in Vienna in June 1993.

A **Central European Forum on Social Policy** is planned for January 1994. This conference will provide leading intellectuals and key policy makers with an opportunity to discuss the social effects of the post-communist transformation. The purpose of the forum is to generate action in public policy circles, to provide an up-date on the various research projects underway in each of the countries and to further promote cooperative research endeavours.

International Expert Committee: Anthony **Atkinson**, Professor of Economics, London School of Economics; Leszek **Balcerowicz**, Professor of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics (SGH), former Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister; Francois **Bourguignon**, Professor of Economics, Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris; Michael J. **Dowling**, Director of Health, Education and Human Services for New York State, Albany, NY; Zsuzsa **Ferge**, Professor of Sociology, Head of Department of Social Policy, Eötvös Lóránd University, Budapest; Richard **Freeman**, Professor of Economics, London School of Economics and Harvard University, Chair of the International Expert Committee; Hans **Geisler**, Minister for Social Affairs of Saxony; Ira **Katznelson**, Professor of Political Science, Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science, New School for Social Research, New York; Janos M. **Kovacs**, Professor of Economics, Permanent Fellow of IWM, and Member of the Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences; Claus **Offe**, Professor of Sociology, Director of the Center for Social Policy, University of Bremen; Andrzej **Rychard**, Professor of Sociology, Director of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences; Julia **Szalai**, Professor of Sociology, Deputy Director, Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy

of Sciences; Jiří **Večerník**, Institute of Sociology, Czech Academy of Sciences.

Czech National Research Team: Petra **Buzková**, M.P., Head of the Committee for Human Rights; Jana **Chalupová**, Office of the President of the Czech Republic; Jiří **Chlumský**, Director of the Institute of Economics, Czech Academy of Sciences; Martin **Fassman**, Czech-Moravian Chamber of Trade Unions; Jan **Hartl**, Director, STEM - Center for Empirical Research; Michal **Illner**, Director of the Institute of Sociology, Czech Academy of Sciences; Kamil **Janáček**, Deputy Minister for Labor and Social Affairs; Jaroslav **Jílek**, Department of Statistics, Prague School of Economics; Jiří **Kabele**, Department of Sociology, Charles University; Karel **Kouba**, Director of the Institute of Economic Sciences, Charles University; Ivo **Možný**, Head of the Department of Sociology, Masaryk University, Brno; Martin **Potůček**, Head of the Center for Public and Social Policy, School of Social Sciences, Charles University; Vladimír **Rudlovčák**, Deputy Minister for Finance; Oto **Sedláček**, Director of the Institute of Labor and Social Policy; Martin **Syka**, M.P., Head of the Committee for Social Affairs and Health; Jiřina **Šiklová**, Head of the Department of Social Work, Faculty of Philosophy, Charles University; Jiří **Večerník**, Institute of Sociology, Czech Academy of Sciences, Coordinator of the Czech National Research Team; Jiřina **Voňková**, Deputy Minister for Labor and Social Affairs.

Hungarian National Research Team: Istvan **Banfalvi**, Chairman and C.E.O., Fraternité Consulting Ltd., former State Secretary of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, Coordinator of the Hungarian National Research Team; Boldizsar **Biro**, Adviser to the Constitutional Court; Laszlo **Cseh-Szombathy**, Professor of Sociology, Institute of Sociology, Eötvös Lóránd University; Janos **Farkas**, Head of Section, Department of Social Statistics, Central Statistical Office; Karoly **Fazekas**, Deputy Director, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences; Gyula **Fekete**, M.P., Hungarian Parliament, Fellow, Central Statistical Office; Zsuzsa **Ferge**, Professor, Head of Department of Social Policy, Eötvös Lóránd University; Maria **Frey**, Scientific Adviser, Research Institute of Labor, Ministry of Labor; Ilona **Gere**, Managing Director, ECONSULT Ltd.; Peter **Gyori**, Chairman, Commission of Social Affairs, Budapest City Hall; Laszlo **Hablicsek**, Scientific Adviser, Demographic Research Institute, Central Statistical Office; Laszlo **Herczog**, Deputy State Secretary, Ministry of Labor; Istvan **Kakuszi**, Deputy State Secretary, Ministry of Welfare; Janos **Kollo**, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences; Jeno **Koltay**, Director, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences; Terez **Laky**, Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, Budapest University of Economics; Marietta **Pongracz**, Vice Director, Demographic Research Institute, Central Statistical Office; Eva **Orosz**, Deputy Director, Institute of Sociology and Social Policy, Eötvös Lóránd University, Coordinator of the Hungarian National Research Team; Agnes **Simonyi**, Assistant Professor, Department of Social Policy, Institute of Sociology, Eötvös Lóránd University; Julia **Szalai**, Deputy Director, Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences; Zsuzsa **Szeman**, Team Leader, Center for Social Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences; Katalin **Tausz**, Senior Lecturer, Department of Social Policy, Eötvös Lóránd University; Istvan György **Toth**, Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, Budapest University of Economics, Adviser to the Alliance of the Young Democrats; Agnes **Vajda**, Head of Section, Department of Social Statistics, Central Statistical Office; Gyula **Zombori**, Institute of Sociology and Social Policy, Eötvös Lóránd University, Member, Supervisory Board, National Directorate of Social Security.

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Kelly Musick

Transition to what?

The second Prague seminar on the Social Consequences in East-Central Europe was held at the Central European University during May. The conference aims to bring together people doing empirical research in the region to discuss their findings, and there is a particular emphasis on Social Policy. The contributors, coming from Eastern and Western Europe are able to enlarge in a dialogue about the transformation from a number of different perspectives. Many of the contributors were also at the first seminar last year and so there is a continuation of debates begun then and the opportunity to reflect upon how the changes have been developing.

In 1993 there was more questioning of the transformation process than last year. What is it a transition from? And what to? What is being transformed exactly? There was some discussion as to how to characterize the societies we currently live in. They are hardly yet capitalist. And yet they are not socialist. The transition seems to take longer than was first anticipated, but in Central Europe there is a situation of comparative political and social stability. Despite plans for privatization and marketization, these have not yet been fully implemented and the state remains the major player in the game. This leads us to look at the very different styles of marketization in the former socialist countries. They began from very different positions: for example in Poland the private sector was already large before the reforms and in Hungary privatization had already been going on for some years before it started in the Czech Republic. Hence privatization and marketization can have many meanings and are not necessarily incompatible with state socialism. There were many forms of communism, just as there are many forms of capitalism and it is not clear what kind of capitalism will emerge in post-communist societies.

Although the seminar aimed to discuss social policy, participants from all countries reported that there was no clear social policy strategy to match the plans for privatization and liberalization. Instead there were ad-hoc measures introduced to deal with newly developing problems - unemployment, migration and so on. In many cases these have been frequently revised as government grope their way towards the right response. In essence, this is the old system, developed to serve a completely different society being adapted to serve a new one. This leaves many ambiguities. What rights to welfare should citizens expect from their state? Should such rights be enshrined in law or in a constitution? Should there be a right to health care for example, or should it be up to individuals to make sure that they are insured and can pay for themselves. The legacy of state protection and the relationship between the citizen and his or her state has left a certain set of expectations to entitlement. But now governments may be unable or unwilling to meet such obligations. What can the citizens expect now? It is clear that there is some attempt to re-draw such welfare rights and to create more autonomous citizens who are not 'dependent'

on the state and also to create state budgets where welfare can be distinguished from other forms of expenditure, or to make it self-financing through 'insurance' schemes of various kinds. However, there is no consistency even in these. Should there be one insurance scheme as in the Czech Republic, or should there be many of them competing in a market, as in Poland? Although governments are keen to divest themselves of welfare responsibilities and to cut costs, such measures as competing insurance schemes for example, often create many more administrative costs. The same is true for the tax system. one problem is that in situations of increasing insecurity, people have little faith in schemes that are constantly changing and fail to be implemented. In Poland there is also a problem with collecting the taxes from the private sector, which means that the state is plunged into a sharp fiscal crisis. The Polish delegates, Grazyna Magnuszewska-Otulak and Jerzy Mielecki outlined some of the many plans for reform and criticized the lack of progress.

Martin Potůček described the comprehensive and innovative plans for health reform in the Czech Republic, which was in some ways modeled on the privatization strategies. However, a paper by Jana Klimentová indicated the problems of continuing with the present pension arrangements - these would absorb a sizeable proportions of the Gross Domestic Product in the next century if they were not reformed. Such projections were reinforced by Vladimír Rys. However, it was evident from Romanian presentation by Ioan Marginean and Mariana Stanciu that some of the problems of Central Europe are also being confronted in Romania, although it seems that the countries of Central Europe have experienced both the reforms and the consequences of reforms more rapidly and intensely so far.

It is clear that these new administrations are keen to balance their state budgets (and are under pressure from international organizations to do so). However the costs of making changes at first outweigh the savings such benefits will eventually ensure, as we have seen with the introduction of taxation and insurance systems which initially can only cost more money. With the state privatizing many of its previous assets, and the ongoing economic crisis in East-Central Europe it becomes important for the state to be able to raise revenue through taxation. However, the means of implementing this efficiently are sometimes missing and so the state is not always able to collect the revenue to which it should be entitled. With rising social problems - unemployment, a growing elderly population, the need to re-train workers and so on, this becomes more serious. Marketization also creates new problems to which states must respond.

Most of the contributors came from Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. These countries of central Europe are the ones where reforms have progressed the furthest and they are also the most stable politically, economically and socially. It would seem that in these countries there is considerable discussion amongst academicians about social policy reform and its implications and Social Policy is developing as a discipline. This will help to inform public debate. There is a search for models of social policy in Western Europe and America (where very different welfare regimes can be discerned), but also a skepticism about applying these in new circumstances. The debate is increasingly well-informed as academicians are able to travel and to see other circumstances. This developing discourse may not be reflected in coherent government plans for social policy, but they reflect a healthy tendency towards a developing public discourse which is an essential prerequisite for democratic reform. Why were there no contributors from other countries? For the first time this year, there were some delegates from Romania, and it turns our that many of the problems confronted in Central Europe are also being raised there. The representatives from Bulgaria came again for the second year. But what about all the other countries? Is it because the idea of social policy has only been discussed in these countries (there is probably a need for relative stability before such issues case begin to be discussed.

One factor brought out by the Hungarian contributor, Judit Eke, is role which local government plays in social policy and the relationship between local and central government. A key plank of the reforms is decentralization and vet local government, or local services often lack the mechanisms for responding effectively, or lack the finances. The same could be said for the attempt to involve a range of nongovernmental organizations in the provision of services: sometimes the legal framework for involving them is lagging behind the reforms.

One debate which has been of key importance during the transformation process is the role of civil society. This rather ambiguous concept is normally taken to mean the role of social organization at an intermediated level between the citizens and the state and which is considered an essential foundation of democratic society. Some people have argued that civil society and civic initiative, being starved and strangled under the former regime, will take a long time to be reborn, which means that governments can implement legislation without any fear of opposition from the people. Others argue that the former regimes actually encouraged the mobilization of protest groups which were the beginnings of a free civil society. A report by Nick Manning looking at social movements and protest groups, found plenty of evidence for the mobilization of citizens protest groups who could pressurize either the government or the local authority into making changes. The examples he provided were over housing and the way in which neighborhoods had organized action committees or even occupied empty housing themselves.

Given the economic crisis indicated in the official statistics, how do people survive? At the previous year's workshop, there had been considerable discussion about the informal economy, the traditional partner of state planning, through which people organized their every day needs. It would seem from presentations this year, that the informal economy is still essential to the survival of households in practice, but that many of the trading and entrepreneurial activities taking place there are no longer illegal. Indeed this may be the nursery for nurturing new business ventures. However, the inadequacy or unwillingness of the state authorities to control such activities also gives rise to the possibility of more criminal-style activities ant it seems that with privatization and marketization the scope for these have grown. At the same time the informal economy has been transformed. The introduction of taxation systems in Central Europe means there are new opportunities for tax avoidance as a dimension to this activity. However, Jiří Večerník's paper indicated that household adapt very well to the change falling back on their own resources and developing new resources and skills which the current environment offers them.

One debate which emerged from the conference was about whether the post-communist societies could be clustered in their development. Should the Visegrad countries, for example, be grouped together as representing one set of characteristics whilst South Eastern Central Europe represent another set and the ex-Soviet Union a further set of characteristics? What could be usefully predicted from such a classification? The existing data presented at the conference suggested that at least in terms of attitudes to democracy and welfare, this was not feasible, but no doubt such classifications will continue to be used.

At the end the group decided to apply for funding for a follow-up workshop next year to continue the discussions. If anyone is interested in the books emerging from these workshops, they should contact Dr. Claire Wallace, Central European University, Táboritská 23, 130 87 Praha 3.

Claire Wallace

Report on Meeting of European Studies Center's Working Group on Unemployment

Lodz, Poland -- September, 1993

The European Studies Center's Working Group on Unemployment reports that its meeting in Lodz, Poland in September introduced new and practical perspectives on assisting the long-term unemployed. After first studying the patterns and trends of unemployment in the four Visegrad countries and the New Länder, the Group turned its attention to programmatic responses.

In Lodz, the Group began by visiting the Lodz Voivodship Employment Office to learn about its active labor market policies. The Group noted that the Polish system has been challenged by the daunting coincidence of high levels of unemployment and limited resources. Some members were surprised that the Polish employment system separates facilities by gender and skill, and that one Employment Office in Lodz still lacks computers.

Next, the Group visited the International Women's Foundation, a non-profit organization which supports women's self-employment through training for business start-ups. Women who attended the IWF course told the Group about their experiences as they lost their jobs and looked for new ones, and about the support they received from the IWF. In addition, the women shared their hopes for their new businesses and identified constraints such as limited credit availability, work space, and family expectations. They all agreed, however, that while they are working harder now than they did as employees, they prefer self-employment to their former jobs.

The following day featured three other Polish programs: the founder of the Center for the Advancement of Women in Warsaw described her efforts to assist women with confidence-building measures, job search skills and placement services. She also presented research about what employers consider the "perfect employee", which illustrated the extra difficulties that women encounter when they apply for vacancies. The director of the EC PHARE program's Local Initiatives Program explained how they will support community efforts, whether in terms of creating jobs or providing social services -- depending on how each community identifies its needs. Regarding rural unemployment, the Group heard how the Women in Rural Enterprise Development Program of the Foundation for the Development of Polish Agriculture is offering training and seeking credit for small businesses, particularly in agro-tourism. After discovering that independent, nongovernmental initiatives already exist in Poland, and learning about their successes and frustrations, the Working Group and its guests heard about programs from outside the region. The Veterans Leadership Program (VLP), established by Vietnam Veterans in the United States to help long-term unemployed veterans, offered an instructive model of a nonprofit organization. Surprisingly perhaps, the veterans' experiences paralleled those of Polish women in a number of ways: while both groups have worked in the past, in military service or in the home, they both (1) have difficulty identifying their employment-related skills; (2) lack confidence and strategies for dealing with employer biases against them; and (3) need training on how to find and interview for vacancies. In terms of organization, when the Polish organization leaders heard about the VLP director's experiences -- including eleven years of ups and downs, learning from mistakes, changing approaches and inconsistent funding -- they discovered that building such programs invariably requires time, patience and determination. The Group also heard about a government program, the Massachusetts Employment Express, which is engaged in an aggressive, targeted campaign to prevent prolonged unemployment by mobilizing the unemployed before they became disheartened.

Finally, the Working Group made some interim observations about delivering services to the long-term unemployed: One sociologist observed that the long-term unemployed should be treated as clients rather than as victims, basing this on the belief that they must take responsibility for their own lives, and that programs should teach the

unemployed to work for themselves by providing them with the necessary infrastructure and resources. The founder of a Polish NGO praised the Employment Express Program for demonstrating how government can work to improve its services. She noted the potential advantages if local, independent organizations and Government worked together.

Two social scientists noted lessons about the role of independent organizations in a civil society. One member saw a need for the development of this sector as a link between people and government. Another participant commented that one person alone cannot achieve results, and that there is therefore a need to work cooperatively, form organizations to articulate arguments and share experiences.

From the government perspective, some participants questioned why the Employment Office in Lodz has not been paying for training offered by the International Women's Foundation. And from the business point of view, it was noted that like since NGO's involve risk, require identification of markets and demand, serve clients, and need credit and resources, they should be encouraged, developed and evaluated as entrepreneurial ventures.

While the meeting in Lodz launched a new area of study, the Group will continue its analysis when looking at Slovak responses and other model programs at its meeting in Bardejov in December.

Marcia Greenberg

STEM

The Centre for Empirical Research

was founded in early spring 1990. Since then it has systematically studied the living conditions, attitudes and value orientation of the Czech and Slovak populations. STEM is an independent, private organization, focusing mainly on the analysis of the political scene and social problems. Here we present in brief some of its findings, in an attempt to illustrate recent developments in the Czech Republic.

According to the STEM's data, the political and economic transformation can be described in terms of several developmental stages.

The Period of Revolution Euphoria - as compared to Poland, Hungary and Slovakia - is clear and intense. The fall of the totalitarian system was greeted with vigorous emotional support and strength in the Czech Republic. This fact can be related to the historical development of Czechoslovakia after 1918, as well as to the character of the Communist system after 1948 and after the Russian invasion of 1968. The breakdown of the communist domination occurred relatively late in comparison to neighbouring countries, it was rather sudden, and even spectacular. In its euphoria the population expected that - similar to "Velvet Revolution" - the change of the system would proceed fast and smoothly, and would be of substantial nature, bringing about a deep and lasting change of the system itself. In the first half of 1990 the people were markedly satisfied with the development of the political situation, but were increasingly impatient with the slow progress in the transformation of economy. STEM's data indicate that the revolutionary momentum on the side of the population has been to a large extent wasted and remained unutilized. At least in their statements the people were prepared to make their own share of personal sacrifice to the radical transformation process, but eventually there appeared to be no real necessity for it. The revolutionary euphoria thus slowly faded and in the press - typically for such a historical situation - one could even have read about "the betrayed revolution".

The support of the new regime has been mainly emotional, prevailingly irrational, perhaps even naive.

The euphoric period was defined by a high level of consensus among different groups of the population. This overall feeling of agreement, was then achieved and further facilitated by the existence of broad political movements, with somewhat unclear political profiles. Thus at the beginning of 1990 we could have observed the high level of simi-

Perception of Historical Periods
(Deviation from Grand Mean) #



STEM, October 1991

#) In all of the four countries the present situations was in 1991 evaluated very high by the majority of population (the best two schoolmarks for freedom are given by 73% in the Czech Republic, 68% in Poland, 63% in Hungary and 60% in Slovakia). The communist regime was on the contrary refused by the majority: the best two schoolmarks were given in 26% of cases in Hungary, 16% in Poland, 14% in Slovakia, and only 7% in the Czech Republic. The prewar regime received best two schoolmarks by 54% in the Czech Republic, 43% in Poland, 33% in Slovakia, and only 23% in Hungary. The distance betwen perception of prewar Czechoslovakia by the two parts of the republic is clearly apparent.

To contrast the differences, this chart is based on the deviations of the country means from the grand mean. By this measure real differences were for instructive purpose exaggerated.

larity between the Czech and the Slovak Republics. Since April 1990, however, the data has increasingly reflected the trend in the intensive diversification of the attitudes of the citizens of the Czech Republic and of the Slovak republic. By as early as the end of 1990 and even more in 1991 this trend resulted in such a remarkable distance separating the two republics, that - at least as far as public opinion was concerned - we might clearly speak of the two different societies. The period of the revolutionary euphoria ended in the middle of 1990, around the first free elections (June 1990), which in some ways may be termed the anti-communist plebiscite.

The Period of Disillusion - was an inevitable reaction to the preceding period and is reflected in the STEM's data immediately following the June 1990 elections. The space for radical action, opened by general political changes remained unutilized. Instead, the political scene was defined by the domination of procedural problems, by disputes over meager marginal topics. This was a fertile soil for prevailing cabinet policies, which cannot appeal to the general public. The communication flow became rather slow and ineffective, the population to a large extent stayed uninformed about crucial aspects of the transformation. This situation may be attributed to the fact that the result of the elections (53% for Civic Forum) led the political elite to saturation and satisfaction. The interaction of the political elite with the public was weakened and the quality of the dialogue stayed rather poor. Not even the communal elections in November 1990 brought about considerable impulse for the local grassroot political movements and for the growth of civil society.

The Interim Period - followed the liberalization of prices after January 1991. At the beginning of 1991 almost 70 per cent of the population expressed the opinion that the economic reform was proceeding too slowly. This was also the reason why the majority was also dissatisfied with the course of the reform. This "economic vacuum" was probably a proper scene for the expansion of the "national" problem. In their attitudes the population of the Czech republic was prepared for a more dramatic decrease in the standard of living and for far-reaching changes in the way the society functioned. Public opinion showed signs of embarrassment and distress. The lowest point was reached by autumn 1991.

The STEM's data from this period shows the prevailing general, "abstract" support of the new regime. Detailed analysis of these attitudes would, however, reveal a somewhat more complicated picture. Out of a series of data we may hypothesize that the groups of active supporters and active opponents of the new regime were almost equally numerous, each of them being formed by 15-20 per cent of the population. The supporters were mainly of the middle age generation, the opponents mainly older people. It is important to notice that the massive support for the new regime was in fact formed by a large group of population, estimated at some 40 per cent, whose attitude towards the new regime was in fact "lukewarm", conditioned by different circumstances. These supporters were rather passive, more or less continuing their habits and stereotypes from the "ancien regime". The remaining part of the population (around one quarter of the total) is formed by people who are not interested in politics or public affairs and who have no clear opinion on the transformation.

The Period of Political Crystallization - apparent in the STEM data was in the Czech Republic since the beginning of 1992. We may conceive this period as a positive overcoming of a relative disintegration of the preceding two periods. Both the political institutions and their acting representatives became more transparent to the general public. Political parties acquired clearer profiles. Public opinion became more differentiated and realistic - an important precondition for the appropriate functioning of the democratic system. The passive part of the population retreated from public life and quite normally did not want to be mixed with politics. The active part of the population found closer ties to existing, more distinct political parties. The illusions of the previous time seemed to be lost, and critical appraisal, or

Secure Feeling for the Future
(Percentage - "Yes")



STEM, Series 1990-1993

Right wing political orientation
(Percentage "Right")



STEM, Series 1990-1993

"pragmatic" approach, as it is usually officially labeled, was winning ground. Realistic expectations were relatively modest: almost half of the population expected that the process of economic transformation, before an acceptable standard of living was reached, was going to last ten years or more. The year 1992 was characterized by general relief and contentment, the situation did not bring about dramatic events and turning points. Political institutions started functioning on a routine basis, which on the one hand brought about more bureaucratic effectiveness, on the other hand the danger of rigidity and - with regard to the public-elite interaction - of certain exclusiveness.

The Period of Diversification - is an operational label for the present period, which began in the summer of 1993. The optimism and relief of the preceding period was vanishing. The period was characterized by a certain weariness, the temporary stability and contentedness slowly being replaced by differentiated ambitions and fears of different groups of population. It is a more complicated period, with the signs of a starker polarization of the political scene. Interest groups were expressing their opposing interests and pushing forward their contradicting requirements. In November 1993 we can see the emerging diversity as only a latent tension. The data do not indicate a possible outburst of a radical political action, the willingness to political protest was relatively low. We can expect that the diversity will grow as a result of the gradual release of legal and factual obstacles to bankruptcies, to the liberation of the labour market and to the cost of housing and energy. This will confront the prevailing ideological concepts in evaluating political progress with the practical consequences of the material deprivation of large groups of the population.

* * *

If we want to understand and interpret the attitudes of the Czech population towards the recent political and economic development properly we have to take the different levels of the subjective evaluation of the situation and the change into account. General and abstract attitudes are quite clearly in favour of an open pluralistic society, based on individual freedom and the market economy (without adjectives). The general pro-reform attitudes are very stable, forming the basic pillar of support for the new regime. These general manifestations are strongly confronted with the specific attitudes in different facets of social life. Here we can observe ambiguity, uncertainty, and a higher degree of variance and contradiction. The subjective evaluations on general and specific levels of the majority of population show an unexpectedly high level of inconsistency. In spite of the high general appraisal of the new regime we are faced with strong reservations to dismantling the socialist, solidaristic and collectivistic principles in organization of the society. The data indicate that socialism probably had deeper roots than has been admitted and even suspected. The main probem area may be identified in the relation of the citizen vs. state, and in the welfare provision in general.

In a way we may speak of a dualistic "schizophrenic" vision of the world, where a generally positive evaluation of the transformation is combined with negative evaluation in most of the specific areas of social life (interpersonal relations, education, health care, family, leisure, standard of living). Moreover, the detailed analysis shows that general attitudes are not related to the characteristics of socio-demographic position of the individual or household, which indicates they are not derived from real practice. This is also true to a large extent for specific attitudes. Indirectly it points to the fact that for a large part of the population the change of the system is defined mainly ideolgically. Also the support for the new regime is based on ideology, i.e. relies on big ideas, on historical tradition, on concepts of national unity etc. It is more oriented towards future promise than towards solving today's problems. It is a question of how much such a vision can contribute to the growth of the meritocratic principals in social organization, how it can stimulate individual efforts, personal initiative and responsibility. We may ask whether such a perspective is

Succes in Building up Democracy
(Percentage "Yes")



STEM, Series 1990-1993

coherent with the idea that plurality, diversity and even conflict are the crucial factors in the systemic change. To conlude, we should be aware of the fact that the impressive support of the new regime, apparent from the STEM's data, may in fact later turn out to be rather frail, volatile, and vulnerable.

Jan Hartl

Regional differences: where is more social protection requested?

It should come as no surprise that economically and socially European countries (not to speak of Eastern European and the Balkan countries) differ considerably. People's perceptions and expectations of the welfare state also differ. It is not easy to compare them in a setting of rapid change and continuing territorial divisions. Nevertheless, some features are not changing so rapidly: the cultural level and mentality of the nations, their hidden social structures, the degree of their internalized communist experience, etc. The consequences of a long-term crisis in Poland are not the same as those of the gradual abandonment of communism in Hungary. Similarly, the lively spirit of capitalism in the Czech Republic and the former backwardness of Slovakia can still be traced, as comparative survey data shows.

In order to describe some of these disparities, we will use the survey *The Dismantling of the Safety Net and Its Political Consequences*, which was coordinated and financed by the Institute of East West Security Studies in New York. The field work took place in October of 1991 and from this four national analytical files were created: for the Czech Republic (1187 respondents), Slovakia (817 respondents), Hungary (1500 respondents) and Poland (1491 respondents). Here we will use the multinational data file which contains information on 4995 adults. In this survey, many questions concerning the welfare state were answered and the various responses have been organized into distinct factor analysis clusters (Table 1):

Table 1. Average scores of some opinions in the Czech Republic, Slovakia Hungary and Poland
(averages from 4 categories, the highest being strong agreement, the lowest strong disagreement)

	Czech Republic	Slovakia	Hungary	Poland
1. Differences should be small	2.45	2.83	2.73	3.21
2. Equal pensions for everyone	2.24	2.39	2.22	3.07
3. Child allowances high	2.86	3.29	3.22	3.44
4. Money for competent people	2.91	2.56	1.98	3.28
5. Wealth is not legitimate	3.23	3.32	3.06	3.39
6. Possibility to pay education	3.12	2.65	2.79	3.33
7. Tuition at universities	2.29	2.04	1.96	3.18
8. Possibility to pay doctor	2.79	2.69	3.03	3.04
9. Everyone should pay doctor	1.75	1.61	1.59	2.85
10. Everyone is responsible	2.29	2.03	1.84	2.72
11. Everyone has to pay rent	2.86	2.59	2.69	3.15
12. State neglects guarantees	2.83	3.24	3.14	3.57

Statements:

1. "The differences in incomes and property must be small."
2. "All pensioners should have equal benefits."
3. "Child allowances should cover all the costs of children."
4. "It is right that competent people can earn a lot of money, even millions."
5. "People here get rich mainly by unfair means."
6. "Everyone should have the right to buy a better education for his/her children in private primary and secondary schools."
7. "University students or their parents should pay tuition covering a great deal of the real costs of their education."
8. "If someone has enough money, he or she should have the possibility of buying better medical care."
9. "Current medical treatment should be paid directly by the patients."
10. "Everyone is responsible for his or her poverty."
11. "If someone does not have enough money to pay the rent, he or she should move to a cheaper apartment."
12. "The government does not pay enough attention to the provision of social guarantees for the population."

1. *More equality* (differences should be small, child allowances high, wealth is not legitimate, etc.);
2. *More paid services* (possibilities to pay for better education, better medical treatment, etc.);
3. *More individual responsibility* (the individual is responsible for his or her poverty, everyone should have an apartment according to his or her financial possibilities, etc.);

In Table 2, multiple classification analysis (the Anova procedure of the SPSSx) is used. In the first part, deviations from average factor scores are presented - both observed (before adjustment to other independent variables) and adjusted (after adjustment). Coefficients eta show the correlation between the dependent and individual independent variable. The coefficients beta can be read as standardized regression coefficients in the sense used in multiple regression: the

square of beta indicates the proportion of additional variance explained by each factor.

The analysis of variance has shown several considerable differences between the observed countries. As far as the inequality issue is concerned (Factor 1), there is a sharp contrast between the Czech and Slovak Republics. Slovaks tend to be levellers and Czechs antilevellers, Hungarians in this respect are similar to Slovaks and Poles similar to Czechs. An orientation toward paid services (Factor 2) is not very welcome in Central Europe, yet Poles accept it more than Czechs and Czechs more than Hungarians or Slovaks. In strong contrast to Poland, the Czech Republic's population stresses individual responsibility for one's standard of living.

The differences between East European nations are partly parallel to educational or age differences. Better-educated and younger people (and also Czechs) demand more inequality, less educated and older people (and also Slovaks) demand greater state guarantees etc. Looking at the set of expectations, national specificities seem to play a paramount role. We are, however, witnessing various patterns, far from a simple "left-right" axis.

The data show that the differences even between the western and eastern parts of the former Czechoslovak Federation are considerable and growing. The communist system was much more advantageous for Slovaks, the systematic redistribution in favor of the less developed eastern territory. After the "complete success" of these politics was declared and statistically documented by the communist regime in the late 1980s, the republics' diversity surfaced with unexpected urgency. Slovaks currently expect more welfare protection, ask for higher social benefits, are less prepared to accept personal responsibility for their standard of living and expect more confidence in the efficiency of state activity. Therefore, populist politics, which promises prominent state engagement in the economy and social life, has had much greater success in Slovakia.

Table 2. Factor loadings of some opinions in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland (Varimax rotation)

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
1. Differences should be small	.76	-.17	-.00
2. Equal pensions for everyone	.65	-.00	.13
3. Child allowances high	.53	-.04	-.13
4. Money for competent people	-.53	.29	.16
5. Wealth is not legitimate	.51	.02	-.22
6. Possibility to pay education	-.16	.71	-.06
7. Tuition at universities	.04	.67	.05
8. Possibility to pay doctor	-.06	.52	.11
9. Everyone should pay doctor	-.11	.54	.17
10. Everyone is responsible	-.05	.11	.72
11. Everyone has to pay rent	.03	.17	.61
12. State neglects guarantees	.26	.01	-.59

According to the last elections, conservative values seem to prevail in the Czech Republic. Nevertheless, following both political preferences and social expectations, the Czech population is crystallizing into two poles - roughly speaking, into the winners and losers in the recent and oncoming changes. Only from a long-term perspective can human capital become the main axis of economic success and can attitudes become identifiable along the re-emerging social structure. After several decades of massive

redistribution, almost the entire Slovak population consider itself to be a loser. At the end of 1992, the dilemma of containing two different socio-economic settings in the country resolved itself politically. Until now, social policies in the Czech and Slovak Republics have developed more or less in parallel but budget constraints in the Slovak Republic will soon force cuts in social expenditures - the opposite of what the voters voted for.

Table 3. Factors of some opinions in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland
Multiple classification analysis of factor loadings

Factors	Observed values 1	2	3	Adjusted values 1	2	3
Adjusted deviations:						
Gender:						
men	-.11	.06	.01	-.09	.05	.02
women	.10	-.06	-.01	.08	-.05	-.02
Age:						
20-29	-.12	.05	-.03	-.06	.06	-.03
30-39	-.13	.07	-.03	-.03	.04	.00
40-49	-.01	.02	-.03	.05	.00	-.03
50-59	.08	-.07	.01	.02	-.06	.00
60-	.19	-.08	.07	-.03	-.04	.05
Education:						
elementary	.44	-.14	.04	.39	-.09	.07
vocational	.11	-.03	.02	.15	-.07	-.02
secondary	-.26	.10	-.03	-.26	.09	-.02
university	-.75	.19	-.07	-.76	.20	-.06
Country:						
Czech Republic	-.16	.11	.35	-.16	.12	.36
Slovak Republic	.20	-.20	.00	.20	-.21	.00
Hungary	.12	-.18	-.05	.13	-.19	-.06
Poland	-.10	.20	-.22	-.11	.20	-.22
Coefficients:		eta			beta	
Gender	.10	.06	.01	.09**	.05*	.02
Age	.13	.06	.04	.04	.04	.03
Education	.37	.11	.04	.36**	.10**	.05**
Country	.14	.18	.21	.15**	.18**	.22**
R2				.17	.05	.05

* significant at the level < 0.01
** significant at the level < 0.001

Working labels of individual factors:
1. More equality
2. More paid services
3. More individual responsibility

Jiří Večerník



YES. IT'S STILL EUROPE, WILKINS...

Jan Keller: Nedomyšlená společnost (The Not Thought-Out Society)

Brno, Doplněk 1992, First edition.

Jan Keller, a young but experienced Czech social scientist, employs a smart, ironical style to tell this rather short popularizing sociological story. He expresses his skepticism of the conviction that the basis of our modern society is rational and of social scientists' efforts to describe and comprehend it intellectually. Using examples of irrational social behavior such as traditional feasts, family life and rituals, Jan Keller shows the dangerous inadequacies of rationalist theories as well as any political practice which promises progress. He accuses the modern state and the social sciences, in their service of disseminating social and political myths, of rendering socialism as deceptive as liberalism.

Emanuel Rádl: Válka Čechů s Němci (The War of the Czechs with the Germans)

Praha, Melantrich 1993, Second edition.

The new edition of this book, first published in 1928, is a splendid contribution to the contemporary discussion on the future of the new Czech Republic. Emanuel Rádl, a disciple of Masaryk and considered to be one of the greatest thinkers of the First Republic and probably the greatest Czech philosopher, was interested in evolutionary theories. In this book he describes the historical development of Czechs' relationship to Germans as well as their relationship to democracy. He discusses the question of the national state; for contrast, he identifies the need to cultivate the consciousness of state citizenship and to address the individual's personal freedom. Although nationalist ideologies are strongly criticized in his book, the idea of nationality is not completely rejected by Emanuel Rádl; the solution is to understand them politically.

Jindřich Pecka, Vilém Prečan: Changes of the Prague Spring

Brno, Doplněk 1993, First edition.

A historical and sociological look at attitudes in Czech society during the Prague Spring (1967-1968) compiled by outstanding contemporary Czech historians, sociologists and writers. The volume is divided into three parts:

I. Studies (articles of several authors based mostly on unknown or unused historical sources)

II. Documents (which deal with post-August civic activity)

III. A chronological survey (of the period from June 1967 to December 1970)

The editors of the volume do not concentrate on the "leading power" in society - the Communist Party - but focus on emancipating parts of society: the intelligentsia, unions, students and the general public. It is an attempt to find a new way of understanding the Prague Spring and the subsequent "normalization."

Vladimír Čermák: Otázka demokracie - Demokracie a totalitarismus (The Question of Democracy - Democracy and Totalitarism)

Praha, Academia 1992, First edition, volume I.

The first of five volumes, this work is the result of several years' study and is of principal significance to the Czech social sciences. It is a summary of historical and contemporary democratic conceptions, types of democracy, and their analysis and comparison. The author perceives democracy as a medium and as a goal. He considers an ideal type of democracy, criticizes totalitarism and Marxism and brings out aspects of human psychology in the process of control over society.

Jan Keller: Až na dno blahobytu (To the Very Bottom of Wealth)

Brno, DUHA, 1993, First edition.

The book, the subtitle of which is "To the Common Roots of the Ecological Crisis," was published by the ecological movement DUHA as the first publication of the Last Generation program. Jan Keller, the famous young radical sociologist from Brno, writes from a sociological point of view, trying to explain Czech society's lack of concern in the face of a looming ecological catastrophe. He traces its cause to the excessive centralization of political authority, bureaucracy and the passive, consumer, mass democracy, where freedom of choice means the willingness to be convinced. Jan Keller is skeptical: it is beyond the grasp of common sense to reverse self-destructive prosperity. The modern state has therefore become defenceless against global problems. But according to Keller, there is a chance in the development of alternative systems.

Lenka Kalinová et al.: K proměnám sociální struktury v Československu 1918-1968 (On the Transformations of Social Structure in Czechoslovakia 1918-1968)

Praha, Ústav sociálně politických věd FSV UK, 1993

A topical scholarly study reworking and modernizing the historiographical probe into the history of social structure and social development in Czechoslovakia through the end of the 1960s. A team of outstanding Czech historians prepared this analysis for sociological research into the contemporary social structure transformation in the former Czechoslovakia, but has published it as a self-contained study.

Jiří Vymazal: Koncepce masové komunikace v sociologii (Conceptions of Mass Communication in Sociology)

Praha, Karolinum, 1991, First edition.

A description and analysis of the leading contemporary conceptions of mass communication in sociology, the main focus of this book is the author's contribution to the creation of real democracy in our society. Jiří Vymazal offers a complex sociological view of mass communication as a social institution. He is, however, also concerned with its specific elements and their interdepent relationship to the social system. Special attention is given to the content of communication as an expression of social.

Ann J. Zammit, Dharam Ghai: Czechoslovakia: Which Way to the Market?

Geneva, UNRISD Report 92.2, 1992, First edition.

This short publication from the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development provides an overview of the socioeconomic and political changes occurring in Czechoslovakia since November 1989. It is mainly intended for non-specialist readers and to be used as background for those who want to orient themselves to the recent developments in the former Czechoslovakia and to follow the major turning points in the history of Eastern and Central Europe. It provides interesting information on economic development, comparative GDP and structural changes during the years 1937-1989 as well as the economic transition, and a description of the main social and political changes following the revolution.

Simona Perušičová

CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

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

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