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Scope and Mission

The CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW is a scholarly review open to the discussion of all professional and societal problems, sociological theory and methodology, and the dissemination of the results and interpretation of sociological research. Its attention is directed towards the development of the field and its teaching, while simultaneously striving to contribute to the solution of the practical problems of Czech social and economic politics.

Manuscript Submission

The editors require an original and two legible copies, which do not state the name or workplace of the author, in order for the reading process to be anonymous on both sides. The accompanying letter should contain a complete contact address, including telephone number. Submission of a manuscript to another journal, while it is under review by the CSR is deemed unethical.

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Editorial decisions: Decisions are generally made within one month from the date of your manuscript's arrival at the CSR office. If your manuscript is accepted you will be asked to submit your final version both on paper and on a microcomputer floppy disk, either in ASCII or ANSI text-only file. IBM disks are acceptable. The final version should also include a twenty-line abstract and an eighty-line summary, an alphabetized bibliography and basic, relevant curriculum vitae.

Sociology and Historical Change: The Case of the Post-Communist Transformation in Europe

Two incentives of a decisive nature initiated the realisation of the present issue of the Czech Sociological Review. The first was an event of general significance: the challenge of the President of the International Sociological Association, Professor Immanuel Wallerstein, inspired by the legacy of Émile Durkheim, to join the forces of sociology and history for a deeper understanding of social change. The second was a seemingly fortuitous incident which happened during a discussion between Czech sociologists. One of the participants known for his fidelity to the principles of the neo-positivist methodology formulated a little bit of an exaggerated demand, that only fully identical variables should be used for the reason of historical comparison of the stratification surveys' results. The acceptance of this practically unreachable requirement (applicable, perhaps, only to quite simple comparisons of the results of pre-planned repeated surveys) would have devaluate the existing extensive data basis describing the historical fates of Czech and Slovak societies. This requirement was expressed when precisely quite the opposite was urgently needed: namely a systematic reconstruction of the societal changes at least in the last thirty years. Without it no serious analysis of the recent course of the post-Communist transformation could be produced.

The need for sociological analysis of Czech, or eventually Czechoslovak, society in the historical perspective appeared with this urgency for the second time. After the imposed 'transition from capitalism to socialism' during the 1950s, the victory of state socialist social system was declared by the authorities. In 1967, data for the first representative survey on social stratification and mobility in Czechoslovakia and one of the first in any state socialist society were collected with the intention to describe and to analyse the new social order. The interpretation of the data took place in the atmosphere of the reform attempt known as the 1968 Prague Spring. The main conclusion drawn from the analysis was the stated position of Czechoslovakia standing then at a historical crossroad of possibilities between either the comeback of bureaucratic and egalitarian system of the 1950s, or a new development leading to a democratic society of achievement. On this basis, a programme of cooperation of sociological and historiographical research was formulated, concerning both the past and current changes.

The brutal intervention of the Warsaw Pact military forces rendered the fulfilment of this programme impossible. The following twenty 'normalisation' years were later quite rightly characterised by the art-historians as the period, when 'times stood still'. While historical changes of major significance – above all the developments towards a modern post-industrial society – occurred in many other countries, in Czechoslovakia and other European state socialist countries only some preliminary conditions for future changes accumulated 'in the womb' of a rigid social structure – all this with the inevitable consequence of stagnation on the cultural and civilisational level of quality of societal life.

After the 'Velvet Revolution' of 1989, the time of rapid and substantial institutional, political and, to some extent also social shifts came. In the course of several fol-

lowing years another 'transition' was accomplished: democratisation, privatisation and liberalisation brought a newly shaped social differentiation. In principle, a new institutional distribution of power, wealth and incomes, with some consequences for the differentiation on life-styles emerged. However, after the dissociation of Federal Czechoslovakia and the three-years' existence of the sovereign Czech state, it came to light, that this 'transition', in spite of its radical character, only has brought the country to a new historical crossroad. There are two offers now: the choice is to be made between either a way leading to a real modernisation in quality of life and the desired 'return to Europe', based, of course, on the application of the 'meritocratic' principles of achievement; or a continuation of the stagnation based on the strange and surviving combination of the inherited egalitarianism with a mixture of state and private ownership, liberalism and state interventionism, class structure and social stratification – all this without any actual substantial changes towards modern society. A new period of societal transformation, of historical change could begin at this very moment equally as a new stagnation could follow.

It is quite clear from this, how important the historical approach to societal reality is not only to us but to other state socialist countries as well. For this reason, it is no wonder, that our reactions to the two above mentioned incentives was: to collect as much serious contributions as possible that could present various ways how to grasp the historical aspects of societal phenomena and to publish them in a special issue of the Czech Sociological Review. We addressed many scholars known for their successful achievements or, at least, attempts in this field, focusing both on sociology as such, and kindred disciplines to join their forces in a common endeavour to reveal both the unique facts and, as far as possible, some more general regularities of historical change.

Gerhard Lenski, an outstanding American scholar and author of many original ideas in the field of social stratification, already so helpful to us in the 1960s, offers in his paper a new version of 'grand theories' aiming to a general scheme of socio-cultural evolution, getting over the biases of the older ones. We appreciate his application of this theory to the case of the post-Communist transformation in Europe, stating that its conclusions focus on the same issues which we consider to be important on the basis of our concrete analyses.

Prof. J. Krejčí, a Czech scholar, living and working in the United Kingdom for years, and a man of great experience in many fields of social sciences and humanities, here offers another approach to history: developing a general socio-cultural theory using for this reason an empirically based typological comparison of significant structural changes in various countries and historical situations.

M. Illner contributed with a paper analysing systematically the stage of development of the sociological endeavour to analyse and generalise the experience of the post-Communist societal transformation in Europe. He comes not only with a survey of the existing approaches, but draws the developments from the first 'transition' theories formulated at the beginning of the 1990s to the later 'transformation' analyses and attempts to create a theory in this field, thus showing the prospects of a promising further development of sociological research.

P. Machonin advances an analysis of the mutual relationships of social transformation and modernisation based on the historical experience of the Czech Republic under state socialism and in the present situation with an outlook into the possible future.

The Czech society regarding its past characterised by a high level of industrial, cultural and political development, is a good example to show the antimodernisation effects of the state socialist social system and the difficulties met on the way to a new phase of modernisation.

The following empirically based studies demonstrate two possibilities of coping with the difficulties of empirical analysis of historical changes by sociological instruments. P. Nieuwbeerta and S. Rijken from the Netherlands publish a paper based on cross-national comparisons of inter-generational mobility in East-Central and East-European countries. Their analysis of the very important phenomenon of educational expansion in these countries and of its relationship to the state socialist social system is fascinating as is J. Večerník's analysis of a long series of historically comparable data concerning the earnings distribution in Czech society from the period of the second world war to the present. Here he presents a clear-cut example of his famous exact analyses revealing the inhibitive role of the state socialist egalitarianism and its still vivid legacy, a phenomenon, so often neglected in many Western studies on state socialism.

From the disciplines kindred with sociology and systematically cooperating with it, we have intentionally devoted a great deal of space to historians, or better to those who for years were engaged in 'social historiography'. L. Kalinová, who presents here an original short depiction of the social history of state socialism in Czechoslovakia led, towards the end of the 1960s, a team of historians who tried to create a historiographical pendant to the sociological analysis of social stratification and mobility. At present, she systematically continues this work with publications concerning the whole period of state socialism. O. Felcman and D. Musilová were so kind as to do the inevitable hard work and prepared a survey of nearly all – both more and less successful – attempts of the Czech and Slovak historians and sociologists to analyse the socio-historical changes which led to the instalment of the state socialist system and attended its existence until its final collapse. M. Bárta contributes with a sketch of a concrete example of a not wholly successful attempt of historians and sociologists' cooperation, concerning the 1968 'Prague Spring' events. He shows quite plastically many existing obstacles hindering the interdiciplinary endeavour.

Pavel Machonin

The Comparative Historical Approach as a Unifying Principle in the Humanities and the Social Sciences

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Abstract: The article deals with the importance of comparative history for an integrated approach to the study of social phenomena, in particular for the study of society in a global perspective. The point is illustrated by several transformation processes which have taken place in the 20th century.

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The title of this article was suggested to me by the editor of this issue. As I have been working along these lines for almost fifty years, I gladly accepted the opportunity to explain what it means to me and how more science, not merely scholarship, may hopefully come from it.

At the beginnning I have to answer certain basic questions. Why do we need a unifying bond and why is it that history can provide one? We need such a link because humans as social beings are indivisible. Even if their individual social acts, behaviour, relationships etc. may be best analysed using specialised methods, a broad understanding of societal life requires, in order to provide a full answer, at least an integrated combination of those specialised approaches. From an historical point of view, there are two reasons. First, the aforementioned integration may be best achieved within an account for which the time dimension provides the unifying bond. Second, in social sciences there is a limited scope for making experiments. Historiography (in particular that written by modern historians) is, in the long run, one of the main suppliers of empirical data. The other sources are regional studies, which, while looking at their subject with an integrated, interdisciplinary approach, also take the historical dimension into account.

The Concepts of a Global Apprehension

Most articles in this issue are focused on contemporary history. My concern is history in general, as well as the link between historiography and the complexity of social science, in particular. I have in mind an integrated social science, in which cultural, political, economic and demographic aspects enter into an appropriately modified framework of sociology, in which the idiographic account is analysed in comparative, nomothetic terms.

A similar kind of integrated social science has indeed already been routinely practised, though at various levels of theorising and/or conceptual consistency, in the schools and departments of area studies in British and American universities.

In the School of European Studies at Lancaster University, I had the opportunity to work out the following integrated approach to area studies with reference to the then divided Germany [Krejčí 1976: 272]. First the situation was put into a historical and geographical perspective; the subject matter was divided into three sections: (a) income and

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wealth[1], (b) stratification and mobility, (c) power and freedom. Population shifts and gender issues were given particular attention. The concluding chapter recapitulated the main features and related them to the dominant ideologies of the respective German states.

Although this approach involved a historical dimension, its limitation to circa thirty years of the present epoch did not necessitate the use of historiography much. Most data and other factual information were obtained from statistics, public opinion polls, mass media information, and from various types of official or private documents, i.e. from primary sources.

However if we want to apply a similarly structured framework to earlier periods and in wider and/or distant areas, we have to turn to secondary sources which summarise and analyse the empirical material we are looking for. Fortunately, such high quality literature is amply available and is continuously increasing.[2] I have found it more interesting, and from a sociological point of view, more revealing than the unending discourse on the virtues of various methodological positions such as structuralist, functionalist, conflict theorist, organicist, historicist, or that which has reached the nirvana of postmodernism.[3] Those who do a solid job in area studies tend to see their subject in terms of its structure, functioning (whether as an organism or mechanism) and conflicts and even do not shun a critical evaluation – all this, as a rule, without any predilection for the aforementioned concepts.

Studying history as empirical material for social sciences may reach varied depths and extents according to the researcher's focal point. My interest resided in the global perspective within historical time and geographical space. There were the social or economico-political formations (not only in the Marxian sense) on the one hand and civilisations or socio-cultural configurations (not only in Toynbee's sense) on the other. Teaching at Lancaster University – first, Max Weber's sociology of religion followed by the role of the main Asian religions in social structure and development – provided me with a testing ground and valuable feedback for my own observations and theorising.[4]

In my view both the aforementioned global categories are useful tools for theoretical insight, provided that we observe a few caveats. First, there is an epistemological difference between them. Economico-political formations such as feudalism, capitalism etc. are taxonomic constructs which consequently are conceived in generic terms. This stance

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[1]) The structure of economic aggregates was calculated for both countries in the UN Standard as well as according to the Soviet national accounting systems.

[2]) As an example of what I have in mind, I give the names of a few sinologists who provided me with a sociologically relevant insight into the development of Chinese society with respect to its values, institutions, structure, (functioning or non functioning) and social change: I. Bianco, D. Bodde, J. Chesneaux, J. Escarra, O. Franke, J. Gernet, M. Granet, J. Gray, I. C. Y. Hsü, Kung-Chuan Hsiao, K. S. Latourette, H. Maspero, H. McAleavy, H. F. MacNair, J. Needham, R. H. Salomon, A. F. Wright.

[3]) As John Holmwood recently put it, "the claims of postmodernism do not represent an answer to our current problems, but a capitulation in the face of them" [Holmwood 1966: 130].

[4]) A good English translation of Max Weber's *Religionssoziologie* from 1922 was available from 1963. The result of my own study and teaching the subject was published in *The Civilizations of Asia and the Middle East Before the European Challenge* [Krejčí 1990]. In the US at SUNY with the title *Before the European Challenge, the great civilizations of Asia and the Middle East.*

follows Max Weber's position. For him both capitalism and feudalism were ideal type labels which could be applied with possibly further specification (appropriate adjectives) to any society, irrespective of socio-historical time and space. Civilisations or, following Gurvitch's less categorical nomenclature, socio-cultural configurations [Gurvitch 1968: 90], are unique historical entities demarcated, though often not in precise contours, in time and space. They have to be identified by a specific, proper name.[5]

As far as social formations are concerned, I can refer to an excellent secondary source, a comparative study of feudalism, written by nine scholars and published by Princeton University Press in 1956 under the title Feudalism in history. The area studies cover Western Europe, Russia, the Byzantine Empire, the Middle East, India, China and Japan. In the comparative analysis, the editor, Rushton Coulborn, took a wider view, the gist of which, relevant to our discussion, reads:

> "Feudalism cannot be fully understood until it has been placed in its larger context, the movement of the whole culture... Feudalism was found to be a mode of revival of a society whose polity had gone into extreme disintegration... No single cause of such a disintegration was discovered but the revival was often connected with, or preceded by, the formation of a religion" [Coulborn 1965: 364 ff].

These findings point to the link with the socio-cultural configurations which we shall be discussing later. In this context, Coulborn made also a perspicacious observation on the relationship of history and theory:

> "Theory is what is abstracted as common to a series of similar courses of events and used to predict the character of future courses of events. It is far more useful than history, but, for plain numerical reasons and for other reasons, it is often much harder to get. And, when theory is hard to get, the scientist must resort to the discovery of all the relevant history he can find, for that may eventually yield him the material for the establishment of theory." [Ibid.: 393]

This is the gist of the matter but only by half. If the theory, like Icarus, gets too close to the sun, its glue melts and the whole ingenious construct disintegrates. In such a case we need to go further than Max Weber. We need a more elaborate nomenclature; ideal types alone will not suffice, especially as far as global concepts are concerned. Here it has proved advantageous to work with concepts whose definition would allow for alternative sets of defining characteristics thus making it possible to consider separately individual aspects or dimensions of what would otherwise be an integral part of a conceptual cluster, in short, to use multidimensional concepts.

The most fertile ground for such a practice is found in economics, where the obvious need for quantification calls for more conceptual precision than in other social sciences. Thus for instance the need to measure a country's output of goods and services generated a two-fold multidimensional approach; firstly with respect to the different coverage of the aggregate (national product, domestic product, national income, etc.; all either gross or net), secondly with respect to the method of calculation (by industrial origin, by distributive shares and by type of expenditure). Another differentiated aggregation became necessary with respect to the concept of money. Money ceased to be a clearly demarcated concept a long time ago. Yet the modern economy having its prolif-

[5]) I have further elaborated this issue in my inaugural lecture "Specialised or general knowledge? Strategy for Harmonisation" (Lancaster University, 24 January 1979).

eration of multifarious types of deposits with various degrees of liquidity and various types of credit facility, requires a conceptual differentiation between individual means of payment. These means of payment represent different degrees of what may best be described as *moneyness*.[6]

Sociologists, too, felt the need to make their concepts more operational and, as far as possible, quantifiable. The major breakthrough came with the concept of stratification, an issue whose multidimensional nature was largely blocked by the popularity of the Marxian concept of class, unduly simplified by its interpreters.[7]

Of what help may this comment be in theorising about social formations? Let us look at the already mentioned case of feudalism. One cardinal point, or dimension, concerns the relative roles of contract and enforcement in, what Marc Bloch has called, the emergence and growth of the ties of dependencies [Bloch 1961]; another dimension concerns which parts of the sovereign's jurisdiction were transferred to, or usurped by the vassals; equally important is the nature of the division of the land or other property between dispositional and usage tenure; connected with this division is the scope of serfdom and bondage, and whether there are any escape routes from these forms of dependence; finally whether the above mentioned issues also concern non-agricultural sectors such as cities, religious organisations, nomads etc. In comparison with other social formations – (in the light of what has been said they too will be better dubbed configurations) – something needs to be added. In a feudal type configuration there is a contrasting structure of power in the upper tier or echelon of society (i.e. relationship between the sovereign and the vassals), and in the lower tier or echelon (relationship between the feudatories and their subjects). In the upper tier the power constellation tends to be pluralistic, in the lower tier totalitarian.

Differences between feudalisms, or to put it better, feudal elements, in various countries carry the imprint of the local socio-cultural configurations. Comparing the two conceptual tools, that of social formations and that of civilisations, we find that it is the latter which provides a more suitable framework for both long term diachronic and synchronic analyses and also for understanding social change at large.[8]

We are supposed to live in an era in which capitalism has become an almost ubiquitous phenomenon. In this context, I intentionally avoid the term 'social formation' because unlike feudalism, capitalism is a denotation only of the economic aspects of social life. Its functioning (whether good or bad) is not necessarily linked with a particular system of political organisation. Although its main ideological support is provided by liberalism and although pluralistic parliamentary democracy is its most frequent and favourably suited political counterpart, its existence in countries with authoritarian regimes is no exception. It may be assumed that this is only a temporary confluence, since once people attain a certain economic standard they begin to demand civic rights also.

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[6]) On the concept of 'money' in the multidimensional understanding 'moneyness' see, for instance, [Hart 1968: 426].

[7]) A fitting example of such a multidimensional approach to social stratification, with the inclusion of a historical dimension and an area comparison, is given in [Machonin 1996].

[8]) I hope I have proved this point in the discussion on the emergence and changes of feudal elements in the countries of Islamic and Confucian/Buddhist civilizations in my *Civilizations of Asia and the Middle East* [Krejčí 1990].

But in my opinion, often it is less an internal than an outward pressure from the core of capitalist democracy which prompts this development. I have in mind in particular the countries of the Far East, where the authoritarian Confucian ethic, and not the democracy-prone Protestant ethic, provides the psychological support for the sense of duty and for entrepreneurial drive.

Here we have touched again on the link between the economico-political and cultural parameters of social life. Individual parameters may be vital in different ways, there being always a disparity between the core and the periphery, and the continuous stream of change may show a significantly different configuration only after a prolonged period. Nevertheless the economico-political parameters encapsulated in the labels feudalism, capitalism and socialism may follow a different rhythm of change from that of the configuration as a whole.

Furthermore there is a special problem with the term socialism. Firstly it was not coined as a denotation for an existing social formation but as a programme, a blueprint. Secondly, what in reality has been already described by this term, means two quite different matters: an egalitarian welfare state combined with liberal parliamentary democracy, on the one hand, and comprehensive communist dictatorship, on the other. In both cases, alien elements crop up, strong capitalist elements in the former, feudal type dependencies in the latter.

The conventional triad of social formations (feudalism, capitalism, socialism) – which, of course, does not constitute an exhaustive list – is not the only conceptual device for a global apprehension of the structure and development of society. With more emphasis on the main type of occupation and organisation at large we may conceive yet another triad: agrarian, industrial and, as Harold Perkin called it, professional society.

> "Unlike James Burnham's managerial revolution, Max Weber's bureaucratisation, or Vilfredo Pareto's circulation of elites, says Perkin, the rise of professional society is more than a change at the top, the replacement of one elite by another. It transforms society from top to bottom. It raises living standards not just for the few but for every member of society. It puts most of its man- and woman-power into services rather than agriculture and manufacturing. It substitutes professional hierarchy for class as the primary matrix of the social structure. It recruits for those hierarchies by means of meritocracy, entailing an increase in social mobility from below. It extends this to women, thus ensuring their (admittedly limited) emancipation. It entails the massive growth of the welfare state, which enlarges and moralises the concept of citizenship. It expands the provision of higher education in order to create human capital. It concentrates production of both goods and services in large business corporations, whether private or state-owned, in a new structure of corporate neo-feudalism. And, paradoxically perhaps, it threatens to erode the nation state by internationalising corporate neo-feudalism and creating a global economy." [Perkin 1996: 8][9]

This assessment embraces quite a few structural dimensions whose social relevance varies in geographical space and historical time. What may yet be done, is to follow Coulborn in his comparative study of feudalism and to find out whether the rise of society, which Perkin calls professional, corresponds to a change in its cultural paradigm. I won-

[9]) For a detailed case study see [Perkin 1989].

der whether there is a correlation with the new paradigm of the human predicament that the West began to develop at the time of the Enlightenment, namely the paradigm of human rights. Its first declarations appeared during the American and French revolutions. Its practical effects began to be perceived much later; a significant advance with respect to gender equality and civic rights came after the first world war.[10] After the second world war it acquired international backing, but only after the demise of military and communist regimes in Europe did it become rooted in constitutions and observed by the legal practice of countries which constitute the core of professional society.

This paradigm of human rights allows a wide range of liberties, including religious affiliation, innovation and syncretism. This makes the spectrum of denominations and cults, the latter often of a secular nature, more variegated; there is also a growing import from other parts of the world. The resulting contrasts in lifestyle and, in particular, norms of conduct, are bound to create tensions. Thus the lay state has acquired a new, difficult, agenda for a balanced interpretation of human rights and of the responsibilities connected with them.

In the 1970's yet another alternative emerged for the apprehension of society in a global perspective. It has been dubbed, with a touch of overstatement, world system theory. The world systems, except for the very modern one, are regional frameworks of interaction, in which trade, diplomacy and wars are the main channels of action. The extent of these interactions defines the boundaries of these systems. Cultural or, in economico-political terms, systemic homogeneity or affinity is irrelevant. These factors may, at best, appear as a contrast between the core and the periphery. Insofar as the world system theorists write well-documented history,[11] they do a valuable job. But once they start to look for the world systems in the distant past and attempt to quantify their findings, their scholarship becomes highly conjectural and their theoretical discourse tends to acquire a scholastic bent.[12]

The preoccupation with the ways and boundaries of interaction make the world theorists less perceptive of what in social life matters most. This may lead to surprising discoveries, such as that the pre-1989 West-East polarity, generally perceived as a fundamental contrast between two different economico-political systems and civilisations, was "a highly structured, carefully contained, formal (but not substantial) conflict, in which the U.S.S.R. acted as a subimperialist agent of the United States" (...) and (...) "served as an ideological shield for the United States in the Third World as well." [Wallerstein 1995: 10, 13]

A Comparative Account of Social Change: Responses to the Challenge of the West

The intricacies of confluence of, or interaction between, economico-political and cultural aspects of social life, within the context of one and the same society, can best be illus-

[10]) For a comparative analysis of the dynamics of the paradigm of the human predicament see [Krejčí 1993].

[11]) Such is, for example, Immanuel Wallerstein's three volume opus on the rise and world-wide spread of European capitalism from the 16th century to the mid 19th century [Wallerstein 1974, 1980, 1989].

[12]) This is my impression from the Spring 1994 issue of *Comparative Civilizations Review* (published at the University of Missouri at Rolla) devoted to the exchange of views between the world system theorists and the civilizationists, i.e. students of civilizations.

trated by situations in which a thorough-going multifaceted social change, a profound societal transformation, took place. In the past, the most likely causes of such thorough-going changes – provided that they were not so slow as to be barely perceptible to contemporaries – were the conquests and, exceptionally, the revolutions. In the 20th century revolution became a more frequent phenomenon. Most of these recent changes can best be understood as responses to the challenge to the superior military, technical and organisational power of the Euro-American civilisation. This term involves the economico-political shell as well as the cultural kernel.

The Western challenge, for the first three centuries purely European, occurred in three waves, each having a different configurational setting. The first wave was due to the Portuguese and Spaniards. Their navigators set out not only for wealth and power for their royal sponsors but also for the conversion of the conquered peoples to Catholic Christianity. With this wave, a mixture of monarchic and ecclesiastical bureaucracy, privileges of upper estates, peasant serfdom and urban guilds and, above all, long distance commercial undertakings expanded overseas.

From the mid 17th century the Dutch, British and French started the second wave of overseas expansion. Although missionary activities were supported, religious conversions ceased to be a matter of primary importance. What made an overwhelming impact overseas was rather expanded trade and capital market and soon after that a new mode of production, creating in its turn a new type of personal dependency.

After the Catholic-Protestant split had lost its acerbity, West European civilisation began to assume a new cultural profile. With the enlightenment there was a move from fideism to empiricism, which triggered off a rapid and progressively amplifying movement from muscles to machines. With romanticism came the shift from religious to ethnic loyalties; with liberalism and socialism came the movement from inequality and obedience to equality and self assertion. Eventually human rights, theoretically anchored in the philosophy of natural law, but in practice codified by the decisions of elected representatives of the citizens, became the unifying, normative paradigm of Western Civilisation. This paradigm was deemed to be acceptable by any religion and/or social philosophy, provided its followers would accept it as a guiding principle.

However before the world wide appeal of this philosophy could be launched (as happened in 1948 by the vote of the brand new organisation, the United Nations), almost the whole world, and Europe in particular, was to undergo an upheaval, in which both socio-cultural values and the economico-political principles were to clash with an unprecedented degree of strength and fervour. There were several key themes, each with its particular set of issues but which in one way or another affected the world at large. Quite a few countries underwent an unsettling alteration to their socio-cultural profile.

In Germany, it was the collapse of national pride, of social and economic security and of the state's power to enforce the law that produced a state of anomy which led to a hysterical outburst of nationalistic fury. The scope of its violence, racist hatred and megalomaniac aspirations revealed a phenomenon, the emergence of which in a highly civilised country would require a special discipline of social psychiatry to explain.[13] Only

[13]) For the sake of fairness, it has to be pointed out that Germany was not the only country which would have called for socio-psychiatric treatment. At the time of writing there are many compara-

the combined forces of the states, which represented contradictory socio-cultural and economico-political configurations, could utterly defeat the military might of that infected society. The subsequent policies of the victors (the West was wiser than after the first world war) and, above all, the change in the prevailing concern of the German people, more devoted now towards economic prosperity than towards political might, made the German society, it is to be hoped, less susceptible to recidivist behaviour.

Russia was quite a different case. From the turn of the seventeenth century she began to emerge on the periphery of the economico-political configuration of the European West, but socio-culturally she continued to be an entity in her own right. Thus, it may be surmised that the socialist blueprint aiming at replacing the economic structure of the West with a better arrangement was more acceptable for a large segment of Russia's political class. Furthermore the socialist blueprint, due to its vagueness, did not necessarily postulate a pluralistic structure of power and, above all, offered Russia the opportunity to safeguard her socio-cultural identity. After the failure of the soviet experiment (it had the life span of one average individual life in Eastern Europe) the situation returned to the dilemma of 1917. The main differences are: the capitalist elements are slightly stronger, socialist aspirations appear less comprehensive, and the feudal elements which survived in Russia until the beginning of the 20th century, reappear in a new, mafia-type shape. Professional society has not yet had time to develop properly.[14]

At the start of the 20th century, the position of China, in terms of our global categories, was similar to that of Russia. However China's peripheral position vis à vis the Euro-American civilisation, with its expanding world market and cultural radiation, was much weaker. On the other hand, the coexistence of capitalist elements with an authoritarian regime was not unknown to Chinese tradition. Also the idea of egalitarian land distribution had left some vestiges in the Chinese tradition. But the main difference, was the strength and particularities of Chinese culture. In the struggle about the reorientation of Chinese civilisation, the Kuomintang could be more moderate; they laid stress on the continuity of the Confucian tradition; only with respect to science, technology and economic organisation were they westernised (some prefer to say modernised) in accordance with the Euro-American example. The communists, in particular under Mao Zedong, wanted to effect a complete transformation of Chinese civilisation. Confucianism was to be swept into the dustbin of history, and replaced by the teaching of the Marxist-Leninist classics to which Mao Zedong acceded as a seal of the prophets. The Russian example of state socialism was followed with caution and with quite a few substantial alterations. But, as in the French revolution, a Supreme Being could not replace God, so in China, the great Helmsman of Revolution was not to replace Confucius. But a great revolutionary change nevertheless did occur. The government of the day is no longer legitimised by the Mandate of Heaven but by the mandate of the correct doctrine. To uphold the balance between the precepts of their teaching and the reality of everyday life, the present day

ble atrocities perpetrated, though in a less systematic way, throughout the world, the nearest case to us being that of the former Yugoslavia.

[14]) 'Mafia-type feudalism' is here used as a cipher for a wider range of relationships reflecting the failure of the state to protect people from extortion by criminal gangs and obliging them to hire private guards in areas endangered by organised crime etc; practices known in various parts of the world.

senior 'ideocrats' (to borrow Malia's term for this kind of elite[15]) try to find a workable balance between their authoritarian rule and the free market economy as the Emperors' mandarins had.

The Japanese also paid a price for the reorientation of their socio-cultural profile – a Shinto-Buddhist complex imbued with Confucian, and above all, samurai ethos. After the first impact of the West upon it in the 16th century, that of the Portuguese with their alarmingly efficient missionaries, Japan reacted with a hedgehog reflex: she closed her ports to the outside world. But, eventually, in the third wave of the Western challenge, American gunboat diplomacy forced Japan to abandon her isolation. A revolution from above in 1867 paved the way for a gradual catching up with the advanced challenger. But before that could happen, Japanese leaders, overestimated their country's resources; Japan, as an ally of Nazi Germany, suffered a humiliating defeat and occupation. The incipient empire was lost and the samurai ethos discredited. Only then the new phase of Euro-American Civilisation (that of human rights, parliamentary democracy and more-or-less managed capitalism) found more fertile ground in Japan.

This is in fact the second time that Japan has imported constituents of another civilisation. The first came in the 7th century from China. Then it was religion rather than the political system which – after centuries of adaptation – came to be fully absorbed.[16] This time, it seems that it is the legal and political structure rather than religion and ethics which is the object of reception.

In Turkey, the transformation had been preceded by a three cornered contest. There were three schools of thought: the Islamists, the Westernists and the Turkists. The Islamists of that period admitted that the Muslims were far behind the West, as regards both material and non-material civilisation, but this, in their view, was due to the fact that Islamic law was not being applied thoroughly to all details of life. Furthermore, in the past, Muslims had contributed more to science than had the Europe of that time: there was no reason why they should not do so again in the future. The Westernists, on the other hand, ascribed Turkey's plight to the mental barrier created by Islam. They were mainly concerned to appropriate the Western mode of thinking. For them the technical and organisational achievements of Western civilisation were manifestations of Western ideas and values. Finally, the Turkists located the essence of Western civilisation not so much in rationalism or humanism but in a nationalism in which religion also played a part. Thus Western civilisation was for them an acceptable framework for Turkish national self-assertion. This understanding allowed them to Westernise and at the same time to fight against Western imperialism. It also enabled them to substitute a clearly circumscribed concept of the Turkish nation (defined by the possession of its own literary language) for the artificial concept of a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual Ottoman nation where Arabic and Persian were the languages of the elite.[17]

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[15]) Malia's full label is *bureaucratie universelle idéocratique* [Malia 1980: 128, 214].

[16]) I have discussed this in more detail in my *The Civilizations of Asia and the Middle East* [Krejčí 1990: 284 ff.].

[17]) In 1920 the political spectrum was temporarily complicated by the appearance of a communist element. The so-called Easternists came upon the scene, urging the Turks to follow the Bolshevik example. From among the disgruntled peasants, partisan units, the so-called Green Army, were recruited, and in the National Assembly the 'Populist' group advocated socialist policies. But the

As Kemal Atatürk succeeded in unifying the Turkists with the Westernists, his revolution, carried out by what may be described as the New Model Army won the day. This army has subsequently remained the main guardian of Kemal's legacy. Within the twenty years of Kemal's dictatorship all necessary changes were inaugurated; the Turks emerged as a nation in its own right, using Latin script adapted to their language and developing a new style of life: Turkey emerged as a lay state, a republic which after the second world war began to develop into a parliamentary democracy with a Western type market economy. However Turkish nationalism orientated itself on the example of post-revolutionary France where all ethnic differences were suppressed. Armenians had already been exterminated or expelled by the Ottoman regime, whilst the Kurds are to be absorbed, as the 'Mountain Turks', into one indivisible Turkish nation, which its leaders want to make a part of Europe on all counts. Of all the transformations discussed here Turkey underwent the most thoroughgoing socio-cultural change. Until recently the Islamic opposition was muted. But in the 1990's with the rise of religious consciousness in the whole of Islam, the Turkish Islamists likewise entered the political arena with more determination. Economic shortcomings and poverty are their main electoral chips. In that respect they do better than the socialists.

Iran's political spectrum was more variegated than that of Turkey. The Westernists were divided between the followers of the Shah's modernising dictatorship on the one hand, and democrats of liberal or socialist hue on the other. There was a strong communist party, the Tudeh. Iranian nationalism, unlike that in Turkey, was based on religion rather than on language. It is the Twelvers' version of the Shiite Islam, established by the Safavid revolution at the beginning of the sixteenth century as a national creed, which differentiates Iran from other Islamic countries. This religion came to be shared also by the main ethnic minority, the Azeris. In opposition to the Shah's oppressive regime the Marxists and the mullahs (i.e. the clerics) started to move closer together. On the intellectual plane there was even a synthetic stream engaged in deriving socialist principles from the Islamic tradition. The aim was to establish a *tauhidi* society, a society of 'unity', where man is united with the product of his labour, with nature, and with all creation and ultimately with God. 'All oppression and exploitation will crumble and social solidarity, based on Islamic principles, will emerge.' [Kamrava 1990: 62] Yet, the Lenin of the Iranian revolution was to be one of those very clerics. Ayatollah Khomeini, at the head of a multitude of determined mullahs, outwitted his Marxist-Islamist rivals; against the communists he could always refer to their godlessness.

Nevertheless Khomeini's revolution did not end in a full return to the past. On the one hand it re-emphasised the idea of a very distant past. This is the belief in the hidden imam, Ali's 12th descendent who in 874 AD went into 'occultation' and is due to reappear as Mahdi (by God guided) and to establish the rightful Islam all over the world. On the other hand, in striking contrast to Islamic tradition, there is the republic, with universal suffrage and various elected bodies. However, all candidates are carefully vetted; women, although under male guidance and family jurisdiction as Islamic tradition requires, are encouraged to perform professional work and to participate in political life. The main area open to discussion is economic policy. However, all attempts at the badly-

progress of the pro-Soviet Communist Party was checked by the official Turkish Communist Party created and dominated by Atatürk, and was eventually eliminated by the defeat of the partisan units, whose Circassian commander fled over to the advancing Greeks.

needed land reform, started under the Shah's regime, have been discontinued on religious grounds.

There were many issues in the four aforementioned revolutions, political, economic and cultural. But with respect to continuity or discontinuity, it was the issue of nationhood which became crucial. I shall review the four cases, ranged according to my perception of their discontinuity, from strongest to weakest.

Both Turkey and Russia were multiethnic and multireligious empires. In Turkey which officially did not bear this name, it was the Ottoman dynasty and Islam which were the dominant and unifying links. The religious-cum-ethnic minorities enjoyed a limited autonomous jurisdiction. In Russia, it was the Russian nation, its orthodox brand of Christianity and the Czar at the top which gave the Empire its character. Only a few minority nations enjoyed a kind of autonomy. The great revolutions in both these two countries were inspired by the French revolution which had taken place more than one hundred years earlier. The Ottoman Turks wanted to emulate its nation unifying effect. The Russian revolutionaries wanted to take over the legacy of the radical stream in the French revolution and push it a big step forward.

The attempt to build up an Ottoman nation in which the Turks, Arabs, Greeks, Slavs, Armenians etc. could be united was doomed to a failure. Secession of the non-Turks was the result. The Kemalist revolution cut the losses and made of the ethnic Turks a European style nation. This amounted to a change of civilisation. The Russian attempts to build upon the legacy of the Paris Commune went astray. Social and environmental engineering, based on a total concentration of power at the top, resulted in collapse. But a by-product of the revolution, the division of the country along ethnic lines, survived. Although, under the unifying bond of the Communist party, this division had a limited practical meaning, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, its constituent republics became more or less one nation sovereign states. Whatever co-operation may be arranged between some of these states, it is unlikely that the ethnic emancipation will be reversed.

The Iranian revolution drew from more sources of inspiration. First, came the example of the Young Ottomans, then the rivalry between two European models: the communist and the fascist. The latter, however, was superseded by a monarchic principle; which eventually looked for a link-up with the pre-Islamic legacy of the Persian Empire in all its glory. But this was not palatable to either of the modernising streams, the Eastern and the Western; above all it was not acceptable to the Islamists. They could base their appeal on what was most popular at the grass-root level and they won. They 'modernised' the time-honoured Iranian nationalism by dressing it in a parliamentary democracy of sorts with carefully selected female participation. In this way, the clerics could promote their societal power to an unprecedented level. Also ethnic Sunnite minorities are subject to the control of the Shiite hierocracy.

In China there was least scope for discontinuity. Revolution, as a cause of a dynastic change and of some improvement in administration, is a well known phenomenon in Chinese history. The Taiping revolution in the mid 19th century gave a foretaste of what may happen if the helmsmen of the revolution go berserk. The issue between the Kuomintang and the communists was not only of economico-political nature. The Kuomintang cherished the link with the Confucian tradition whereas the communists showed more patriotism vis-à-vis the Japanese invaders. The communists won the war thanks to their superior fighting spirit and concern for the common man. Due to the fol-

lies of their great leader's social engineering, they might have lost the fruits of their victory. But the Chinese tradition gave them both the strength and inspiration to carry on in a more cautious way.

This brief sketch of the dramatic social change in China, Iran, Russia and Turkey was based on the case studies in my comparative study of eight great revolutions [Krejci 1994].[18] The case of Japan has been added in order to show an alternative, non revolutionary response to the Western challenge, a response which is vigorous but without any formal break in continuity.

The sketch should illustrate what I consider to be the merit for social science of a comparative historical account and analysis. It should also restate my refutation of those approaches which try to exorcise the subjective factor, be it will, belief, ethos or spirit, from explanation and theorising, and look instead for some depersonalised structural or systemic perspectives of social reality as the only rational explanation. Achievement in social action, whether cultural, political or economic, depends not only on the number and skill of the people involved, on the resources being available and effectively used and, possibly, on a propitious environment or frame of interaction; it depends above all on motivation; on the will to create, to fight and to work, to save and invest. These are the social vectors the sum of which decide the direction and magnitude of social change.

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[18]) The other four revolutions under study are those in France, England, Mexico and in the Hussite Bohemia.

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Ecological-Evolutionary Theory and Societal Transformation in Post-Communist Europe

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Abstract: Ecological-evolutionary theory offers a unique and distinctive perspective on societal change.In particular, it draws attention to the enormous and revolutionary power of technological innovations as a source of change. Some of the implications of this for the post-Communist societies of middle and eastern Europe are then considered. Ecological-evolutionary theory also offers a unique and distinctive perspective on human nature, and the implications of this are also discussed.
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Introduction

At the end of the nineteenth century and in the early years of the twentieth, the social sciences gradually abandoned the evolutionary perspective that had been dominant up to that point. They did so for a number of reasons, a few of which still seem justified although most now appear dubious.

Then, surprisingly, after decades of rejection, attitudes began to shift in the 1960s. Some came to recognize that evolutionary theories have one invaluable feature that other theories lack: they compel us to take account in our thinking of the total range of human experience – not simply that little segment with which we are familiar in our own lives and immediate experience. For this reason, they provide a far more solid foundation on which to build a science of human societies and, thus, also, a unique and valuable tool for understanding social change, especially the more fundamental and far-reaching transformations of societies.

In this paper, I provide a brief introduction to one version of the new evolutionism and then explore some of its implications for societal development and change in the Czech Republic and the other societies of middle and eastern Europe which, until recently, were governed by Communist regimes.

Basic Features of Ecological-Evolutionary Theory

Currently, there are several versions of the new evolutionism in western social science. The one on which I focus in this paper is known as ecological-evolutionary theory and builds on foundations laid by the Scottish social philosophers of the eighteenth century, especially Millar and Ferguson. Their work was developed and extended in important ways later in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by various archaeologists, especially Thomsen and Childe.

Ecological-evolutionary theory can be described as a qualified materialist theory, since it views three sets of material factors as the primary forces shaping the life of human societies, but not as the only ones. The first of these is our species' genetic heritage

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which is shared by the members of every society and is responsible for all or most of the characteristics that are common to all societies (e.g., the use of language, moral codes, the division of labor along age and sex lines). Second, there are the biophysical environments to which societies must adapt, which have been responsible for many of the differences among societies in the past and still contribute to differences today (e.g., differences in levels of development between societies in the tropics and those in temperate regions, or the differences between societies in oil-rich areas and those in resource-poor regions). Finally, there are the technologies that societies possess that enable them to satisfy their members' varied needs and desires. These have been the basic engine of change over the course of human history and they have become the most important determinant of societal differences.

While acknowledging that other variables, such as ideologies and social structures, have, and have had, considerable influence on societies, especially in the shorter run, when the experience of human societies is viewed in its entirety (i.e., from prehistoric times to the present, and for humankind as a whole), it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the primary determinants of the most basic characteristics of human societies have been the three sets of factors that ecological-evolutionary theory emphasizes and that other factors are best understood as intervening or dependent variables [Heise et al. 1976; Nolan and Lenski 1995].

To appreciate the enormous importance of technology, for example, one need only compare Stone Age societies of the past with modern industrial societies: the differences between them in size, wealth, productivity, nature and extent of the division of labor, rates of invention and discovery, degree of social inequality, and human health and longevity, to name but a few, have all been enormous [Lenski et al. 1995]. The power of technology is evident not merely in comparisons of Stone Age societies with modern industrial societies, it is equally evident in advanced societies of the modern era. For example, as Table 1 indicates, advances in agricultural technology in the United States in the last two centuries have dramatically increased agricultural productivity, and this, in turn, has led to a radical transformation of the American labor force and caused the rapid growth of urbanization. It has also contributed enormously to improvements in health and longevity and in the standard of living.

Table 1. Productivity of American agriculture, 1800-1990

Production of:	Number of worker-hours required: 1800	1910-1917	1990	Percentage reduction
100 bushels of wheat	373	106	6	98.2
100 bushels of corn	344	135	3	99.0
1 bale of cotton	601	276	4	99.4
1,000 pounds of milk	n/a*	38	2	95.1
1,000 pounds of beef	n/a*	46	9	81.1
1,000 pounds of chicken	n/a*	95	1	99.2

*) Not ascertained.

Sources: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970*, Series K 445-485; U.S. Dept. of Commerce, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1989*, table 1110; and U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, *Agricultural Statistics 1992*, table 550.

If ecological-evolutionary theory is correct, it was no mere coincidence that as the demands of Marxist ideology came increasingly into conflict with the potentialities of modern technology that the latter prevailed. Not only have the innovations introduced by Lenin and his successors proven less durable, they never were as profound.[1] Still today, however, many sociologists cling to an exaggerated view of the transforming power of ideologies, partly because of their own strong personal commitments to various ideologies, and partly also because of their lack of familiarity with preindustrial societies.

From the standpoint of an understanding of the process of social change in the modern world, it is important to recognize the degree to which ideologies reflect the influence of ecological-evolutionary theory's three basic factors. Marxist ideology, for example, obviously reflects the influence of the new technologies that were transforming western European societies in the nineteenth century. One simply cannot imagine Marxist ideology emerging in medieval Europe or ancient Greece, nor, alternatively, Thomistic theology emerging among the societies of pre-Columbian America. This is why ecological-evolutionary theory views ideologies as intervening variables in the larger process of social change.

To understand why technology has been such a powerful force in human life, we need to understand that technological advances are, in essence, improvements on the basic "tools" with which we are endowed by our genetic heritage – that is, our arms, our legs, our eyes, our ears, our brain, etc. Thus, the invention of the microscope and telescope were functionally the equivalent of radical evolutionary (i.e., biological) improvements in our species' genetic heritage, as were the invention of the steam engine, the computer, and every other technological advance. If it is all but impossible to exaggerate the importance of the biological "tools" with which nature has endowed us, it is surely difficult to exaggerate the importance of the varied technologies that humans have created to extend and enhance the powers of our bodies. Simply put, technologies are the means by which humans satisfy all of their many material needs and desires and many of the nonmaterial ones as well.[2]

Marxism and Ecological-Evolutionary Theory Compared

Marxian theory, in some respects, is similar to ecological-evolutionary theory. It, too, recognizes the enormous transforming power of technological innovation. But Marxism and ecological-evolutionary theory differ in two important respects. First, they differ profoundly in their assumptions concerning human nature, a difference that has far-reaching implications. Second, they also differ in their view of the relative strength and importance of technology and ideology in the modern era and this, too, is a difference that makes a critical difference.

When viewed from an historical perspective, it is clear that Marx's view of human nature was essentially a secularized variant of classical Christian doctrine. With classical Christian thinkers, Marx imagined that in the beginning there was an idyllic era in which human life was good and that people lived together in harmony with nature and with one

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[1]) In fact, in many respects (e.g., in the concentration of power and privilege in the hands of a small, self-perpetuating elite) they were actually regressive.

[2]) Status striving, for example, is often satisfied by the acquisition of material goods, as Veblen made clear in his discussion of conspicuous consumption.

another (i.e., in the Garden of Eden/in the era of primitive communism). During this period, selfishness, greed, exploitation, and oppression were absent. With the emergence of private property or, for Christians, with the Adam's sin and the Fall, a long era began in which the darker side of human nature prevailed. But, once again, paralleling Christian doctrine, Marx predicted that this era would shortly end and a happier time was imminent (i.e., the Second Coming of Christ/the era of socialism and later communism). Finally, where Christians, such as St. Paul, believed that faith in Christ would give rise to the new man in Christ, a paragon of Christian moral values, Marx predicted that the creation of a new social order would give rise to the new socialist man, a paragon of socialist values.

Today, we know that Marx, like St. Paul, was much too sanguine in his expectations concerning human nature. The experience of a score or more of socialist societies has sadly demonstrated that the new socialist man has been even rarer than the new man in Christ. Furthermore, thanks to advances in the biological sciences, we now begin to understand why this is so. People do not enter this world like blank tablets, as John Locke (and Marx) supposed, waiting for environmental forces to shape our character. Rather, as Kenneth Boulding once wrote, "Straight from the womb we like milk, we dislike loud noises, and we dislike falling" [Boulding 1970: 31].

Because human nature is a product of the interaction of environmental influences with our species' genetic heritage and, not simply a product of environmental influences, it is not nearly as malleable as we might wish [Lenski et al. 1995: 13-15, 26-30]. Like other primates (and unlike the social insects), humans are genetically programmed to have a strong sense of self and of self-interest. While this is often channeled into socially useful activities, the sense of self and self-interest is rarely, if ever, totally suppressed. Elman Service, the anthropologist, summed up matters best when he wrote that the task confronting societies is one of redirecting human selfishness rather than overcoming or eliminating it.

Ecological-evolutionary theory also differs from Marxian theory in its view of the relative importance of technology and ideology in shaping societies in the modern era. Where Marx expected ideology to become the dominant revolutionary force in advanced industrial societies, ecological-evolutionary theory predicts that technology and, more specifically, technological innovation will remain dominant in social change and transformation.

This is not to suggest that ideologies are unimportant in the process of social change. On the contrary, ecological-evolutionary theory assumes that as technology advances, societal wealth increases, and that this provides societies with a wider range of options than previously, thereby increasing the potential for ideologically motivated change. Nevertheless, the range of options within which ideologies and their advocates are able to choose continues to be limited by the technologies available at the time. Furthermore, technological innovation does not merely increase the range of options available, it also alters the structure of rewards and costs of all the options and thus alters the preferences and choices made by individuals and groups. For these reasons, then, ecological-evolutionary theory regards technology as still the dominant force in social change--even in technologically advanced societies.

Societal Transformation in Post-Communist Europe

Benjamin Franklin once said that two things are certain in this world, death and taxes. Had he been more perceptive, he would have added a third, technological innovation. We can, of course, forgive him, since in his day the rate of technological innovation was far less than it is today; for another of the constants throughout human history has been the exponential growth in the rate of technological innovation *at the global level*[3] [Lenski et al. 1995: table 5.1].

The italicized qualification in the previous sentence is especially relevant for the post-Communist societies of middle and eastern Europe. By all accounts, the leadership of these societies during the Communist era failed to appreciate the enormous importance of technological innovation and change[4] and created a social system that caused their societies to lose ground relative to the non-Communist societies of western Europe, America, and the Far East. According to one observer, the Czech Republic was only a few years behind western Europe technologically when the Communists seized power in the late 1940s, but had fallen forty years behind by the time the Communists were ousted.

In an era when rapid advances in the technologies of transportation and communication are creating enormous pressures toward European economic union – even a global economy – the post-Communist societies of middle and eastern Europe have little choice but to try to catch up with their competitors.

But catching up is only part of the task that lies ahead. As noted above, the rate of technological change is steadily accelerating. Thus, even when the process of catch-up is completed (if, indeed, it ever is), the Czech Republic and other post-Communist societies will almost certainly be subject to continuing technological innovation and change.

Because post-Communist societies are compelled to play catch-up, it is not difficult to anticipate many of the changes that lie ahead for them. In other words, many of the changes that occur in middle and eastern Europe will be of the kind that western European societies have already undergone or are currently undergoing – changes of the kind that are often described as the emergence of "post-industrial" society.

Like many popular concepts, the idea of "post-industrial" society can be useful, but it can also be misleading. Where it is most useful is in drawing attention to the many social changes that technological advances have caused; where it is misleading is in its suggestion that western societies have somehow freed themselves from, and moved beyond, their long-standing dependence on industrial technology. For, when industrial technology is properly understood as technology that utilizes inanimate sources of energy (coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear power) to power machines that produce the material necessities of human life, it is clear that western societies today are no less dependent on this

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[3]) In other words, while exponential growth has continued over the long run at the global level, this has not always been true of each and every society. On the contrary, for various reasons the rate of technological change and innovation has remained stable or even declined in many individual societies [Lenski et al. 1995: 53-55].

[4]) This may have occurred because Marxist ideology led them to overestimate the importance of the structural and ideological changes they made in the societies they controlled. In other words, they appear to have overestimated the transforming power of structural and ideological innovation and underestimated the power of technological.

kind of technology than western societies of the last two hundred years. If anything, they are even more dependent!

The revolutionary change that has given rise to the widespread use of the term, "post-industrial", has been the transformation of the labor force of western societies. New technologies have drastically reduced the need for human labor in the productive process. Vast armies of industrial workers (Marx's proletariat) are no longer required; fewer and fewer workers are able to produce more and more and usually better and better products. Just as newer agricultural technologies drastically lowered the demand for agricultural workers in the not far distant past, now newer industrial technologies are reducing the demand for industrial workers, and the end result is just as revolutionary. According to one recent forecast, opportunities for employment in semi-skilled and unskilled jobs in the Czech Republic will be reduced by one-quarter in just the twelve-year span from 1993-2005 [Tuček 1993: 26-28], and the trend is not likely to end then.

The larger social consequences of these technologically induced changes in the labor force are likely to be every bit as great as those that occurred earlier in response to advances in agricultural technology. Large numbers of middle-aged and older workers will find their occupational skills rendered obsolete. How society will deal with this problem remains to be seen.

In the United States, one of the more immediate consequences of the growing oversupply of less skilled workers has been the failure of real wages (i.e., wages after correction for inflation) to keep pace with increases in productivity. In fact, at a time when productivity is increasing fairly rapidly, wages for the average worker have stagnated or even declined [Head 1996].

This problem is further aggravated by advances in the technologies of transportation, which have led to the emergence and increasingly rapid growth of the global economy. As new technologies have greatly reduced the cost of transporting goods, it has become increasingly profitable for employers to turn to the so-called emerging nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America for semi-skilled and unskilled labor. Labor costs in these nations are only a fraction of the costs in advanced industrial societies.

To make matters worse, many less skilled white collar jobs are also being rendered obsolete by new technologies. Networks of computers are dramatically reducing the need for armies of clerical workers to keep and maintain organizational files and records and have even begun to reduce the need for middle level managers and professional staff.

How societies will adapt to these changes remains to be seen. One possibility is to reduce the length of the work week and work year, spreading opportunities for employment more widely and increasing opportunities for leisure. This approach, however, raises the unit costs of production and in an increasingly global market economy threatens the economic security of societies that follow this path.

An alternative response, but one that most industrial societies have been slow to adopt, is the establishment of a rigorous national population policy, one that not merely limits the natural increase of population through an excess of births over deaths but also limits severely or even forbids immigration from other nations. With the notable exception of Japan, elites in most industrial societies have been unwilling to adopt such policies since they (i.e., the elites) usually benefit from the trends that threaten or harm so many of their compatriots. Moreover, various currently popular ideologies confuse the

issue in the minds of many since efforts to restrict immigration are commonly attacked as "racist" by opponents.

A growing body of evidence suggests, however, that this argument is beginning to lose its appeal. Recent surveys have shown, for example, that a substantial majority of Americans (including even members of recent immigrant groups) now favor raising barriers to immigration [Federation for American Immigration Reform 1996].

If the various trends cited above continue, the probability of greater tensions and conflicts within societies is likely, especially if the more powerful members of society continue to benefit economically from the trends, while millions of their fellow members suffer. Already, a growing number of politicians in western Europe and the United States have begun to direct attention to the problem, but it is unclear if any have found a satisfactory solution.[5]

New technologies promise to give rise to other often unrecognized kinds of change. In countless subtle ways, for example, they have weakened the traditional family system. Children have become increasingly expensive and also increasingly free of parental control; opportunities for profitable employment for women have risen sharply, thus weakening the economic bond between men and women. In addition, new technologies of many kinds (e.g., frozen meals, microwave ovens, dishwashing machines) make life outside of marriage increasingly easy for both sexes. Finally, other new technologies (e.g., television, the internet) provide dramatic new opportunities for those who reject traditional family values to promote their views.

One could easily extend the list of changes that are likely in post-Communist societies. Since space does not allow that, I will merely restate the basic underlying thesis, namely, that the most revolutionary force at work in the world at large today is technological innovation. And, I would add, the prospects for slowing this force in the near-term future seem negligible, if only because technological innovation increases the ability of the more powerful members of societies to satisfy their many and varied needs and desires. Halting a force such as this, will prove an extraordinarily daunting task.

Societal Continuity in Post-Communist Europe

If ecological-evolutionary theory is correct, there is at least one change that the peoples of the post-Communist societies of middle and eastern Europe should not expect: that is, a major change in human nature. Changes have occurred and will surely continue in what people say and do; but changes in their basic underlying motives and goals are unlikely. In short, continuity is more likely than change in this aspect of life.

If most politicians and others were devious and self-serving in the bad old days under Communist Party rule, one should not be surprised to find these patterns persisting. The shift from a totalitarian system to a democratic one is not likely to change basic human nature and it would be a serious mistake to expect it.

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[5]) The problem for which no one seems to have a solution is the competitive nature of the emerging global economy. Everyone wants the benefits of this kind of economy in the form of lower prices for goods and services, but no one in advanced industrial societies with their high standards of living wants to pay the price in terms of businesses bankrupted by their inability to compete in world markets and lowered standards of living for the population at large.

This is not to say, however, that conditions will remain as bad as they were: the demise of totalitarianism and the breakup of monopoly power in the realm of politics is an enormously important change and should never be underestimated. But it appears too much to expect that the ending of Party control will bring about a radical transformation in basic human motivation. As General Secretary Krushchev once said, this is as likely as shrimps learning to whistle. Or, alternatively, as he might have said, it is about as likely as the emergence of the new socialist man.

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Post-Communist Transformation Revisited

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Abstract: During the seven years that have elapsed since 1989, empirical evidence and theoretical reflections have been accumulated which make it possible to elaborate, supplement and extend some of the initial observations made in the early stages of the processes of post-Communist transformation in East and Central Europe. The author argues that (1) the transformations are more complicated, conflictual and prolonged than originally expected; (2) they are not the "rectifying revolutions" or "transitions" suggested by some authors, since they are creating a new social reality which is not a mere transfer of the known societal models; (3) there is more continuity in the post-1989 development than was originally admitted and this development has been greatly influenced by both the Communist and pre-Communist legacies; (4) to understand the post-Communist transformations, it is necessary to understand the Communist system itself, its social roots and genesis; in doing so, it is appropriate to view the Communist society not only as oppressive and economically untenable, but also as a functioning and, to a certain degree, legitimate system; (5) the post-Communist transformation in East and Central European countries has been increasingly determined by the strategic, long-term factors and less so by the more immediate circumstances of the regime change and the post-1989 situation; (6) in terms of the long-term strategic factors, the situation of the individual post-Communist countries is different and so are their probable future developments; it is, therefore, increasingly inappropriate to make broad generalisations about the post-Communist development in the whole East and Central European region, while it is appropriate to distinguish between the individual countries and their clusters.

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Introduction

Societal transformation in the former socialist countries of East and Central Europe has entered its seventh year. It has also been seven years since the processes of the transformation in this region became a major focus of interest in the social sciences. The first generation of comments and analyses brought many relevant ideas, interpretations and hypotheses, mostly of a general character, on the causes, nature, problems and potential future course of transformation. They were inspired by perceptive observation, theoretical reflections and sometimes by analogy with the earlier democratic transitions in Latin America and Southern European countries [e.g. Andorka 1992, Ash 1990, Dahrendorf 1990, Habermas 1990, Offe 1991, Przeworski 1991, Sztompka 1992, Staniszkis 1991, Stark 1992, Wolchik 1991 and Czech authors Možný 1991, Machonin 1992, Musil 1992].

In the years that followed, the different aspects of transformation quickly became the subject of empirical research and a rich body of data and data-based knowledge has

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been accumulated, which shed light on the individual components of transformation and their interlinkages, on the temporal aspects of transformation as well as on the specific features it has acquired in the different countries of the region. Many were comparative multinational projects which linked the findings from Eastern and Central Europe to the existing Western knowledge of social and political change. In this way, the Eastern and Central European *"transitological"* studies, as some have called the study of societal transitions or transformations [van Zon 1994], have become better informed. Attempts were made to verify, to further elaborate the initial observations and to propose new hypotheses. In addition, the societal development in Eastern and Central Europe itself has brought some new twists, not foreseen by the first generation of transitological studies, which called for explanation.[1]

In this paper, I wish to sketch several general tentative propositions concerning the more advanced stage of the post-1989 societal development in East and Central Europe. The propositions were inspired by the recent development in the region as well as by some more recent studies, both theoretical and empirical [e.g. Bauman 1994, Gorzelak et al. 1994, Juchler 1994, Machonin 1994, Matějů 1995, Rychard 1993, Šrubař 1994, Sztompka 1993 and 1996, van Zon 1994, Zapf 1994 and others]. In particular, the ideas expressed by van Zon in his study of the transformations in East and Central Europe and the results of the comparative research project East Central Europe 2000 [c.f. Gorzelak op cit. and Illner 1993] were helpful in this context. My propositions are of a rather hypothetical character and are intended to stimulate further discussion.

The transformations are more complicated, more conflictual and lengthier than originally expected

Although the post-Communist transformation was viewed from the beginning as a formidable task – c.f. R. Dahrendorf's [1990] "valley of tears", the real-life difficulties of this process were underestimated by the first analysts, the general public and politicians. Let us discuss some of the problems.

Transformation is a multi-dimensional process and its political, economic, social and cultural components are so tightly intertwined that they have to be considered jointly, both in practical policy and research. While on the purely analytical level, the three components and their change can be taken (temporarily at least) as separate, in the reality they are interdependent and they occur simultaneously. There are no such things as purely "economic", "constitutional", "political" or "social and cultural" transformations, the real process is always multidimensional – sociocultural, economic and political at the same time [c.f. Sztompka 1992, Musil 1992].

Moreover, while it is possible to model transformation as a series of consecutive stages – first the political and constitutional changes, thereafter economic changes and finally sociocultural changes – c.f. R. Dahrendorf's [1990] "hour of the lawyer", "hour of the economist" and "hour of the citizen", in reality the three processes occur in parallel, or tend to be ordered differently, and are parts of one stream of change. The simultaneity is a major source of difficulties – of a "mutual blockage of solutions to the problems" [Offe 1991: 873], as the progress in any of the above respects depends on the success of

[1]) Among the surprises which call for explanation are the recent left turns in several countries of the region. One of the possible interpretations was proposed by P. Matějů [Matějů 1995].

the remaining ones. This *circulus vitiosus* can only be broken by stepwise changes on all the above fronts. The idea that in policy making the three components of change can be temporally separated and "done way" one by one is illusory.

Typically, three kinds of fallacies become a threat when the multidimensionality of transformation and simultaneity of its components are neglected. The *"institutional fallacy"* consists in overestimating the importance of changes of formal institutions within the overall context of the transformation. Some legislators believe, for example, that, once proper institutions have been built, social behaviour will automatically follow along the established formal channels. Obviously, that is an illusion. While institution-building is an inevitable component of post-Communist transformation – new political and economic institutions (political parties, parliaments, local governments, administrative bodies, private firms, financial institutions etc.) had to be established during the early stages of transformation, they do not by themselves guarantee the proper functioning of the new system. For institutions to function properly, social and cultural prerequisites, such as supportive social interests and a corresponding democratic political culture, administrative culture and a culture of economic relations (the entrepreneurial culture) must as well be available. It is certainly true that institutions can to a certain degree stimulate, channel and mould social behaviour, but it is equally true that incompatible cultural patterns may make institutions ineffective or may even undermine them. The problem of *civilisational competence* [c.f. Sztompka 1993] or rather civilisational incompetence in the post-Communist societies has, therefore, assumed a foremost importance in the latter stages of the transformation. While the new institutions (though not all of them) are mostly in place, their proper functioning, determined in a great part by social and cultural factors, is endangered by the lagging social and cultural transformation (c.f. also below on the continuities in post-Communist development).

In turn, the *"economic fallacy"* consists in overestimating the economic component of the post-Communist changes, in assuming a deterministic causal chain between the new economic relations and other aspects of transformation. Changes of ownership structure, liberalisation of prices, re-creation of the market, structural changes of the economy – such processes are considered to be the sole and primary movers of transformation, with social and cultural changes following automatically in a more or less passive manner. Championed by many professional economists and by economists-turned-politicians, some of them theoreticians and designers of economic reforms in the former socialist countries, this approach neglects the fact that economic measures are filtered by culture and that there is a powerful feedback between these measures and the social system. Beside being a manifestation of "professional blindness", this stance is sometimes doctrinally rooted in neoliberal economic theories.

Finally, the *"voluntaristic fallacy"* is the belief that the successes and failures of the post-Communist transformation predominantly depend on the configuration, behaviour and strategies of political actors (political parties and movements, the leading politicians – the Havels and Walesas; foreign political and economic institutions – NATO, the European Union, the World Bank, the IMF, foreign capital, the conspiracies of the former *nomenklatura*, Mafias, ethnic minorities, etc.). Situational and organizational factors, personal qualities, the behavior of key individuals and small groups and good luck, play an exaggerated role in this view, while the hard societal factors are disregarded. In East

and Central European politics, this voluntaristic approach is usually embraced by populist political parties and is attractive for segments of the less educated public.

Transformation also takes more time and brings more hardships than was expected by the general public and often more, in fact, than the public is willing to tolerate. The length and the difficulties of transformation tend to exhaust the patience of the population, especially where living standards have dropped dramatically and for a protracted length of time, where high unemployment prevails and upward social mobility stagnates. Beside the deterioration of material living standard, they are other concomitants of the transformation – the volatile and anomic social situation and the rise of criminality, which create the feeling of instability and distress and which contribute to public dissatisfaction. The social legitimacy of the reforms is weakened and with it, political support for the reform parties. Left- or populist turns may then follow in national elections, as was the case in several countries of the region (Belorussia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Slovakia). Dissatisfaction with the development may also be the result of a contradiction between the population's *expectations* of the reform and its perceived outcome. This *relative* deprivation may have a political impact similar to that of the objective handicaps [c.f. Matějů 1995]. The first cohort of post-1989 politicians might have contributed to this frustration by promising sooner and easier results than they could have realistically expected.

New social systems are created during the post-Communist transformation

Several students of post-Communist societies have noted that the majority of ideas and institutions brought to life during the transformation are neither entirely new nor untested. They have been the cornerstones of Western democracy and of the market economy, and many of them were anchored in the pre-war life of the Eastern and Central European countries. Ash [1990] has observed that the ideas emphasised in the Eastern European countries after 1989 were the old, well-tested ideas of democracy and liberalism. The absence of novelty in the programs of post-Communist transformation, the emphasis on restoration rather than innovation, the fact that no influential new ideas about social organisation, no *"ex ante"* revolutionary theory [Offe 1991] was advanced, have led some observers of the Eastern and Central European scene to the conclusion that recent developments are simply bringing these societies back towards a normal situation, that they mark the end of a *"long and tragic historical deviation which had begun in 1917"* [Dahrendorf 1990]. In this sense, the changes in 1989 have been labelled as *"rectifying revolutions"* [Habermas 1990] and it was assumed that the post-1989 changes would be a *transition* to some well-known target situations.

While this observation is mostly correct as far as the stated goals and ideologies of transformation are concerned, it may prove wrong in terms of the policies used to implement such goals and the changes themselves (even the goals of transformation occasionally included non-traditional ideas – c.f. the idea of *"non-political politics"* promulgated by anti-Communist dissidents in Hungary or the idea of a *"post-democratic"* political system suggested by the present Czech president Václav Havel as a possible way of overcoming deficiencies of traditional democracies – [c.f. Havel 1990: 129-133]).

In fact, the "rectifying" forces interact with the legacies of the Communist system as well as with those of the more distant past of the Eastern and Central European countries to produce problems, solutions and a new reality that is sometimes different from

both the Western and the pre-war situations in the countries involved. Forty or so years of totalitarian, redistributive and paternalistic systems have had a heavy impact on social structure, social networks, behavioural patterns and the cultures of Eastern and Central European societies, and it would contradict sociological wisdom to suppose that this heritage has vanished without leaving any trace. There is an on-going interaction between the forces and models transferred from Western democracies, the heritage of the *"real-socialist"* society, the more distant past of Eastern and Central European countries and the innovative solutions called for by the unprecedented situation of the "exit from communism". The *"lost-child-returning-home"* model of post-Communist transformation is simplistic and ahistorical; we hypothesise that irrespective of the programmatic intentions of the transformation's designers – politicians and intellectuals, the societies that are developing in Eastern and Central Europe on the ruins of the Communist regime will not just become late-arrivals to the family of the Western liberal capitalist states and will not be passive copies of some of them. Nor will they be reproductions of what Eastern and Central European societies used to be before the Communist takeover or before World War II.[2]

The process of transformation is apparently producing its own social systems, unprecedented in many respects. It is still too early to predict the final shape which the new societies in Eastern and Central Europe may be taking as the result of the many, often contradictory influences currently being exerted. Their transformation has not yet come to its end, their development options are open and the outcome may prove difficult to subsume under any of the known societal types. The emerging societies may be as specific as is the process of transformation itself. Almost certainly they will not correspond to the blueprints of the reformers, whose declared goals – the (re)introduction of pluralist democracy, civil society, market economy and the rule of law – while certainly an important driving force, do not fully determine the actual course of the development. This development is more complex and contradictory than a mere implementation of the "democracy and marketisation" program package. The program has unexpected and unwanted consequences which can potentially derail it. We would, therefore, hesitate to endorse W. Zapf's view that transformations are an underlying process of *modernisation* [Zapf 1991: 46]. This may be so, but also other than modern outcomes of this process are still imaginable.[3]

There are strong elements of continuity in the post-1989 development.

As a consequence of the fact that the post-Communist development is co-determined by factors anchored in the recent as well as the more distant past, there is much more continuity in this development than has often been admitted. Both public opinion, politicians and many social analysts at first primarily perceived and stressed the elements of rupture and disconnectedness in the transformation, the profound differences separating the post-

[2]) Those who claim that the countries of Eastern and Central Europe should nowadays be inspired by what they were before the Second World War or before the Communist takeovers, would do well to remember that, with the exception of former Czechoslovakia, the countries in question had authoritarian or even semi-fascist regimes and retarded agrarian or semi-agrarian economies. Certainly nothing to be copied sixty years later.

[3]) C.f. the critical discussion on the modernisation-based model of transformation in Srubar [1994].

Communist and the Communist situation, the *"sudden, radical break with the past"* [Sztompka 1992: 11]. This impression was supported by the speed of the disintegration of the Communist regimes and by the suddenness of the events which took most observers by surprise. The influence of the past was disregarded and for some time the feeling prevailed that the reforming societies would enjoy a wide freedom of choice when redesigning their political, economic and social systems.

It took some time before the grip of the past made itself felt. As all revolutions, that of 1989 was not quite as radical as it purported to be. The continuities are both structural and cultural and reach to the more recent as well as to the distant past. P. Sztompka wrote about the *"burden of liabilities"* encountered by the transforming societies in social consciousness, economic infrastructure, ecology, administrative system, demographic structure and other areas [Sztompka 1992]. D. Stark [Stark 1992] introduced the concept of *"path-dependency"* to express the fact that innovation is constrained by the *institutions* inherited from the past which limit the space of potential action and, in fact, induce some continuity. What was meant was mainly the limiting role of the institutions of the Communist regime for the post-Communist development. P. Sztompka [1993] and others before him [Dahrendorf 1990, Musil 1992] drew attention to the limiting role of the *cultural legacies* of Communism. For the new institutions to function properly, cultural prerequisites have to be fulfilled: the democratic political culture, the administrative culture and the entrepreneurial culture. All three degenerated during the years of "really existing socialism", so that a *"civilisational incompetence"* has developed, as Piotr Sztompka [1993] called the syndrome, which severely complicates the progress of transformation. The political changes of 1989 and the restructuring of institutions that followed were to a much lesser degree accompanied by the change in people's patterns of behaviour, values and attitudes that had been moulded during the relatively long period of "really existing socialism".

Beyond the Communist legacy, and on a deeper level, the processes of transformation seem to be also influenced by long-range factors stemming from the more distant, *pre-Communist past* of the respective societies. Many such legacies were temporarily "frozen" during the years of the Communist regime and have been re-activated since its collapse.[4] The long-distance continuities have been frequently overlooked as the search for legacies focused mainly on the more recent handicaps inherited from the Communist society. It is, for instance, in the territorial structure of political behaviour that, in some countries of the region, the pre-war patterns have been reproduced.[5] Other analyses suggested that family traditions mattered in post-1989 economic and political entrepreneur-

[4]) In fact, the pre-Communist legacies, were not entirely "frozen" during the Communist era. They co-determined the particular shades which the regime adopted in the individual countries of Eastern and Central Europe as well as the ways it was digested by the respective societies.

[5]) In analysing the regional structure of the Czech parliamentary elections in 1990 and 1992 and comparing it with the pre-war and early post-war elections, P. Jehlička, T. Kostelecký and associates found that there is a prolonged tendency in some regions to support the Communist party, continuing from the pre-war time [Jehlička et al. 1993, Kostelecký 1994]. Analogically, W. Suražska [1996] found that in Poland the territorial structure of political activism on the local level (measured by turn-out in the parliamentary elections) followed to a certain degree the former partitions of the country among the Austro-Hungarian, Prussian and Russian empires.

ship [c.f. Illner 1992]. Little is, unfortunately, known about the social and cultural mechanisms which are facilitating this transmission.[6]

The legacies of the past – of the socialist one, as well as of the earlier, pre-socialist era – co-determine the space available for transformation. The methodological lesson is that there should be more *historical thinking* in the analyses of the post-Communist transformation. The societal changes after 1989 can hardly be understood without the knowledge of the genesis and functioning of the "real-socialist" system and of the political, social and economic development preceding and causing the Communist takeovers.

The "really existing socialism" has also to be viewed as a functioning system with a certain degree of social legitimacy

When tracing the legacies of the "real-socialist" societies, one would be ill-advised to paint such societies simplistically as just the "empire of evil" into which they were dragged solely by external forces, entirely against their own will, and in which nearly everybody, with the exception of the *"nomenklatura"*, suffered. Such an over-politicised ideological approach tends to ignore the social roots of the socialist system and makes it impossible to understand its functioning as well as its legacies. The socialist option, although nowhere a majority choice, was embraced in these countries during and after World War II by significant parts of their population – there were, of course, considerable differences between the countries in this respect; for example, in Czech Lands Communist Party received a massive support in 1946 elections, while in Slovakia it did not succeed. The support was also a reaction to the economic and social deprivation accompanying the pre-war capitalism and, in particular, to the social stress of the economic crisis in the thirties, the political disappointment resulting from the appeasement policies of the Great Powers toward Nazi Germany (this was a powerful factor in the Czech Lands) and the war experience, which lead to the determination to arrange things differently, so as to prevent any such conflicts in the future. Also authority of the USSR whose armies liberated East Central and Eastern Europe, and idealised images of its social and political system played an important role during and after the war.

The "really existing" socialism, although politically oppressive and, in the long-term perspective, economically untenable, functioned for several decades. This would not have been possible without at least some degree of social legitimacy and some accommodation between the regime and society. The legitimacy was attained by trading political democracy for an egalitarian social welfare system and by the regime's tacitly tolerating the existence of a "second society" [Hankis 1988]. Numerous social groups and strata profited from such conditions and were, for quite a long time, interested in maintaining them. Not surprisingly, some of them may still be regretting the loss of former privileges and advantages after 1989. In the Czech Republic this applies, for example, to the rural and semi-rural population with combined sources of income from agriculture and industry and which had profited from the highly subsidised, socialised form of agriculture as well as from the semi-formal supportive networks in rural communities. They enjoyed, during the forty years of Communist rule, an increase in their standard of living. Most advantages of this sort are now being lost, which creates

[6]) In an entirely different setting (Italy), the transmission of political culture across large span of time was documented by R. D. Putnam [1993]. According to this author, persistence of patterns of civic engagement was rooted in the history of various regions.

disillusionment. A similar situation applies to the population in those regions that were most subsidised in the past and which lost their preferential status after 1989. Similarly, in Slovakia, legitimacy of the system was supported by the rapid modernisation of Slovak society during the Communist rule, bolstered by the assistance, financial and other, obtained from the Czech part of the former Czechoslovakia [c.f. Musil 1993, Szomolányi 1995].

When analysing the present transformation, one should, therefore, be aware that the experience with "really existing socialism" is not viewed as entirely negative by all groups within the populations of the Eastern and Central European countries. Moreover, the experience of that time established the high popular expectations toward the role which the state should play in providing and guaranteeing social welfare and social services. The society of "really existing socialism" is further idealised as the passage of time contributes to a selective memory forgetful of its hardships, and as the social costs of post-Communist transformation become heavier. From among those who lost after 1989, either in the objective sense or in their own minds only, whose expectations were not fulfilled, the discontented are recruited who may express their disappointment by the rejection of the reforms, by the pledge to choose the "third way" or by leftist or rightist extremism.

When compiling the balance sheet of the old system, not only its burdensome legacies should be considered but also the assets it might have left that could be used as resources in the transformation. It is debatable what exactly such assets are but universal literacy, general education and skilled labour force are certainly among them [c.f. Sztompka 1992].

Long-term strategic factors have become increasingly relevant in the post-Communist transformation

At least three historically different, yet overlapping sets of factors can be distinguished which are relevant in determining the transformation. The first set has to do with the more immediate circumstances of the *regime change* in the individual countries, among them the social and political parameters of the change itself. These include the structure, relative strength and composition of the institutional actors in the power struggle (for example, the consolidation of the anti-Communist opposition, its experience and determination, the morale of the Communist party etc.), the character of the coalitions they formed, the programs and strategies which they applied, the personalities of the political leaders, the immediate international situation, the mood of the masses etc. In their majority, such factors were situational, short-term and volatile, and frequentjy also decisional. They are related to the relatively narrow time span surrounding the collapse of the Communist regime, extending over several months, or perhaps a year or two. Some political scientists would attribute an important or even decisive role in shaping the transition to just this kind of factors, whose impact can be characterised as *"exit causality"*.[7] While we agree that such circumstances were indeed highly relevant during that stage when power was being transferred, we would hypothesise that their relevance for further development has been decreasing during the later stages of transformation.

[7]) V. Dvořáková and J. Kunc in their excellent book on transitions to democracy present a systematic list of such approaches [cf. Dvořáková and Kunc 1994].

The second set of factors are the structural and cultural *legacies of the system of "really existing socialism"*, i.e. the more recent elements of continuity mentioned above. Their influence will also gradually weaken, but we believe that these factors will leave a lasting imprint on the shape of the post-Communist societies.

The third set of factors – one, the importance of which we wish to highlight here – are the long-term "strategic" characteristics of the countries and societies involved which result from their history and are also determined by their geopolitical position. Although socially produced, their pace of change is only slow. Such characteristics define the relevant environment not only of the post-Communist transformation, but they also influenced the ways in which the Communist regimes were assimilated in these countries.

What we have in mind here are, for example, the following strategic characteristics: the geopolitical situation of the countries involved – their size, geographic location, strategic importance, proximity to the developed world etc.; the economic resources of the countries – their natural resources, human resources, infrastructure, level and kind of industrialisation, structure of the economy etc.; the level and kind of modernisation; their political and social history – previous experience with a democratic political system, with independence, with the role of being either subjugated or dominant countries, the history of their social structure etc.; their cultural tradition – e.g. the technological, industrial, political cultures, the prevailing traditional value orientations as either individualistic or paternalistic, meritocratic or egalitarian, religious or secular, achievement oriented or complacent etc. Such strategic characteristics do influence the ways in which the individual societies of Eastern and Central Europe manage the post-1989 transformation and how they cope with the social and political tensions and conflicts associated with it. They influence the behaviour of the elites, the level of social integration, the political culture etc. Perhaps the term *"historical causality"* can therefore be used in this context to characterise their impact.

Probably one of the most important strategic characteristics of the Eastern and Central European societies is the *mutual timing* of two processes: of their modernisation[8] and of the beginning of the Communist rule. On the one hand, there are countries which did not experience any major wave of modernisation prior to the Communist takeover or whose modernisation was not finished until that time. Another group are countries which had already been modernised (i.e., in particular, industrialised and urbanised) before the Communist seized power. Modernisation of the former was accomplished or completed by the Communist regimes as a component part of "building socialism". No matter how problematic, the "really existing socialism" played a modernising role in these countries and the benefits of modernity are associated here with the era of the Communist rule, contributing to its legitimacy in the eyes of the population. In the latter group of countries, where the major part of modernisation had occurred independently of the Communist regime, the era of "really existing socialism" can be considered more as damaging the modernisation already attained and interrupting its further progress.[9] As a result,

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[8]) By modernisation we understand here the complex process of societal change driven by industrialisation, technological progress, urbanisation, secularisation, political participation and the massive increase of literacy. C.f. Bendix [1969] or Smelser [1966].

[9]) The difference in the mutual timing of modernisation and the beginning of the Communist rule was used to explain the post-1989 tensions between the Slovak and the Czech parts of Czechoslo-

other things equal, the exit from Communism should be easier in these countries. The market economy is probably easier to introduce in a society with a history of urban capitalism than in a former agricultural society urbanised and industrialised only during the years of the Communist regime. Also, it is one thing to build democratic political institutions in a society which had already some experience with democracy before the Communists seized power, and another one to do that in a country where the only pre-Communist political experience was a semi-feudal system or an authoritarian regime.

The post-Communist transformations can hardly be understood without considering these strategic factors. The recent developments should be analysed in a much broader time perspective than the post-1989 period alone or the four decades of the Communist regime, and within a much wider sociocultural space than the individual societies. The proper time-scale is the *whole modern history* of Eastern and Central Europe, within which the Communist era was a relatively short, although highly relevant episode. The appropriate sociocultural scale could be that of *civilisational orbits* determined by shared cultural and political experience (e.g. by common religion or by a long former appurtenance to supranational political units as was the case for the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman or the Russian empires). The strategic factors of transformation, being socially produced, are, of course, subject to change such that the burdens of history and geography are no irreversible fatalities. Yet, they change sufficiently slowly to be considered the givens in the context of the so far short period of post-Communist transformation.

We propose the hypothesis that, with the passage of time since the break-down of the Communist regime, the relevance of the strategic factors (of the "historical causality") in determining the societal development of the post-Communist countries emerges more clearly, while that of the Communist legacies and of the "situational" factors relevant during he regime change (the "exit causality") decreases. However, the influence of the legacies will probably fade away much more slowly than that of the "situational" factors. In other words, it is less important how the revolutions were performed whereas it is increasingly more important to take into account what resources (economic, social and cultural) transforming societies can mobilise.

Individual countries and their clusters, not Eastern and Central Europe as the whole, form the proper framework of analysis of transformation and of prediction of its further course

Much of transitological research has generalised on the transformations in Eastern and Central Europe as one whole; including e.g. the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belorussia, the Baltic states, the Balkan states and the countries of the Visegrad group. The generalising approach has been based on the implicit assumptions that (1) these countries share certain geopolitically determined historical and cultural characteristics that make them all "Eastern European" or "Eastern and Central European", (2) there are structural and cultural similarities among all these countries given by their common Communist past (the "legacies") which are very important in the analysis and prediction of their post-Communist development, (3) that all the countries aim at the same target, i.e. political

vakia that lead eventually to the split of this country. Slovakia belonged to the group of countries where modernisation and the rule of Communism overlapped, while the Czech Republic was modernised already some fifty years earlier. In Slovakia, the Communist era was associated with progress, whereas in the Czech Republic it meant stagnation. C.f. Musil [1993] or Szomolányi [1995].

democracy and a market economy, (4) that on their way toward that target they will follow more or less the same path.

Such assumptions are justified only to some degree – and so are the generalisations which are based on them. The generalising approach may have been more legitimate before 1989, when the otherwise widely different societies of Eastern and Central Europe were amalgamated by the external pressure of the Soviet dominance and forced into the Procrustean bed of the uniform institutional structure (yet even then, there were many divergences), but has become less and less adequate since the Soviet grip was released in 1989. As suggested, "historical causality" is reasserting itself in the post-Communist development and, with it, all the long-term differences among the Eastern and Central European countries and their clusters that were forcefully overshadowed by the uniform institutions of the Communist system. The *"historical episode"* during which societies with considerably different historical backgrounds and systems of social organisation and belonging to different sociocultural orbits were assembled under one roof is over, and these societies are again embedded within their traditional contexts. Thus it is probably more legitimate to generalise on the transformations in clusters of kindred Eastern and Central European countries (the Visegrád four may be one of them), than on the post-Communist Europe as a whole. In fact, the concepts "Eastern and Central Europe" or the "post-Communist countries" are increasingly misguiding as tools of analysis and prediction.

Conclusion

The above propositions have not touched upon all the important characteristics of the post-Communist transformation in Eastern and Central Europe – certainly many more could be mentioned (and, indeed, are mentioned in the literature). The propositions were meant to highlight some of those features of the transformation that, we believe, were not so clearly visible in the early phases of the process and have been emerging only in its later stages. Awareness of the complexity and social risks of the transformation, of the bonds linking it with the recent as well as the more distant history of the transforming countries (the logic of which cannot be easily escaped), awareness of the contradictory perceptions and evaluation of the Communist experience by different social groups, of the open-endedness of transformation as well as of its uneven and unequal course in the different countries, of the importance of the strategic characteristics of the Eastern and Central European societies for the process of transformation, should all contribute to a more balanced and realistic analysis and evaluation of what is happening in Eastern and Central Europe.

Of course, much of what we have proposed is tentative and must be further documented and verified. Moreover, we agree with Z. Bauman [1994] that it is still too early to make any definitive conclusions as the societal changes induced by the fall of Communism in Eastern and Central Europe are still going on and their destination and direction are uncertain. Anyhow, it can be expected that new phenomena will occur that will challenge the existing theories of transformation.

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Markets and People:
The Czech Reform Experience in a Comparative Perspective

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A large documentation of statistical and sociological surveys is used in this book to present a plastic picture of the transition in the Czech Republic as experienced by individuals and households. Other East-Central European and the EU countries serve as a comparative context. The focus is on the economic dimension of the transformation, as displayed in earnings, secondary resources, household incomes and expenditures, financial hardship and poverty. The establishment and cultivation of markets (labour, consumer, housing and financial) is described on the behavioural and attitudinal level as well as social policy responses to the emerging hardship, experienced by the population. Consequences of changing standards of living on inequality, social structure and political orientations are displayed within alternative theoretical concepts.

"An impressively broad analysis of the Central European revolution ... and how the Czech Republic brought itself back into the family of ordinary European liberal democracies"
(Prof. Stein Ringen, Oxford University)

Contents:

Modernisation and Social Transformation in the Czech Republic

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Abstract: The specific analysis of the Czech historical experience could offer interesting incentives for theoretical generalisations. The global post-Communist societal transformation is conceived in the following paper as a complex social transformation and modernisation in all spheres of human culture. Analogously, in several other European countries which already were relatively advanced before World War II, the influence of the totalitarian/egalitarian state socialist social system on the modernisation processes in the Czech lands was in principle negative. So far, the post-Communist transformation of Czech society has been rather successful. However, this was caused, among others, by the abandoning, the postponing, or the mitigation of some aspects of the originally presupposed radical liberal democratic changes. The long-term prospects of Czech society depend mainly on the ability of the social and institutional system to stimulate a significant progress on the road to qualitative modernisation. It will only be possible through creating a dynamic social equilibrium generating a new motivation structure based on social relationships strongly influenced by the principles of equity of chances and meritocracy.

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As far as the broader theoretical and methodological background of this paper is concerned, the author will limit himself to only one short remark. The original incentive for developing the orientation of thought presented in this paper was not the academic desire to apply some already existing general theory of social change to a new historical case, i.e. the post-communist transformation of the 1990s in general or in a group of selected countries. Quite on the contrary, the considerations cumulated in this study, *have been stimulated by the need to explain the concrete historical experience* of the Czech and Slovak Republics with the state socialist social system, its collapse and replacement by a newly emerging social order. In the analysis of the post-Communist changes, more emphasis is given on the ongoing processes in the Czech Republic, now a sovereign state. Thus, the task of this study is to *analyse, from a theoretical point of view, some aspects of the concrete historical experience of recent changes occurred in one society* in the last fifty years. I do not think such an approach less valuable for the development of theoretical thought in sociology than are either the inductive generalisations of many analysed cases or the deductions on the level of abstract categories. On this point, I share one of K. Marx's methodological principles, i.e. to consider "the reproduction of the concrete by means of thought" as an indispensable, and perhaps most significant, part of theory [Marx 1857]. However, this principle can work only if the unique subject of analysis gives enough incentives for the development of theoretically relevant ideas.

I think that focusing on the Czech experience could fulfil this requirement. Before World War II, the Czech Lands belonged to advanced European capitalist industrial re-

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gions, with a corresponding cultural level and a well operating pluralist democracy. After the war, however, they also became a part of a small amount of countries where, in the course of a radical left-turn, the Communist attained a relatively broad social and political support and where, subsequently, the Communist policy was carried out in highly radical forms and with serious consequences on all spheres of human life. This specific contradiction brought some unique traits into the mutual relationships of social and political changes on the one hand, and of the cultural modernisation processes on the other. It became clear for the first time during the inspiring attempt at a modernising reform of the state socialist system in the 1960s, which peaked in the 1968 Prague Spring movement. The brutal defeat of this attempt caused a prolonged and harsh repression and societal stagnation in the period of 'normalisation', 1970-1989. After the 1989 'Velvet Revolution', the contradictory development continued. In none of the other post-communist countries in Europe, did the newly established political and economic system seem so radical and persistent in the endeavour to push through a liberal economic reform and corresponding right-wing orientation. This paper has been written in the time following the dramatic June 1996 Czech elections, which yet again surprised with its partial left-turn, not expected by most foreign observers. Basically, *the historical developments of Czech society in the last sixty years were extremely contradictory and involved many sudden, abrupt and radical societal shifts related to the main subject of this paper: the relationship between changes in social structures and the dynamics of the modernisation (or anti-modernisation) processes.* This could be the case when historical experience accumulated in one subject should bring important incentives for theoretical generalisations is one example.

1. Basic Concepts

The existing conceptual framework, familiarly used when dealing with social transformation and modernisation, is far from being unambiguous. There exists, e.g., a tendency to confuse the two basic concepts: social transformation and modernisation. In order to avoid possible misunderstandings, I therefore consider it useful to begin with a clarification of the most important concepts as I understand them. Looking for inspiration mainly in classical sociological and cultural anthropological works, I share the view that every human society can be conceived as a complex of three basic, mutually interpenetrating entities. These entities (leaving aside the interpenetration of society with both external and internal nature) are: a) human *personalities*, b) their mutual, that is *social relationships* and c) the *culture* created by them in the course of human history. Continuing the tradition of some classics of cultural anthropology and some of the pioneers of Czech sociology (Chalupný, Bláha) I apply here – in spite of the existing strong tendency to reduce culture only to 'that what people are learning, not to that what they are doing and creating' [Keesing, Keesing 1971] – the *concept of culture in its broadest sense, i.e. including all creative and reproductive human activities and also all their socially adopted products – both material and non-material.*

Those, however, who prefer a different concept such as A. Weber's dualism of (material) civilisation and (spiritual) culture, for example, can simply replace the concept of culture I am employing with an image of an intrinsically contradictory complex of spiritual culture and civilisation. In such a framework, the field in which social relationships and culture interpenetrate is the sphere of *institutions* conceived as stabilised patterns of social interactions or, concurrently, as the cultural aspect of social relationships.

With regard to *social transformation*, I have in mind the historical process of a structural, qualitative change of social relationships, while in the case of *modernisation*, I refer to a certain orientation of structural change in culture, including institutions and corresponding socially adopted values and forms of behaviour. Those *institutional changes*, which are usually presupposed to be part of post-Communist transformation, e.g. the marketisation of the national economy, the introduction of a pluralist democracy and 'state of law', the creation of a balanced and stimulating structure of (predominantly private) ownership forms, etc., represent in this conceptual framework the connecting link of both major processes in question. They can be regarded, on the one hand, as changes in social relationships and on the other, as phenomena characterising modernisation in the cultural sphere.

Only the complex of cultural changes – mainly the modernisation processes – and of changes of social structures, that is social transformation (encompassing changes in economy, political relationships, law, moral, etc.), intermediated by the connecting link of institutional changes, represents the *global societal transformation*. And the interactions of cultural changes (modernisation) and social transformations create the *societal environment for the development of human beings as social actors and personalities*. In the end, the existence of rather stimulative or inhibitive conditions for the developments of human personalities is the decisive criterion for the success or failure of societal transformations.

Among the enumerated concepts, perhaps the *concept of modernisation is the most disputable*. I, of course, share the emphasis laid by most modernisation theories on the processes of innovation, rationalisation, mobilisation, secularisation and other kindred cultural changes. However, in our context, we were obliged to *conceive modernisation as a general process embracing – including the corresponding institutional changes – each important sphere of societal life*: ecology, demographic behaviour, health-care, education, science, technology, infrastructure, housing, amount and qualitative standards of production and services, well developed markets of goods, services, labour and capitals, corresponding characteristics of consumption, structure of leisure activities, advanced pluralist democracy and rationalisation of administration, perhaps quality of life of individuals and families in general. Hence, by modernisation I mean *general progress in the level of broadly conceived culture*. It is, of course clear, that the empirical information concerning the processes of modernisation in one country, or in a group of countries, presented in this paper, has had to be substantially reduced to only several phenomena of crucial significance for societal change.

On the other hand, the former state socialist countries' cultural backwardness in comparison with the advanced countries compelled us to exercise extreme caution with some of the consequences of so-called 'post-modernist' approaches. For the time being, we are not concerned so much with the *'pathology' of modernity* (clearly a very important phenomenon occurring in the more developed countries and, unfortunately, in the future very likely to appear in our countries), as much as by the apparent *lack of modernity* and by the specific pathology behind it. We have also observed some post-modern phenomena in our society – partly in real social life, partly as an anticipation of possible future developments. I find it rational to make a distinction between those which only represent a little excessive reaction to the 'pathology of modernity' and those which can be explained as a comprehensible negation of the deviations and imperfections typical of

the former phases of modernisation. Similarly, as the recently emerged stream of neo-modernism referred by Alexander [1994] I, though for other reasons, view some of the phenomena stressed by post-modernists (e.g. the new role of information systems and mass media, the collapse of 'great theories' in their ideologised form, or the increase of the significance of subjective actions of individuals, social groups and institutions) rather as elements of continuing modernisation, bringing society closer to the post-industrial phase of development. I prefer to speak of a new, more complex and sophisticated phase of rational approaches to societal reality rather than of the collapse of rationalism. Perhaps, for other societies, it is time to speak about the 'end of history' (although I personally doubt it too), but in our case the very clear standards of an advanced modern society still lie before us.

Under the given circumstances, Prof. Zapf's straight-lined approach, directly linking modernisation and post-Communist transformation stressing on innovation, mass-consumption, marketisation, the welfare-state, ecology, a well-operating pluralist democracy and similar well known phenomena as constituent elements of modernisation processes, seems to be quite appropriate [Zapf 1994; Machonin 1996b]. Perhaps we will also be able in the future to accurately appreciate the significance behind the sophisticated concept of 'reflexive modernisation' [Giddens 1990; Beck 1993].

2. Communism and Modernity

Many European – including Czech – members of the cultural 'vanguard of modernism' of the 1920s identified themselves to some degree with the Communist ideology under the assumption that this is, finally, a scientific theory aiming at the introduction of rationalism, technological progress, new lifestyle and other attributes of modernity into societal reality. This assumption also became one of the factors assisting to gain the support of a not negligible part of the Czech democratic intelligentsia in favour of the post-war Communist programme describing the idealised 'specific Czechoslovak road to socialism'. In the 1960s, yet again, a part of intellectuals met with sympathies the attempt to link the vision of the 'scientific-technical revolution' with expected reforms of the state socialist system. And even now, there are authors finally considering in their retrospective analyses some aspects of the socialist industrialisation and corresponding changes in the way of life of the Czech population under state socialism as a contribution to the modernisation processes. As all these phenomena registered in the Czech milieu have some analogies in other East-Central European countries, it is important to understand at least the main *reasons for the emergence of these illusions about the modernisation potential of communism and to confront them with historical facts.*

In my opinion, one of the reasons for the *possibility to identify communism, or at least some aspects of its ideology and practice, with modernity*, lies in the doubtless *ambiguity of this social and political movement and ideology.* Marxism was born in the last century as a continuation of rationally argued and presented tendencies of thought connected with the Enlightenment and bourgeois democratic revolutions, applied scientific methods of empirical cognition and building of theory and tried to base even its utopian futurological ideas and political radicalism on the presupposition of the actually ongoing industrial modernisation of technology and rationalisation of economy. Everywhere the social and political movements influenced by Marxism had to face either the backwardness of pre-industrial societal conditions or the monopolistic, authoritarian and militaris-

tic tendencies of the developed capitalism (mainly those connected with the fascist ideology and politics), they emphasised the 'modern' aspects of their ideologies.

This was apparent particularly in those countries which, under objectively given pre-industrial conditions, really had to solve the tasks incurred by the first *extensive phases of industrialisation and urbanisation.* In some of these societies, the communist regimes in fact stimulated cultural changes crucial for modernisation and favourable for the population in certain aspects. Besides the relative technological progress in the production of goods and the basic consumption standards (including some improvement in housing conditions), a doubtless *educational expansion* also needs to be mentioned. It is still obvious: *the less industrially developed were the post-Communist European countries before the establishment of state socialism, the stronger seems to be the 'legacy of Communism' – the positive evaluation of the 'contributions' of Communism, etc., in the public opinion and, consequently, the support in favour of political subjects linked to the communist past or using populist and authoritarian ruling methods.* This historical cultural difference seems to be one of the grounds for the partly diverging public opinion and political development in the Czech Lands and Slovakia.

However, the communist regimes introduced in the European countries *concerned new social systems based on the combination of totalitarianism, abolition of the market economy and subsequently the egalitarianism concerning the distribution of wealth, official incomes and, to some extent, also of lifestyles.* Functionally interconnected material privileges for the nomenclature and an extensive network of corruption of the less qualified and less efficient people were inevitable. Power and income distribution became incongruent to education, work complexity and cultural level of lifestyle. A deep *status inconsistency* became a typical characteristic of the state socialist social structure.

Table 1. Rank Correlation Matrices for Status-Forming Variables in 1984*

	Czech Republic				Slovak Republic			
Variables	CA	EA	MP	WC	CA	EA	MP	WC
ED	0.49	0.19	0.34	0.62	0.56	0.21	0.31	0.64
WC	0.37	0.20	0.31		0.46	0.24	0.31	
MP	0.16	0.30			0.18	0.30		
EA	0.08				0.11			

*) ED = education, WC = work complexity, MP = managerial position, EA = earnings, CA = cultural level of leisure activities. Data from the secondary analysis of results of the survey on class and social structure, IPhSo CS AS, Prague [Machonin, Tuček 1994].

The low values of correlations between the earnings distribution and other status-forming variables are particularly apparent when comparing the relationships found out both in the course of the Czechoslovak reform attempts in 1967 and in the course of the post-communist transformation in 1991, 1993 and 1995. The somewhat higher degree of status consistency in Slovakia proves the already mentioned various modernisation impacts on the regional processes of modernisation with different levels of industrial developments on the advent of communism.

Under such conditions and after the exhaustion of natural sources caused by extensive industrialisation, the population of state socialist countries *lost their motivation.*

People were not able to own the fair results of their work, could not be recompensed according to their real merits, lacked the opportunity of free development in the economic and political sphere, disposed of limited chances of free development in their leisure activities, were neither able, nor willing and, additionally, not allowed to *overstep the threshold separating them from the more demanding activities typical of the intensive phase of industrial developments*. Even the most developed European state socialist countries *were not successful in starting the post-industrial developments* on a large scale. Only the limited sphere of production, research and development connected with the military purposes could be considered an exception. At the same time, the arms production was one of the reasons which led to the extreme and extensive industrialisation favouring heavy industry and thus contributed to the stagnation of the acquired extensive industrial level. Compare analogous conclusions in Srubar [1991].

While *in the originally pre-industrial countries the state socialist way of industrialisation can be said to have somewhat contributed to the basic modernisation* of societies concerned – although in specific forms of the 'Soviet-type industrialism' –, the same cannot be said about some of the countries which belonged to the economically and culturally relatively advanced European states before the Second World War. This is doubtlessly valid for the Czech Lands, for East Germany and probably for Slovenia too.

The difference between the two clear-cut types of developments (from both the pre-industrial and industrial level) can be demonstrated using the cases of the Czech Lands and Slovakia. We will use two of the basic indicators of degree of modernisation: the branch (sector) structure and educational attainment.

Table 2. Branch Structures in Percentage of Economically Active Persons*

	Czech Lands				Slovakia			
Sector	1921	1930	1983	1992	1921	1930	1983	1992
Agriculture	36.6	30.4	11.2	8.6	65.0	60.6	17.2	12.1
Industry	46.2	47.6	55.3	49.1	20.9	20.7	49.8	44.0
Services	17.2	22.0	33.5	42.3	14.1	18.7	33.0	43.9

*) Recounted statistical data from [Machonin 1996a].

Table 3. Attained Levels of Education in Percentages of Population over 15 Years*

	Czech Lands				Slovakia			
	Males		Females		Males		Females	
	1950	1991	1950	1991	1950	1991	1950	1991
Tertiary	1.6	9.5	0.3	5.2	1.0	9.5	0.1	6.3
Secondary	7.3	21.7	3.2	24.6	4.6	22.1	2.0	26.9
Lower degrees	91.1	68.8	96.5	70.2	94.4	68.4	97.9	66.8

*) Recounted statistical data from [Machonin 1996a].

This, as well as many other known data, clearly shows that in the end the extensive development under state socialism brought the industrially more advanced Czech Lands (now a sovereign country) only very limited pro-modernisation changes in comparison with the pre-industrial Slovakia. Even the quantitative development of the educational

structures was substantially more favourable for the latter. It is necessary to take into account that most quantitative and qualitative indicators of the Czech post-war modernisation processes lag significantly behind analogous indicators for comparable Western countries like Austria, Belgium, Norway, the Netherlands, etc. It means that, in principle, the long development started in the late 1930s until the late 1980s *can be evaluated from the point of view of stages of modernisation rather than of stagnation or even of relative regression.*

This tendency was already perfectly known by the better educated part of the Czech population in the 1960s and has become one of the stimulating factors the reform attempts with their culmination in the 1968 Prague Spring movement. The endeavour to substitute the conflictual co-existence of capitalism and socialism by the convergence strategy was accepted in the case of this region as a) a confirmation the cultural stagnation under state socialism and b) as a challenge to start the trend of a new stage of modernisation [Machonin 1992]. Unfortunately, the Warsaw Pact occupation and the re-establishment of the nomenclature-rule not only renewed the operation of the totalitarian and egalitarian inhibitive mechanisms known from the 1950s, but additionally, required the strengthening of the social corruption benefiting the numerous less qualified strata as a compensation for the loss of national sovereignty.

After the sudden and smooth collapse of the state socialist regime in 1989, the stagnation of modernisation processes expressed itself a) in the radical turn of the intelligentsia from the Communists to those forces which were supposed to re-fuel the modernisation strategies and b) in the consequent popularity of the slogan 'return to Europe' understood as an attempt to join the advanced European countries.

Generally speaking, *one cannot only speak about the 'interrupted modernisation'* (Mojca Novak's formulation for Slovenia), *as far as the Czech case is concerned, but more directly about – for the second time – a repeated dysfunctional extensive industrialisation with final anti-modernisation effects.* The decisive reason for this – after the influence of the German occupation and the consequent inclusion of the Czech Lands into the military economy during the Second World War – was, indeed, the protracted influence of the state socialist social order. From the point of view of the Czech experience, *the state socialist system as the 'really existing' incarnation of the Communist ideology and policy, proved to be anti-modern right through its essential characteristics.* This circumstance became one of the most important reasons for the simple and easy collapse of communism in the Czech Lands. One of the leading presupposition of the country's development after the 'Velvet Revolution' was, for a large part of the population, the return to European modernisation trends and, as a goal, the attainment of modern standards of advanced countries.

3. Achievements and Problems of the Czech Societal Transformation

Leaving East Germany aside, which represents rather a case of the national reintegration based on the more developed part of a formerly divided country, there remain four countries in East Central Europe of the so-called Visegrád group. After the well-known left-turns in Poland and Hungary and the conflictual developments on the Slovak political scene, it is quite clear that *the original, somewhat simplified one-way models of liberal democratic transition, popular after 1989*, have not been satisfactorily verified by the societal changes in these countries. It does not mean that the post-communist transfor-

mation has been abandoned there. The real changes have been much more complicated and conflictual than initially expected.

Before the June 1996 elections, the Czech Republic was considered by its government and also by many both domestic and foreign observers as, perhaps, the only case among the Visegrád countries where *nearly all principles of the transition models had been applied and where successful results had been attained.* Some of these achievements are commonly known and doubtless:

a) Obvious was the progress in the field of human and citizens' rights with broad social support for a liberal democratic President and a relatively broad social support for the right-wing conservative-liberal government. (Even after the last elections it still embraced approximately half of the adult population.)

b) An extensive privatisation and substantial liberalisation of the national economy was attained in conditions of a stable macro-economic balance and the annual inflation has been reduced to one-figure percentage.

c) Quite clear was the progress of the service sector which in 1994 supplied 54% of the GDP, that is much more than in the over-industrialised state socialist economy.

d) Some recovery and even revitalisation of the economy was observed. After the initial fall of the GDP in 1991 to approximately 82% of the level achieved in 1989, this indicator grew gradually in the last years, already stepped over the level of the late 1980s and is still increasing today.

e) In 1991 and after the decrease of the average real income to three quarters of their value in 1989, this indicator already stepped over the initial level and is making yearly progress. These changes were followed by a steadily low unemployment rate between 3 and 4% and nearly negligible poverty rate.

f) As indirect consequences of some of the transformation processes, several improvements were shown in the environmental parameters and even in the life expectancy.

On the other hand, *social changes accompanying all the above-mentioned achievements were not favourable and smooth for everyone* in all parameters.

An almost complete exchange of the old 'nomenclature' for a new political élite led to the stepwise and simultaneous exclusion not only of the Communists from 1989, but also of moderate centrist and left-wing democratic subjects, including many of those active in the anti-Communist dissent and including the non-communist Social Democracy, from the power élite. In spite of the mentioned progress made by pluralist democracy, this kind of changes also led also to the *emergence of some centralist, bureaucratic and partocratic tendencies, hindering the developments of 'civil society'.* These became the subject of a systematic criticism by the President of the Republic [Havel 1996]. One of the results of the June 1996 elections will obviously be distinct improvements in this direction.

The far-reaching and rapid privatisation of the Czech national economy accomplished either by the voucher method, or by the standard privatisation methods *have not yet led to firm and clear-cut ties between the new owners and managers* – mostly prepared for their careers during their professional experience in state socialism – and have left relatively high participation of the state (through its share in the large banks and companies) in the formally privatised economy [compare Mlčoch 1995a, b]. The finan-

cial capital, including the investment funds and companies, has remained one of the most probable pretendents of the leading position in economy, while the decisive role of managers is not as clear as I. Szelényi assumes on the base of the Hungarian experience [Szelényi 1995]. Besides, *a part of the privatisation acts and initial activities of the privatised firms have been doubtlessly accomplished by unlawful and/or immoral means.*

The so far accomplished differentiation of incomes, wealth and life-styles *created a stratification structure with some class aspects.* Approximately 10-12% of the economically active population belong now to the *higher income categories* (with significantly higher representation of entrepreneurs with employees, small private businessmen and a section of higher professionals), while the agricultural workers and members of cooperatives, the unskilled and semi-skilled workers as well as some pensioners and members of the one-parent families and families with three and more children, often belong to the *segment of population endangered by poverty.* Some surveys show that the amount of families having certain difficulties with ensuring their elementary needs could be estimated as approximately one quarter of the total number.

However, the cross-national comparisons prove that the inherited, still relatively *egalitarian distribution of incomes continues to operate*: among one half of the population was registered in 1992 in the medium interval of an equidistant seven degrees scale of per/capita family incomes, which is more than in Hungary and much more than in Poland. The average ratio for one hour's wage of an employee with tertiary education to the wage of a worker with elementary education and without apprenticeship or vocational school in 1994 was not greater than 1.7 : 1. In 1995 the ratio among males was 1.95 : 1 and 1.7 : 1 among females.

It is no wonder, under these circumstances, that the President of the Union of Industry and Transport (that is the head of the main industrial lobby) Mr. Š. Popovič explained its position in this issue with the following surprisingly open words:

> *"In the former regime, you earned roughly the same, irrespectively of whether you were working or not. That is why after the revolution all applauded the idea that the social differences among people would finally be more distinct. Now some social stratification has appeared. And some people wish that everybody were paid the same once again. However, I cannot agree with this, it is a very dangerous tendency. This would lead to the thought that stealing is better than working more and better. Such an approach does not motivate people to a better achievement but to destruction."* [Popovič 1996a]

The most complicated issue resides in the *situation of the 'new (upper and lower) middle classes' composed of higher and lower professional employees.* These groups *are developing slowly and unevenly.* The status of manager in industry, particularly if employed a firm with foreign capital, other economic professionals, mainly in the business services (banks, insurance), professionals in the foreign trade, information services, communications, mass-media and entertainment industry, in some sections of administration, justice, armed forces are particularly advantageous. However, the material status of most physicians and other professionals in the health-care and social services, teachers of all levels, workers in science, research and development, people active in culture and arts and in kindred professions is, as a rule, *far from being satisfactory.* If we add the relatively good situation of some branches of heavy industry with their lower than average qualification

level, it is clear that the differentiation in wages is far from matching the differentiation in work-complexity and qualification.

Table 4. Average wages in selected branches in 1995 in thousands CZK

Credit plus insurance	18.7	Research and development	9.0
Finance	14.3	Construction	8.8
Information services	12.5	Motor-cars production	8.3
Insurance	12.1	Machinery	7.9
Energy	10.4	Health-care	7.5
Coal-mining	10.3	Education	7.4
Publishing and press	10.1	Culture, recreation, sport	7.1
Administration, defence	9.6	Agriculture	6.9
Metallurgy	9.4	Textile industry	5.9
Retail-trade	5.9		

The unfavourable situation of numerous groups of professionals with tertiary and secondary professional education not only *hinders the development and homogenisation of the middle-classes*, so important for the maintenance of social equilibrium, but, concurrently, also *hinders the implementation of the meritocratic principle*, conceived as social equity of chances.

The *contemporary class structure as well as intertwining with the social stratification* of the Czech society is not distinctly enough developed or stabilised yet. It *represents rather a dynamically moving hybrid combination of surviving state socialist (etatist and egalitarian) principles of social differentiation with emerging new social differentiation* (class structure and social stratification) typical of modern industrial and post-industrial societies.

The increase of vertical social differentiation has had a significant *impact on the attitudes and political orientations of people*. At present, the Czech population's opinion of the post-Communist transformation is far more sceptical than it was at the beginning of this process. It is becoming more and more socially differentiated according to the acquired social experience. All this is contributing to the gradual increase in the social determination of political orientations, preferences and voting behaviour. As a result, a *long-term polarisation process* was observed even before the 1996 elections between the two right-wing civil parties and the Czech Social Democracy.

Table 5. Ratio of Votes or Voting Preferences for the Civil Parties and for the Social Democracy

Elections	Public Opinion Polls*			Elections
1992	9/92	9/95	5/96	1994
4.28 : 1	6.00 : 1	1.33 : 1	1.26 : 1	1.15 : 1

*) *Trendy*, STEM Prague

In the Czech case, this turn is not favourable for the direct followers of the Communist Party, but for the traditional left-centrist Social Democratic Party. Up to now it has not been as extensive as the recent left-turns in Poland and Hungary and did not bring the victory of a new, relatively homogenous majority. However, *it is an ongoing left-turn, indeed, which in some points corroborates the Polish and Hungarian experience.*

Thus we come to the conclusions concerning the often declared *specific Czech transformation*. The transformation process in the Czech Republic in some points really differs from the changes in the other three Visegrád countries. It has been *more moderate and less conflictual*.

The *main factors delaying so far a sharp culmination of the social and political conflicts in the Czech Republic* and an even more radical left-turn, in our opinion, are: a) *a better economic situation at the beginning of the transformation*; b) *the initial political situation which was in a way also more favourable for the post-communist transformation*, namely, a high degree of discreditation of the Communist Party; c) *a more careful course of action of the Czech right-wing governments* in the process of economic and social reforms; d) *the notorious historically developed high adaptability of the Czech people to sudden social and political changes*.

On the basis of these conclusions we can state that the *post-Communist changes in the Czech Lands have been so far relatively successful. Indeed, they seem to be, in many ways, closer to what was expected from the original transition models, than what happened in other countries* (except East Germany. These results were however achieved by abandoning, or, at least, with the substantial mitigation of the formerly presupposed economic shock-therapy as well as of some imaginable hardships in the political field. Particularly in the field of the widely conceived social policy, a *careful approach led by all governments in the period of post-Communist transformation moderated the conditions created by economic reforms, mainly for the lower classes*. On the other hand, the *processes of meritocratisation were hampered to the dissatisfaction of the new middle classes*. In this way, *many immediate achievements occurred despite the fact that the solution of many problems was at the same time postponed for future phases of development* or were solved to the dissatisfaction of a not negligible part of the population. This experience influenced the results of the 1996 elections, an event which has meant some shift in the political power distribution, by now closer to the standard equilibrium of the democratic right-wing and left-wing political parties as seen in advanced European countries.

As far as the *future developments in the Czech Republic* are concerned, *one cannot totally exclude the eventuality of partial success of either the left-, or rather the right-wing variants of authoritarian populism, although this eventuality has so far remained unlikely*. However, the basic meaning of post-Communist transformation can be achieved only by the *realisation of the democratic and market (liberal) alternative of development* in any one of its possible variants. So far, *the most likely perspective for the Czech Republic in the next years still consists in the continuation of the neo-liberal strategy of transformation, perhaps with some modifications coming from the centrist liberal democratic strategy* and from the pressure of the social reformists. *Less probable*, but not fully excluded, *seems to be the social reformist variant of the liberal democratic alternative of changes (in possible combination with the socially coloured centrist liberal democratic strategies)*. In certain circumstances, even a 'large coalition' involving social and political subjects from the democratic left-centre to the neo-liberal right would not be excluded, although this solution does not seem likely in the actually existing present conditions.

4. Long-Term Prospects: Post-Communist Transformation and Modernisation

The brief analysis of the social and political strategies of post-Communist transformation presented in the previous section is significant mainly in a short- or medium-term perspective. If any one of the enumerated liberal democratic strategic orientations win within the next two or four years, or if any combination of these strategies succeeds, it is quite clear that only some important institutional and corresponding social changes could be completed or newly concretised in this short-term.

However, even the most imaginable radical institutional and social transformation following the neo-liberal concepts would in no case mean the fulfilment of the essential long-term goals which many people quite naturally connect with the post-communist societal transformation in East-Central Europe and, especially in the Czech Lands. The *long-term prospects of the Czech developments can only be discussed essentially in the framework of a completed conceptual apparatus, encompassing the crucial issue of mutual relationships between post-Communist social transformation and modernisation.*

Many social scientists (Habermas, Zapf, Offe, Srubar, Müller, Havelka and others) have stressed the importance of the modernisation processes in the post-communist changes. Most authors dealing with these issues quite rightly evaluate many of the steps already accomplished or in the process of being accomplished in the rebuilding of social institutions as modernisation measures. This concerns the introduction of both the parliamentary democracy and state of law and the market institutions and instruments as well as many other reforms. However, the *profound sense of the 'escape from state socialism' does not consist only in the revolutionary or reform changes in (selected) institutions, mainly those regulating the distribution of power, incomes and wealth.* (Compare with the identical position of P. Sztompka concerning the same issue [Sztompka 1996].) It was quite natural, that this kind of institutions has become the primary subject of rebuilding in the course of and after the political upheavals. On the other hand, if one of the most important reasons for the collapse of Communism was the population's objectively determined dissatisfaction with the quality of life as a whole (from lack of freedom through stagnation of living standards, short life expectancies and deterioration of the environment to low standards of work productivity, technological level of production and insufficient information services), then the *modernisation of the key political and economic institutions will demonstrate its usefulness only if it gives incentives for positive changes in the whole quality of life as well.* That is why we are compelled to *conceive modernisation as a long-term process of profound changes in all spheres of culture, the success or failure of which have not yet been decided by the first, although highly important, steps in modernisation of a section of institutions.*

As it has been already emphasised, the modernisation processes in the Czech Lands had already progressed before World War II. The analysed developments during the German occupation and the state socialist regime rule led to substantial lagging behind the advanced European countries. After November 1989, the *modernisation processes in the Czech Republic progressed (concurrently with the already discussed major changes in institutions) mainly in the field of information and business-services as well as in the import of a wider selection of consumer goods.* Some positive quantitative changes are visible also in the *educational system*, particularly as far as the secondary professional and tertiary education is concerned. However, the modernisation is ***still*** *lagging behind West-European standards in science, research and development, many*

qualitative aspects of education, technological progress and restructuralisation on the level of enterprises, health-care, housing, consumers' satisfaction and protection, environmental protection, culture, the rationalisation of administration, etc.

At least two of the broad spectre of the problems connected with the insufficient modernisation need to be especially mentioned here. First of all, an increasing number of both foreign and domestic economists connect the well known difficulties in the Czech foreign trade balance (increasing prevalence of import of goods above export) with still *low levels of technology and labour-productivity on the micro-level of industrial enterprises*, that is with the *lagging behind of the restructuralisation of plants and enterprises*. Many of these experts explain this phenomenon with the insufficient degree of the privatisation process. Let me once again use one of the declarations of the 'industrial lobby's' leader. Having been asked about the reasons of the low unemployment rate and the existing 'lack of skilled people', he simply stated:

> *"The main restructuralisation of enterprises has not yet been accomplished. It is true, they have been privatised, but the former over-employment is still there. (...) The enterprises have often remained the same as they were in the past. The coupon privatisation has been carried out, but the new owners have brought neither new money, nor unfortunately, new ideas about what to do with the firms. (...) However, the restructuralisation can be carried out only by really existing owners."* [Popovič 1996b]

Another frequently presented explanation of the same phenomenon resides in emphasising the *lack of young professionals with scientific and/or technological qualification capable of elaborating and realising modern scientific and technological projects* [Janouch 1996]. Directors of many advanced machinery factories complain of insufficient 'supply' in tertiary technological schools leavers.

This explanation leads to the second important aspect of the insufficient modernisation. It is, generally speaking, the *very slow and structurally unbalanced development of the quaternary sector, science*, research and development and education inclusive. It has been proven by many special studies that the conditions for science, research and development are so far particularly unfavourable [see, e.g., Niederle 1994]. The most regrettable statistics about the transformation process I have ever seen, shows the decrease in the number of people employed in research and development from 138 thousand in 1989 to 39 thousand in 1994, including the decrease in workers with tertiary level education from 46 thousand to 14 thousand [*Statistická...* 1995: 285]. Even taking into account possible lower qualification of a part of employees in the 1980s, these figures reflect a catastrophical process. This decrease has not been substituted by a corresponding increase of people engaged in research and development at universities, where conditions for such activities remained unfavourable, and unfortunately, by an increase on the soil of practically non-existing private research institutes, either. Some authors explain the difficulties of the developments in the quaternary sector by the inability of the free market instruments to saturate the demanding needs of this sector and see in the apparent state of crisis in science, research and development, health-care and culture and in the existing difficulties in education, a proof of the urgency to complement the market relationships by the operation of a strong public sector in this field [Pick 1996].

In any case, all the above mentioned issues represent crucial points deciding whether the modernisation process in the Czech Republic will be able to overstep the

traditional industrial cultural level and lead to a progressive development of the already existing nuclei of the post-industrial phase of its history.

What are the reasons for the relatively slow pace of thus conceived modernisation in various spheres of societal life? The clearest reason seems to be the *lack of time and financial means (in a still undercapitalised country)*. This could be partly connected to the second reason, that is the endeavour of the ruling élites to prevent eventual dissatisfaction of the lower classes with the ongoing political changes and social differentiation. In other words, it is the problem of the *high social costs of the post-Communist transformation, spent at the detriment of investments put into the development of the quaternary sector* (including adequate salaries) and *into the restructuralisation of the industrial production and of the infrastructure*. At the same time, the left-wing oriented critiques point out the wasting of public financial means in favour of people getting rich by illegal and/or immoral means. The third explanation could stress the obvious *unwillingness of the Czech conservative neo-liberals to use even the market-conform means for an intentional stimulation of modernisation tendencies on the base of rational strategies concerning the development of the national economy, or, at least, of some of its branches.* Thus, the 'invisible hand of the market' remains in this regard also blind.

Our survey on "Actors and Strategies of Social Transformation and Modernisation" in 1995 showed that more than 40% of the adult population express consequent pro-modernisation attitudes mainly concerning production, even if it were to bring some social costs (increase of unemployment, endangering of firms with obsolete technology, decrease in agriculture); about 20% are against and the rest is neutral. [Machonin 1996c] This is not a bad result as far as socio-psychological presuppositions of modernisation are concerned.

The attitude of the decisive political subjects to the same question seems to be far more complicated. The Czech Social Democracy, naturally stressing the principle of social solidarity, concurrently devoted some passages of its programme documents to the support of individual aspects of the modernisation trends. Access to education, support of export of goods and services produced by progressive branches and companies, formulation and realisation of the 'industrial policy', improvement of the situation in the quaternary sectors and some other items of this reformist programme may be important in this connection. On the other hand, the topic of modernisation seems to be not too attractive for the right-wing parties, which almost forget to mention it in their programmes, mainly because any engagement in this direction is seen as a deviation from the programmatic non-interventionism required by the neo-liberal doctrine. However, our survey data from 1995 shows that Social Democrats sympathisers, that is their social background, are less intense supporters of the modernisation processes (if they required social costs) than people supporting the right-wing civil parties. It is a paradoxical situation: those who declare to be pro-modern have not a sufficient social support for modernisation actions since their electorate prefers social solidarity (and, frequently, egalitarianism). On the other hand, those, who receive social support for modernisation from better educated , more competent and enterprising people are not willing to take any clear-cut measures in favour of this process for ideological reasons and, in practice, are in many cases acting against it by reducing (on fiscal grounds) means necessary for the development of the budget sphere.

In any case, the *long-term future depends on further, widely conceived, modernisation of Czech society*. Irrespective of the results of the recent elections, all significant political and other institutional subjects have to face this challenge. It seems true that the new competition already opened after the elections will not touch only the traditional social and political problems connected with the increasing social differentiation. One of the key issues of the future social transformation will be *how to achieve a dynamic social equilibrium in order to push forward the qualitative modernisation of the country*. The only possibility is to *built a new motivation structure, corresponding to a modern market society* by giving new life to *equity of chances* for individuals, families and firms and of *social justice based on rewards roughly adequate to the real achievements* of all socially relevant actors, both individual and institutional ones. In the long-run only a substantial progress of meritocratic principles will give the ongoing social transformation the quality necessary for further modernisation. Despite the leading Czech right-wing political party simply refusing in its political programme the idea of social justice as a 'tragic and quite false Utopia', we are convinced that the long-term social and political strategy of significant political subjects will be evaluated mainly in terms of their capability to propose and concretise strategies able to achieve the goals of modernisation and to develop appropriate means of motivation based on the principle of equity.

PAVEL MACHONIN *was the head of a team that in 1967 carried out the first representative survey on social stratification and mobility in Czechoslovakia. The results of the survey were published in 1969 in the book* Czechoslovak Society. *After an enforced break in research activities, he returned in 1990 to professional work in sociology. At present, he is working at the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic in Prague. He has published a new study* Czechoslovakia's Social Structure on the Eve of the Prague Spring 1968 *(1992) as well as a number of articles in the* Czech Sociological Review, *other journals and miscellanies. In the framework of an international project Eastern Central Europe 1993 he elaborated the study* Post-Communist Transformation in the Social and Political Sphere in the Czech Republic. *His research activities continue to focus on the problems of social transformation and modernisation in the Czech and Slovak Republics. In this field, he has prepared three recently published books.*

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Educational Expansion and Educational Reproduction in Eastern Europe, 1940-1979*

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Abstract: This paper considers changes in the effects of parental background on educational attainment in five Eastern European nations (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) over the 1940-1979 period. Data of male respondents (N = 13,997) from Treiman and Szeleny's 'Social Stratification in Eastern European' surveys held in these countries are analysed. The paper shows slight but consistent decreases in the effects of parents' education, status and political party-membership on final educational attainment (measured in years of schooling). On the other hand, it demonstrates stability or increases in the effects of parental background on the continuation probabilities at schooling transitions. Applying a method developed by Mare (ASR 1981), the paper reveals that the slight decreases in the effects of parental background on final educational attainment result from two offsetting influences. Stability or slight increases in the effects of parental background on school continuation probabilities in schooling transitions resulted in the stability of increase in these effects, whereas the substantial educational expansion that occurred in these nations resulted in their decrease.

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Introduction

The role of education in the process of status attainment has become increasingly important in modern industrialised societies. Social stratification researchers have therefore paid much attention to the determinants and consequences of educational attainment. Studies on this topic were primarily focused on Western industrialised nations, whereas the social inequalities in Eastern Europe have relatively scarcely been documented. In most communist nations under Communism (especially in Bulgaria and Russia) the totalitarian governments did not allow to hold empirical stratification surveys or to publish their factual results. This despite the fact that in the former Communist nations forceful attempts were made to create more equalitarian societies for more than forty years, and it is clearly of interest to know to what extent these attempts have been successful.

The breakdown of Communism in Central and Eastern European nations at the end of the 80's improved the possibilities for social stratification researchers to hold new

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cross-national surveys in these nations [e.g. Treiman and Szelenyi 1993a, 1993b]. These surveys do not only provide us with information about stratification patterns after the breakdown of Communism, but also about these patterns during the Stalinist and neo-Stalinist regimes, since the surveys also collect retrospective data. This paper uses such retrospective data and aims to examine the changes in the effects of parental background on educational attainment in five Eastern European nations (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) over the 1940-1979 period. In addition, the paper aims to examine why earlier studies on educational reproduction in Eastern Europe came up with contradictory conclusions.

In earlier studies the conclusions on changes in the effects of parental background on school success in Eastern Europe were not univocal [Shavit and Blossfeld 1993, Gerber and Hout 1996]. The divergent outcomes seem to be related to the different methods of analyses employed in the studies. Traditionally, studies focused on the (overall) effects of parental background on people's final attained level of education, commonly measured in total years of schooling, and using linear regression techniques [Blau and Duncan 1967]. This method results in a single indicator of the effect of social origin on the final level of education, and it can easily be examined whether this indicator has changed over time. The results of most of the studies employing this linear regression method indicated a decline in the effects of parental background over the past decades in Eastern European nations.

More recently, studies considered educational attainment as a sequence of transitions within an educational career, and examined the effects of parental background on school continuation probabilities in each of these transitions [Mare 1980, 1981; Simkus and Andorka 1982]. These studies do so, since the linear regression method obscures that effects of parental background can differ across schooling transitions. Consequently, the indicators for the effect of parental background on final educational attainment obtained by applying the linear regression method are biased by the distribution of education in a society [Shavit and Blossfeld 1993]. This bias is relevant in Eastern European nations, since their educational systems have shown a rapid and substantial growth in attained levels of education. The more recent studies, employing the school continuation probabilities in different transitions, hardly revealed a decline in the effects of parental background over the past decades in Eastern European nations.

In this paper we therefore re-examine the changes in the effects of parental background on school success in Eastern Europe by employing both mentioned methods of analyses, and comparing their results. To do this, data are analysed from large-scale cross-nationally comparable surveys held in these nations in 1993 within the international project 'Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989' [Treiman and Szelenyi 1993a, 1993b], while applying a research design using cohorts as baseline units of historical comparison. In addition a procedure developed by Mare [1981] is employed to connect directly the outcomes of both methods. This procedure makes it possible to get a precise idea of the consequences of changes in the educational distributions in Eastern European countries on the (overall) effects of parental background on final educational attainment in these nations.

Summarising, in order to examine possible changes in the effects of parental background on their children's educational attainment in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, the following questions will be addressed:

1. *To what extent did the distributions of education change in Eastern European nations over the 1940-1979 period?*
2. *To what extent did the effects of parental background on final educational attainment vary between these Eastern European nations and over time over the same period?*
3. *To what extent did the effects of parental background on school continuation probabilities at different transitions in these countries change over the studied period?* and
4. *What were the consequences of (1) changes in the distribution of education and (2) changes in the effects of parental background on school continuation probabilities at different school transitions on the effects of parental background on final educational attainment in Eastern European nations?*

Theories of variation in educational stratification

The effects of parental background on educational attainment are strong and consistent in all industrial societies. It is also true for Central and Eastern European countries where strong effects are found [Shavit and Blossfeld 1993; Peschar 1990, 1993; Matějů 1990; Simkus and Andorka 1982; Robert 1991a, 1991b; Ganzeboom and Nieuwbeerta 1996]. However, many scholars argued that the effects of parental background have changed with time and differed between nations, and discussed several theories explaining these variations. In this paper we give a brief overview of four main explanations and refer to Shavit and Blossfeld [1993] and De Graaf and Luijkx [1995] for more extended discussions. The theories concern explanatory factors ranging from increasing industrialisation and modernisation, to policy measures taken to create more equalitarian educational systems.

The first theory to be discussed is the modernisation theory. The arguments of this (functionalist) theory, already given by several sociologists, were actually systemised by Blau and Duncan [1967]. The basis of this theory is that the more modern and industrialised societies become, the more efficient labour has to be carried out, that is by the best available workers. Here 'best available' means with respect to talent and effort, and not with respect to their ascribed characteristics that were from their social background. Thus, according to this theory the modernisation and industrialisation of a given society goes together with a process from 'ascription' to 'achievement'. This general notion of the modernisation theory is supplemented by Parsons [1970], when he argued that the modernisation of a society goes together with an accompanying change in value systems. The value patterns change towards more equalitarian political values. Furthermore, others have claimed that changes towards more equalitarian political values and more objective needs for equalitarian opportunities are reflected in governmental policies. By means of scholarships and other measures, the governments of most industrial nations have lowered the financial and social thresholds in the educational system. All these arguments therefore suggest that according to the modernisation theory, the influences of (ascribed) family characteristics on educational attainment decline along with modernisation.

The cultural reproduction (conflict) theory, however, suggests that the influence of the social background will not decline with modernisation. This theory points to the enduring influence of cultural status in education, particularly in secondary and tertiary schooling [Bourdieu and Passeron 1994]. According to this theory, the educational system is in favour of children who bring with them cultural preferences and competence

from home and are subsequently rewarded at school. This argument seems strong, since several studies have shown that the association between people's social background and their educational attainment can be explained by their parents' cultural resources. Therefore, this theory predicts that also in (modernised) societies where there are no financial constrains to participate in the educational system, an effect of people's social background will exist and is possibly even greater than in less modernised nations. Thus, based on this theory it can be predicted that – certainly in later transitions – the effects of parental background have remained stable or increased over time.

The third theory we will discuss the socialist transformation theory. This theory assumes that certainly in their beginning the socialist regimes in the Eastern European nations studied carried out policies aimed to create more equalitarian societies. These policies therefore can be expected to have reduced the effects of parents' resources on their children's education. After some years, however, the ruling (Communist) elite tried to preserve their status quo for themselves and for their children [Matějů 1990]. Consequently, the effects of parental background on education will eventually become stronger.

The fourth theory, the differentiated selectivity/educational expansion theory, predicts that, under the conditions of rising levels of education in a society, the effects of parental background on continuation probabilities in transitions will increase. This prediction is based on the assumption that later schooling transitions are in general less selective on parental background, since students at later transitions are more homogeneous with respect to intermediate factors between parental background and educational attainment, e.g. talent and motivation [Shavit and Blossfeld 1993]. If due to educational expansion growing proportions of all social groups reach higher levels of schooling, then the higher transitions become more heterogeneous with respect to factors like talent and motivation, and larger effects of parental background on school continuation probabilities can be expected. However, whether the total effect of parental background on final educational attainment will also increase is less clear, since with educational expansion an increasing number of people reach higher transitions where the effects of parental background are relatively smaller, which result in a downward pressure on the total effect of parental background in that country.

Educational systems in Eastern European nations

The history of the educational systems in most Eastern European countries can be divided in two periods – before and after 1948. In the earlier period, i.e. also before World War II, primary education and secondary education took, on average, about thirteen years – age 6 to 19 – whereas most nations recognised three stages. The first five to six years consisted of basic elementary education. This could be continued with three to four years of upper elementary education or lower secondary education on the one hand, or lower vocational education or middle schools on the other hand. After completion of lower vocational education, the end of the schooling career was reached. Middle schools led to secondary vocational schools, and upper elementary or lower secondary prepared for general, higher or academic secondary education (gymnasium). General secondary schooling took about four years of education. Higher education took four to five years to complete. For all countries, higher education was restrictive, costly and highly exclusive in the period preceding W. W. II.

Around 1948, after World War II and the take-over of Communism in Eastern European nations, the school systems in these countries were nationalised and most set the Russian system as an example [Husén and Postlethwaite 1994]. One of the aims of these reforms was to create a comprehensive school system which could provide every citizen with a complete elementary general education. These new established national educational systems, although with several nations specific characteristics, had a comparable structure over the Eastern European nations [Kurian 1988, Apanasewicz and Rosen 1963, Braham 1970, Wulff 1992, *International...* 1984]. Primary education in all nations took around 7 to 9 years. In Czechoslovakia and Hungary people stayed in school from the age of 6 to 14-15, and in Poland and Bulgaria from 7 to 14-16. Completion of primary school gave access to vocational schools or entrance to examinations of general secondary schools (technical or gymnasium). General secondary education in Eastern European nations took about 4 years (gymnasium or technical secondary education) and after completion a state examination was requested to apply for university. The vocational schooling channel or apprenticeship training channel took on average between 2 to 4 years. These vocational channels gave in principle the possibility to enter university, however these kind of educational careers proved to be rare. Most students registered at university came from a form of general secondary education. Their higher education subsequently took 2 to 4 years (college) or 4 to 6 years (university).

During the post-war period the educational systems in all Eastern European nations showed major developments. One of the most striking was the increase in the number of people enrolled in educational institutions. To a large extent this was due to the growing size of birth cohorts. However the expansion of the educational system was also caused by a considerable rise in the proportions of people from the birth cohorts that went to school. This growth in proportions did not occur as much in primary education, since the proportions were already around 100% at the beginning of the post-war period. The major growth in the proportions of people registered in schools occurred in higher education institutions. As is clear from Figure 1, based on data from the United Nation's statistical yearbook (UN several years), the percentages enrolled in general secondary education increased from around 35 % to around 70% in the five nations over the post-war period. Furthermore, the proportion of people in a certain cohort that were enrolled in a institute for tertiary education has risen from around 8 to 15 percent.

Since 1948 the state socialist regimes in Eastern European countries studied made serious attempts to reduce social reproduction. Among other approaches, they tried to do this by actively increasing schooling opportunities for the children of families in lower social positions and decreasing these opportunities for children of families in higher positions. For example, primary and secondary education was normally free for everyone and scholarships were established for low income class children. In addition, the length of compulsory education in these nations was extended from a 7 year average around 1950 to about 10 years around 1980 [Apanasewicz and Rosen 1963, Buti 1967, Wulff 1992, *International...* 1984, Deighton 1971]. Furthermore, especially in the 1950s, admission to secondary and higher education was based on social class quota. For example, in Poland special higher education entry courses were established for students of manual background who did not complete secondary education. Together the educational policies, led a much higher participation of pupils with a manual origin in the institutes for higher education [Archer 1972, Apanasewicz and Rosen 1963, Braham 1970, *Interna-*

tional... 1984]. However, the policy measures on education taken by the Communist regimes were not always as severe as suggested. In most countries the policies were particularly upheld in the 1950s, the period of orthodox Communism, but much weaker in later decades [Gerber and Hout 1996].

Figure 1. Enrollment in secondary (above) and tertiary (below) education in five East European nations



Data and operationalisations

In order to examine the mechanisms of educational reproduction in Eastern nations, data from respondents (N = 13,997) are to be analysed from a large-scale survey held in five countries, namely Bulgaria (N = 2,898), the Czech Republic (N = 3,168), Hungary (N = 2,785), Poland (N = 2,072) and Slovakia (N = 3,074),[1] and a research design is applied that uses cohorts as baseline units of historical comparison. The survey data analysed consist of rather large-scale samples (about 5,000 respondents in each nation) of the general population in 1993. The data are collected within the project 'Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989', directed by Ivan Szelenyi and Donald J. Treiman [Treiman and Szelenyi 1993a, 1993b], in collaboration with researchers from the nations surveyed, the United States and the Netherlands. When collecting the data similar sampling designs and questionnaires were used, and internationally comparable coding schemes applied. So, the data are highly comparable across the nations.

The surveys of the different nations differ somewhat in the age restrictions of the selected respondents. To make the data as comparable as possible, and to be sure that (almost) all respondents had finished their educational careers, we selected in all nations respondents being between 28 and 67 years of age at the time they were interviewed, and thus excluded the youngest and eldest respondents. Since the data were collected in 1993, these age restrictions provide us with information on the process of educational attain-

[1]) Within the Szelenyi and Treiman project a survey was also held in Russia, but the educational data from this survey were not adequately available to us.

ment for the cohorts which attended school around 1940 (our oldest respondents) to the cohorts that attended school around 1979 (our youngest respondents). Consequently, a cohort design offers a unique opportunity to examine long-term historical trends in educational reproduction.

In the analysis the data are divided into four ten-year wide cohorts, which constitute the baseline units of our historical comparison. These cohorts have a value for their midpoints which corresponds to the year when the members of the cohort were on average 14 years of age (i.e. we coded cohort as: cohort = year of birth + 14). We take this value, as it is around this age that major decisions on educational careers are taken and that particular year is the best approximation to historical contexts (such as war and revolution) associated with educational careers.

For respondent's education we use the CASMIN classification schema of qualification levels as first given by Koenig et al. [1988]. In this classification schema the different educational categories were defined as to reflect to the greatest extent possible the typical, class-specific barriers in the educational system and grasp the differentiations in the educational courses and certificates that are relevant in the labour market [Müller and Karle 1993]. In this paper we combined some of the nine original educational levels in line with Matějů [1990] and distinguished between the four levels that are given in Table 1. In order to create a variable that measures respondent's final level of education attained, i.e. the highest level completed, we recoded our educational categories into the approximate years of schooling it took for them to complete that level. Doing this, we made use of the information provided by the original investigators of the dataset.

Table 1. Description of Educational Qualification Variables for five Eastern European Nations

Level of Education	Casmin categories	Description
1. Less than lower secondary	0	No Schooling
	1a	Incomplete primary education
	1b	Completed (compulsory) primary education
2. Lower secondary	1c	Completed primary education and basic vocational training
	2a	Secondary, incomplete, no certificate
3. Complete general secondary	2b	Secondary vocational qualification
	2c	Secondary acadamic certificate (e.g. matura)
	2c	Higher education, incomplete, no certificate/degree
4. Tertiary	3a	Higher education, tertiary certificate/degree
	3b	Higher education, post-graduate study

As discussed above, people's final level of education can also be considered as a series of grade progression through they move. At all successive transitions a proportion of respondents have success, whereas the remaining proportion of others fail. Using our educational classification the first transition can be considered as a failure for those who finished only primary education or less, whereas those who continued towards a specific qualification level beyond primary education are considered successful. In the second

transition, those who were successful at the first transition are divided into two groups – people who only get a basic level of secondary education (failure) and persons who get entrance into complete secondary education (success). Finally, at the third transition among those who reached full secondary education, those who finish some form of tertiary education are considered as successes and those who leave school with only full secondary education are regarded as failures.

Parental background enters the analysis as three variables. We first measure parental background by the parents' level of education (measured in years of schooling), i.e. as the average number of years it took the mother and father to complete their highest level (min-max: 0-20). This highest level of schooling completed was recoded into the approximate years of education using expert judgements. Secondly, the parental background is indicated by the parents' social economic status measured by the International Socio-Economic Status Index [Ganzeboom, De Graaf and Treiman 1992] (min-max: 1.6-9.0). Thirdly, in order to assess the value of the parents' political resources allocated for their children's educational career, a dummy variable for the parents' membership of the Communist political partymembership was constructed. In our dataset, an average of 33 percent of the respondents in the Czech Republic, and between 18 to 21 percent in the remaining countries indicated that one (or both) parents had been a member of a Communist political party.

In order to control differences in educational attainment between men and women, in our analyses we use a dummy variable (1 = woman, 0 = man). Furthermore, differences in processes of educational attainment between people from rural and urban areas are taken into account by using an ordinal variable for degree of urbanisation (1 = low, 5 = high).

Table 2 shows that our survey data captures long-term social demographic and modernisation trends in Eastern Europe. Structural occupational mobility decreased the size of the farming class and increases the size of the professionals and industrial labourers. This resulted in an increase in parents' ISEI. Besides, the level of education of people and their parents' increased significantly over the distinguished period. In addition, more and more people live in urbanised areas, especially after the fifties. Parents' partymembership was rare among the first cohort and increased over time; possible simply because parents of older respondents had less time to become a member of a Communist party during their lives.

Models of educational stratification

Linear Model of Highest Level Completed

Two types of models have been applied to model the relationship between social background and educational attainment for the research on social stratification. The first model is the 'Linear model of highest level completed'. This model was introduced by Blau and Duncan [1967] and assumes that educational attainment, as a dependent variable, can be represented adequately by a metric variable (for example years of schooling) and that the relation between social background variables and successive levels of educa-

Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations (between brackets) for Variables in the Educational Attainment Model in five Eastern European countries by cohort, 1940-1979

		Cohort			
	All	1940-49	1950-59	1960-69	1970-79
Bulgaria					
Parent's education	5.6 (3.9)	3.5 (3.1)	4.7 (3.4)	6.1 (3.8)	7.4 (4.0)
Parent's ISEI	3.2 (1.4)	2.7 (1.1)	2.9 (1.2)	3.4 (1.5)	3.7 (1.6)
Parents partymember	0.2 (0.4)	0.1 (0.4)	0.2 (0.2)	0.2 (0.4)	0.3 (0.4)
Female	0.5 (0.5)	0.5 (0.5)	0.5 (0.5)	0.5 (0.5)	0.5 (0.5)
Urban (at 16)	2.7 (1.4)	2.5 (1.4)	2.5 (1.4)	2.9 (1.4)	2.9 (1.4)
N (listwise deletion)	2,898	608	683	850	757
Czech Republic					
Parent's education	9.6 (1.9)	8.7 (1.7)	9.1 (1.7)	9.9 (1.9)	10.4 (1.9)
Parent's ISEI	3.7 (1.4)	3.3 (1.2)	3.5 (1.3)	3.9 (1.5)	4.2 (1.4)
Parents partymember	0.3 (0.5)	0.2 (0.4)	0.3 (0.5)	0.4 (0.5)	0.3 (0.5)
Female	0.5 (0.5)	0.6 (0.5)	0.5 (0.5)	0.5 (0.5)	0.5 (0.5)
Urban (at 16)	2.5 (1.4)	2.4 (1.5)	2.4 (1.4)	2.5 (1.4)	2.5 (1.4)
N (listwise deletion)	3,168	755	646	932	835
Hungary					
Parent's education	7.2 (3.0)	5.5 (2.5)	6.5 (2.9)	7.6 (2.9)	8.4 (2.9)
Parent's ISEI	3.4 (1.4)	2.8 (1.2)	3.1 (1.4)	3.5 (1.4)	3.7 (1.5)
Parents partymember	0.2 (0.4)	0.1 (0.3)	0.2 (0.4)	0.2 (0.4)	0.2 (0.4)
Female	0.5 (0.5)	0.6 (0.5)	0.6 (0.5)	0.5 (0.5)	0.5 (0.5)
Urban (at 16)	2.8 (1.5)	2.7 (1.5)	2.8 (1.4)	2.9 (1.5)	2.7 (1.4)
N (listwise deletion)	2,785	564	612	814	795
Poland					
Parent's education	7.5 (3.2)	5.6 (3.7)	6.5 (3.1)	7.5 (2.9)	8.7 (2.7)
Parent's ISEI	3.3 (1.3)	2.8 (1.1)	3.1 (1.3)	3.3 (1.4)	3.5 (1.4)
Parents partymember	0.2 (0.4)	0.1 (0.2)	0.1 (0.3)	0.2 (0.4)	0.2 (0.4)
Female	0.5 (0.5)	0.6 (0.5)	0.5 (0.5)	0.5 (0.5)	0.5 (0.5)
Urban (at 16)	2.5 (1.3)	2.5 (1.4)	2.5 (1.4)	2.6 (1.3)	2.5 (1.3)
N (listwise deletion)	2,072	299	403	600	770
Slovakia					
Parent's education	8.7 (2.1)	7.4 (1.6)	8.0 (1.8)	8.7 (1.9)	9.6 (2.1)
Parent's ISEI	3.4 (1.4)	2.8 (1.2)	3.1 (1.3)	3.5 (1.4)	3.9 (1.4)
Parents partymember	0.2 (0.4)	0.1 (0.3)	0.1 (0.3)	0.2 (0.4)	0.2 (0.4)
Female	0.5 (0.5)	0.6 (0.5)	0.5 (0.5)	0.5 (0.5)	0.5 (0.5)
Urban (at 16)	1.9 (1.2)	1.8 (1.2)	1.8 (1.2)	1.9 (1.2)	2.0 (1.3)
N (listwise deletion)	3,074	509	580	969	1,016
All Nations					
Parent's education	7.8 (3.2)	6.3 (3.1)	7.0 (3.1)	8.0 (3.0)	9.0 (2.9)
Parent's ISEI	3.4 (1.4)	2.9 (1.2)	3.1 (1.3)	3.5 (1.4)	3.8 (3.8)
Parents partymember	0.2 (0.4)	0.1 (0.3)	0.2 (0.4)	0.2 (0.4)	0.2 (0.4)
Female	0.5 (0.5)	0.6 (0.5)	0.5 (0.5)	0.5 (0.5)	0.5 (0.5)
Urban (at 16)	2.5 (1.4)	2.4 (1.5)	2.4 (1.4)	2.5 (1.4)	2.5 (1.4)
N (listwise deletion)	13,997	2,735	2,924	4,165	4,173

Note: For descriptions of variable codings, see text.

tional attainment is linear [see also Blau and Duncan 1967, Ganzeboom and Nieuwbeerta 1996]. In this model, the highest level of schooling (measured in number of years of schooling) for individual i in cohort c (Y_{ic}) is taken as dependent variable, and social origin variables (X_{oic}) as independent explanatory variables:

$$Y_{ic} = \beta_{0c} + \Sigma\beta_{oc}X_{oic} + \varepsilon_i. \quad (1)$$

This implies that in each cohort c the effect of a certain social origin variable on the highest level completed – i.e. the effect of a unit shift in X_{oic} on Y_{ic} – equals to the value of the β_{oc}-parameter in that cohort. Changes in the β_{oc}-parameter over cohorts, therefore, represent changes in inequality of educational opportunity in a society [see e.g. Hauser and Featherman 1976].

Logistic Response Model of School Continuation

The second model is a 'logistic response model of school continuation'. This model, that was introduced by Mare [1980, 1981] and – for example – applied in the volume edited by Shavit and Blossfeld [1993], separates the educational career into a set of successive transitions between levels of education. At each transition, people having made all the preceding transition, have a probability to be successful in that transition. In the 'logistic response model of school continuation' the log odds of being successful in a transition is regressed on social background variables:

$$\log_e (p_{itc}/(1 - p_{itc})) = \lambda_{0tc} + \Sigma\lambda_{otc}X_{oic} \quad (2)$$

where p_{itc} is the probability of the *ith* individual in the *cth* cohort of continuing from the (t - 1)*st* to the *tth* schooling level, and X_{oic} the value of the *oth* social background variable for that individual in that cohort. Here, the λ_{0tc} is a constant and gives the mean log odds of grade progression in the reference category; and the λ_{otc} denotes the effect of a unit change in X_{oic} on the log odds of grade progression. Changes in the λ_{otc}-parameter thus represent changes in the effects of social background on educational opportunities. If the logistic model is properly specified and fits the data reasonably well, estimates of the parameters of this model are invariant under changes in the marginal distributions of the variables in the model. In other words, the effects of social origin on school continuation probabilities of a country are independent from changes in the educational distribution of that country.

The two models combined

At first sight the two models above discussed might seem totally different and unrelated. However, Mare [1981] showed that there is a direct link between the two models. He demonstrated that the 'logistic response model of school continuation', provides a specification of the proportions of people who are successful in making the distinguished educational transition (p_{tc}), and that the effect of a unit change in background variable X_{oic} on the final level of education completed (measured in years of schooling) (Y_{ic}), can be expressed as follows:

$$\delta Y_{ic}/\delta X_{oic} = \beta_{oc} = \Sigma_{k=1}^{K} [\Sigma_{j=1}^{k} \lambda_{otc} p_{tc} (1 - p_{tc}) \Pi_{l=1}^{k} p_{lc}] \quad (3)$$

where λ_{otc} represents the effect of background variable X_{oic} in the *cth* cohort on log odds of grade progression from level of schooling t-1 to level of schooling t; and p_{tc} stands for

the proportion of people – out of those who completed at least t-1 levels – who are successful in making the educational transitions from level t-1 to level t; and p_{lc} represents the proportion of people – out of those who completed at least l-1 levels – who are successful in making the other (non-t) educational transitions from level l-1 to level l, when the immediately progressing level is finished (i.e. school continuation probabilities). Thus, this equation shows that the values of the β_{oc}-parameters depend both upon the marginal distribution of education in a cohort (i.e. the p_{tc} and p_{lc} parameters), and the effects of the social background variables on school continuation probabilities in that cohort (i.e. the λ_{otc} parameters) [see also Smith and Cheung 1986].

The properties of equation (3) therefore enable us to address our last research question, i.e. to examine (1) what the consequences of changes in the educational distribution are and (2) what consequences the changes in the effects of parental background on school continuation probabilities at different school transitions have on the effects of parental background on final educational attainment in Eastern European nations.

Educational expansion

The central aim of this paper is to examine trends in intergenerational transmission of education in Eastern Europe. However, we address our first question and describe changes in the educational distributions in Eastern European nations over the 1940-1979 period. In general, the conclusions of our description of educational expansion patterns in these nations are in accordance with earlier descriptions [see e.g. Shavit and Blossfeld 1993].

In the beginning of the 1940-1979 period significant differences between the nations existed in the average number of years of schooling and in the distribution of the levels of schooling. Around 1940 the mean level of education in the Czech Republic was the highest (about eleven years) and in Poland the lowest (about nine years). The figures in Table 3 show that around 1945 in general in all socialist nations (except Czechoslovakia) more than thirty percent of the people finished no more than primary school, about sixty percent finished some kind of secondary education, and about ten percent finished some tertiary education. However, significant differences in the educational distributions obviously existed between the nations. For example, in the Czech Republic only about twenty percent finished no more than primary school, whereas more than thirty percent did in the other countries.

The figures also show that educational expansion occurred in all nations. This expansion is characterised by a decrease in the proportion of people having finished only primary education, and a significant increase in the proportion of persons having completed some kind of secondary education. On average, the proportion of people finishing some type of secondary education around 1975 had risen to about seventy-five percent, whereas the proportion of people having finished only primary education had decreased to about ten or twenty percent. It is to be noted, however, that rising levels of education in the socialist nations did not imply fast growing proportions of people having finished some kind of tertiary education. This proportion remained fairly stable and had increased only from about ten percent to about fifteen percent over the 1945-1975 period.

The patterns of educational expansion have important consequences on people's chances to be successful in continuing their educational career in distinguished school transitions, i.e. the p_{tc} parameters in equation (3). For example, the increase of the per-

centage of people having secondary education implied a large increase in the proportions of people successful in the first transition. Around 1945, the chances to finish at least some kind of lower secondary education differed between forty percent in some nations and eighty percent in others, whereas around 1975 these chances were about eighty percent in all nations. For instance, in Bulgaria and Poland the chances to complete some additional defined qualification rose from about fifty to eighty percent. For Hungarian people these chances rose over the same period from about seventy to eighty percent, and for Czech and Slovak people from eighty to ninety percent. At the second transition people are divided into those who only get a basic level of secondary education and those who enter complete secondary education. The chances of success in this transition in the socialist nations (but Bulgaria) have remained rather stable over the period under investigation. The chance to be successful in this transition was about fifty in most countries and about ninety in Bulgaria. Furthermore, at the third transition those who reached full secondary education, had on average a chance of around forty percent to finish some form of tertiary education. The data show that again these chances were rather stable at about forty percent over the period under investigation, although in Hungary this chance was somewhat higher in the first cohorts (i.e. around fifty percent), and lower in Bulgaria in the more recent cohorts.

Table 3. Educational distribution in five Eastern European countries by cohort, 1940-1979

		Cohort			
	All	1940-49	1950-59	1960-69	1970-79
Bulgaria					
Less than lower secondary	39	63	49	32	19
Lower secondary	6	6	7	7	5
Complete general secondary	44	24	35	49	62
Tertiary education	11	7	9	12	14
Czech Republic					
Less than lower secondary	20	33	24	14	10
Lower secondary	43	42	41	45	44
Complete general secondary	27	18	25	31	33
Tertiary education	10	7	9	10	13
Hungary					
Less than lower secondary	37	66	48	26	20
Lower secondary	25	14	20	28	34
Complete general secondary	24	12	20	31	30
Tertiary education	13	8	12	15	16
Poland					
Less than lower secondary	31	63	47	25	14
Lower secondary	28	11	17	30	39
Complete general secondary	31	19	25	34	38
Tertiary education	10	7	12	11	10
Slovakia					
Less than lower secondary	24	52	34	18	11
Lower secondary	34	23	31	36	38
Complete general secondary	31	17	26	34	37
Tertiary education	12	8	9	12	15

Effects of parental background on final educational attainment

The second question concerns the descriptive issue of whether the patterns of educational inequality have changed over the 1940-1979 period in Eastern Europe. To begin with, we examined the changes in the effects of parental background on final educational attainment employing the 'Linear Model of Highest Level Completed'. In this model, respondent's final educational attainment, measured in years of schooling, was regressed on parental background variables. In our analyses the data were pooled over the nations.[2] In order to control in our models for the sex- and nation-specific growth in the average years of schooling, in addition to the model's intercept, dummy variables were included in the model for the distinguished sex-nation-cohort combinations. Furthermore, a measure of the degree of urbanisation was included to take account of differences in educational attainment between urban and rural areas. To examine how the effects of parental background changed over the cohorts, two versions of the 'Linear Model of Highest Level Completed' were applied. The first version allows for non-linear trends by using dummies for the distinguished cohorts. In the second version of the model the cohort variable was included as ordinal variable, and thus this model tests for linear trends.

The parameter estimates of both versions of the 'Linear Model of Highest Level Completed' are presented in Table 4. These figures give a precise picture of the effects of parents' education, occupational status and partymembership on final educational attainment in Eastern Europe in the 1940-1979 period. Due to our coding procedure, in the 'Non-linear Trend Model' the parameters for the effects of parental background variables represent these effects in each of the distinguished cohorts, and in the 'Linear Trend Model' the parameters refer to these effects around 1945. The coefficients for the various variables are significant and differ between the nations. The coefficients for the effects of parents' education vary between 0.333 in the Czech Republic and 0.598 in Slovakia. Furthermore, the coefficients for the effects of parents' social economic status vary between 0.238 in Bulgaria and 0.551 in Poland. In the international perspective these effects can be regarded as rather large [cf. Ganzeboom and Treiman 1993]. On average these results square with conclusions drawn in earlier studies that Communist regimes have not totally succeeded in diminishing the intergenerational transmission of status in education.

However, in all nations the effects of parental background have decreased over the 1940-1979 period. The linear trend parameters, representing the change in the effects of parental background variables per 10 years, have for all nations and variables (with the exception of the trend parameter for parents' partymembership in Poland) a negative value. These imply that in the first cohort (people who entered the educational system around 1940) the social origin effects were larger than for people in the last cohort (who entered around 1975). Thus, in all these nations the advantages for children from higher social background have gradually diminished over that period. The trends are not linear in all nations, but in general the decline is systematic in all.

[2]) All analyses in this paper were also done using separate datasets for each nation. However, since these analyses yielded similar results, it was decided not to present them in the text.

Table 4. Selected parameters of 'Linear model of highest level completed': five Eastern European countries by cohort, 1940-1979

	Nonlinear Trend Model Effect of Origin				Linear Trend Model	
	1940-49	1950-59	1960-69	1970-79	Effect of Origin in 1945	Linear Trend Change/10 years
Parent's education						
Bulgaria	0.47**	0.43**	0.43**	0.31**	0.482**	-0.047**
Czech Republic	0.37**	0.31**	0.26**	0.37**	0.333**	-0.002
Hungary	0.48**	0.48**	0.44**	0.40**	0.493**	-0.028
Poland	0.34**	0.31**	0.30**	0.28**	0.333**	-0.018
Slovakia	0.63**	0.47**	0.33**	0.23**	0.598**	-0.124**
Parent's ISEI						
Bulgaria	0.31**	0.16	0.04	0.14*	0.238**	-0.056
Czech Republic	0.49**	0.41**	0.38**	0.20**	0.494**	-0.086**
Hungary	0.47**	0.37**	0.27**	0.28**	0.437**	-0.062**
Poland	0.42**	0.58**	0.36**	0.27**	0.551**	-0.090
Slovakia	0.59**	0.34**	0.38**	0.42**	0.479**	-0.035
Parents partymember						
Bulgaria	1.38	0.71**	0.90**	0.30	1.281**	-0.304**
Czech Republic	0.68**	0.05	-0.27	0.29	0.326	-0.114
Hungary	0.54	0.35**	0.01	0.15	0.418	-0.126
Poland	0.67	-0.37	0.52*	0.45*	0.089	0.121
Slovakia	0.83**	0.41	0.48**	0.07	0.706**	-0.185

Note: For descriptions of variable codings, see text.
* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$

Effects of parental background on school continuation probabilities

Model selection

Our third question concerns the impact of parental background on respondents' school continuation probabilities in each transition, and how this effect has changed in Eastern Europe over the 1940-1979 period. To answer this question we employed the 'Logistic Response Model of School Continuation', assuming the log-odds to be successful versus not to be successful in a certain transition to be dependent on social background variables. Following the approach as that used by Hout and Raftery [1993], Müller and Karle [1993] and Gerber and Hout [1996] a dataset was analysed containing pooled information from all three transitions, i.e. for each transition a datafile was created containing those respondents being at risk – who survived all previous transitions – and these datafiles were merged. In the models in order to control for varying success rates across transitions (T), nations (N), men and woman (W), degree of urbanisation (U) and cohorts (C), these variables and their five way interactions (Z(d)) were included. To test whether the effects of parental background differed significant across transitions, nations and cohorts, several variations of the 'Logistic Response Model of School Continuation' were applied. Likelihood-ratio tests (L^2) [for more information see Gerber and Hout 1996] are

used to detect whether the fits of the models differed significantly.[3] The goodness-of-fit statistics are presented in Appendix A1. The results from the comparisons of these models' fit-statistics, indicates that Model 14 represents the data best. This model assumes that the parental background variables have a significant effect on school continuation probabilities and that the strength of these effects differed across the distinguished transitions. Furthermore, this model allows the effect of parental background on school continuation probabilities to differ between nations and cohorts in the first and second schooling transition. In addition, it assumes that at the third transition the origin effect are constant over all nations and cohorts.

Effects of parental background

The estimated parameters for the effects of parental background variables on school continuation probabilities of Models 14 are presented in Appendix A2. However, due to the specification of this model, these parameters do not provide a clear picture of the effects of peoples' origin in each country and cohort. Therefore, in Table 5 we present the calculated effects of the three parental background variables at the three schooling transitions for all nations and cohorts. Clearly, for all three variables the positive value of the effect parameters indicate that people whose parents had a higher education and social status and who were member(s) of the Communist political party had higher chances to succeed in continuing their educational career at the transitions.

The first set of parameters represents the effect of parents' education on the log-odds to be successful in the first schooling transition. These effects differ between the nations, where Poland shows the lowest effects (0.19) and the Czech Republic on average the highest (0.36). In general the effects of parents' education are stable over time. Only in Hungary the effect differ between cohorts, i.e. the two most recent cohorts show somewhat higher effects (0.34 and 0.40) than in the two oldest cohorts (0.27). The effects of parents' social economic status is stable in all five nations. In Bulgaria and Hungary these effects are the weakest (0.13) and in the Czech Republic and Slovakia the strongest (0.35), and in Poland (0.24) they hold an intermediate position. The effects of parents' partymembership on chances of success in the first transition are strongest in Bulgaria (0.65), and on average weakest in Hungary and Poland (0.08). In the Czech Republic the

[3]) To reach a preferred model, we followed the set modelling procedure similar to that of Gerber and Hout [1996]. The first step (A) involved entering background variables. To begin with we employed a model including only control variables and their interactions (model 1). These controls were included as separate dummies corresponding to the distinguished combinations. Subsequently, variables for parents' status, parents' education and parents' partymembership were entered (model 2), and the background x transition interactions (model 3).

In the next steps we examined whether the effects of parental background at the different transitions differed across the nations and whether these effects changed over cohorts. We proceed one transition at a time (Step B, C and D in Appendix A1), and for each transition we focus on subsequent cross-country differences (Step B1, C1 and D1) and on changes over time (Step B2, C2 and D2). In each step, first interactions between each background variable, transition, and nation or cohort are entered. Second, we adjusted the dummy specification so that within each respective set of interactions the omitted category is either the highest of the lowest. This allows us to evaluate the statistical significance of the interaction. Subsequently, the insignificant interactions were excluded from the model. Finally, in order to provide a more parsimonious model, those interactions that are significant were re-specified in a 'linear' way.

effect of parents' partymembership starts off at a relatively low level and after a decrease, increases in the last cohort (0.43). In Slovakia these effects were exceptionally strong in the first cohort (1.09) but took an intermediate level in the more recent cohorts.

The pattern of effects of parental background variables on school continuation probabilities in the second and third transition is less complicated. First, there are hardly any differences between nations as far as the strength of these effects is concerned. The only exception is that the effects of parents' education on school success in the second transition in Slovakia is stronger (0.24) than in the other nations (0.16). Furthermore, the effect of parents' education, occupational status and partymembership did not change over time in the Eastern European countries studied. The Czech Republic forms the only exception, with a stronger effect of parents' education in the last cohort (0.38) than in the first three cohorts (0.16). Thus, there is generally no indication that effects of parental background on school continuation probabilities have changed, and certainly no indication that these have diminished during the post-war period.

However, we find that the effects of parental background in the second and third transition are somewhat slighter than those in the first transition. Furthermore the effects of parents' status are slighter in the third transition than in the first and the second. Our findings thus are in accordance with results from earlier studies on social stratification in the Communist nations [Peschar 1990, Shavit and Blossfeld 1993, Gerber and Hout 1996] and in other industrialised nations [Mare 1980, Shavit and Blossfeld 1993].

Explaining variation in effects of parental background on final educational attainment

At first sight the results from the preceding two sections seem contradictory. On the one hand, the effect of parental background (especially parents' education and social status) on final level of education attained (measured in years of schooling) has decreased in the five Eastern European nations under investigation over the 1940-1979 period. On the other hand, the effects of parental background variables on school continuation probabilities in school transitions were stable or have increased over that period. However, as Mare [1981] already revealed, these seemingly contradictory findings might result from an important development in these nations, i.e. the substantial expansion of education.

Therefore, we now address the fourth and last question of this paper which reads: what were the consequences of (1) changes in the distribution of education and (2) changes in the effects of parental background on school continuation probabilities at different school transitions, on the effects of parental background on final educational attainment in Eastern European nations? To answer this question we employ the method developed by Mare [1981], and calculate hypothetical values for the effects of parental background variables on final educational attainment (measured in years of schooling) in three counterfactual situations, using equation (3) presented earlier in this paper.[4] In order to keep the analyses simple, the analyses will be restricted to the effects of parents' education, and will not discus results on the effects of parents' occupational status and partymembership. The calculated values of the effect of parents' education are presented in Table 6.

[4]) In order to come up with results applying Mare's method of examining the effects of parental background on respondent's final educational attainment, we multiplied the outcomes of equation (3) by three [see Mare 1981: 78, fn. 2].

Table 5. Selected parameters of 'Logistic response model of school continuation': five Eastern European countries by cohort, 1940-1979

	First transition				Second transition				Third transition			
	1940-49	1950-59	1960-69	1970-79	1940-49	1950-59	1960-69	1970-79	1940-49	1950-59	1960-69	1970-79
Parent's education												
Bulgaria	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Czech Republic	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.38	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Hungary	0.27	0.27	0.34	0.40	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Poland	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Slovakia	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Parent's ISEI												
Bulgaria	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15
Czech Republic	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15
Hungary	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15
Poland	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15
Slovakia	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15
Parents partymember												
Bulgaria	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12
Czech Republic	0.11	0.11	-0.21	0.43	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12
Hungary	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12
Poland	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12
Slovakia	1.09	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12

Note: For descriptions of variable codings, see text.

In the first counterfactual situation (A), it is assumed that the grade progression rates changed over time (p_{tc}), whereas the association between parents' education and grade progression were constant (λ_{ot}) – i.e. had the values of the effect parameters of Model 14 presented in Table 6. This shows the 'pure' consequences of educational expansion on educational inequality in Eastern Europe over the period under investigation. The obtained figures show that under these conditions the effects of parents' education would have decreased substantially. For example, in Bulgaria the effect would have taken the value of 0.45 in the first cohort (1940-49) and 0.35 in the last cohort (1970-79). Similar patterns reveal for the other nations, although in Hungary the decrease is less pronounced. The declines in the effects are also illustrated by estimated trend parameters given in Table 6. To obtain these trend parameters, for each nation a linear regression was performed on the presented counterfactual effect parameters with the mean year of the cohorts as independent variable. For all nations these trend parameters have a negative value which is even statistically significant in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. So, if no other mechanisms had been at work, educational expansion would have caused the effects of parents' education on final educational attainment to decrease substantially over the 1940-1979 period.

In the second counterfactual situation (B) it is assumed that the grade progression rates were constant over time (p_t), i.e. we gave them values set around 1945 in each nation, whereas the association between background variables and grade progression varied over the cohorts according to the parameters of model 14 in Table 5 (λ_{otc}). The obtained values of the effect parameters under these conditions show that in three nations the effects of parents' education would have remained stable over time. Furthermore, the obtained effect parameters show that in Czech Republic and Hungary the effect of parents' education would have increased in the last two cohorts. Thus, changes in the effects of parental background on school continuation probabilities at various transitions per se (i.e. under the condition of constant educational distributions) would have resulted in stable or increasing effects of parents' education on final educational attainment.

In the third counterfactual situation (C) the consequences of simultaneously changing educational distributions and effects of parental background on school continuation probabilities are examined. The grade progression rates were assumed to have changed over time (p_{tnc}), and the association between parents' education and grade progression were assumed to change according to the parameters of model 14 in Table 5 (λ_{otc}). The obtained values of effects of parents' education on final educational attainment show that in this counterfactual situation – that is almost identical to the empirical situation – these effects would have decreased in three nations, i.e. in the nations where the effects of parents' education on school continuation were stable (Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia). Furthermore, the obtained values show that the effects would have increased over time. The speed of the decreases in these countries, however, would have been less pronounced than in a given situation where no changes in the educational distribution would have occurred (counterfactual situation B).

Concluding, the factual slight decreases in the effects of parents' education on final education attainment (measured in years of schooling) in Eastern Europe over the period 1945-1979 result from two offsetting influences. The stability and increases in the effects of parental background on school continuation probabilities in schooling transitions caused these effects to raise, whereas the substantial educational expansion in these na-

tions caused these effects to decrease substantially. A finding that very much resembles Mare's findings for the USA over the period 1907-1951 [Mare 1981].

Table 6: Results from counterfactual analysis: (A) Effects of origin (parent's education: years of schooling) on final educational attainment (years of schooling) under the conditions of stable associations between origin and school continuation probabilities, but varying educational distributions, (B) these effects under the conditions of stable educational distributions, but varying effects of origin on school continuation probabilities and (C) these effects under the condition of both varying educational distributions and effects of origin on school continuation probabilities.

Cohort	1940-49	1950-59	1960-69	1970-79	Linear Trend (N = 4)
A: p varies over countries and cohorts, λ constant over cohorts					
Bulgaria	0.45	0.49	0.45	0.35	-0.033
Czech Republic	0.47	0.46	0.37	0.34	-0.047*
Hungary	0.41	0.50	0.45	0.41	-0.005
Poland	0.32	0.38	0.33	0.28	-0.018
Slovakia	0.48	0.49	0.43	0.39	-0.033*
B: p constant, λ varies over countries and cohorts					
Bulgaria	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	.
Czech Republic	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.60	0.038
Hungary	0.41	0.41	0.49	0.56	0.054*
Poland	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	.
Slovakia	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	.
C: both p and λ vary over countries and cohorts					
Bulgaria	0.45	0.49	0.45	0.35	-0.033
Czech Republic	0.47	0.46	0.37	0.53	0.009
Hungary	0.41	0.50	0.52	0.52	0.034
Poland	0.32	0.38	0.33	0.28	-0.018
Slovakia	0.48	0.49	0.43	0.39	-0.033*

Note: significant at 0.10 level
p = proportion of people who are successful in making transitions
λ = effects of background variable, here: parental education

Conclusions

Research on the effects of parental background on educational attainment can be divided into the analysis of final educational attainment (commonly measured in years of schooling) and the analysis of school continuation ratios at different school transitions. In this paper, following Mare [1981], these two approaches are combined. First, analysing data from Treiman and Szelenyi's 'Social Stratification in Central Europe' surveys held in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, the effects of parental background on final educational attainment are shown to have varied cross-nationally and declined in three of the nations over the 1940-1979 period. Second, it is established that the pattern of changes in these effects can be explained by two offsetting influences: stability or small increases in the effects of parental background on school continuation probabilities in schooling transitions have caused these effects to be stable or to raise,

whereas substantial educational expansion in these nations have caused these effects to decrease significantly.

There has been a debate on whether the final educational attainment or the progression rates should be under investigation when focusing on processes of social stratification in nations. In this paper we do not choose between these two sides. We feel that both tell their own story. It is interesting to know how great the effects of parental background are in each successive transition of people's educational career. However, since it is predominantly people's highest and completed level of education that will be the decisive factor for success in their occupational career, the effects of parental background on people's final educational attainment are also very relevant. Thus, if the effects of parental background decrease due to educational expansion in a given society, it has important consequences on the association between social origin and occupational status in that society (i.e. the pattern of social mobility).

Then there is the question of the extent to which the Communist regimes have been successful in reducing the effects of people's parental background and in creating more equalitarian and meritocratic societies. The implications of this paper's findings are not univocal. On the one hand, it is shown that the effects of parental background on school continuation probabilities have certainly not decreased – they have even increased – between 1940 and 1979. This thus suggests a complete failure of the destratification policy. However, it is also shown that the marked expansion of education in the Eastern European countries studied, has resulted in a substantial downward pressure on the effects of parental education on final educational attainment. Since the educational expansion in these nations can be seen as a result from Communist educational policy, it is possible to argue that in this way the Communist regimes were successful in reducing inequalities in education. Nevertheless, this success seems to have been more an unintended consequence of general educational policy, and not an intended consequence of specific destratification policy.

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Appendix A1. Selected Models for School Continuation Succes

Step and Model	Chi-square	df_{model}	Comments
A. Enter background and background x Transition			
1. Z(d)	31604.8	179	
2. [1] + S + E + P	29184.2	182	
3. [2] + ST(d) + ET(d) + PT(d)	29076.8	188	(No PT(d) are significant)
B1. Identify and constrain Transition 1 x background x Nation			
4. [3] + T1SN(d) + T1EN(d) + T1PN(d)	29019.8	200	
5. [4] with 1 df specifications	29024.0	191	T1SN (1,3=0)(4=1)(2,5= 2), T1EN (4=0)(1,3,5=1)(2=2), T1PN (2=0)(3,4=1)(5=2)(1=3)
B2. Identify and constrain Transition 1 x background x Nation x Cohort			
6. [5] + T1SN(d)C(d) + T1EN(d)C(d) + T1PN(d)C(d)	28967.0	236	Some T1EN(hun)C(d), T1PN(slo)C(d), T1PN(czr)C(d) are significant
7. [5] + T1SN(bul)C(d) + T1EN(hun)C(d) + T1PN(czr)C(d)	29006.8	200	
8. [7] with 1 df specifications	29007.5	194	T1EN(hun)C (1,2=0)(3=1)(4=2), T1PN(czr)C (1,2=1)(3=0)(4=2), T1PN(slo)C (1=1)(2,3,4=0)
C1. Identify and constrain Transition 2 x background x Nation			
9. [8] + T2SN(d) + T2EN(d) + T2PN(d)	28995.8	206	No T2SN(d) and T2PN(d) are significant
10. [8] + T2EN(d)	29000.1	198	
11. [10] with 1 df specification	29010.3	195	T2EN(5=1)(else = 0)
C2. Identify and constrain Transition 2 x background x Nation x Cohort			
12. [11] + T2SN(d)C(d) + T2EN(d)C(d) + T2PN(d)C(d)	28941.5	240	Some T2EN(czr)C(d) are significant
13. [11] + T2EN(d)C(d)	28987.3	199	
14. [13] with 1 df specifications	28988.9	196	T2EN(czr)C (4=1)(1,2,3=0)
D1. Identify and constrain Transition 3 x background x Nation			
15. [14] + T3SN(d) + T3EN(d) + T3PN(d)	28981.1	208	No T3SN(d), T3EN(d) and T3PN(d) are significant
D2. Identify and constrain Transition 3 x background x Nation x Cohort			
18. [14] + T3SN(d)C(d) + T3EN(d)C(d) + T3PN(d)C(d)	28965.9	253	No T3SN(d)C(d), T3EN(d)C(d) and T3PN(d)C(d) are significant

Note to Appendix A1: W = Woman (male = 0, female = 1); U = degree of Urbanisation (1=low, ..., 5= high); C = cohort; T = transition; N = nation (1=bul) (2=czr) (3=hun) (4=pol) (5=slo); Z(d) = WUNCT and all lower interactions. E = parent's education (average); S = parent's status; P = parents member of communist party (no = 0, yes= 1); (d) indicates dummy variable specification of the variable in question; otherwise specification is ordinal. T1, T2, T3 refer to dummy specifications of transistion where the respective transision equals 1.
Number of respondents = 13,997.

Appendix A2. Selected Parameters of 'Logistic response model of school continuation' (model 14)

Variable	b	s.e.	p
Parent's education	0.189	0.020	0.000
Parent's education * Trans2	-0.027	0.025	0.276
Parent's education * Trans3	-0.032	0.026	0.220
Parent's ISEI	0.133	0.033	0.000
Parent's ISEI * Trans2	0.161	0.040	0.000
Parent's ISEI * Trans3	0.017	0.042	0.692
Parents partymember	-0.209	0.133	0.115
Parents partymember * Trans2	0.328	0.145	0.024
Parents partymember * Trans3	0.328	0.150	0.029
For Trans1:			
Parent's education * country (4=0)(1,5,3=1)(2=2)	0.085	0.020	0.000
Parent's education * hun * cohort (1,2=0)(3=1)(4=2)	0.063	0.023	0.006
Parent's ISEI * county (1,3=0)(4=1)(2,5=2)	0.108	0.025	0.000
Parents partymember * country (2=0)(3,4=1)(5=2)(1=3)	0.287	0.070	0.000
Parents partymember * czr * cohort (1,2=1)(3=0)(4=2)	0.321	0.149	0.031
Parents partymember * slo * cohort (1=1)(else = 0)	0.729	0.360	0.043
For Trans2:			
Parent's education * slo	0.080	0.031	0.011
Parent's education * czr * cohort(4=1)(else=0)	0.215	0.060	0.000

Note: For descriptions of variable codings, see text.
The estimated Z(d) parameters are not given.

Earnings Disparities in the Czech Republic: The History of Equalisation*

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Abstract: Statistical and sociological surveys are used to show the long-term development in earnings disparities. A considerable equalisation in wages occurred in three phases: the first one occurred during the Nazi occupation, then in the 1945-1948 period and finally after the post-Communist victory. The Communist 'rewarding' system was characterised by the predominance of demographic factors, the decline of secondary and especially tertiary education and the priority given to productive branches. After 1989, the general "needs" principle is being replaced, however hesitantly, by the "market" principle. Increasing returns to tertiary education were observed, the gap between gender somehow attenuated and the age profile of earnings became flatter. Market adjustment is uneven between sectors of ownership and branches of industry and moreover there exists a backlash primarily in the professional public services.

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Income distribution probably indicates best long-term trends and the inspection of basic changes in social stratification. Although it is not often used as such (unlike educational and occupational mobility), there are several reasons for this choice. Firstly, it is because income data are relatively easily available through statistical surveys. Secondly, because the income data are relatively easily comparable over time and across countries. And thirdly, because due to the double utility of income (its material and status values), income can be considered as the "hard core" of an individual's or a family's social position and, then, the distribution of income can be regarded as the key breakdown of society.

Each of these points can however be challenged. The availability of income data differs according to each country, given the continuity of its history and consequently the economists' and statisticians' concern with provision, analysis, publication and protection of data. Comparability of income data is limited in both the cross-national and temporal aspects due to the variety of income indicators, type of survey and population covered. Whether the economic history exists as a functioning discipline or not, it is of utmost importance. Finally, according to each society, the monetary income can always be disputed as an indicator of households' economic position (the role of income in kind) and, even more, an indicator of the social status of people and families (the role of power).

In this article, I focus on earnings only. First I show the available statistics to summarise the most important long-term tendencies in the distribution of earnings. Then

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I concentrate on the specific rewarding systems under the Communist regime and their endurance. Using the after-1989 sociological surveys, I later show the recent changes in earnings disparities and structures. The basic ambition is to outline an overall picture of earnings distribution which would contribute to expose the functioning of the new regime. Here, we should have in mind all far-reaching economic, social and political effects of income distribution, contrasting with its – so far – almost neglected place in the economic and sociological research.

Historical roots of equalisation

Unlike some Western countries where some key income distribution indicators were kept for over one century, like the U.K. [Routh 1980], or other countries where a systematic research allowed to reconstruct a long history of income inequality, like the USA [Williamson and Lindert 1980], the Czech "written history" of income distribution begins in the Communist period. Whereas income statistics start in the late 1950s, some modest analysis of income structures start in the late 1960s and the overall critical evaluation of the role of inequality is still expected. Although the historical information is better in Czechoslovakia than in the Balkan and Eastern European countries, we can gather only fragments of its pre-war history.

Actually, no income survey has been conducted in pre-war Czechoslovakia; family expenditures which are available in tables, were collected from small and non-representative samples. The only usable source of information about earnings by bounds is the social insurance testimony. According to the insured daily wages of manual workers (in the Central Social Insurance Company) and insured yearly salaries of private employees (in the General Pension Office), we estimated earnings differentials using the data of 1929 (3 mil. of insured persons) and in 1936 (2.2 mil.). Although these two groups do not include all workers, the data provides us with a rough picture of income inequality: the decile ratio in the pre-recession (1929) period was about 6 and in the post-recession period (1936) about 7.

Such figures rank pre-war Czechoslovakia among the family of similarly developed Western countries such as Germany, France or the UK In those countries, the range of earnings inequality was probably even somewhat higher, as the early 1950s data witness [*Incomes*... 1967]. However, Czechoslovakia was not an extremely equalised country at all, despite some historically enrooted specificities. Those can be summarised as a social-democratic profile of the – especially – Czech nation, reborn in the 19th century from plebeian roots, not having large nobility and never producing a numerous grande-bourgeoisie of its own.

Social cohesion of the Czech society was given to the absence of extreme poverty existing at the time in Poland, Hungary and also Slovakia. Despite quite considerable disparities in earnings, the final inequality in consumption was less striking, showing the ratio 1 : 3.5 between unskilled workers and higher professionals [*Rodinné*... 1932]. In the inter-war period, the middle classes were certainly the most important social category (35% of the population in 1930) and served as an integrative amalgam of the society. In the late 1930s, the Czech society was characterised, with an exaggeration typical of the period (resumed later in Geiger 1949), as "almost one homogeneous strata of urban workers and employees with very similar living conditions and a mentality corresponding to the unified mass culture of today" [Ullrich 1937: 43].

During the World-War II period, the Germans introduced a policy which was directly aimed at equalisation. On the one hand, they preferred to reward manufacturing workers for producing for the German war machine. On the other hand, they simultaneously suppressed Czech intellectuals in order to break the spiritual basis of the nation intended to be Germanised. Intellectuals were considered more hostile to the Nazi occupation and less acceptable for planned assimilation. Preferences and dispreferences in rationing only strengthened what was done by deliberate diminishing of wage disparities. Whereas the ratio of manual and non-manual workers was in 1937 1 : 2.6 by men and 1 : 2.9 by women, it decreased to 1 : 1.45 in 1946 in both cases [Maňák 1967: 531].

After the war, inflation required a differentiated increase in earnings: the lower the level, the higher the growth. Equalisation had already begun by December 1945 with the first wage regulation and followed by innumerable decrees which all stressed the main criterion of need. The necessary equalisation was further strengthened through deliberate policies filled by the Communist Party and welcomed by the majority of the populace within the general climate of Socialist ideology. The tenor of the time was not to allow incomes to fall below the subsistence level and not to waste money for the comfort of higher social categories. Consequently, while the real wage of manual workers almost doubled in the 1937-1948 period, the wage of non-manual employees was kept stable [*Problémy...* 1949: 63].

The most important changes occurred in the period 1948-1953, when a fortified industrial growth was launched with the Stalinist emphasis on heavy industry. This orientation was underpinned by the dominant Communist ideology in which "intellectual" became a swear-word and equalisation was militantly promoted. As the main Communist ideologue of the 1950s and the first Communist Minister of education Zdeněk Nejedlý said: "what is important is that many people only measure their satisfaction by how much better off they are than others are. They need others to be worse off than they are. It is the very basis of their pursuit of satisfaction and happiness" [Nejedlý 1950: 18].

After February 1948, when Communism took complete power, a true "wage revolution" started, in which the previous trend was even intensified. Through this, in the five following years, the existing wage structure was completely reversed to the benefit of the manufacturing and construction industries (and temporarily also transport) and to the detriment of almost all other branches of the national economy (see Table 1). The main sectors of the qualified intellectual workers (health services, education, culture) fell far below the national average. One factor facilitating these changes was the large inflow of women and peasants' labour-force nourishing the lowest ladders of manual and administrative work.

Table 1. Earnings according to the branch in Czechoslovakia (% of the average)

	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
Manufacturing industry	92.7	95.0	96.4	100.0	104.4	108.0
Construction	101.2	105.6	110.4	108.1	110.8	115.2
Transport	109.4	112.6	118.6	118.5	111.4	110.3
Communications	80.1	91.2	83.4	95.8	93.9	91.4
Trade and catering	102.5	101.6	98.9	83.5	80.9	90.0
Health and welfare	120.9	114.7	105.8	99.9	96.7	92.2
Agriculture	80.3	77.9	88.4	86.9	80.3	71.7
Education and culture	124.7	118.4	107.6	99.8	96.3	90.0
Banking and insurance	134.7	125.8	120.2	117.0	107.7	104.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Sources: [Hron 1968].

During the 1948-1953 period, general wage differentials (in quantiles measures), branch and skill disparities became one of the smallest among European countries (together with former Eastern Germany, Romania and Albania (Table 2). The reason for reaching such a high degree of equalisation in Czechoslovakia is to be found in the coming together of political, economic, and ideological pressures. The widespread expectations of equality by considerable parts of the population conformed to the intense need of the new rulers to redistribute the lesser wage bill among a greater number of workers and to promote production of raw steel and concrete instead of fine products and innovations.

Table 2. Earnings distribution in European countries (percentiles in % of median)

Country	Year	10%	25%	75%	90%
Czechoslovakia	1987	62.2	77.8	125.8	154.1
Hungary	1986	60.2	76.8	128.7	164.3
Poland	1987	61.3	77.3	129.2	168.8
USSR	1986	54.6	72.2	135.9	183.4
Yugoslavia	1987	55.7	74.1	137.3	182.6
U.K.	1987	56.6	73.5	135.3	180.8
West Germany	1987	61.2	77.4	130.3	175.9
Austria	1987	38.4	69.5	137.9	187.6

Sources: [Atkinson and Micklewright 1992]; National Statistical Yearbooks.

Vested features of the Communist system

As our reconstruction of two income inequality indicators shows, all the basic characteristics of the earnings structure were established in the initial post-war period and firmly fixed for a long period of time, presumably for ever. As for the general pattern of distribution, no real change occurred over the following 30 years, apart from some minor movements in the bottom and top 5% of workers. Despite the demonstrated (or rather assumed) effort to reinforce inequality of earnings according to qualification and performance criteria, no substantial change in the wage system occurred except in the late 1960s (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Earnings differentials in Czechoslovakia



Figure 1 combines statistical surveys, sociological data and our estimation. The first indicator is the decile ratio, i.e. ratio of the ninth and first decile of the distribution of gross earnings. For the period 1940-1948, we rely on insured wages and salaries; for the period 1948-1958, we use statistical surveys which are not entirely comparable with the following ones; data of 1959-1988 are from wage surveys and fully reliable; data of 1992 is Microcensus and the last period is estimated on the basis of Economic Expectations and Attitudes surveys. The second indicator is the earnings ratio of higher professionals (HP) to manual workers (MW) in manufacturing industry. As this information was gathered by the Czechoslovak Statistical Office for the period 1958-1972 only, the rest was estimated using the Family Expenditures surveys for the war and various statistical data for the post-war period. The data concern Czechoslovakia up to 1989 and the Czech Republic afterwards.

Even the reformist tendencies of the 1968 Prague Spring were too weak to bring about significant changes in the system of rewards, although some serious attempts to increase the wage differentials and provide incentives for more qualified workers certainly occurred. Here, we have only very basic information concerning differentials between individual sectors of the economy and the relationship between the earnings of manual workers, engineers, and routine non-manual workers in the manufacturing industry. According to this information, the relative position of engineers and lower administrative staff improved slightly in the mid-1960s but it deteriorated again.

The research on disparities were only slightly more successful than the disparities themselves. The late 1960s saw a revitalisation of sociology in general and more particularly the research in stratification and inequality which brought about a better insight into income differences. The first Czechoslovak social stratification survey was conducted in 1967 and the first statistical survey of earnings according to education in 1968. While the former survey located the country among the most equalised societies and showed income as the prime source of social status inconsistency [Machonin 1969], the latter documented heavy under-evaluation of higher education in rewards, the people educated at a tertiary level catching up with less educated peers in life-time income not sooner than in their forties [Večerník 1969].

Unlike the early stages of Communist rule, changes in earnings inequality of the 1970s and 1980s are described by several income and social stratification surveys. Despite the fact that already the 1958 Microcensus included enquiries about earnings, the

earliest available micro-level dataset is the 1970 Microcensus (smuggled by the author from the Statistical Office). For 1978 and 1984, we can use data from the social stratification surveys. Data show basic tendencies of the earnings structure in the period of the violent "normalisation" after the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (Table 3). The main issue is to determine whether behind the stability of the relative inequality of earnings some important changes did occur and how to assess the character of such changes [Večerník 1991].

Table 3. Multiple classification analysis of gross earnings in Czechoslovakia (deviations in % of mean)

	Observed			Adjusted		
	1970	1978	1984	1970	1978	1984
Sex:						
men	17.1	19.5	19.3	15.8	17.9	17.8
women	-23.9	-22.2	-20.4	-22.0	-20.4	-19.2
Education:						
elementary	-13.2	-15.0	-15.5	-9.8	-9.7	-13.1
vocational	3.1	1.5	1.7	-3.0	-0.4	-3.8
lower specialized	-0.2	-5.1	-2.6	2.3	1.2	-0.9
secondary	5.4	4.1	1.6	9.4	7.6	6.7
university	45.4	41.9	26.1	38.9	34.9	25.5
Age:						
20-29	-12.8	-14.4	-13.4	-11.0	-14.4	-14.8
30-39	2.9	1.5	0.2	1.1	1.3	0.6
40-49	7.3	3.9	6.4	7.6	5.7	8.5
50-59	5.9	7.7	5.8	5.0	5.6	6.0
Sector:						
primary	-4.1	-0.6	3.2	-5.5	-4.5	-0.2
secondary	1.7	3.3	5.6	1.5	2.5	4.0
tertiary	-3.6	-5.7	-7.8	-1.9	-0.7	-2.2
quartery	-0.8	-2.3	-5.7	-2.0	-3.2	-6.1

Sources: [*Microcensus* 1970; *Social stratification surveys* 1978 and 1984].
Earnings variable in all surveys is gross wage reported or verified by employers. We compare here the gross earnings of the subsample of full-time workers in the state sector of the economy (excluding cooperative agriculture). The multiple classification analysis is a part of the procedure Anova of the SPSS^X which performs analysis of variance for factorial designs. Analysis of variance tests the hypothesis that the group means of the dependent variable are equal. The dependent variable is interval level and categorical variables (called factors) define groups. In the multiple classification analysis, unadjusted and adjusted deviations from grand mean are counted, the latter displaying net effect of the individual category within each variable.

The dominant axis of the earnings distribution was apparently gender. In fact the hierarchy of earnings in Czechoslovakia fell into two parts, the bottom for women and the top for men. Only university-educated women had a chance of invading the "men's space". This situation is at least as old and valid as the data on earnings. In 1946, manual working women earned 68% of the male wage and women employed in civil services earned 64% of their male colleagues income [Hron 1968]. In 1959, women earned 66% of the average male wage and in 1988 68%. Despite a significant increase in women's qualifi-

cation, little changed throughout the post-war period. The other reason for the highly explanatory power of gender is that the other factors are too weak to dominate over men/women disparities.

Education appears as the second important factor. Comparing vocational qualification and lower secondary education (the length of study being the same), no significant distinction appears between the rewarding of manual and non-manual work. Returns to investment in secondary or university education were of questionable value considering the costs of studies and foregone earnings. A long-term trend was the decreasing significance of education during the observed period and probably also before it. Especially in the early 1980s, the value of education fell very rapidly. This tendency matches closely the period when real wages started to fall and the regime responded by wage increase to the "working class" while freezing the earnings of "other employees".

Despite the lower importance of education in determining earnings, this result is still better than the initial program of the "socialist revolution". According to the principles expounded after 1945, a) since the costs of education are paid by society, only society itself should receive the fruits of qualified labour, and b) once the rewards are more equally distributed, qualified people will be more committed to increase the total national product, i.e. they will automatically act in the interest of all people. Although these principles are far from having been fully realised, many such ideas have persevered both in reality and in consciousness of today's Czech society.

Under the Communist regime, education played its role less through "cash nexus" (the return to invested human capital) and more through other channels. Firstly, the best jobs were attractive not because of their official reward but due to the various perks they offered (extra money, access to scarce goods or services, useful acquaintances). Secondly, the main advantage of higher education and corresponding jobs was not a good wage but better working conditions, resulting to a better quality of both work and life. Education was then conceived as an important compensation for the increasing discrepancy between the cultural level of the population and its hopelessly backward standard of living.

In the age specification of earnings, we could trace significant shifts in favour of older workers and to the detriment of younger ones. Those shifts begun in the 1950s and continued after 1968. When the Communist Party usurped all power in 1948, the catchphrase of the day was "youth forward". Consequently, the age curve of earnings shifted radically to the left. As this generation of Communist "Gründers" grew older, it never passed its position of power on to new and young people. Simplifying a bit, the system of rewards was continually adapted to the increasing age of this founders' generation. Preference for young people was replaced with a preference for workers about to retire because – according to another catchphrase – "they are working for their pension benefits".

The Communist specificity becomes incredibly clear when looking at wages by branch. Whereas in agriculture, manufacturing industry and construction, the relative income level increased considerably, it decreased in the services sector. This might well be explained by Stalin's complement to Marx' maxim concerning the reward system under socialism: "Each is paid according to the quantity and quality of his work *and according to the importance of his/her work to society*". Economic growth was managed primarily to achieve full industrial autonomy and the greatest military capacity. On the basis of the

functional importance of the mining and steel industries was built a complex hierarchy of preferences.

The other axis of income hierarchy was directed to the preservation of the regime. Specific functional importance of a job served as a base to the rewarding managers, party and state bureaucrats, army and police officers.

Changes brought about by transformation

During a transformation period, administration according to the fulfilment of basic needs is – however slowly an unevenly – replaced by distribution according to the share in the national income which is itself produced by education, job commitment, responsibility and risk-taking. The transition proceeds from the Marxist-based to a Weberian-based society. Instead of fictitious classes defined by their relation to the means of production (their possession according to ideology but their destitution in reality), the reconstruction of the social structure as of "earnings classes" (Erwerbklassen) is beginning, these classes being generated by opportunities for the market valorisation of the skills which people offer or the activities they perform [Weber 1956: 225].

After decades of apparent stability in earnings distribution, the overall range of inequality started to increase in 1990. This increase concerns the bottom and the top of income distribution, as measured by decile distribution. The lowest income is protected by the minimum wage and a socially motivated rise of income while the top categories enjoy opportunities made available by private business, foreign capital, new management requirements and the financial market. The middle income categories are, however, considerably suppressed by this and have in no way profited from the transformation in real earnings terms. Indeed, it was only the top income category that won in real terms (Table 4).

Table 4. Earnings distribution in 1988-1996

	Year 1988 gross	Year 1992 gross	Jan. 1993 net	Nov. 1993 net	Nov. 1994 net	Jan. 1996 net
Decile shares						
1.	5.3	5.0	4.8	4.5	4.4	4.4
2.	6.6	6.1	5.6	5.7	5.1	5.3
3.	7.4	6.9	6.4	6.5	6.4	6.3
4.	8.3	7.7	7.2	7.1	7.2	7.1
5.	9.2	8.5	8.1	7.9	8.1	7.9
6.	10.0	9.4	9.0	8.8	8.9	8.8
7.	10.9	10.4	10.5	10.1	10.3	10.0
8.	12.0	11.7	12.1	11.7	11.8	11.4
9.	13.3	13.8	14.1	13.9	14.2	14.3
10.	17.0	20.5	22.2	23.8	23.6	24.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Gini coefficient	0.19	0.23	0.25	0.26	0.26	0.27
Robin Hood Index[x]	13.2	16.4	18.9	19.5	19.9	20.2

Sources: [*Microcensus* 1989, 1992, *Economic Attitudes and Expectations* 1993-1996]
[x]) The Robin Hood Index, coined in [Atkinson, Micklewright 1992] measures the share of incomes necessary to equalize the whole distribution.

The proportion of demographic and economic characteristics have changed significantly during the transformation: in 1988, gender and age explained 36% of earnings variance while education increased the variance explained by an additional 8%; in 1992, the variance explained by gender and age dropped to 19%, while education increased it by 12%; in January 1996, the variance explained by gender and age dropped further to a mere 14%, while the education increment decreased it by 10%. Occupational differential in earnings increased given especially to deterioration of the lowest degrees of the hierarchy in comparison with self-employed people and entrepreneurs (Table 5).

Table 5. Net earnings according to occupational group

	In CZK monthly			In % of the average		
	1984	1992	1996	1984	1992	1996
Higher professionals	3,193	6,648	11,338	128.0	145.5	135.2
Lower professionals	2,555	4,730	8,367	102.4	103.5	99.8
Routine non-manuals	2,078	3,864	7,082	83.3	84.6	84.5
Self-employed	.	6,526	15,333	.	142.9	182.9
Supervisors	.	5,387	8,831	.	117.9	105.3
Skilled manuals	2,700	4,244	8,017	108.2	92.9	95.6
Unskilled manuals	2,108	3,998	6,087	84.5	87.5	72.6
Agricultural workers	2,422	3,752	5,200	97.1	82.1	62.0
Total	2,495	4,567	8,383	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: [*Social stratification surveys* 1984, 1993; *Economic Attitudes and Expectations*, January 1996].

In the branch division, former preferences were replaced by milder market differences which have promoted trade, catering and especially banking. The state pushed forward administration while neglecting education, health services and research (Table 6). Here, we should mind that the available statistics do not present fully shifts in branch disparities. As the data only includes firms of over 25 employees, rapidly increasing incomes in retail trade and catering are not adequately represented in statistical figures. Generally, however, wage shifts according to industry led to a diminishing significance of this dimension of income distribution: there are currently more intra- than inter-branch income disparities than pre-1989.

The economic reform liberated the labour market and – through extensive privatisation – introduced business incomes as well as greater freedom to employer/employee contracts. Moreover, companies were free to distribute the wage bill and therefore had the option to reward better qualified and more productive workers. The transformation resulted in increasing opportunities for private entrepreneurship, employment abroad or in foreign firms, high rewards for managers and a general upward mobility: over the 1989-1996 period, 24% of workers declared themselves to be climbing the occupational hierarchy in comparison with the 8% declaring themselves downward mobile [*Economic Expectations and Attitudes*, January 1996].

Table 6. Earnings according to branch of employment (% of the average)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Manufacturing	104.4	103.8	103.6	103.5	101.3	99.9	100.4
Construction	111.2	109.9	106.6	108.2	112.3	110.6	108.9
Agriculture	108.2	109.6	97.7	91.8	87.7	85.0	84.7
Transport and communications	106.4	104.6	103.2	99.1	97.5	98.7	100.8
Trade and catering	83.8	85.0	86.2	90.1	88.6	91.6	88.4
Health and welfare	90.1	92.6	96.6	94.5	95.0	93.9	92.4
Education	89.8	88.1	90.3	90.6	90.3	91.7	90.4
Banking and insurance	98.3	102.0	136.9	169.6	177.7	175.2	171.3
Administration and defense	101.3	100.4	105.3	114.6	117.8	120.7	117.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: [Czech Statistical Yearbooks].

Simultaneously however, earnings in the production sector remained under state control through wage regulation (until mid-1995) whereas earnings in the public sector were determined by tariffs which were equalised and rewarded experience more than qualifications. Several wage scissors have opened. While the state and large private firms were confined, both small and foreign firms had liberty in wage settings, many seeking to attract highly qualified people by offering multiplied wages in comparison with those received in their previous or current employment. Within the non-productive sector, earnings in banking and insurance as well as salaries of judges and top bureaucracy climbed while earnings of teachers, physicians and researchers stagnated.

Whereas in Hungary and Poland, the main axis of earnings distribution is education, the sector of ownership dominates in the Czech Republic. The current superiority of the privatisation process in the determination of earnings is understood by the absence of a private sector under Communism. Recent changes in occupational disparities indicate a certain decline in the relative position of professionals (which does not concern managers) while the return to entrepreneurship is increasing. This makes the renewed Czech capitalism better rooted but less modern. Indeed this will be attenuated in the long-run but it does not necessarily implicate the restoration of the human capital reproduction, vital to the economy.

Conclusion

The unique Czech income equality, created in a synergy of internal and external forces, was firmly fixed by the Communist regime. Behind the facade of almost stable and small disparities, some important changes have occurred in the 1948-1989 period. Firstly, a pattern of determination was characterised by the predominance of demographic factors (especially sex) and their increasing influence over time (especially in relation to age). Secondly, the main long-term tendency was the declining wage position of secondary and especially university educated workers. Thirdly, we observed an intensifying priorisation of the productive branches of industry to the detriment of the service and welfare sectors. Fourthly, the systematic transfer from the young generation to older ones occurred over a whole period examined here.

Transformation broke free of all those tendencies and started to weaken these characteristics. Returns to education increased while the gender gap attenuated somewhat and the age profile of earnings became considerably flatter. However, only the first steps of a long journey have been taken and the earnings distribution in the Czech Republic is still closer to the previous regime than to the Western system. Given the uneven regulations, the adjustment is more rapid in some segments (new private firms, firms with foreign capital and/or management) than in others (newly privatised state firms). Also public services see uneven income development, some of them advancing (finance, administration, justice), other lagging behind (health and social services, education, research).

In the near future, contradictory tendencies rather than consistent development towards greater and more functional inequality are to be expected. Earnings between the private and public spheres develop unequally to the detriment of professionals. Financial capital – represented by rewards in banking – seriously prevailing over human capital – represented e.g. by teachers' salaries. While labour is intensively used in the new private sector, its wasting continue in the former state sector. And preachers of wage moderation – deputies and top bureaucrats – require an over-average increase of salaries for themselves. A sort of a polarized system is being developed and congregates in the top, disregarding the differences in the middle.

However, it would be unrealistic to imagine that labour market will quickly and adequately transform the patterns of various factors influencing the allocation and rewarding of manpower. One might hope that after a rather confused transition period, the inequality of earnings will become organised along market axes reflecting the skill, performance, and inventiveness of the work. By providing work incentives and gradually adjusting the reward system to that in the West, the sources and extent of earnings inequality will see marked movements through which the conditions necessary to improve returns to skills, managerial responsibility, risk-taking and performance will be created.

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Surveys used

Microcensuses: 1970 and 1989 conducted by the Federal Statistical Office on 2% sample (N = 70,000 households) in March 1971 and 1989 respectively and including yearly incomes of 1970 and 1988. Microcensus 1992 conducted by the Czech Statistical Office on a 0.5 % random sample (N = 16,000 households) in March 1993 and including yearly incomes 1992. While in the 1989 Microcensus, incomes were confirmed, in the 1992 Microcensus were not.

Social Stratification Surveys: 1978 and 1984 conducted by the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Academy of Sciences in cooperation with the Federal Statistical Office (number of observations used in the Table 3 7,279 for 1978 and 10,907 for 1984.

Social Stratification in Eastern Europe: international comparative research project Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989 conducted in early 1993 under heading of Donald J. Treiman and Ivan Szelenyi, University of California in Los Angeles. National sample of the Czech Republic 5,000 adult respondents. Data collected by the Czech Statistical Office.

Economic Expectations and Attitudes: a semi-annual (1990-1992) or annual (1993 onwards) survey on quota samples organized by the socio-economic team of the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences headed by Jiří Večerník. Collected by the Center for Empirical Surveys STEM.

A Contribution to the Social History of Czechoslovakia 1945-1989

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Abstract: The post-war transformation of society in Czechoslovakia had certain features in common with the corresponding process in those developed countries in the process of building a welfare state, and its declared principles were close to the social policy of the latter. In practice however, social development began to move in a different direction as early as 1945-1948. Those years saw a wide-ranging redistribution of property, income and social benefits and after 1948 the middle classes were forcibly repressed and the intelligentsia degraded. The fear of losing its totalitarian power stopped the system carrying out sufficiently deep-reaching reforms, even in the late 1950s and 1960s. The restoration of the discredited forces of authoritarianism after the foreign intervention in 1968, isolated them from the country's intellectual elite and their social corruption alienated even the majority of the people. Mass corruption and the emergence of new channels of distribution were signs of the collapse of the system. The fact that it proved unsustainable in the face of popular opinion and changes in the world eased the first stages of the post-communist transformation.

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This article is a brief reflection on basic landmarks of the social development which contributed greatly to the emergence, maintenance, crisis and fall of "socialism". All the social sciences are concerned with this in their different ways, in connection with the ongoing social transformation. Economists investigate the functional defects of the system, while sociologists and political scientists focus on the social system of state socialism. Historians are also making a significant contribution to this research.

Historical research has not yet gained a sufficient time distance and also needs a critique of earlier works and sources which bear the mark of their times. This also applies to social history, which used to be a peripheral element in economic and common history and was limited by a narrow view of the social sphere. Independent research into social questions first began at the beginning of the 1960s, when sociology and history became interested in the changes in the social structure of society. In the second half of the 1960s the two disciplines undertook joint research and the results of its historiographical part were published in a number of studies [Kalinová 1967, 1968, 1969a], in a collection of essays in a special issue of the *Revue Dějin socialismu* (Review of the History of Socialism) in 1968 [*Revue*... 1968], and in two larger works [Kalinová 1969b and 1993a].[1] All these works were based on an extensive study of archival material.

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[1]) A major work on the social history of Czechoslovakia from 1918 to the 1960s was prepared by a collective of historians led by Lenka Kalinová and including V. Brabec, Z. Deyl, V. Hanzel, K. Jech, J. Maňák and V. Průcha. Its publication was however halted in 1969 and after some correction and expansion it was only published in 1993 [Kalinová 1993a].

After November 1989 an institutional base for research into post-1945 history was established with the Institute of Contemporary History of the Czech Academy of Science. Since then a mass of documentation has been studied and a number of new works published. The main figures concentrating on the social history as an element of contemporary history are Karel Kaplan [1993] and V. Průcha [1993]. A number of sociologists have also begun to investigate various aspects of the social history of the past decades [Machonin 1992, 1996].

This article aims to contribute to the sociological research of transformation with certain findings from the history of the emergence and development of the social system in Czechoslovakia after 1945, and in doing so it aligns itself with the tradition of collaboration between these two disciplines. Restrictions of space have meant that the article considers only selected areas and periods of social history.

1. The First Stage of the Transformation of the Social System 1945-1948

After the second world war, all those countries that had suffered from it set out to change their social systems. The experience of the economic crisis of the 1930s, the sufferings of the war and the subsequent poverty gave people a desire for greater social security as a guard against unemployment and poverty. The renewal of production after the war, the rebuilding of the social and transport infrastructure, and the restructuring of the war economy all required the state to participate in the economy and to ensure a certain level of social protection for the population. This basis corresponded to the basic features of Keynes's model of economic policy.

There was such a pressing need to change the social system that a commission was set up in the United Kingdom during the war, headed by Lord Beveridge, to prepare a plan for its reorganisation after the war. The official aim of the plan was to compensate a population gravely damaged by the war and to create a society that was less unjust than before the war. As with Bismarck in 1878, it was also undoubtedly intended to disarm the radical socialist forces. The 1942 Beveridge Report [Social Insurance 1942] and its comprehensive view of social protection of citizens became the model for the majority of European countries in setting up their social programmes, and it undoubtedly had a certain influence on social policy in Czechoslovakia after 1945. The Czech government in exile was familiar with it (a Czech translation was published by *Knihovna Čechoslováka*) and it certainly influenced President Beneš in signing the decrees of nationalisation. In 1945 it was retranslated and discussed by the Czechoslovak Revolutionary Union Movement which was also involved in the preparation of the law on national insurance. [*Archiv ÚRO* 1945].

The first plan put forward by the Czechoslovak provisional home government (the Košice Government Programme) in April 1945 announced a "munificent social policy", with protection for all citizens in case of unemployment, illness and old age. Although it had been worked out by the communist leadership in exile in Moscow, it had many points in common with the post-war policies of many developed European countries. As in those countries, children's allowances were introduced in Czechoslovakia as early as 1945.

The national insurance law prepared the way for fundamental changes in society. The radical nationalisation begun in 1945, however, had different aims from that which was gradually carried out in many countries of Europe. The latter saw nationalisation in

the spirit of the Beveridge plan, as a move to ensure full employment and as a source of state funds to finance outlays on social measures. These aims were gradually attained in the United Kingdom and other countries, involving a wide-reaching redistribution which marked the rapid development of the welfare state.

The exceptionally painful experiences of Czechoslovakia during the 1930s, when unemployment had been among the highest in Europe (reaching 20% of the total labour force and 32% of industrial labourers, with minimal social support for the unemployed), meant that the majority of people here were convinced that only fundamental changes in society could ensure employment, earnings and social protection. In the climate of the post-war years, the idea of social justice was linked with socialism, which was to divide income and property equitably. This was anticipated by Friedrich A. Hayek, who during the war had warned that the immense dissatisfaction of the post-war generation with the injustice of the existing order threatened to treat poverty with redistribution [Hayek 1990: 160-161]. The image that most Czechs of that time held of socialism is well demonstrated by the fact that Great Britain was seen as one of those countries which was also "moving towards socialism".

At that time it was not only low-income groups seeking redistribution which expressed sympathy with socialism, but this was shared by a part of the middle classes and the intelligentsia. Among agricultural workers this sympathy was based on a desire for land, while for others it grew out of the disillusionment with the betrayal of Munich and the bitter experience of the Great Depression, the occupation and the war. This is documented in many historical sources, including both specialised publications and the works of some of the outstanding writers of the time. The atmosphere is also borne out by the results of the democratic elections in 1946 in which left wing parties gained an absolute majority in the Czech Lands.

The fact that Czechoslovakia fell within the Soviet sphere of influence made it easier for communist leaders to capitalise on and abuse the general social and national radicalisation. This led to a slow move away from the type of social transformation under way in western countries. In 1945 companies with more than 500 employees were nationalised, affecting 61% of all employees. As the power struggle reached its height in 1947, the communist leadership pressed for further nationalisation and the next stage of land reform.

The decisive step towards the levelling of incomes came with the currency and wages reform in December 1945. This reform recalculated prices and wages on a ratio of 1 : 3 with respect to 1937. The wage reform aimed to "eliminate starvation wages", and raised the lowest incomes by an index of 442 and middle and higher incomes by 141 and 106 respectively, without changing the highest group of earnings. The wage reform in 1945 and the subsequent partial adjustments in 1946 created the basis for an earnings structure which lasted for years with only minor changes. Industrial wages were 10% higher and those in the civil service 10% lower than the national average [Kalinová 1996].

The levelling of incomes was supplemented by rationing and price subsidies. The rationing system and the shortage of goods did far more to limit and equalise consumption than did the level of incomes itself. The reduced social and pension differences did not however bring equality of incomes and expenditure. In 1947 many people were existing around the minimum economic living standard, although fewer than in 1937. (In

1947, 27% of the population fell into this group compared with 56% in 1937.) Pensions were also subject to similar levelling, with the very low pensions of manual workers being raised by an index of 502, and those of state employees by 81% [*Vývoj*... 1965: 164, 167].

The following table shows the redistribution of incomes over a relatively short period (with a certain level of change having already been reached during the war).

Table 1. The Structure of Earnings in 1937 and 1947 (in %)

	1937	1947
Wages & Salaries	53.7	61.3
Of which: wages	25.7	32.2
salaries	14.3	12.2
Pensions (total)	10.1	12.3
Of which public employees	4.9	2.6
Entrepreneurs' Pensions	27.1	21.2
Of which earnings from capital	8.7	3.0

*) Balance to 100% represents incomes in kind.
Source: [*Průběh*... 1949].

Even in this period of so-called people's democracy, the share of incomes from wages, salaries and pensions rose at the expense of those from capital and property. Within this, the incomes of manual workers were increased and those of other employees decreased. The nationalisation of mines, banks, insurance companies and industry, land reform and the changes in the employment structure brought major change in the social structure. This was further increased by post-war migration, particularly by the transfer of the ethnic German population, which reduced the population of today's Czech Republic from 10.7 million in 1930 to 8.7 million in 1947. The confiscation of land and land reform in the border areas temporarily increased the number of small and middle land owners at the expense of agricultural labourers and reduced the proportion of "capitalists" from 6% to 3.5% (this category included businessmen with three or more employees). The redistribution process was moving towards the elimination of the lowest groups in society and the weakening of propertied class. The reduction of these two poles meant a strengthening of the middle strata, with 23% small and medium land owners, 48% manual workers and 24% other employees ([*Soupis*... 1948] and calculations by Vladimír Srb).

The years between 1945 and 1948 saw the preparation of a fundamental change in the system of social insurance, aimed at eliminating the earlier differences between pension allowances for different groups of people. The ambitious national insurance law worked out by experts of social democratic tendencies and passed in April 1948 was distinctly universalist. It provided for the protection of children, mothers, elderly people, and for cases of illness, invalidity, old age, loss of breadwinner etc. It also provided for free education and medical care. In the following years social insurance became an integral part of centralised planning.

The redistribution of property and incomes which radically lessened the former polarised distribution was an important weapon in the struggle of the communist party to gain a monopoly of power. When this struggle came to a head it opened the way for further transformation which began to affect the middle classes.

2. Social Consequences of the Adoption of the Soviet Model of Government, Its Crisis and Attempts at Reform

The seizure of power by a single party in February 1948 (the role of the other two parties in the government became purely formal) greatly shook the former faith of the majority of the population in the possibility of building a just society. The middle classes in particular came to doubt this more and more and this was demonstrated in open opposition to the new rulers. After the coup in February 1948 social policy was used selectively as a means of limiting the social rights of a part of the population.

The first weeks and month after the coup saw some demonstrations of disapproval of the new government. The first open act of disagreement came during those first days in February with a demonstration by students of the Prague universities. They were cruelly punished, first by the police intervention and then by the subsequent screening which ended with the expulsion of 7,000 students, representing 17% of all those at universities. The purge then moved on to other sectors of the population, primarily non-communist politicians and leading workers in both the economy and the political structure and in the public sector. Thousands of professionals were purged out of public life and many others became prey to a sense of fear and uncertainty.

In the climate of the cold war, expressions of disagreement with developments after February 1948 were interpreted as signs of the "intensification of the class struggle". In accordance with this line and encouraged by the Soviet leadership a "concentrated move against the opposition" was announced in autumn that year. A series of repressive measures followed, including political trials of representatives of non-communist political parties and, after 1950, of some members of the ruling elite. The "purification of public life", as the mass expulsion of people from management positions and from their jobs was termed, opened up an era of "encadrement" and constantly repeated purges and became a tool of personal politics as one of the foundations of the monopoly of power. It was a very effective means of silencing real or potential critics of the regime. Those who had been negatively screened were excluded from qualified work and generally forced into manual labour, and their very freedom was threatened. This situation created an atmosphere of fear, limitation of political freedom and social rights, first and foremost the right to work and to education, as children of people who had been negatively screened were not allowed to attend university. The screening affected not only individuals but also associations and many of the latter were disbanded after the 1948 coup.

One part of this "concentrated move" was the so called class provision, which was seen as one of the means to eliminate the middle classes. Self-employed individuals did not receive coupons for food and other goods and had to buy them on the open market at greatly inflated prices. This pressure on their everyday lives, together with the general social climate, resulted in a mass movement of small entrepreneurs out of private business. Their work was not replaced and this led to a chronic shortage of services. In 1948-1949 the promised alternative of retaining private farms which applied in Poland, for example, was rejected. By the end of the 1950s agriculture had been completely collectivised, where necessary by force.

The "class-directed cadre policy" helped create power groups even in the lower echelons of power, bringing wide-ranging transfers of people between different administrative and economic bodies. Even though many prominent specialists emigrated after February 1948, there were still many trained technical and managerial personnel who

were able and to a certain extent willing to work under the new conditions. However in the course of a few months almost half of those in top managerial positions as well as hundreds of people in lower-ranking positions were replaced.

Their places were taken by workers coming directly off the shop floor with no, or in some cases with only a few days training. In 1950 30% of those in management positions were former manual workers with only elementary education or vocational training. By 1957 this had risen to over 50%. This headlong replacement of professionals with the "new intelligentsia from the ranks of the working class" meant a devaluing of education and qualified work. This affected all spheres, state and local administration, the army, police, diplomatic service, the press and so on. Unofficial estimates place the number of workers promoted from the production process to leadership positions between 1948 and 1952 at 200,000 [Kalinová 1993a: 108-111]. This upward mobility went arm in arm with the downward mobility of tens of thousands of professions [Kalinová 1967] and a sharp drop in the level of qualifications in all spheres of the economy and administration.

From 1951 there was a gradual application of the Soviet model of central planning which was fundamentally anti-efficient. The shortages that were its fundamental characteristic were the fruit of the behaviour of centre, enterprises and population. In an economy of rationing it was better for firms to maximise their resources and minimise their production (i.e. the so-called reverse mini/max) [Šulc 1993: 98], and this led to wastage and economic inefficiency. The adoption of this model was part of the massive upgrading of the five-year plan in 1951. Czechoslovakia was intended to become the machine shop and arms supplier of the "socialist camp" in the cold war. These plans called for a fundamental restructuring of the economy, with far-reaching social consequences. The high tempo of the development of heavy industry and the high costs of armaments limited the possibility of increasing personal consumption. The extension of free social services meant a rapid rise in social incomes between 1948 and 1953 (i.e. in the so-called social consumption). The share of personal consumption in national consumption fell from 75% to 59% while the share of social consumption rose from 5% to 7%. The massive expenditure on armaments swallowed up 10% of national revenue, more than social consumption. In such a situation even a wide-ranging redistribution could not prevent disenchantment and the loss of illusions even among the privileged groups. The currency reform in 1953 which robbed people's savings of most of their value gave rise to an outburst of accumulated dissatisfaction. Workers' demonstrations in Plzeň and in other cities represented a real threat to power [Kaplan 1993].

The crisis situation in 1953 was the first serious warning to the forces in power of the collapse of the "social contract" with their original supporters in society. In that year and again in those following, particularly at the beginning of the 1960s, it became clear that a system founded on promises of social security unlinked with economic efficiency was unsustainable. In the second half of the 1950s the inefficiency of production, the outdated technical development and the poor management became patently obvious. In response to these warning signals and to the situation in the USSR and in neighbouring communist countries, the Czechoslovakia leadership decided on certain changes. Some capital was moved from heavy to light industry and the rate of collectivisation was slowed down. The measures included the introduction of so-called systemization, which meant that requirements for a certain level of education were set. It was supposed that

those workers who lacked such qualifications would be able to gain them through special education.

The wave of criticism of the regime that was roused by the revelation of the crimes of stalinism in 1956 and by the events in Hungary led the rulers to try and silence criticism by announcing a battle against revisionism, a new campaign of encadrement and the abandonment of education requirements for leading workers. Systemization was denounced as "an attack on working cadres", and as "a move away from the basics of correct assessment of political reliability" ([Kalinová 1993b: 152], see archival sources cited). In October 1957 a new "class political screening" was announced, justified by the claim that "people who are unreliable both politically and from the class point of view are working in central offices under the cloak of their expertise". A quarter of the 28,000 people in central bodies in the Czech Lands who were screened were moved to lower-ranking posts, to manual labour or forcibly retired. Thousands more in research and educational bodies were also affected (State Central Archive and the archives of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, 02/2, 217). This purge eliminated thousands of professionals and temporarily silenced criticism of the regime.

The new wave of expulsions of a part of the intelligentsia in science and the economy took place at a time when Czechoslovakia's technological backwardness had already been officially recognised. (Theses of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and the Government in 1955). In the second half of the 1950s it became clear that the egalitarian distribution of incomes also played a role in limiting technical development and economic efficiency, principally due to the low level of professionals in comparison with manual workers. Any change to the salary structure required major financial input and considerable courage to override the opposition of less qualified workers. By the end of the 1950s the ratio of salaries of manual workers to professionals had improved slightly to 100 : 134, but with the economic decline of the early 1960s the ratio fell back to its 1953 level (100 : 126).

Throughout the period of state socialism, it proved impossible to change the established salary structure due to opposition from less qualified workers, even though it was more marked than in the Soviet Union or Poland (where it was about 100 : 165). Not only did Czechoslovakia have a greater level of earnings' levelling, but the general attitude towards the intelligentsia was also worse than elsewhere in the Soviet block. This was noted by the Soviet delegation visiting Czechoslovakia in 1953, which remarked that it had not met such sectarianism with relation to the intelligentsia in any other country [Kalinová 1967].

The crisis in 1953 and the years following was distinctly a social one. The headlong restructuralisation and the unsustainable rate of growth of heavy industry and employment, together with the rapid transformation of a pluralist political system and a mixed economy to a largely Soviet model of control of all aspects of life in society brought greatly increased tensions in society. The deep-reaching changes in many directions at one and the same time brought major social movement and a change in status for a large part of the population. The expropriation of not only large but also medium and small scale businesses turning their owners into employees attacked the very basis of the functioning of society, eliminating a whole set of management workers in business and social institutions. This broke down such social relations and values as responsibility and initiative at work and stable property relations. The transformation process was linked

with a change in foreign economic and political orientation, which also affected society greatly. The shock when the full depth of Stalinist crimes in the Soviet Union and also to some extent in Czechoslovakia was revealed in 1953, and then again in 1956 to an even greater degree, also contributed to the crisis.

The 1950s saw another decisive stage in the changing of social structure. While the first stage, up to 1948, saw the disappearance of agricultural workers and large scale entrepreneurs, in the following years small and middle-sized businesses also disappeared. Between 1950 and 1961 the number of small and medium farmers fell from 19% to 2.5% of the total population. A new category of cooperative agricultural peasants appeared, reaching 13.2% of the population by 1961, with a similar status to employees [*Historická*... 1985: 424]. Subsequent changes in the relative proportions of the main groups in society were only slight, but their professional and educational composition did change. This contributed to a change in value orientations and attitudes to life of the new generation now emerging. Its members had not suffered the traumas of the 1930s and the war and so expected and actively supported the moves to reform society.

In the 1960s the growing sense of fear declined, partly due to the external situation. A certain lifting of the ideological terror opened the way for a flood of academic and artistic debate in culture and the social sciences. The greatest direct relevance was the development of an economic way of thinking which exerted pressure on the political ruling apparatus. Major economic reforms were drafted and started being implemented. The reforms of the second half of the 1960s had wide support in society, even among less qualified groups. During the Prague Spring, the majority of manual workers joined in demonstrations in support of the reform programme. This process, which was gradually moving further and further away from the original plan of reform socialism, ran aground on the opposition from external forces and small groups of conservative apparatchiks. (There is ample documentation of this process in both historical and sociological literature, including [Machonin 1992] and [Mencl 1993].)

3. The Social System in the Period of "Normalisation"

The interruption of the reform process by foreign intervention was a turning point in people's attitude to the ruling powers. The remaining post-war illusion of a large number of people that it was possible to build a just society had been badly shaken in 1953-56. In the 1960s public confidence in the possibility of reforming socialism so as to introduce greater democracy and economic efficiency had been partially restored. The Warsaw Pact intervention in August 1968 became a lasting trauma on a par with the betrayal of the Munich Agreement.

People found various ways of expressing their opposition to the occupation and the move away from the principles of the Prague Spring. In autumn 1968 there were open demonstrations, with the best organised protest again coming from students, who called a strike against the occupation on 17th November (the anniversary of the Nazi attack on Czech universities). This attitude, together with such related sacrifices as Jan Palach's self-immolation, demonstrated their unwillingness to accept the loss of national independence and the political changes made after January 1968.

The political changes in April 1969 influenced the nature of popular opposition. On the first anniversary of the occupation in August 1969 students and other young people took to the streets but after the violent police attack on all forms of resistance, fear

and resignation became prevalent. Only a few groups of intellectuals began to issue various proclamations and calls to the population to protect the last remnants of the Prague Spring. With Charter 77 the dissident movement concentrated on the fight to protect human rights and freedoms against the political and social persecution of a substantial part of the population [see Otáhal 1993 and 1994]. The new power structures wielded various instruments of persecution to quieten public opposition, from heavy-handed police intervention to political trials of members of the opposition and later of dissidents.

The most effective weapon to break up the opposition forces was once again "screening". Differences between former protagonists of the Prague Spring reappeared in 1969, when some of them refused to work with the new leaders, tens of thousands emigrated, the majority failed to pass the screening in 1970, and the rest stayed loyal. The ardent "normalizers" took over the media and provided only officially approved information. A wide-ranging screening was then begun in order to purge all areas of social life of "right-wing opportunists and anti-Soviet forces". A number of careerists capitalised on this screening to gain high recognition from the forces in power and so the opportunity for rapid advancement in their career. Some of the places left open by those negatively screened, as well as a number of newly created posts, were also filled by young people who were politically indifferent.

The attack was directed primarily against both top and rank-and-file workers in the sciences, culture, universities and masss media considered to belong to the "ideological sphere". Virtually all those working in these fields were expelled and whole organisations were disbanded. In the economy too, as in all areas of social life, the most capable people were stripped of their posts and dismissed. They were forbidden to do any qualified work and many had their passports confiscated and were unable to travel. A total of 326,817 people were expelled from the Communist Party and when non-party-members and family members were included, the number of people deprived of a part of their political and social rights amounted to almost one fifth of the population [Belda 1993: 95-99].

This was the greatest purge in the forty-year development of state socialism which was unique among the communist countries, particularly following the condemnation of such repressions after 1956. When the powers of normalisation ejected a large part of the creative scientific, educational, artistic and technical intelligentsia from public life, it condemned itself to isolation from the nation's intellectual elite. Those in their middle years at the height of their creativity were worst affected by the purge and the subsequent persecution, particularly in the Czech Lands. In Slovakia a lesser proportion of the population was affected and so some professionals from the Czech Lands sought lower-ranking positions in Slovakia, while a considerable number of Slovaks found better jobs in federal and other institutions in the Czech Lands.

The posts vacated in the purge were filled not only by strong supporters of normalisation, but also by young people who were ready to adapt to the new regime. This interrupted the process begun in the 1960s, when a new generation of more capable professionals had begun to replace the apparatchiks of the 1950s. However, even "normalisation" could not completely halt intellectual progress. Many of those working in the social sciences concentrated on areas that were ideologically neutral. Even under these conditions some people studied new-classical economics and modern sociology, a good preparation for the later transformation to a market system [Šulc 1996].

The stringent suppression of the opposition and the intimidation of other members of the population was not enough to maintain the discredited government, and it had to recreate a system of social corruption to quieten public dissatisfaction. This included a price freeze which was to counter-balance the price rises that had been necessary in 1968. In 1971 the 14th Congress of the Communist Party announced a programme, later confirmed by the government, aimed primarily at the young people they saw as the greatest threat. Moves to support young families were introduced, including special loans for newly-weds, an extension of paid maternity leave until a child's second birthday and an increase in child benefits. With economic growth, normalisation policy could increase personal consumption, at least temporarily, through price subsidies and imports of consumer goods, rather than the urgently needed modern technology. Such moves, however, only postponed the stagnation of the standard of living until the early 1980s.

In the 1970s and 1980s the whole style of life in the country changed. This was partly due to the introduction of a five-day working week in 1968 and a certain tolerance of private activity. These years saw people turning to their holiday homes, private cars and self-built private houses and cooperative flats. To some extent, the regime tolerated this activity in order to turn people away from public affairs and thus de facto supported the spread of the second economy. Moonlighting, bribes, currency swindles, the grey and black economies and the "second society" all spread. This second economy compensated for shortages of goods and services within the official economy and made it possible to satisfy the greatly increased demands particularly of those people who had access to the distribution of goods and services in short supply. This new redistribution contributed an increased differentiation of unofficial incomes and consumption.

In the second half of the 1970s economic efficiency again dropped, as in 1961-63, and the rate of economic growth slowed bringing increased imbalance in the national economy and a negative balance of trade. The restoration of central planning and the low level of adaptability of the economy left little room to adapt to changing times. The abolition of obsolete branch structures and the inefficient energy intensive production was not even socially feasible. The guarantee of work was seen as a guarantee of remaining in a certain post and this inhibited occupational and geographic mobility. Fear of the rising level of social tension was an unavoidable obstacle in the way of the necessary social change.

The distribution processes with their lack of motivation were typical of the command system that had been reinstated in the economy. The slow growth of earnings did not permit the income differences which would have allowed the elimination of former egalitarianism. The ratio between the earnings of manual workers and other employees fell to 100 : 115. Greater income differences were however appearing within the main categories of workers, particularly with the raising of the salaries of top managers and other members of the nomenclatura. In 1984 the salaries of the former were 40% higher than those of people doing creative workers in research and development. In this period the increase income differentiation did not correspond to the achievement principle. There were disproportionate differences between wages in mining and processing industries, between production and public services, between men and women, and between workers of different ages [*Mzdy*... 1988]. In the 1970s and 1980s there was a growing discordance between the complexity of work and the remuneration for it, leading to increased inefficiency. Income differences were a sign of the distribution of jobs and of

status within the governing hierarchy, rather than of complexity of work and performance. The main factors in deciding household income were demographic, being primarily the number of wage earners and of children. The shortage of many types of goods and services led to a growth of alternative channels and an illegal market both inside and outside the state sector.

Comparing the society of the 1960s with the years of "normalisation" the greatest difference was the creation of a new power apparatus with unlimited power, which enriched itself from both official incomes and from those illegal ones gained from the access to various privileges, to various reciprocal services, priority access to supplies and so on. The new "small entrepreneurs" in the second economy probably profited even more, capitalising on the shortage of goods and services on the home market to earn high tax-free incomes. Thus income differences grew but without any relation to performance. This second economy became an organic part of satisfying people's demands and so also of the growth of national income and consumption. In some professions tips, bribes and so on represented the major part of earnings. The level of illegal earnings was estimated at 10% of declared earnings [Sova 1989: 212].

During the years of "normalisation" the changing relationship between incomes from employment and those from social benefits was another factor which served to lessen motivation. Real wages rose by 14.6% between 1975 and 1985, while income from social benefits rose by 35.6% People's increasing social ease [Turek 1995: 60] due to the increase in social protection for a part of the population, tolerance of low efficiency and the satisfaction of needs even at the cost of a growing second economy, did not bring the expected support for the ruling elite, but was only a certain tolerance on the part of the silent majority. The growth of corruption and privilege aroused bitter opposition even among less qualified people. The inability of the ruling elite to react even to those changes which were under way in certain other communist countries at the time did much to discredit it particularly in the eyes of the younger generation. The generational shift during the years of normalisation had brought a new dynamism to the social structure. Despite all the limitations the new generation now appearing was better educated than that of the 1960s, with a different set of values. At the end of the 1980s the critical attitude of the majority of the population and the changes in other countries meant that the ruling elite became completely isolated and made their departure from the scene unavoidable.

4. Notes on the Nature of the Social System in the Last Decades from the Point of View of its Transformation

It is only possible to evaluate these forty years of social history in Czechoslovakia in the context of changes in the systems in other countries. In the first few years after the war the philosophy of the state having a strong presence in the economy was current in all developed countries, including its greater responsibility for providing social protection for its citizens. The new economic situation in the 1970s threw Keynesian theory and then the welfare state itself into crisis. Most countries were successful in adapting to the new situation, albeit at the cost of considerable suffering, particularly mass unemployment. Under these conditions the reapplication in Czechoslovakia of the 1950s system of an inefficient centrally planned economy, political totalitarianism, egalitarianism and inconsistent status was an unsustainable anachronism. However even Hungary and the

other countries which had already begun to reform the existing system could not really cope with the difficult challenge to their adaptability.

Social security was a firm priority in the system of state socialism and for this reason social policy was used as a means of retaining power, particularly in times of crises. There remains therefore the question of what level of social protection was attained in Czechoslovakia in comparison with the developed countries of Europe. This question is all the more relevant because the indicators show that before the second world war social expenditure as a percentage of the gross national product was approximately the same in the Czech Lands as in Austria (about 6%). In Great Britain and Germany the percentage was higher (7.8% and 14% respectively) [*The Cost...* 1960]. According the OECD method of calculating social expenditure in member countries was about 13% of GDP in 1961 and 25% in 1981, compared with 11.1% and 17% in Czechoslovakia. The relative levels in Czechoslovakia and the European Union are similar, with social expenditure in 1991 reaching 26% of GDP in the latter and 23% in Czechoslovakia [*Social Expenditure...* 1985: 21-24].

The structure of social expenditure is equally as important as its overall level. Here Czechoslovakia differed from the majority of developed country in having a lower level of expenditure on pensions (5% compared with 7% in Germany and 10% in France) and a higher level on health care and child benefits. This tendency is also underlined by the so-called measure of compensation for social risk. According to this indicator the level of social risk in health care in 1960s Czechoslovakia was 92%, while in Germany it was 75% and in Austria 66% [Hiršl 1965: 68].

The quantitative values of a share of the social product do not really correspond to the real value of social protection for the population. Because of the lesser economic efficiency this was lower in Czechoslovakia than in those European countries with a developed welfare state. The system of social insurance in Czechoslovakia was however more convenient in many respects than in those countries.

The main difference from systems of social protection in developed countries was that none of the "social states", not even the highly developed Swedish model, had abandoned the market mechanism, but only tried to correct its faults. In the state socialist countries the social system was a fundamental part of the system of central planning, in which the state provided its citizens with social services and employment. Social benefits and services were allotted to citizens and so could easily become a means of manipulating public confidence in the interests of the political authorities. Raising social benefits at a time when they were falling behind rising prices could be presented as a gift from the party and the government. (In developed countries social systems are based on consensus and changes in them affect voting preferences, which was not possible under a totalitarian system.)

The meagre social security gradually provided to all citizens and the equally meagre level of earnings (which meant that it was only due to the high level of female employment that family incomes were adequate) were compensated for by convenience in other aspects: over-employment, tolerance of low efficiency and poor quality of work, cheap accommodation and other inexpensive services (recreation, transport, public canteens, cultural services, etc.). These services were also in short supply, however, and so during the years of "normalisation" they too were prey to corruption and the black market.

The social history of Czechoslovakia before 1989 has undeniably left its mark on both the course and nature of the post-communist transformation. In spite of all the declarations about social security, social expenditure as a percentage of the social product was not very high in Czechoslovakia. Pensions were lower in relation to earnings than, for example, in Hungary. By keeping social expenditure within certain limits the communist leadership in Czechoslovakia had also kept down the level of its foreign debt. The attitude of the public towards changes in the social system is a key question in the post-communist transformation. The first steps in the reform, which included a major reduction in real earnings and social benefits and moves towards changing the comfortably paternalistic universalism to a residual form of social state, were accepted with a certain measure of tolerance. This can be partly explained by the fact, borne out by many international opinion surveys, that people in Czechoslovakia were less nostalgic for "the good old times" than in the majority of post-communist countries, in which communism, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, was less discredited than in Czechoslovakia.

Translated from Czech by April Retter

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A Survey of Post-World War II Works Concerning Social Historiography in Czechoslovakia

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Abstract: The survey shows the results of post-war historiography focused on social problems. Having overcome the dogmatic Marxism era, the historical science of the 1960s noted the expansion of objective and non-ideologized efforts to research social classes and strata including their standard of life. Features of that effort and important papers and works are mentioned herein. The text presented touches briefly a new wave of interest in knowing the so-called "state socialism" social face. At the end, the authors draw attention to new works on social history of the post-Communist time period.

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Problems concerning the social structure seen as a complex social organism, where individual classes, social strata and groups are interconnected with innumerable economic, social and political-ideological links, and as the position of these social components within the frame of the whole social system were one of the priority areas the historical research was focused on in post-war Czechoslovakia. At first, researching this area of historical reality did not raise a great deal of interest. Paradoxically, this theme was totally omitted by Czechoslovak historical science in the very first period of the dogmatic attachment to Soviet Stalinism based on a rigid class comprehension of the social evolution. It perhaps occurred because the establishment of the Communist rule brought a discontinous disruption of the previous social structure and its forced transformation based on the Stalinist model.

Only the ascension of the objective, non-ideological historical knowledge supported by sources analysis and a non-dogmatic approach to Marxism, in the second half of the 1960s, led to many written papers and articles in which a relatively ample portrait of the post-war Czechoslovak society was created. An extraordinary attention was paid to the time period prior to February 1948 (attempts at interpreting the political evolution of this period in a new way, i.e. establishing an adequate framework for social history analyses), as well as the 1950s, when the groundwork of the so-called state socialism was built up by the Communist regime.

The late 1950s and early 1960s started to show historians' interest in these problems. Gradually, it became clear that the historiography saw social questions as a necessary and integral component of post-war historical research.

Marta Vartíková [1960] was one of the first specialists who tried to characterise the likeness of the working class – already with the ideological stress on the "leading"

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role of workers – and its social modifications within the time period between the end of the war and the declaration of the "Socialist" Constitution in 1960. A bit later, Karel Jech [1963] chose the peasantry to be extensively analysed during the period of 1945-1948. Along with a conventional explanation concerning transformations of workers and peasants' alliances during the struggle for the Communist power monopoly, he offered several impulses to research the peasantry more comprehensively. Věra Jarošová and Oldřich Jaroš [1965] also integrated into their papers the analysis of the social position and internal composition of the Slovak working class (on the background of the social structure of the Slovak society) and the role of this social group in post-liberation revolutionary processes. Thus, they stressed the significance of historical-social analyses for the understanding of historical reality – in spite of the fact that they mainly tried to justify the worker's struggle for power by making full use of social facts. Analogous processes inside the intelligentsia were described regionally [Linhart 1965].

New authors became interested in researching the historical evolution of the social sphere in spite of being forced to use political approaches, notions and processes as decisive interpretation factors. New unused and unknown information emerged although it still had to support conventional explanations about the positive influence of political events on the metamorphosis of social groups. In his study, Zdeněk Deyl [1965a, 1965b] began to research various social categories both in the pre-February 1948 and post-February period. His work witnessed the gradual weakening of the narrow class view and the strengthening of objectively grounded approaches. In accordance with the tendency of some to see the 1945-1948 period as the so-called specific Czechoslovak way to socialism, Mr Deyl treated analogically the sphere of mutual relations between social classes and strata and social policy. He tried to explain the notions of socialism and democracy in a new way studying the issue in the light of the concrete relations between the working class and the small city bourgeoisie or city middle class as a whole.

The mid-sixties were a certain turning point for social history, bringing political liberalisation, reform attemps in economics and rapid expansion in scientific knowledge without the burden of dogmatic Marxism. The objective study of the previous development and of the current position of classes and groups within the state socialist society, the study of their character, social activity and social transformations was propelled by the works of the team of sociologists led by Pavel Machonin. During the late 1960s, various publications [Machonin et al. 1967, 1969; Deyl and Kerner 1967] showed the results of their extensive efforts. Starting with 1966, papers and studies by Czechoslovak historians were appearing to discover different aspects of the social life and activity of the working class, private farmers, small bourgeoisie, intelligentsia and also co-operative farmers and co-operative workers in other branches originated during the 1950s [Kalinová 1966, 1967a; Maňák 1967].[1] At least, some unnatural consequences of the political interventions into social processes and the life of original classes were being unveiled.

[1]) Or the miscellany *K politickým a sociálně-ekonomickým proměnám v ČSR v letech 1948-1953*, Praha 1967 with papers by Z. Deyl [1967] a L. Kalinová [1967b], where basic modification trends are followed inside the working class after 1945 and transformations of small production as the consequence of post-February during the 1st Five-Years Plan.

Finally, even attempts at analysing structurally the social face of the Czechoslovak post-war society were made. As the first historian, Karel Kaplan [1967] made use of the structural analysis taking also into account social parameters, social composition and relations among various groups and classes to get a view on the complex post-war society. He developed fully this approach in his following work which became the first monography based on a thorough structural analysis of the Czechoslovak society and its individual social components. The impact of the nationalisation on social transformation and the post-war society structure grew into a linchpin of the analysis, supported by the analysis of new economic and property relations and their development under the so-called "economic democracy" conditions which still admitted the private initiative and market competition in the post-war period being renewed in spite of the dominant role of the nationalised sector [Kaplan 1968].

This method was being developed, completed in a deluge of new works crossing the February 1948 border. Their authors mostly co-operated on the basis of a common programme. They were strongly determined to discover actually existing social features of post-war transformations and – more and more frequently – post-February economic and social processes including the use of violent administrative means. This is documented by collections of papers that were published in various publications and special journal issues. A rapid expansion of the Czechoslovak reform movement following January 1968 created a positive political security environment for those scientific efforts [Kalinová 1968a, 1968b; Maňák 1968; Hanzel 1968; Jech 1968; Kalinová and Brabec 1968; Deyl 1968; Brabec 1968a].

The process of improving the historical research of the post-war Czechoslovak society after 1966 was characterised by several features. Firstly, historians working for the Communist Party scientific establishments took an active part in fighting for theoretical and practical reform approaches long before January 1968 (many studies presented were published in Party journals and publications). Secondly, their works enabled an overall and complex view on the social changes in the pre-February society, while analyses of class and social groups position during the 1950s remained rather probes, although some were rather enlightened. There was no overall historical synthesis for the post-February time period, which would be similar to the monography written by Kaplan. Neither the theoretical postulates and knowledge derived by Machonin's team from the analysis of the 1960s social reality could become a spring-board for historic-social analyses of the 1960s because of the lack of historical time distance. Bibliographers of that time did not omit to make documentation on the extensive effort of historians and sociologists in getting acquainted with social transformations [Cejpová 1968].

Despite the Soviet invasion suppressing quickly the hopeful political development of 1968, new contributions to the theme were published in 1969 [Kalinová 1969a, 1969b]. Even the non-typical component of the Czechoslovak working class – the agricultural proletariat – was focused on [Lacina 1971]. Problems of the social structure and its components found its due place in the first synthetical Czechoslovak Economic History, when Václav Průcha and Rudolf Olšovský [1969] enriched their first attempt explaining the economical history up to the mid-1950s by adjoining brief explanations concerning social structure.[2]

[2]) V. Průcha also analyzed thoroughly the position of workers between 1918 and 1945.

Almost the whole of the following decade made historians silent as for the social history. The "normalisation" organised by Husák's Communist Party leadership limited rapidly or excluded completely possibilities of publishing such kind of works.

* * *

During the late 1970s, some historians who had "survived" the persecution, along with the new generation of scientists tried to overcome the existing "normalizatory" politico-ideological apprehension of the contemporary history. They started researching extensive social processes of the post-war period. They really induced a new wave of interest in the issue of social structure changes. At the very first, attention was paid to the social structure as a whole, the working class inside being taken for the most important subject of the Soviet-type society according to the ruling Communist ideology and power. The interest in questions connected with classes and groups, their political profile, economic activity, internal class differentiation, social face and origin of class members, questions contingently connected with other special aspects of the historical research like professional qualification, working conditions and cultural level of individual classes and groups exceeded the pre-February period [Barnovský 1978; Vartíková 1978; Felcman 1984a, 1984b].

Slovak historians were particularly efficient in researching social questions, that is why the 1950s and the 1960s as well were given the due attention in Slovakia [Barnovský 1980, 1982; Vartíková 1980; Felcman 1980]. As for the last case, the steadily stronger or weaker stress on proving the justification for the working class leading role in society was "enriched" by looking for the causes behind the 1968 events within the social structure and inside the working class composition during the late 1960s [Gabaľ 1977, 1981].

Out of the works mentioned, the papers of Barnovský and monographs dealing with time-conditioned social processes (e.g. post-war resettlement of borderlands) and their reflecting in social structure were particularly characterised with good methodology able to bring, in spite of the obligatory ideologisation, considerable number of new data which were analytically gained [e.g. Slezák 1978].

From the group of historians who overpassed limits of dogmatic Marxism in 1960s, only L. Kalinová kept on publishing papers concerning mostly economic questions or labour force qualification during 1950s-1970s [Kalinová 1977, 1980]. Karel Kaplan and J. Krejčí exiled abroad continued writing on social questions [Kaplan 1981, Krejčí 1972]. An important monography of Zdeněk Mlynář [1983], which was useful for understanding social-economic base of the Soviet system, was also published abroad. Jaroslav Klofáč [1982a, 1982b] described the social structure evolution during the post-war period by means of the illegal "samizdat" (self-published) publications.

The interest in researching social structure of post-war Czechoslovakia maintained during the 1980s. Typically, it was being transferred from the whole of working class to individual professions or socially non-homogeneous strata [Hovorka 1985, Zdycha 1984] and, within the social structure, it moved from employees [Grešík 1983] to co-operative farmers. The analysis of this second social class within the state socialism social system was linked to an ample team task in researching the village collectivisation and the further productive and social evolution of rural areas. Collective efforts reached both nationwide and regional dimensions, during the 1980s, offering certain knowledge concerning

not only causes and course of both collectivisation waves, evolution of farmers' co-operatives (JZD) in the following decade, but also numerous facts on collectivisation impact on the rural social structure, everything being actually based on Marxist ideology. That research was focused both on private farmers in the eve of collectivisation and co-operative farmers and "state farms" employees.[3]

Papers on the urban petite-bourgeoisie appeared repeatedly, but only the Slovak's [Bálková 1983, 1986; Zelenák 1988] dealt with the post-February 1948 period. The structure of the post-war society also found its regional expression, the urban complexes were researched above all [Lukas 1986].

* * *

Many papers from those mentioned above which come from both the 1960s and the following "normalisation" period were interested not only in the socio-economic position of classes and social strata, but also, in particular, in the social living standards level of their members. Some historians preferred this line of research by working out independent papers [Maňák 1969] along with keeping on being interested in social structure. Others followed questions of social and working conditions as an independent problem within both nation-wide and regional scope, almost without taking the contemporary social structure into account [Martínek 1980, Wysocki 1966, Zahradník 1979].

While browsing through individual papers, one can find out that there was no deeper accordance in delimiting the notion of "social problems". Some historians saw it particularly as the evolution of wages, others understood it within a broader context as a complex of wages, salaries, post-war ration supply system, housing, employment and working condition questions. The theme was mostly analysed using concrete manifestations and transformations of the relevant social phenomena. However, at the end of the 1960s, some historians tried to analyse the trends of the Communist state official social policy in a deeper way, being interested in political circumstances of forming the living standard of both the whole society and its individual parts. Different interpretations of historical facts and events to those published in the 1950s or to recent official standpoints expressed by the highest Party authorities started to appear. The most complex approach of this kind can be found in Václav Brabec's works [1968b].

In spite of the limiting influence of the "normalisation" ideology, social problems became a comprehensive part of the economic history and later on, in the mid-1980s, they were included into attempts at describing the complex evolution of the Czechoslovak history during the so-called state socialist era [Průcha 1974, *K dějinám...* 1986].

A new view without an ideological burden and, above all, new interpretation approach is brought by the new post-November literature. Although the research is not conceived in a large-scale, it reaches substantial goals. A modest area of several smart publications show exactely which directions changes in the social structure (with the stress on researching not only past evolution, but also conditions of it), evolution of life style and standard of living and the development of the non-performance social system have taken. Such works have mainly been written by authors who belong to the genera-

[3]) The monography by S. Cambel [1972], was followed by almanacs [e.g. *Kapitoly...* 1982, *Formovanie...* 1984].

tion that contributed fundamentally to the development of the social historiography during the 1960s.

K. Kaplan presents such contributions in a wider temporal range [Kaplan 1993, *K proměnám...* 1993], P. Machonin [1992], within the context of the 1960s, using a sociological and social-historical approach, L. Kalinová [1993] stresses social-economic analysis of social structure development in the 1970s and 1980s system. Political elites begin newly to be researched as a specific part of the social structure [Koutská and Svátek 1994].

A contemporary research of questions mentioned is a completely new chapter in analysing post-war social reality. That reality is seen in close connection with recent political evolution, enabling the post-November historiography to have a thorough view on the bases and crisis factors of the so-called state socialism social system.

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The Use of Sociological Knowledge and Methods in the Study of History

This article does not aspire to an overall examination of the subject posed in the title, but to something rather more modest: to analyze the concrete experience of the teamwork by representatives of these two social sciences investigating those developments in this country which climaxed in the attempt at social reform in 1968. Not all historical material is suitable for the application of sociological knowledge and methods, but there are areas in which a true and convincing picture of the past is not possible without the use of such methods. 1968, the events which led up to it and their fateful outcome fall into the latter group.

The necessity of including sociologists in any investigation of the events leading up to the Prague Spring of 1968 arises out of the very character of society at that time.

The processes under way in Czechoslovak society at the end of the 1950s were reshaping it on the basis of new relationships which were founded on individuals' position in society, given their education and qualification, the complexity of their work and their style of life. This caused deep rifts in the original class division of society, since basic social differences began to emerge within one and the same class. Thus a new type of social differentiation began to appear in Czechoslovakia – an apparently vertical stratification based on the increasing spread of the principle of achievement. This process of stratification came up against the prescribed equality of incomes, which worked in favour of the less well-trained and qualified workers within any one stratum. The egalitarian distribution of incomes and the allocation of cadres with this were rooted in the period immediately after February 1948 and the new interpretation brought by the communists. Its fruits were a high percentage of people in management positions without appropriate qualifications and the privileging of a large proportion of labourers. This undemocratic organisation was thus supported both actively and passively by that part of the population for whom this equality was an advantage. It also contributed to the functional interdependence between the bureaucratic apparatus and the groups of workers and employers who were unfairly favoured by the egalitarian system of compensation.

Other social conflicts also developed against the background of this fundamental conflict of interests. Social and political tensions were on the rise in Slovakia, where society was still largely agrarian and the traditional way of life was still strongly in evidence, even though some indicators showed it to be drawing closer to the level of the Czech Lands. In these circumstances, the rapidly increasing younger part of the population was no longer prepared to put up with the country's unequal constitutional position. The new and more highly educated generation which came on the scene in the 1960s had lower incomes, lower standing in their professions and a much lesser share of power, and this made them an extremely sensitive group in society. Social tensions were also heightened between the rapidly growing group of highly qualified professionals and those who lacked qualifications but nevertheless held a large number of posts. The rising level of qualifications also began to make itself felt within the structures of power, where an influential core of young qualified pro-reform people was growing. Nor were the topmost positions in the power structure devoid of conflict, and this created some room for social and political change. The rising tensions also affected the communist party, the size of which made it a mirror for all the conflicts which were appearing in society.

Czech and Slovak society at the beginning of the 1960s was at a crossroads, with a sizable group interested in social and economic change. Opposing them were those forces for whose very existence it was essential to maintain the egalitarian and bureaucratic order unchanged or even to revert to the situation in the first years after February 1948. Conflicts of interest and aims among the decision-makers in the society led them inevitably into conflict and the nature of these interests meant that society as a whole was drawn into the conflict.

The above is a brief and necessarily schematic outline of the state of political development in this country at the time when the reform movement appeared and spread. Through these developments, the Czechoslovak

society acquired those fundamental sociological characteristics[1] which were presented to the Government Commission, set up shortly after November 1989 to analyze the events of 1967-1970.[2] The commission aimed to provide an objective evaluation of the events and it saw the developments in society in the decade leading up to 1968 as the determining factor.

It is also worthwhile asking what methods and what basic information are needed to make sense of the complex reality of those years. It is not enough to analyze the changes in Czech and Slovak society, or even the relations between the countries of the Warsaw Pact and the international power relations.

To some degree the commission recognised the importance of these factors and it therefore decided on a multi-disciplinary study and, as well as historians (who formed the majority), it included lawyers, political scientists and sociologists. Among the latter participated Pavel Machonin, who had carried out the general survey on social differences and mobility in Czechoslovakia in 1967.[3]

The commission also invited other individuals to provide the basic sociological information necessary when considering social development in the crisis years. Róbert Roško wrote a paper on the predominant features of Slovak social structure in the 1960s, Josef Bečvář contributed with an extensive study on public opinion surveys in 1968-1969 and J. Hudeček also dealt with this in his article on opinion surveys concerning the political system in 1968. The commission also received a paper from Lenka Kalinová on the development of the social structure in Czechoslovakia, and various sociologists, Pavel Machonin, Josef Alan, Petr Matějů and Lubomír Brokl, put forward their views in internal discussions on particular aspects of the problems.

The mountain of material received by the team was a virtual "embarras de richesse". They were given special rights of access to all national archives, including those of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSČ), the Office of the President, the presidium of the government, the Ministries of Internal Affairs, National Defence and others, as well as certain important foreign archives including that of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. Over three years they collected 125,000 pages of previously unavailable documents and from this basis they tried to cast new light on certain parts of the recent past.

The original time limit set for the commission was twice extended and it eventually came to an end at the same moment as the government that had created, in 1992. The three years it had worked proved to be too short a time to write a solid and wide-ranging work on the efforts to reform Czechoslovak society in the 1960s. The commission thus decided to include only some of the sociological information at its disposal in its final report.[4] This was mostly information obtained from public opinion surveys, primarily concerning people's political views.

In the end, only a very small part of the sociological material which could cast new light on the commission's analysis was used, and this was taken primarily from the studies

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1) See Machonin, P. 1992. *Sociální struktura Československa v předvečer Pražského jara* (The Social Structure of Czechoslovakia on the Eve of the Prague Spring). Praha: Karolinum.

2) The Government appointed Dr. Vojtěch Mencl as Chairman of the Commission with Dr. Jozef Jablonický and Dr. Václav Kural as deputy chairmen, and the author of this article was its academic secretary. Seventeen further members were appointed and many historians, lawyers, economists, political scientists, philosophers, sociologists and politicians both from Czechoslovakia and abroad collaborated within the project.

3) Machonin, P. et al. 1969. *Československá společnost. Sociologická analýza sociální stratifikace* (Czechoslovak Society. A Sociological Analysis of Social Stratification). Bratislava: Epocha.

4) *Československo roku 1968* (Czechoslovakia 1968). 1993. Vol. 1: *Obrodný proces* (The Process of Revival). Prague: Porta. The commission also worked on a much more extensive version of this work, which can be found in the archives of the Institute of Modern History of the Czech Academy of Sciences.

by Machonin and Roško. This may have been due to the existence of certain barriers between the various academic disciplines, including history and sociology. Machonin's and Roško's work was written in the language of sociology and used sociological methods, in the assumption that their historian colleagues would be able to understand the sociological approach and its importance for historical research. The historians were not sufficiently well-prepared for such interdisciplinary collaboration. Nor, however, did the sociologists do as much as they could have to help the historians, by providing something of the background knowledge which would have made it so much easier to understand the appearance, development and failure of the reform movement. But this is all the fault that can be found. The fundamental reason for the limited success of the collaboration between these two disciplines and for the inclusion of only the less important sociological aspects in the historical analysis, lies elsewhere.

The documents in the archives were primarily political in nature and the members of the government commission were only too easily drawn to concentrate on the political developments in Czech and Slovak society in the 1960s. The commission saw its first task as the preparation of "studies of the material", dealing purely with original documents. As 1968 was seen as a collision between reforming and conservative forces in society, with the principle field of conflict being within the communist party, the historians concentrated on political materials, documenting the development of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and of the ruling parties of the other countries of the Warsaw Pact.

This approach left no room for considering the development of Czech and Slovak society, the move from a class division of society to its stratification and the resulting conflicts between the interests of different groups, or for analyzing the relationships between different interests, political views and their ideological expression. These are however things which it is difficult or even impossible to understand through the usual methods of historical analysis.

The unwillingness of certain members of the government commission to go beyond the limits of archival materials, to move away from the strictly political and investigate the origins and real significance of the conflicts which the documents bore witness to, inevitably affected the results of their work. The socio-economic processes which began in the late 1950s, and which sociologists discussed in their studies prepared for the commission and which were mentioned at the beginning of this article, gradually contributed to the shifts in sizable parts of society, particularly a part of the Slovak intelligentsia, of Czech and Slovak youth and of the more highly qualified members of many social strata.

This movement first made itself felt in a change of mood. Václav Havel referred to it in the magazine *Kultura 60*, when he wrote that the popularity of the new Prague theatres "bears witness to a deep-reaching shift in the theatrical sense of the times".[5] Havel pointed out that his generation had grown up outside the political confrontation of the 1950s, and he saw the Semafor Theatre in Prague as a spontaneous manifestation of the feelings of this first non-ideological generation. The small theatres, followed somewhat later by the Za Branou Theatre and the Činoherní Club, were an integral part of a wider social movement. Havel also counted in with them the "new wave" of Czech film, some fine art (Medek, Klobasa, Šmidrová), the "New Music" group and the wave of Czech Big Beat, the happenings, the poetry of Hiršal and Grögrová, the writings of Linhartová, Hrabal, Škvorecký and Páral, the plays of Topol, and the group of poets clustered around the *Tvář* (Face) and *Sešity* (Notebooks) magazines, as well as the rapidly growing freedom within the social sciences.[6] There were also many signs of a growing sense of national identity in Slovakia and of the emergence of a

[5]) Havel, V. 1989. *Dálkový výslech.* Praha: Melantrich, p. 41. On several occasions I pointed out to my colleagues on the commission the importance of this work for a real understanding of the development of the reform movement.

[6]) Ibid., pp 45-47.

critique within the ranks of the Communist Party.

The sociologists provided the government commission with a view of the social movements of the 1960s as a long term process, deeply rooted in the changes in the socio-economic structure. The open crisis in the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the last months of 1967 marked the beginning of the political phase of this process. The political crisis showed how incapable the conservative leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSČ) was of adjusting its policies to the new conditions created by the social movements of the decade. The forces for reform within the KSČ, backed up by considerable support in society, reacted to these new conditions by creating a federal state, by introducing a greater degree of democracy into the political system and into social interaction, by mixing economic planning with market principles and a wide-ranging validity of expertise and achievement. The fact that the pro-reform forces responded to specific problems in society and to the deep-reaching processes already mentioned, ensured them wide-ranging support and gave them much greater force.

The Government Commission saw the currents of reform within the KSČ and in society at large as separate. They considered that society at the beginning of 1968 was still "relatively inert" and that the plenary session of the Central Committee of the KSČ in January that year was "basically just a struggle between two factions within the totalitarian system".[7] There was no explanation of how, in only a few short months, the struggle between two factions within the totalitarian system in a relatively inert society could produce a movement which forced one of the world's two super powers to send a force of 600,000 men and thousands of tanks against it.

It is clear that the reform movement in 1968 cannot be explained solely within the context of political history and indeed this was why the search for criteria to evaluate it within the latter failed. This was well documented by the Russian historian and archivist R. G. Pichoja, who published and discussed hitherto unknown documents on Czechoslovakia in 1960 from the meetings of the ‚Politbureau' in the USSR.[8] Pichoja gives a fundamentally different assessment of the reform movement and the policy of the Soviet leadership than that of the Commission. He sees the increasingly brutal pressure from the Soviet leadership on the Czechoslovak reformists as an expression of the very the interests of the USSR and of Communism, and Dubček as having irresponsibly rejected Brezhnev's demands and so as having ultimately forced Moscow to intervene militarily. Pichoja could defend the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia because he never moved beyond the archival material, identifying uncritically with the position of the Kremlin and with its political assessment of the Czechoslovak reform process, and because he equated this evaluation with historical truth.

The sociological analysis of social processes in this country which began in the late 1960s provides important indications as to the nature of the movement which emerged from these processes, showing it to be a social movement rather than purely a political one. This became eminently clear in summer 1968 and in the following eight months in which the civic movement for reform of the political system, the Slovak movement for national equality, the struggle of all active members of Czech and Slovak society for national independence, the efforts of young people, particularly students, to assert themselves as valued members of society, the efforts of workers and highly trained technicians to forge new relations within industry, the efforts of agricultural workers to affirm their rights, all came together into one complex movement aimed at overturning the bureaucratic egalitarianism of Czech and Slovak society. It was this very coming together of such varied currents that gave the reform movement its dynamism, its depth and its striking power, and determined its tragic outcome. The different currents within the movement did not come to reach their peak

[7]) *Československo roku 1968.* 1993 Vol. 1 *Obrodný proces.* Praha: Porta, p. 29.

[8]) Pichoja, R.G. "Чехословакия, 1968 год. Взгляд из Праги. По документам ЦК КПСС." *Новая и новейшая история*, 1994/6, 1995/1.

at the same time, nor did they all have the same opportunities to influence the decisions of the political leaders, who in any case had very little room to manoeuvre thanks to the pressure from the Kremlin and its allies. The conflict with foreign neo-Stalinist forces was however unavoidable. It was not only a clash between two political cultures, but also, and more importantly, between two societies at different stages of development.

The results of the sociological analysis could have helped the Government Commission to grasp the dramatic nature of this development and so provide a better picture of the many-layered political and social processes of the time. In some cases it would also have helped them evaluate certain phases or concrete events. Unlike the authors of the first volume of *Československo roku 1968*, I do not think that the manoeuvres of the Dubček leadership and their reaction to Soviet pressure (the ruling of the May session of the Central Committee of the KSČ) can be seen as completely mistaken.

One important sociological finding, principally due to Machonin's 1992 study, was the description of the basic types of social groupings whose interests lay in maintaining the social status quo (or even in a return to the situation immediately after February 1948) or on the other hand in their adaptation to different ways of understanding the new conditions. This made it possible for the government commission to try and determine whether these groupings had a political emphasis, and whether or how the relationship between certain socially economic groupings and political tendencies or currents, which appeared at the peak of the social crisis, was determined. The historians in the commission worked with a simplified map of the political forces. They divided the opponents of the reform movement within the KSČ into the conservatives (Novotný, Kapek, Chudík) and the neo-conservatives (Biľak, Kolder, Indra), but were unable to really describe the reform current itself. Within the fast growing movement, individuals under the influence of many and varied circumstances – ideological, group and personal – changed their stance towards the reform movement and did not always act in accordance with their position in society. This did not however change the fact that in the course of the political crisis of 1967-1969 the reform movement was a coalition of social forces, in which very well-differentiated democratic and technocratic tendencies could be distinguished. A detailed analysis of the political stance of the leading figures of the Prague Spring at key moments would make this very clear, but the Government Commission did not unfortunately have sufficient time for such an analysis.

In order to really understand the reform movement, it is important to distinguish between the democratic and technocratic tendencies within it. The technocrats were seeking to perfect the functioning of the political and economic mechanism, which was no small task, and gave this task preference to the reconstruction of social and political relations. When they felt that the democratic demands of the reform movement were threatening their aims, they left the movement and some even moved to the ranks of its opponents. Important members of this tendency included Indra, Štrougal and Černík, who was the only one to remain faithful to the reform movement, despite some wavering. A new situation caused the failure of the Czechoslovak movement after the Czech technocrats had joined forces with the Slovak politicians, having considered the move to a federal state more important than increasing democracy.

The Government Commission achieved a major academic aim in a relatively short time. It collected a massive quantity of previously unpublished material and working from this it built up a picture of the political development of Czechoslovakia at the peak of the social crisis. It was not however able to make use of the possibility which sociology offered of really determining the causes of this crisis.

Miloš Bárta

Translated from Czech by April Retter

Modes of Restructuring. Empirical Research in Czech Industry

The processes of adaptation and restructuring of industrial enterprises are of crucial importance to their successful transformation of the countries of Eastern Central Europe into free-market economies and democracies. This process is taking place in the context of global economic changes caused by the emergence of supranational free trade areas and economic blocs, transnational corporations and strategies. In the long run, these global trends will result in the replacement of the dominant Taylorist industrial production paradigm. For this reason, western structures of industrial production and work are of only limited use as models for societies in transition from a command to a market economy.

The research group *Transformation und Globalisierung at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)*[9] seeks to answer the following questions: Which forms of firm and plant organisation have come into being and are proving successful? What consequences do these new structures and institutional arrangements have for management and working conditions? Which social inequalities and forms of power all established as a result of competition shaped by strength, by changing political structures, and by modern processes of individualisation and dissociation?

The research group's approach is a synthesis of industrial sociology and cultural sociology. A holistic concept of action is adopted which includes the concepts of self-understanding of the social actors in their historical and social contexts. From the perspective of problem-solving, both the systemic order of technical and bureaucratic rationalisation and the social actors' patterns of interpretation and decision-making are analysed, showing the firm as a social construction of reality in a historical situation.

This cultural approach in the field of transformation in Eastern Central Europe was the main theme of a conference held at the WZB in June 1994. The participants agreed that culture must be seen as a basic feature determining the process of modernisation. The new global model of production places high value on qualified work and strong social networks as factors of productivity.

The high esteem of professionalism in connection with specific solidarity patterns forms the core of an Eastern European working culture, which, in the research group's opinion, constitutes a comparative advantage under the conditions of a globalising world economy. The cultural aspects were also the subject of the conference *Communication and Co-operation in Joint Venture Firms*, held in Prague in autumn 1994 in co-operation with the Sociology Department of the Philosophy Faculty of Prague's Charles University. Joint ventures were chosen for discussion because they play a central role in the transformation process as transmitters of innovation. Participants included German and Czech social scientists together with managers from Czech mechanical engineering and automotive industries in particular. The industrial specialists' reports of their experiences in multicultural organisations showed that the presence of foreign partners on site supports tremendously the exchange of know-how, experience, and – last but not least – the constitution of trust relationships among the partners. From the Czech point of view, the benefits of joint ventures were seen in the transfer of foreign investment, management know-how and in access to the EU and world markets. For the foreign firms, the advantages are the highly qualified specialist workers and engineers, deinstitutionalised deregulated regulations and access to the Eastern European market. An important result of the conference was the evaluation of the behavioural patterns of foreign partners in Czech firms. Three typi-

[9]) The research group is part of the *Technology-Work-Environment-section* of the *WZB*. The group started in 1994. The WZB is a publicly financed non-profit corporation researching developmental trends, problems of adaptation, and possibilities of innovation in modern democratic societies. Work at the centre interlinks basic research and practical relevance following a multi-disciplinary approach and often has internationally comparative dimensions. The results are communicated to scientific and policy-making communities.

cal forms of behaviour could be identified: American partners prefer a very instrumental style of co-operation which sees on-site presence as unimportant. French partners were the subject of complaints about their extremely bureaucratic and centralised practices. The example of a German-Czech joint venture showed relatively extensive agreement. One reason may be similar labour and industrial traditions – namely a high esteem of professionalism and consensualism. Here, the problems regard primarily the recognition of these abilities and competence, which are often underrated by German partners. The Czechs' respect for their German partners' competence is often not reciprocated. These examples show that the cultural dimension is of great, but often underestimated importance. This is especially the case for joint ventures as new forms of business in a more competitive and integrated global economy.

The research group aims at an intercultural comparison of different types of industrial restructuring. Using qualitative methods, different forms of enterprises are analysed in the mechanical engineering and automotive industry. A distinction is made between foreign direct investment in the forms of joint ventures and greenfield site investments on one side and those 'autochtonous' firms restructured by Czechs without foreign input, on the other. The first team analysed a Czech-German joint venture and a Hungarian-German greenfield site investment belonging to the same German company. The second team has started research in co-operation with a colleague from Charles University on one of the biggest Czech mechanical engineering concerns in the Czech-Bavarian border region.

From the Czech point of view, one main reason for merging to form a joint venture was the commitment of the German partner to preserve the company as an independent manufacturer in all its core functions, with a product of its own and a separate trade mark. For the German partner, the locational advantages of the Czech Republic and the access to the new markets in Eastern Europe were considered more important in the context of the concern's global strategy. Regarding the different expectations on both sides, the concept for restructuring the company must be seen as a result of the struggle for the survival of existing and still workable structures, practices and potentials on one side and the transfer and implementations of western concepts on the other. One matter in dispute was and still is the degree of autonomy and integration of the Czech company within the German company.

This case study shows clearly that a simple direct transfer of western models of production to former socialist countries is not possible. The western production model itself is in the process of transformation; furthermore, the historical and socio-cultural structures demand specific adjustments. Consequently, the German company is using the restructuring of a company in a former socialist country as an experiment and a test-case for new models of production in different cultural contexts. As it was, however, this intended process could not be controlled completely. The premises of the western plan for reconstruction, for example the prejudice of dysfunctional socialist firms, had to be revised. Structures which were at first rejected as obsolete and in conditions of deficit, were necessarily retained and proved to be functional after all. As the retention of these "old structures" proved to be more useful, the implementation of new "western" structures was revoked. The management learned that the reliable concepts of the German company could not guarantee the successful adaptation of the Czech company to the new conditions of the world economy. The application of western concepts, some of which may quickly become obsolete, would lead to a technocratic mode of modernisation and the destruction of reliable knowledge of production.

Based on a process of learning, a concept of modernisation was developed which aimed at a consequent break with the Taylorist paradigm of industrial production. Modernisation was not restricted to certain fields and functions, but was effectuated both on the firm as a whole and its external interfirm relations. Elements of the reorganisation are the model of a 'fractal factory', the implementation of teamwork, the development of networks of suppliers and the integration of system suppliers in the factory (via settling on the plant's ground and inclusion in the entrepreneurial process).

These measures confront the joint venture with great challenges to its social integration. Traditional structures and practices have to be synthesised with new forms of organisation. The resulting conflictive dynamic has to be transformed into a 'conflictive cooperation' to set free extra synergies. A precondition for the successful realisation of this is the competence of reflexive organisational learning.

In the case of an "autochtonous" company – a traditional mechanical engineering concern – the restructuring process has proceeded in at least two stages. In the course of the privatisation and decentralisation initiated by the Czech government, the concern has been transformed into a joint-stock company. All individual companies – at the moment more than forty – form a conglomerate of autonomous subsidiaries within the framework of a holding. The privatisation policies of the state worked as an exogenous impulse which forced the individual companies to take measures for the development of new markets and to ensure competitiveness. The exceptional scope of action available to the subsidiaries had several advantages from the concern's point of view. Considering the lack of proven methods of management under market principles, only smaller business units were transparent in their activities and thus controllable. In addition, this offered incentives to managers to test and develop independently new methods of leadership in an experimental manner. This process of the concern's internal dissociation into a number of entrepreneurial units externally instigated by the privatisation policies caused a segmentation into those companies that were able to survive autonomously and those that were not. However, after only a short period the restructuring by straight principles of market economy reached its limitations: The destruction of internal concern relations with regard to supplying and buying began to jeopardise the existence of companies which were already developing successfully. The second, actual phase of internal restructuring started in around early 1995. It was initiated by the first remerger of two subsidiaries, at first still as legally autonomous companies within a consortium. But de facto the consortium is acting under one management. The merger stems not only from the necessity of preventing the destruction of a production chain which would jeopardise the survival of the two companies but also from the independent concern strategy. Concurrent to addressing the direct financial interests of the holding, the group is realising the plan to integrate a couple of industrial core activities plus their suppliers under its control. From this perspective, the support of unprofitable, but irreplaceable subsidiaries and the rather aggressive expansion of the concern is reasonable. The contemporary initial restructuring demands stronger control of the subsidiaries. In addition to the financial controlling, the main instrument of the holding in the phase of privatisation, the holding intensifies methodological controlling to harmonise the subsidaries' actions and to homogenise their image.

During the privatisation period, the first steps in the direction of a technological rationalisation, i.e. the modernisation of machines and equipment, were made. The second phase of restructuring is being accompanied by the first attempts at holistic reorganisation, the aim of which is to free up the human resources blocked by the socialist production regime.

On the tide of restructuring, a radical reorganisation and reduction of the number of autonomous subsidiaries will follow analogue to the already realised merging of two metallurgical plants. In addition, the new subsidiaries have to be integrated in the concern. In contrast to the politically initiated transformation which resulted in "greater autonomy" for the units, the actual phase of restructuring undermined partly the radical market-oriented logic of action to serve and reanimate the synergies still latent in the networks of traditional exchange relations in- and outside the concern. Its strategy follows the principle that the survival of Czech industry depends on a concentration of industrial potentials to a degree that makes it possible to withstand international competition. Only a minority of Czech industrial firms would survive as single enterprises on the market. Were there to be no such concentration, then the Czech Republic would lose her historical status as a leading industrialised nation.

The creation of the new organisation of work is being accompanied by a change of

management form and function. Leadership by instruction and control through higher authorities in the vertical line is being increasingly replaced by horizontal co-ordination based on co-operation and communication. In this way, not only specialist qualifications but also social competence on and among all levels are gaining importance. Even though Czech management still has problems with the demands made on them by the new roles, generally the new managerial competence of executives can be assessed positively. The problems that do arise seem to be caused not so much by the abilities of the Czech managers or by a possible lack of willingness to adapt to new challenges, but rather by the structures of work organisation themselves. The openness of the new organisational structures tend to increase the insecurities in decision and action instead of diminishing them. Besides, through the reduction of hierarchies, managers have less possibility of promotion. The insecurities in this new concept of organisation with regard to the careers of managers lowers their motivation and diminishes the attraction of the industry for junior executives. In the firm of the autochtonous type, new organisational patterns have not been totally or simultaneously implemented throughout the company as in the joint venture but only partially and parallel to the still operating traditional organisation. The insecurities and demotivation of the managers are therefore much weaker in this case.

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