

CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

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CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic

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Scope and Mission

The **CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW** is a scholarly review open to the discussion of all professional and societal problems, sociological theory and methodology, and the dissemination of the results and interpretation of sociological research. Its attention is directed towards the development of the field and its teaching, while simultaneously striving to contribute to the solution of the practical problems of Czech social and economic politics.

Manuscript Submission

The editors require an original and two legible copies, which do not state the name or workplace of the author, in order for the reading process to be anonymous on both sides. The accompanying letter should contain a complete contact address, including telephone number. Submission of a manuscript to another journal, while it is under review by the **CSR** is deemed unethical.

Manuscript format: Manuscripts must be typed or computer printed (12-point type preferred), double-spaced, with 60 columns (characters) per line, 30 lines to an A4 page. The maximum length of research and methodological essays is 20 pages, 7 pages for reviews, 5 pages for news or information, and 1 page for annotations.

Editorial decisions: Decisions are generally made within one month from the date of your manuscript's arrival at the **CSR** office. If your manuscript is accepted you will be asked to submit your final version both on paper and on a microcomputer floppy disk, either in ASCII or ANSI text-only file. IBM disks are acceptable. The final version should also include a twenty-line abstract and an eighty-line summary, an alphabetised bibliography and basic, relevant curriculum vitae.

Introduction

Czech Sociological Review is a journal open to those authors who inform on society in the Czech Republic, occasionally in comparison with the surrounding countries which, similarly, share a communist past. It also offers an opportunity to foreign authors who are concerned with questions of transformation in Central and Eastern Europe.

During the preparation of the *Czech Sociological Review*, it is not always possible to get together contributions of such character that enable us to give successive issues a more compact, or even monothematic structure, and this applies equally to the contents of this issue.

The first contribution concerns the Czech Republic's most current political and sociological problem, that has influenced the pre-election preferences of individual political parties. Brno sociologist Ladislav Rabušic deals with it in his essay *Poverty of the Czech Elderly – Myth or Reality?* He generally maps out the evolution of the question of poverty in the Czech Republic, tries to define this social phenomenon, and shows an objective picture of poverty amongst retired Czechs. He supports this with a number of empirical data, and concludes that although "from an official perspective the Czech elderly are not really poor", it is significant that "many of the Czech elderly feel poor, and define their situation as real: their perceived poverty shapes their political views and also behaviour".

In the following article entitled '*Soft*' *Deviance or Erosion: The Forming of Organisational Culture*, Jiří Buriánek uses the concept of 'erosion' for describing processes of minor erosion, or problematisation of everyday behavioural standards (norms) in the sphere of economic activities and organisations. He does not interpret these processes as mere remnants of the former communist regime, but also shows them as phenomena accompanying certain deficits of the Czech transformation.

In the essay on the *On the Emergence of Political Identity in the Czech Mass Media*, Jiří Nekvapil and Ivan Leudar present a case study of media construction of political reality. In the beginning of 1993, shortly after the split of Czechoslovakia, the post-communist daily *Rudé právo* reported two events: a press conference given by a previously unknown politician Jaroslav Blümel and the foundation of the Democratic Party of Sudetenland (DPS) that was announced during it. This material was taken over and critically commented on by most of the Czech media including television, and the authors show in their analyses the extent to which the political identity of the DPS was created by its political opponents. They point out that "in the case of the DPS the 'fleshing out' was by no means a consensual matter: Blümel and his political opponents never converged on a common definition of the DPS".

German authors Heinz Fassmann and Christianne Hintermann are concerned with the phenomenon of migration from East and South-east Europe in *Potential East-West Migration: Demographic Structure Motives and Intentions*. They refer to a first wave at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, when Austria-Hungary, Germany, France, and also the USA became major target countries, and a second wave, when 13.3 million people migrated not only as a result of the Second World War, but also in connection with the subsequent 'Russification' of Central Europe. In contrast, today's

form and potential threat of population migration is changing and dependent on the contemporary political situation, the level and success of political transformation of post-communist regimes, and on the economic prosperity of western European countries. The authors state, on the bases of a selective questionnaire investigation in Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the total figures and proportions of potential migrants, their structural characteristics (demographic and social, material status, education, last job etc.) and they also try to typologise the reasons for migration.

Under the rubric heading *From Sociological Surveys* come three reports: *Changes in the Perception of Poverty and Wealth: Czech Republic 1991-1995* by Martin Kreidl can be read as a kind of supplement to the article by L. Rabušic. It issues from the statement of three alternative interpretations of poverty (and wealth), of their ideologically political equivalents and possible changes of their subjective perception, and deals with their influence upon voting behaviour.

The material by Milan Tuček and Valentína Harmádyová *Structural Changes and Social Mobility 1988-1995* is a description of changes of the structure of employment and social mobility from the point of view of property sectors and basic employment categories in the Czech and Slovak Republic in the period 1988-1995, and shows that while until the split of Czechoslovakia the development in both countries followed a similar path, after it there appeared differences both in the depth of changes, as well as in their perception.

Young Brno sociologist and prominent activist in the Czech ecological movement Duha (Rainbow) Jakub Patočka contributes to the rubric headed *Debate*. In his text *From Marxist Revolution to Technological Revolution*, he attempts to ideologically analyse the opinions of Gerhard Lenski which were published in the second issue of *Czech Sociological Review* in 1996 under the title 'Ecological-Evolutionary Theory and Societal Transformation in Post-Communist Europe'.

This issue also includes two reviews of publications from the field of Czech sociology.

Miloš Havelka

The Poverty of the Czech Elderly – Myth or Reality?*

LADISLAV RABUŠIČ**

Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University, Brno

Abstract: Poverty among the Czech elderly is considered from two perspectives: objective and subjective. Various indicators of objective poverty are analysed, such as the relation of average monthly income to average old-age pension, pension inequalities, the structure of household expenditures, and the structure of consumer durables ownership, as are representative survey data measuring subjective poverty. It is concluded that from the objective point of view the Czech elderly are as a whole well above subsistence poverty. However, their subjective poverty seems quite far-reaching, affecting between 30 and 50 percent. This suggests that feelings of social exclusion are quite widespread among the Czech elderly population.

Czech Sociological Review, 1998, Vol. 6 (No. 1: 5-24)

Introduction

The population of the Czech Republic as with the populations of other developed countries is ageing. In 1995, the proportion of the population aged 60+ and 65+ was 18% and 13% respectively. The ageing of Czech society will become more rapid in the next decade as the baby boom generation of the late 1940s ages. However, due to the unprecedentedly low birth rates which we have been experiencing since 1993, and due to a substantial improvement in mortality since 1990,¹ ageing is gaining speed even now.

From the point of view of poverty, the elderly have always been a population at risk. It is a world-wide phenomenon and Czech society, even during its Communist period, was no exception. However, as I shall argue in the second part of this paper, the contemporary situation of the Czech elderly is not as dramatic as some East Central Europe transition analyses might suggest. Before doing so, I shall briefly outline the ways in which poverty can be defined and show how Czech poverty is dealt with. At the end I shall try to answer the basic question of the paper: to what extent is the poverty among the Czech elderly real, and to what extent is it socially constructed.

*) Research for this paper was supported by the following research grants of the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic: *Social Trends* (No. 403/96/K120) and *The Elderly in Czech Society* (No. 403/95/0525). I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments.

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1) The total fertility rate declined from 1.67 in 1993 to 1.2 in 1996. Life expectancy at birth increased from 67.5 for men and 76.0 for women in 1990, to 70.4 and to 77.3 respectively in 1996. Despite such an increase, it is still well below the level of life expectancies of developed countries. However, because of a low retirement age (60 for men and 53-57 for women until 1995, from 1996 it increases by two months for men and four months for women annually so that in 2007 the retirement age will be 62 for men and 57-61 for women), the time spent in retirement is not short (about 16 years for men and 24 years for women).

Czech Poverty

Every human society has its rich and poor – even in the former Communist societies, where all people were supposed to be absolutely equal, there were some who were ‘more equal’ than the rest. Obviously, from the moment when there are those who are richer, there must also be some who are poorer and *vice versa*. Affluence and poverty are complementary terms that cannot be separated.

Communism in Central and Eastern Europe, and in other parts of the world, was based on an egalitarian ideology. After World War II, almost all property in the Czech Republic (or Czechoslovakia at the time) was expropriated. Wealth lost its legitimacy, the accumulation of capital became illegal, the word ‘profit’ disappeared – even from the economic textbooks. On the other hand, poverty also became ‘illegal’. It had to be, since communist ideology promised to fulfil all the people’s needs.

By means of an egalitarianist wage policy,² Czech society became a kind of middle-class society: the rich had been ‘abolished as a class’, and the poor were abolished ideologically [Mareš and Možný 1995]. Of course, from the perspective of our affluent Western neighbours, it was a middle-class society of the poor. On the other hand, from the point of view of our ‘comrades’ from Russia, Romania, China or Cuba, it was a society of the affluent. However, even in this situation, neither wealth nor poverty totally disappeared from society. Everybody knew who was well-off and who was poor in a neighbourhood. Officially, though, both poverty and wealth were made marginal and invisible.³

The transformation of the Czech economy, which started after 1991 with the introduction of market mechanisms, has been gradually eliminating the basic principles of a command economy, mainly large transfers of investments to unprofitable economic fields, especially to heavy industry and agriculture, and high state subsidies on the prices of food, energy, rent, transport, and so on. Naturally, the impact was soon reflected in the standard of living of many families and individuals. From 1989 to 1992, the decrease in the standard of living was approximately 30%. It was not until 1996 that the standard of living reached 1989 levels with a real average Czech income of 101 percent of the 1989 income [Dúchody 1996].

²) Analyses of the distribution of official income (grey economy income excluded) in the Czech Republic in the 1980s reveal that the average income of the bottom and top deciles were not very different from the average, indicating that all strata of society were in terms of their income to a great extent equalised [Večerník 1995a].

³) Czech statistics did not officially follow the proportion of the well-off. Analysts interested in the poor, and there were just a few of them, had to refer to them euphemistically as ‘people with limited possibilities of consumption’. Thanks to these analyses, we know that the level of poverty among the Czech people (measured as those with income below 56 percent of the average income of a consumption unit) fluctuated between 6-7 percent in the period 1960-1985 [see Hiršl 1973, 1988]. We also know that poverty was ‘demographic’ during the communist era. This means that it was not related to the position of an individual on the labour market. It was almost exclusively an attribute and function of certain phases of the life cycle of an individual or a family. On a wider scale, people became temporarily poor during the period in which they set up their families (in particular, the number of dependent persons in the household and number of economically active persons played an important role) and permanently poor in old age, since their old age pensions were not indexed.

Despite a gradually improving economic situation in the mid 1990s, social surveys began to repeatedly record worries expressed by the Czech public about poverty – almost 70 percent of Czech adults believed that there were more poor people in 1995 than before 1989. On average, they also thought that about 25 percent of the Czech population were currently poor⁴ [Mareš and Rabušic 1996].

Such an emergence of feelings of poverty creates a serious challenge for the welfare system, and for its social policy. To tackle the problem requires a knowledge of who is poor and therefore eligible for some form of social assistance. In other words, it requires a good definition of poverty, by which basic human needs and the minimum income necessary for their satisfaction would be established. Unfortunately, there is no such general definition. Recognised basic needs depend on cultural standards and expectations. For these reasons, the concept of poverty is highly relative, normative, and political. Therefore, in any society, the poverty level depends solely on the way it is defined.

To set down a line distinguishing those who are poor and those who are not is a tricky business for any welfare state. To set it low can mean having a relatively large proportion of the poor who will seek and demand assistance; these large numbers would also mean huge state expenses and high taxes for the public. On the other hand, to set it high can mean having few poor and low state expenses on one side, but huge crowds of people dissatisfied with politicians on the other. Both options may have serious political consequences. It is no wonder then that poverty is such a controversial issue. As Ringen put it:

“The trend in poverty is the litmus test of the social quality of the mixed economy system. If poverty remains rampant in spite of economic growth, the market does not do its job; if it remains rampant in spite of expanding public transfers, welfare does not do its job. If this is a valid description of contemporary affairs, we have failed in one of our most basic ambitions, that of alleviating misery and ridding our societies of the cancer of poverty” [Ringen 1988: 352].

How to Define Poverty

Hagenaars [1985] observed that to be poor means at least three different things: (1) the absence of the possibility of satisfying basic needs, (2) to have less than others, or (3) to have the feeling of deprivation due to the feeling of insufficient income for the satisfaction of needs. Having said this, several basic questions immediately arise: What are the basic needs, and what does their absence mean? How much less must one have to be poor? What does a feeling of inadequacy mean? These questions suggest that poverty has many facets and many dimensions. To answer them means to define poverty.

There are many ways to define poverty. Poverty can be, in terms of sociology, regarded as a social problem. The sociological theory of social problems says that any social problem has its objective (i.e. actually existing conditions defined as problematic) and subjective side (the perception of these conditions by social actors as threatening their values). Since poverty has both objective and subjective dimensions its definition can be divided into these two basic groups.

Classical objective definitions make the distinction between *subsistence* (or *absolute*) poverty and *relative* poverty. According to the subsistence definition, people are

⁴) In 1994, the Czech public believed that among the elderly 41% were poor and 9% were rich [“Názory... 1994].

poor if they lack the resources regarded necessary to achieve a minimum level of consumption. Minimal consumption is considered the simplest possible diet and minimum requirements for clothing, rent and heating [Ringen 1988]. There are various methods for setting such a definition such as *the basic needs approach, budget standards, or the food ratio method*.

According to the *relative (or deprivation)* definition, people are poor if their standard of consumption is seriously below what is considered decent in their society. In this way the poor become, in effect, excluded from the ordinary way of life and activities of their community [Ringen 1988].

All these definitions are called objective because poverty is defined through factors which are not dependent on the opinion of those who are poor. However, they all rely on only one form of measurement – income. In many welfare policies, income level serves as the poverty threshold. In Europe, for instance, there is the European Union Poverty Line set at 50 percent of the median income per equivalent person.⁵ A poverty line has also been set up by a group of experts as the income necessary for subsistence and as such it serves as the legal poverty line for various measures of means-tested welfare programme.

Czech social policy primarily uses the objective approach for determining the level of poverty. The poverty line is defined as the *subsistence minimum* necessary for the survival of a household (also referred to here as the *life minimum*). As such, it is the prescribed and legal rate of poverty. It sets the minimum income necessary for survival as a sum of personal income plus additional costs for household maintenance. From the standpoint of this rate, in 1993, the Ministry of Labour and Social Issues estimated the poverty rate in the Czech population at about 4 percent, but in 1996, it was only 1.5 percent, which is relatively good when set in the European context. From the viewpoint of comparison with other populations, however, we must be very careful, because the life minimum in each country is a reflection of that country's economic level, social traditions, and norms.

Naturally, as there exist different definitions of poverty, they bring about different results. For instance, in 1993, the various proportions of the poor in the Czech Republic were as follows:

- According to the legal 'minimum subsistence' line, i.e. households with income below the threshold of social necessity established by the "Law on Minimum Subsistence", 4 percent were poor households.

⁵) In determining the level of poverty, most statistics come from surveys in which the unit of analysis is usually a household. Therefore it is usually household income that is recorded. However, because households differ in their sizes, the income is expressed per person. Thus, household income should be divided by the number of persons in the household. This is, however, not done because by doing so "economies of scale" would not be taken into account. Three people in a household do not need three times as many refrigerators, bathrooms, money for food preparation, and so on. Therefore, the equivalency scale is computed as 1.0 for the first adult, 0.7 for other adults and 0.5 for each child. The total income of the household consisting of two parents and two children would be divided by 2.7 (1+0.7+0.5+0.5) to reach the income per equivalent person.

- According to the standard method of European Union Poverty Line (households with income below 50% of the median of income per equivalent adult), about 3 percent were poor households.
- According to the first decile (the first tenth) of the distribution of equivalent income, 9.5 percent were poor households [Večerník 1996].

These figures are lower than those for the period of communism. This paradox is easy to explain: Through the definition of the poverty line and by the level of the minimum pension, single elderly people, who made up a large proportion of the poor during the 1970s and 1980s, have been lifted above the poverty line.

In many instances, an objective way of defining the poverty line can be regarded as unjust by members of society, because 'the experts', that is those who are not poor, decide what income is enough for survival. Therefore, the objective approach to poverty is regarded by many scholars as paternalistic, because it does not reflect the feelings of those who suffer poverty. Obviously, every poor person will maintain that the objective poverty line is set too low and does not enable a 'decent living'.⁶ Therefore, subjective or consensual approaches to poverty have been developed.

Subjective measures are those based on the evaluation of the experiences of individual households. The aspirations of these households are included into subjective concepts (from this viewpoint they are also relative). The fact that poverty is subjective does not mean that it is purely fictitious. In agreement with sociological constructionists, we have to maintain that subjective poverty can be just as oppressive both for an individual and for society as objective poverty. Subjective poverty is measured through a number of varied processes. From a simple question to discover whether a person feels rich or poor, for instance: "*If you compare your contemporary situation with others, do you think you are a poor family?*"⁷ or through self-perception on the continuum between poverty and wealth, which was used in a national representative sample of the Czech adult population in 1995 [Mareš and Rabušic 1996]. The question was phrased as follows: "*In our society there are people who can be considered rich, and there are people who can be considered poor. Where would you personally classify yourself on the following scale?*" Here poverty was measured by means of a nine point scale (in the form of a ladder) with categories for *rich* at the top and the categories for *poor* at the bottom (see Figure 1).

The share of the poor recorded through this method naturally depends on which category we classify for the term poverty. If we were to divide this nine-level scale into thirds, we would find that 20 percent of the respondents see themselves as poor, 73 per-

⁶) In 1996, the subsistence minimum income for one-person households was 30 percent of the mean gross monthly income in the Czech republic as compared to 36 percent in 1992. On the one hand, it is much lower than in, for instance, Hungary (54 percent in 1994) and Poland (52 percent in 1992). On the other hand, it is compatible with the level of the USA (28 percent in 1995) and France (27 percent in 1992). In both of these latter countries the mean income, however, was the income of blue collar workers only [Oficiální... 1996].

⁷) In a representative survey carried out in 1992, those who answered *definitely yes* to such question were 12 percent of Czechs compared with 16 percent in Slovakia, 21 percent in Poland, and 23 percent in Hungary [Tuček 1995].

cent as neither poor nor rich, and 7 percent as rich.⁸ If we only consider those who put themselves into the two lowest categories, we obtain a figure of about 8 percent poor.

Figure 1. The proportions of people classifying themselves in individual categories on a nine-level scale of poverty or affluence (Czech republic, mid 1995)

rich	+ 1	0.0 %
	+ 2	1.7 %
	+ 3	5.1 %
	+ 4	13.0 %
neither rich, nor poor	+ 5	45.6 %
	+ 6	14.9 %
	+ 7	11.6 %
	+ 8	6.5 %
poor	+ 9	1.6 %

Source: [Mareš and Rabušic 1996]

A much more sophisticated method of defining subjective poverty is to determine the minimum amount of money needed to run a household, i.e. to satisfy their basic needs. We already know that in the *objective* approach, this legal life minimum is determined by experts who decide – for the public as a whole – what level of income it is possible to survive on. The basic question in democratic societies is naturally whether it is possible for the public to agree on the amount of money set by the official poverty line? How high would this income poverty line be if it was not determined by experts, but by society itself? This question is answered by the *subjective or consensual poverty line (SPL)*.⁹

The Subjective Poverty Line was developed at Leyden University [see Goethart et al. 1977, Van Praag et al. 1982]. It is based on the answers of respondents in representative surveys to the Minimum Income Question (MIQ) phrased as follows: *In your opinion, what would be the very lowest net monthly income (that is, income after tax before payment of any bills) that your household would have to have to just make ends meet?*

This answer primarily depends on some of the characteristics of the household. These variables also have to be measured.¹⁰ It is assumed that the minimum income is a

⁸) It is notable that the highest category of wealth was unoccupied. In 1995, nobody in the Czech Republic had enough courage to define themselves as rich, although some of the respondents declared that they were earning up to 50,000 CzK monthly, i.e. 7 times higher than the average monthly income in 1995.

⁹) Not even one classification is ideal. The term 'consensual' is somewhat misleading, because this defined poverty line is basically a populational average and not a poverty line with which all must inevitably agree. Even the attribute 'subjective' is not the most completely appropriate, because the construed poverty line does not mean that an individual determines whether a given household is poor or not. The result of this process is an intersubjective standard, with which the situation of individual units (household, family) are compared.

¹⁰) There is an even more sophisticated alternative to this way of measurement. It is called the *CSP Measure (Centre for Social Policy)* which was developed in the Center for Social Politics in Antwerp [Deleeck 1989]. It uses the MIQ, but also the additional question: *"With your current income can you get by: (1) with great difficulty, (2) with some difficulty, (3) with a little difficulty,*

function of the real income of the family and the number of family members (differentiation is also made for the number of children and the number of adults). It is expected that the size of the outlined minimum income will increase with real income and with the number of household members (the higher a family's income, the higher the standard of living; and the more members in a household, the more money is needed for its reproduction). Given the assumptions that this function has a linear character, it is possible to solve it by means of regression analysis.¹¹ This will give us the level of income considered by the population as the necessary minimum.

Objective Poverty among the Czech Elderly

The conditions which determine the standard of living for Czech senior citizens are basically the same as for those in western countries. Their standard of living is "a function of access to resources over the earlier stages of the life cycle. Occupational status in earlier life determines salary or wage levels and, therefore, the opportunities to save and invest in property and other possessions" [Walker 1993: 288].

Of course, there were some basic exceptions here: (1) the entire ideology of the socialist state reassured future generations of senior citizens that retirement is a 'deserved vacation', in which the state will completely care for all individuals. Even if reality was somewhat different, this ideology alone tempted many Czechs into not worrying too much about their future economic situation. This led to the rate of savings being, in many cases, inadequate. (2) The impoverished nature of the entire society necessitated inter-generational co-operation: parents supported their children with their financial and social capital for an unusually extended period of time: more or less, permanently up until their deaths. This was a significant transfer of both financial resources and life energy from the senior generation's households to the those of their sons and daughters. (3) The possibilities of investing their financial resources into assets, which would have brought returns when they retired, were basically zero for the simple reason of the illegal nature of private enterprise within the system of a socialist economy.

As has already been shown, from the standpoint of the structure of Czech poverty, the elderly have been a regular component. Many scholars maintain that the correlation between poverty and old age has been universal throughout the industrial societies of the world [see e.g. Hendricks and Hendricks 1986, Walker 1993]. However, according to Laczko [1990] and other scholars, there are also current views claiming that elderly people have a much better standard of living now than before, and that old age can no longer be associated with poverty, or at least that the contemporary elderly are not a homogeneously impoverished group [Crystal 1996]. Some scholars even maintain that because of their increasing numbers, the elderly manage to influence public policy decision-making in favour of their own interests at the expense of their younger cohorts [see, for instance, Preston 1984]. However, more detailed analyses of the economic situation of the elderly reveal that this is not always true. British experience suggests that the majority of older people still live in or on the margins of poverty – in terms of both the official poverty line

(4) *fairly easily*, (5) *easily*, (6) *very easily*?" In this case, the poverty line is counted only from the MIQ respondents who indicate that they are able to make ends meet "*with great difficulty*". The reason for this is these respondents can be thought of as relatively the best 'reporters' concerning the minimum needs for the running of a household. The CSP method was not applied here.

¹¹) $SUB-MIN-INC = a_0 + (b_1 * \text{real income}) + (b_2 * \text{number of adults}) + (b_3 * \text{number of children})$.


and average living standards [Walker 1993]. On the other hand, US data show that the availability of resources to meet fundamental needs varies widely among the elderly, but most older Americans have adequate incomes and housing [Atchley 1988]. Crystal [1996] even says that the decline in income after age 65 – when adjustments are made for household size, assets, and underreporting of unearned income – is minimal.

A gloomy picture of the price of transition to a market economy for older people in Eastern and Central Europe is painted by Laczko [1994]. One of his main conclusions, namely that the effects of transformation point to an increasing marginalisation of the older populations in transitional countries, is, however, as I shall show below, difficult to apply to the Czech Republic.

In order to understand the problem of poverty among the elderly on a cross-national comparative level, one has to ask primarily whether the elderly have adequate economic resources and who among them experiences inadequacy. As far as the Czech elderly are concerned, my thesis here is that from the point of view of objective indicators, they are relatively well-off. However, in terms of subjective well-being many of them feel poor, economically deprived, and dissatisfied.

One of the most important indicators of economic well-being among the elderly is the relation of the average old age pension to average income (see Figure 2). It is important to note that in the Czech Republic, the old age pension is a very good indication of the economic level of the elderly. Social security income (the state pension) is the main source of all personal income constituting about 90 percent of the income of elderly households. Employment income makes up 5 percent and other income (asset income) also 5 percent. This composition will not soon change and it will actually take some years before the elderly will have the opportunity to take advantage of other sources of income

Figure 2. Average monthly income of the Czech population and average old-age pension of the retired, CR 1970-1996



(e.g. from private assets or private pension funds¹²). For the time being, the state pensions from the pay-as-you-go system remain the major income for Czech elderly.

In 1996, the average monthly pension was about 4,250 CzK which was 44 percent of the average national income before tax.¹³ This proportion has been more or less stable (with some minor fluctuations) since 1970 [Důchody 1996]. Because Czech pensions are not taxed and the retired do not pay the health insurance premium, it is legitimate to compare pensions with income after tax. In this case, the average pension was about 57 percent of net income in 1996.¹⁴ In real terms, 1996 pensions were 109 percent of pensions in 1992.

As far as pension inequality is concerned, since 1989 there has been a trend towards greater equality. In 1996, there were 26 percent of pensioners with income (pension) up to 90 percent of the average pension, while in 1989 the corresponding figure was 45 percent (see Table 1). The proportion of the elderly with 130 percent of the mean pension was only 5 percent while in 1989, it was 12 percent.

Table 1. Distribution of monthly pensions in relation to the mean pension

Level of pension in relation to the mean	1989		1996	
	Pension in CzK	% of pensioners	Pension in CzK	% of pensioners
- 89	- 1,437	45	- 3,851	26
90 - 109	1,438 - 1,757	26	3,852 - 4,710	48
110 - 129	1,758 - 2,076	17	4,711 - 5,560	21
130 +	2,077 +	12	5,561 +	5
Mean	1,598	100	4,280	100

Source: Híršl [1997]

An important factor in assessing the living standard is the consumption pattern. Table 2 provides information on the structure of household expenditures. The data reveal that there is one substantial difference between the expenditures of retired elderly households and the households of employees. The retired spend more on necessities: food and household expenses, which constitute altogether 66 percent of all of their expenditures, while employed persons spend only 40 percent on these items.

¹²) Private pension funds as the second pillar of the Czech old-age pension scheme were established only in 1995, which means that the current cohort of the elderly will stay dependent on state pensions.

¹³) From a household income perspective we get a different picture. The standard *Household Income Survey* reveals that the average income per capita of the elderly household income was 79 percent of the per capita income of Czech households in 1995 [Dlouhý 1995].

¹⁴) However, the Czech pension system is characterised by high redistribution. Therefore pension-to-income ratio is disproportionally different for various income groups. For instance, for those with below the average income, this ratio is about 83 percent, for those, with income which is two times higher than the average, it is only 37 percent.

Table 2. Structure of household expenditures in the Czech Republic in 1996 (per capita, in %)

Items	Employed Persons	Pensioners
Food	22	36
Alcohol and tobacco	3	3
Clothing and footwear	7	5
Housing+household expenses	11+8	21+9
Medical care	4	5
Transport	10	7
Culture, education, sports	9	7
Taxes, insurance, payments	2	8

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Czech Republic '97

It seems that the Czech elderly do not have many degrees of freedom in consumption. They experience a substantial decrease in their monthly income and, on average, they spend two-thirds of their income on daily necessities: food, rent, energy, and the running of the household. However, they are supposed to be the group whose households have been already furnished and supplied with consumer durables, and with enough decent clothes. Table 3 gives us some idea how true this is.

Table 3. Structure of ownership of consumer durables in households of people aged 50-59, 60-69, and 70+ in the Czech Republic in 1996 (% who own an item)

Items	50-59	60-69	70+
Refrigerator	93	87	85
Telephone	58	41	42
Automatic washing machine	80	64	48
Colour TV	95	87	80
Microwave oven	29	16	9
PC	14	6	3
Car	69	41	23
Garden which is not a part of a house or apartment	35	28	26
Summer cottage or <i>dacha</i>	26	19	8

Source: Rabušic, Mareš: 50+. Representative national survey of the Czech population (November 1996, N = 1302)

The table shows quite clearly that there are not large differences between the three age groups in terms of the various consumer durables. It also tells us that the cohort 50-59 will enter the retirement period well supplied with material items. It is important to add in this context that such older people also live well from the point of view of their dwelling type. According to the 1991 Census data, 52 percent of the population aged 60+ live in their own houses. The corresponding figure for the whole Czech population is 43 percent. Of those aged 60+ who live in apartments, 83 percent live in categories I. and II., which means they have all the necessary comforts: central heating, hot water, bathroom and toilet. Our 1996 representative survey data indicate that 91 percent of the Czech people aged 70+, 87 percent aged 60-69 and 87 percent aged 50-59 were satisfied with their accommodation. The majority of older people are not interested in moving (81 percent of cohort 70+, 82 percent of cohort 60-69, and 80 percent of cohort 50-59 years), and only a

tiny fraction of them (4-6 percent) think that they will have to move despite their wish not to.

All these data suggest that as far as the basic economic conditions are concerned, the living standard of the Czech elderly is not too bad. The only clear-cut difference in comparison with the economically active population is the level of income. This difference, however, looks less frightening when we realise that, generally speaking, the elderly are a group which does not need to make heavy investments. US estimates of the average income needs assume that the elderly need slightly less income than the non-elderly to maintain comparable lifestyles [Atchley 1988].

What then is the level of the poverty among the Czech elderly? The Czech government in reshaping the social security system has stuck to a simple principle as far as this type of poverty is concerned: to ensure that the elderly are entitled to a minimum pension which is set above the subsistence level and is protected against inflation. Therefore, from the perspective of the Czech legal (or subsistence) poverty line, set by the Minimum Subsistence Act of Parliament in 1991, officially, there should be no poor elderly households because even the lowest pension is above the legal poverty line. The pension law No. 155/1995 surprisingly changed this principle, and from 1996 there may appear cases when the new pensions will be lower than the subsistence minimum.¹⁵

The subsistence line was regularly adjusted when there was a 5 percent rise in the consumer price index and pensions are indexed by the same mechanism.¹⁶ However, in 1997, due to unfavourable economic development an amendment to the law was adopted which increased the 5 percent limit to 10 percent. This will negatively effect the development of the level of pensions in real-terms. Both changes may thus have an impact on the level of poverty among Czech pensioners.

In 1992, 3.2 percent of all Czech households fell under legal poverty, and by 1995 this share had decreased to 2.7 percent. Of all elderly households consisting of two retired persons, only 1.9 percent had income below the poverty line in 1992. In 1995 this proportion further decreased to 1.4 percent¹⁷ [Dlouhý 1995].

All these facts indicate that from the perspective of Czech social policy the Czech elderly have not really been poor. However, it has been known for a long time in social gerontology that, generally, in retirement feelings of economic deprivation increase [Riley and Foner 1968]. In the Czech Republic, the feelings of deprivation can be even more intense. Due to the transitional situation, three factors are at work here: (a) by 1996, consumption capacity had increased unprecedentedly for inhabitants of the Czech Republic following 1989. However, the beneficiaries of these changes were, above all, economically active individuals; (b) income inequalities increased – in 1996, the income of the


¹⁵) In such a case, a retired person will fall into the net of the state social support system. The frequency of these cases has so far been only minimal.

¹⁶) To be quite precise, the increase in real income is also taken into consideration. Whenever, during the previous two years, the index of real income increases by a factor of more than 1, old-age pensions are increased in such a way that the increase must be at least of the magnitude of one-third of the average real income increase which has occurred during those two years.

¹⁷) Until 1995, the retired who had an old-age pension could not be under the subsistence level. However, some senior citizens (especially the oldest women) cannot claim a pension. These are mainly housewives who have not fulfilled the basic condition of the pension scheme: to pay contributions for at least 25 years.

population in the lowest income decile was six times lower than the income of the highest income decile; and (c) the income discrepancy between those who are economically active and the elderly also increased. This is caused by the fact that pensions have not kept pace with the income increases of active wage-earners. This different pace of development of real average income and average old-age pension is illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Real average income and real average old-age pension in the Czech republic, 1989-1996 (1989 = 100%)



Thus, in many elderly households, there may be taking place monthly existential mini-dramas, brought about by feelings of uncertainty, over whether the pension will allow the buying of various goods. It is true that the average elderly income has increased nearly three-fold since 1989 (from about 1,500 CzK in 1989 to about 4,200 CzK in 1996) but apparently in many households, regularly increasing prices of goods, rent, energy, and so forth, may cause feelings of financial deprivation.

These are the most likely reasons why the elderly subjectively perceive their situation as relatively unfavourable. It is quite natural then that in such context this analysis of poverty among the Czech elderly should change from an objective approach to a subjective one.

Subjective Poverty among the Czech Elderly

It has already been said that the elderly's subjective assessment of income and wealth can be expected in many cases to be negative. Psychological factors are at work here. After decades of extremely equalised living standards, it is natural that increased income inequalities between the working population and the population of the retired will be viewed with a certain bitterness: *'After all those years spent at work, we do not deserve this'* is a frequent argument of the retired. Survey data which were collected in 1995 and 1996 in

two consecutive national representative surveys¹⁸ included various items on the elderly's attitudes towards their affluence. These can serve as indicators of poverty among the Czech population over 50.

As far as the general position on the continuum between being rich or poor is concerned, Table 4 provides the following results.

Table 4. The feeling of poverty and affluence among retired pensioners, retired but working pensioners and non-retired people (aged 50+) in the CR in 1995 and 1996. Collapsed (trichotomised) 9 point scale of subjective assessment of affluence or poverty

Economic status	Defining themselves as:					
	poor		middle		rich	
	1995	1996	1995	1996	1995	1996
Economically active	9	26	82	65	9	9
Retired	39	48	61	50	0	2
Working retired	15	29	81	62	4	10
All respondents	28	39	69	57	3	5

Source: Mareš, Rabušic: Survey data *Perception of Poverty in the CR* (N = 361), and *Survey data 50+*. (N = 1302)

The increase in subjective poverty was substantial between 1995 and 1996. Almost half of the retired elderly declared themselves poor in 1996. On the other hand, both in 1995 and 1996, the proportion of the subjectively poor was not very different between the working population and the working retired, and it was much lower than the proportion of the retired category. As we shall see later, this similarity will persist throughout the majority of subjective poverty indicators. Since poverty is caused mainly by a lack of adequate income, the interesting thing is how the Czech pensioners assess their household income by means of the CSP question (see Table 5).

Table 5. How older Czech households get along with their income by economic status in the CR in 1995 and 1996 (Population 50+)

Economic status	With your current income can you get by:					
	with difficulty		sometimes with difficulty,		easily	
	1995	1996	1995	1996	1995	1996
Economically active	16	17	44	44	40	38
Retired	39	31	43	44	19	25
Working retired	15	12	35	38	50	50
All respondents	30	24	42	43	28	33

Source: Mareš, Rabušic: Survey data *Perception of Poverty in the CR* (N = 361), and *Survey data 50+*. (N = 1302)

¹⁸) These surveys were carried out by P. Mareš and myself. The 1995 survey, which was interested in the public perception of poverty, covered the Czech adult population (18+) of which a sub-set of respondents 50+ was created. The 1996 survey was a special one, interested only in older people and covered the population aged 50+.

Between 1995 and 1996, the assessment of income situation changed in a way opposite to the assessment of general feelings of poverty. The share of economically active people who can get by with their income with difficulty was 16-17 percent in 1995-1996. This proportion among the working retired was even lower (and notice their share of those who can get by easily – 50 percent in both years). Only the retired felt that they had problems getting by with their pensions: 39 percent in 1995 and 31 percent in 1996.

Tables 4 and 5 reveal two very important facts: (1) The feeling of poverty is much more frequent on a general level than with relation to income, and (2) the working retired and working population assess their situation in similar way, the former even feel richer than the latter.

Analyses of the assessment of income usually ask not only the CSP question, but also add the question of what the respondent's income is enough for. Table 6 describes the Czech situation.

Table 6. What was the household income enough to buy in the CR in 1995 and 1996 (Population 50+)

What is your household income enough for?	Economic status							
	Economically active		Retired		Working retired		All respondents	
	1995	1996	1995	1996	1995	1996	1995	1996
For everything, but we have to be good managers	45	47	21	34	35	55	30	41
We have to economise very much before we buy expensive things	39	40	33	36	31	35	35	37
Only to buy the cheapest things	15	11	35	19	31	9	28	15
Only to buy the cheapest food	2	2	10	9	4	1	7	6
Often we do not have money enough to buy even the cheapest food	0	0	2	3	0	1	1	2

Source: Mareš, Rabušic: Survey data *Perception of Poverty in the CR* (N = 361), and *Survey data 50+*. (N = 1302)

It shows that about 10 percent of retired people both in 1995 and 1996 thought that their income was sufficient to buy only the cheapest food. When we add together the categories of retired pensioners who claimed to have enough money to buy only the cheapest things and those claiming to have money only for the cheapest food along with those not having money even for that, we come to a figure of 47 percent in 1995 and 31 percent in 1996 who can be thought of as poor people.

What kind of situations make people feel poor? We offered our respondents four situations: before Christmas, before summer vacations, when shopping for clothes, when shopping for food, and asked them whether they have felt poor on these occasions during the last five years. The results are summarised in Table 7.

For the retired, the most frustrating situation was Christmas, the other three situations showed almost no difference, with about 40 percent feeling poor. Relatively well-off were the working retired – the proportions feeling poor in these situations were substantially smaller than in the other two categories.

Table 7. Feeling of poverty in different situations. The CR in 1995 and 1996 (Population 50+)

Economic status	Feeling of poverty during:							
	Christmas		summer vacation		clothes shopping		food shopping	
	1995	1996	1995	1996	1995	1996	1995	1996
Economically active	30	44	40	46	25	40	21	26
Retired	52	53	53	41	46	42	40	41
Working retired	35	37	39	34	27	32	23	21
All respondents	44	48	48	42	37	40	32	34

Source: Mareš, Rabušic: Survey data *Perception of Poverty in the CR* (N = 361), and *Survey data 50+*. (N = 1302)

All the items analysed so far can be regarded as valid indicators of subjective poverty. More sophisticated is, however, the subjective poverty line (SPL). The SPL expresses the income that is felt by the population as income which is just enough to make ends meet. Calculations of the Czech SPL have been made from the 1995 and 1996 survey data. The results are provided in Table 8.

Table 8. Subjective poverty line (SPL) for various types of households among the Czech population aged 50 and older in 1995 and 1996

Type of household	(1) SPL (in CzK)		(2) % of households below SPL		(3) structure of poverty		(4) average monthly income (CzK)		(5) legal poverty line (CzK)	
	1995	1996	1995	1996	1995	1996	1995	1996	1995	1996
Single retired	4,465	4,838	90	67	48	62	3,497	5,354	2,440	2,890
Retired couple	6,350	6,622	40	16	28	16	7,287	8,662	4,360	5,110
Single economically active	5,141	5,349	22	19	1	2	6,800	7,774	2,440	2,890
Couple economically active	7,647	7,343	19	8	7	4	12,818	12,913	4,360	5,110
Family with children	10,691	9,785	40	11	9	3	12,966	16,094	8,160*	9,470*
Working retired	7,017	6,960	42	24	7	13	9,768	11,020	x	x
Altogether	x	x	41	30	100	100	x	x	x	x

*) two parents with two dependent children aged 15-26

Source: Mareš, Rabušic: Survey data *Perception of Poverty in the CR* (N = 361), and *Survey data 50+*. (N = 1302)

There are several conclusions which can be drawn from this table. First, the threshold of poverty defined in such a way (column 2) was both in 1995 (41 percent) and in 1996 (30 percent) several times higher than the threshold of poverty defined by the official (legal) poverty line. (Compare columns 5 and 1 to see how much lower the Czech legal poverty minimum income is compared to the poverty income defined by the Czech public). Second, the share of people who are below the subjective poverty line decreased from 41 percent in 1995 to 30 percent in 1996. Such a decrease is substantial and corresponds to the improved income situation in 1996. While in 1995, the average old-age pension was, in real terms, 101 percent of the pension in 1992, in 1996, it was 109 percent. Third, the structure of subjective poverty changed from 1995 to 1996. In both years, the biggest

proportion of households whose income was under the SPL were the households of the single retired (90 percent in 1995 and 67 percent in 1996 – see column 2). In 1995, the next largest group of subjectively poor were the households of the working retired (42 percent), of retired couples (40 percent) and of families with dependent children (40 percent). In 1996, the proportion of poor households was much lower than in 1995, with the second largest group being poor households of the working retired (24 percent).

What do all these data on subjective poverty mean and how can they be interpreted? Czech 'objective' data reveal that the Czech elderly are able to satisfy their basic needs and that they do not have less wealth than others. However, their feeling of deprivation is relatively high due to a feeling of insufficient income. Feelings of subjective poverty recorded in a number of situations among elderly households are rather frequent (about 30-50 percent of the retired), mainly when they are assessing their general situation or in situations which relate to their income.¹⁹ These findings can be socially very significant because they point to the possibility of feelings of social exclusion of some groups of the Czech elderly.

It is a known fact that subjective poverty is always higher than objective indicators would suggest. Poverty is a relative concept and sociology has known for a very long time that even a general increase in the standard of living or an increase in income can not remove the borders between rich and poor. It just moves them. Moreover, there are not just 'general poor', but – due to the relativity of poverty – each social class has its 'own poor'.

In a transitional country, it is necessary to take one factor into consideration. The pace of change is relatively rapid and the scope is vast. Pensioners, for whom the regularities of their lives are very important, and who favour regular behaviour and routines, are less able to adapt quickly to a new social and economic order than other people. These changes can bring about feelings of unhappiness, deprivation, alienation and anomie, all of which correlate with poverty.²⁰

The period of societal change that we are now experiencing is a time which on the one hand benefits eager, dynamic, capable and flexible individuals. This period, however, can be unusually harsh for the elderly, who do not possess these characteristics. We are all experiencing a new socialisation and it is natural that resocialisation is much easier at a younger than an older age. The temporary decrease in the standard of living, brought about by the transformation from a socialist economy to a market economy, affects the elderly population above all, who, because of their age, do not have an adequate set of opportunities to change strategies, which would help them manage and bridge this diffi-

¹⁹) A category which does not fit this description is the retired but working. Their attitudes towards their income are closer to the population of economically active than to the retired. In some aspects they evaluate their situation even more positively than the former. I believe this can be understood as additional evidence for the effort to further raise the Czech retirement age.


²⁰) We did find these attitudes among the senior citizens in our samples. The elderly who felt subjectively poor also maintained that life was much better before 1989 than today. Of those who felt subjectively poor, 64 percent said so, of those who felt neither poor nor rich, there were 33 percent and of those who felt rich there were only 17 percent. Both those who felt poor and who thought life was better before 1989 were also more anomic than other respondents (anomie was measured by means of Srole's [1956] anomie scale). Of the retired respondents 45 percent were not happy (but only 24 percent of the retired but working respondents).

cult period of economic transformation. According to Kolosi and Róna-Tas [1992], there are six economic strategies used during the transformation period for adaption to market institutions:

- (1) To change position in the economic hierarchy through professional career (promotion).
- (2) Use the market of supplementary work opportunities for a second job while continuing in present employment.
- (3) Quit employment in the public sector and work full-time in the private sector (understanding that the private sector uses a different system of organisation with fewer overheads, the reward can be higher wages which correspond with performance and productivity).
- (4) Establish a private family business in agricultural operations as a supplementary economic activity.
- (5) Establish a personal company and become an entrepreneur.
- (6) Use the growing investment market by purchasing stocks, government stocks, bonds, or investment in real-estate – in other words, choose a strategy of investment to create income.

It is clear that not one of these strategies is appropriate for the average elderly person in retirement or preparing for retirement. The first three strategies are based on work and are almost impossible for people in these age categories to realise. For retirees, because of an increasing number of people of working age, the basic problem is that their current chances for future employment are slim and, are most likely to decrease sharply in the near future (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. Number of persons of working age, number of retired but working, and number of the labour force, the Czech republic 1950-1996



These strategies are also very difficult to realise for people who are on the verge of retirement. At this age, promotions come very rarely, for supplementary work activities there is frequently an inadequate supply of energy and for transfer from the state sector to the private sector, either there is an absence of courage, or (and this is more often) the private sector does not express interest in workers who are on the verge of retirement. The fourth and fifth strategy combine work and capital, which in some cases, in connection with the restitution of property, could be an option for some older people. The sixth

strategy, which depends entirely on capital, only applies to cases of inherited or returned property.

Conclusion

The concept of poverty among the elderly has been a frequent weapon in the political rhetoric of Czech opposition parties and trade union leaders who want to get the votes of the elderly. They have been using the 'catastrophic' situation of the elderly a great deal in the media over the last three years, as evidence that the social policies of the Klaus cabinet is actually asocial and inhuman,²¹ so much so that many of the elderly have accepted this idea and it has gradually become an 'objective' fact for them.

I believe that we can, by all measures, state that poverty among the Czech elderly is not a major problem from the subsistence point of view. However, from a subjective standpoint it seems serious. As such, it has to be taken at full weight and it cannot be mitigated by the fact that it has been to a high degree constructed by the psychological and social milieu of a transforming society. By no means does it mean that such poverty is less real than the objective one. To use sociological language in this context, one can point to the so-called Thomas theorem in which the social constructionists remind us quite often: *if people define their situation as real, it becomes real in its consequences*.

It is clear that the elderly are today, and for the foreseeable future will be, quite extensively dependent on public institutions: the level of old-age pensions, housing policies, the health insurance system, and also on policies of special care for ageing citizens (dwellings for retirees, in-home health care, centres for elderly citizens, etc). Only the new cohorts of older people, who will be able to take advantage of and fully use some of the outlined strategies during their economic activity, supplemented by the assurance of private pension plans and the security of privately-owned dwellings, will be more independent of the state. One can only hope that such independence will also bring about positive feelings of subjective well-being.

Poverty is a very complex issue to deal with. To answer the question posed as the title of my paper is not easy because it depends on the viewpoint. On the one hand, for bureaucrats of the central and local governments, the poverty of the Czech elderly objectively does not exist and therefore it is a myth. On the other hand, many of the Czech elderly feel poor and therefore for them their poverty is real. For a sociologist, the whole situation is socially constructed; the Czech elderly are not really poor, but because of its subjective perception, their perceived poverty shapes their opinion and also behaviour.

In dealing with poverty, we should not forget the clever maxim of Abraham de Swaan: *The problem of the poor is to survive: the problem of poverty is a problem of the rich, how to distribute some of the surplus without changing the rules for its accumulation or protection* [de Swaan 1988: 14].

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²¹) This type of statement was prevalent in 1994 and 1995 during discussions before the bill on the gradual increase of the retirement age was passed.

Česká společnost stárne – *Czech Society is Ageing (1995) and an edited book Česká společnost a senioři – Czech Society and the Elderly (1997)*. In 1997 he delivered papers at the European Population Conference in Warsaw and at the European Sociological Conference at Colchester, University of Essex.

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'Soft' Deviance or Erosion: The Forming of Organisational Culture*

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Abstract: An omnibus survey in 1996 (economically active population CR, N = 1,322) showed a number of surviving nuisances or more serious deviant elements at the level of the workplace. Even though privatisation has brought some positive trends for the development of organisational culture, the quality of the leadership of the management and the whole agenda of human resources of the organisation belong among the weak points. Sexual harassment is not a major problem, however, the readiness of higher level staff to tackle this problem is not very high. The main nuisances are misuses of telephones and the material equipment of the company. While employees react sensitively to partial manifestations of inequality, protection and mobying within the organisation, their attitudes toward customers remain sometimes a problem. This experience is seen in the context of theories of anomie and concepts of discipline, and life in a risk-society.

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The concept of erosion is used here to describe the process of erosion or sophistication of the norms of people's everyday behaviour in the sphere of their *economic activities in organisations*. There is no intention to examine the process of decay or even disintegration of these firms. The aim is to point out seemingly slight problems occurring within the monumental processes of social transformation of post-communist society. These darker sides of the formation of a new organisational culture can, of course, be ascribed to the previous system and considered as remnants of the past. From this point of view, the question may arise whether something new has yet been formed that could already corrode. On the other hand, the shortages and nuisances described further can be considered as the product of an anomic situation that has been provoked by radical change. They can be considered also as newly appearing forms of reaction to frustration, to relative social deprivation, and to organisational conflicts. The initial thesis is based on the supposition that the painstaking formation of a corporate culture following the transformation not only shows certain slight cosmetic faults but that it is accompanied by certain erosive processes.

The erosion of organisational culture is supported by individual, gradually cumulative deviant elements, which are taken as *partial deviations from the norms of behaviour* on the level of individual employees. Of course, larger organisational bodies can also act in a non-effective, regressive, irrational way, or in a way that runs contrary to currently accepted cultural norms, however, these deviations or outright pathogenic processes require a much more complex analysis. Here, the focus is to find out to what extent, for example, individual employees at lower levels of management (shop floor) behave in a

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undesirable way, be it by their passivity, intentional absenteeism, breaking of regulations and norms (including the unwritten ones), even though only rarely does this result in substantial damage or catastrophic scenarios. Typical deviant elements will all be considered as manifestations of *erosion of norms, slight or more serious erosion of human relations*, ethical principles, and further acts that may even reach the level of criminal offence.

Within the introductory delimitation of the subject it is necessary to point out that the focus is not on the phenomenon of corruption, although – even from the viewpoint the Czech Republic's image abroad – this is a fashionable and topical subject. Similarly excluded are the deviant actions of top-management or new owners, and the Czech phenomenon of 'tunnelling'. On the one hand, these topics go beyond the scope of this research, on the other, they are not typical for the internal functioning of organisations. In such cases it would hardly be adequate to speak about 'soft' erosion: these are serious systemic problems, if not a disease.

It might be objected that all that remains is to study certain slight nuisances, which only sometimes become more serious matters. However, the monitoring of these in an individual company and in society as a whole is of great significance because:

- advancing slight nuisances or offences negatively influence the social climate and have a negative effect on the satisfaction and motivation of employees who proceed in a correct way,
- under certain conditions they can involve whole groups of employees and complicate the process of management, and lead to reduced effectiveness in achieving the aims of the respective organisation,
- where such information leaks out, it tarnishes the image of the company, and makes the conditions for dynamic public relations more difficult etc.,
- some deviant elements irradiate the whole society and devastate the normative consensus, deviation becomes 'normalised'.

The substance of social transformation originates from the potential of human resources and presupposes the development of initiative and creativeness of employees, that is to say a certain level of positive deviations (R. K. Merton). Absolute conformism or even a certain bureaucratic stiffness are not ideals [Keller 1996]. It is not in the interest of the organisation to suppress the initiative of the employees in the field of innovation, the presenting of patents or suggestions for rationalisation. However, it is without any doubt interested in keeping an adequate level of *discipline among employees* in the elimination of all negative deviations.

It is symptomatic that the literature published in recent years in the Czech Republic on the topic of corporate culture [Bedrnová and Nový 1994] with certain exceptions [Buriánek 1997] monitors a larger scale of positive movements in the formation of enterprise identity or organisational culture. It seems as if it were enough to define correctly new values, to create an impressive image and to introduce functioning rules of action in the organisation. After all, the theory of organisation [Peters and Waterman 1992], and the theory of human resource management followed for a long time the same direction. Older critical views of organisational behaviour monitoring in connection with the phenomena of bureaucratisation, power and special strategies of actors, (for example, the study by M. Crozier from sixties) seem to have been forgotten.

In my latest research I have focused on the phenomena where the negative label is, in its own way, indisputable (there exists strong consensus characterising certain behaviour as incorrect, for example, the favouring of some employees based on personal relations) and matters where the limits of the 'norms' are not quite clear (e.g. the problem of sexual harassment). I attempt to choose such situations which occur in everyday life relatively often but which can be tolerated to a certain extent. In spite of this, there exists considerable agreement that they represent what is not correct and what represents a latent risk.

Risk, Tolerance and 'Discipline' in the Management...

In sociological research it is necessary to monitor rather global tendencies: it is not possible to measure in detail the level of tolerance in individual cases, in the given situations. We are interested in the general climate, in prevailing norms. If we want to inquire what people think about the use of a service telephone for a private call, we have to consider the whole spectrum of possible situations. Certainly there are working places where nobody dares to do so (be the motivation immediate threat of a penalty or inner conviction), in other places a person refers to the mentioned reasonable level of 'human' tolerance, elsewhere nobody bothers – it is simply something 'normal'. In any case, it is important for the management of the organisation to find out the opinion of the majority of the employees, regardless of whether it holds a strict disciplinary (authoritative) or reasonably tolerant (democratic) attitude. In addition, the question should be considered of whether all employees are treated equally, and if abuses are tolerated selectively.

The manager always needs to look for an adequate *level of tolerance*, an effective and motivating way to reach the aims of the group. It is desirable to set up morals which stimulate effectiveness, competitiveness, and innovations, but at the same time the responsibility of employees, and their obedience to the instructions of the management. Internal conflict may be hidden here – under certain circumstances the management may require the employees to chat to customers and perhaps break the regulations. The following considerations are valid only under the given conditions: not every employee who revolts against the climate in the enterprise is necessarily a deviant in a broader, all-society sense. Continual reconstruction of what the actors consider normal is naturally based on the discourse, on the dialogue.

The conception stressing a certain level of tolerance towards nuisances and slight inconveniences might be supported by reference to the specifics of life in a '*risk society*'. Some authors such as U. Beck [1986], and A. Giddens [1990] designate thus the state when the endeavour to keep the balance and relatively smooth movement of society leads to the effort to identify and to master the risks of exposure to danger by means of expert systems that have been formed specifically for this purpose. This can lead to the fact that people transfer responsibility for the solution of problems to these 'responsible bodies'. In contemporary theories of social deviation, this concept is extended into the so-called new principle of insurance ('actuarial') justice [Feeley and Simon 1994]. The society endeavours to foresee and to calculate the risks; this leads to the monitoring of the risky areas, and suspicious persons, it increases the volume of social control, sometimes seen as leading to the manipulation of the people, produces excessive legal regulation and so forth.

On the other hand, risk is taken as something that is in its way inevitable, since any action has a certain probability of occurrence ('intervention' towards the given subject)

and there remains nothing other than to take out insurance and invest an adequate amount into the solution of the eventual problem (of course, this concerns rather the consequences, the indemnity). Some critical authors have pointed out that even the police have started to pay attention only to what insurance companies are interested in.

On basis of these propositions it is possible to draw certain conclusions even on the level of enterprises:

- there is a low probability that all risks of the occurrence of undesirable behaviour can be prevented
- however, it is useful to monitor the occurrence of these risks and take effective measures (such as the education of employees, training of managing staff etc.)
- it is necessary to balance the cost of prevention, control and the eventual damage.

The last of the mentioned principles evokes, of course, a rather different theoretical basis, that is, the theory of rational choice. A reasonable attitude toward soft deviation, however, need not sound like resignation, or reconciliation with a certain volume of 'losses'.

Sometimes it is a question of offences that do not cause direct material damages (e.g. the slandering of co-workers) or which have 'no victim' (especially apparent in cases of corruption, offering favours). The absolute decriminalisation of this type of social pathology are not adequate. An industrial enterprise or organisation can be considered as a functioning *social system*, as a certain community of people which can exist only in conditions of basic and universally accepted consensus. Consequently, disintegrative tendencies and influences always represent a certain threat.

There remains a general problem of how far unpunished or 'accepted' deviation can lead to a broader demoralisation of the whole social system. This aspect should be included into our calculations. After all, even compensation (indemnity) is never a hundred per cent and so the general account of losses must be on the permanent increase.

...plus Anomic Character of Change

A specific situation opening space for 'soft deviations' arises in the process of social change. Not only revolutions but even reorganisations provoke conflicts of the old system with new elements. Many norms and proven ways of action cease to be valid, a certain vacuum of values, or in the worse case, confusion arises. Durkheim characterised this state of society as *anomie*, which means a certain weakening of the normative regulation of the system. It should be taken into account that states of anomie occur even in the case of organisational changes. One example of this is the entry of a foreign partner when it is necessary to achieve a symbiosis of different organisational cultures, and when the rules imposed can be interpreted differently by both sides. In Czech conditions, a pre-privatisation syndrome has been described [Vlášil 1996a, 1996b] which is characterised, on the one hand, by the effort (of management but sometimes also of employees) to utilise quickly the space and adapt to a market setting, and, on the other, not to undertake anything that might threaten the survival of the enterprise and wait for what the new owner comes up with.

A major task for sociological research is monitoring within the existing reorganisation the processes of setting up norms and rules of behaviour [Srubar 1994]. This should concern not only new technologies and organisational charts, but the whole complex of social climate. Many norms do not come into existence by the simple publication

of a regulation but are set up by the activities of people, by interaction and communication. Behind the problems a certain fatal *misunderstanding* can often be found, which can concern the positions of a novice at the working place.

Deviant tendencies may have more causes. As previously mentioned, a cause of tension can be a discrepancy between declared aims and values and the possibilities of achieving them. If employees are promised something they cannot then reach, this can also provoke negative reactions. It may be that the intentions of management are not understood, but also actions of protest or actions seeking compensatory satisfaction (small thefts, sabotage) can be involved. There may be a more general problem of *relative social deprivation*: the people may feel that they are curtailed in their rights when either compared with the previous situation or compared with other groups of employees.

In some organisations certain *subcultures of deviation* can come into existence, that is to say groups which choose different values and ways of behaviour. Sometimes it is a question of relatively closed groups which subjugate even their manager. These groups develop a considerable pressure of 'socialisation' on the new employee, who quickly becomes acquainted with various nuisances.

It is useful to close this brief theoretical excursus by noting that any concept of deviation is accompanied by the act of evaluation. In other words, the group defines its own limits of tolerance and in this sense it constructs deviation socially in mutual conflict with those who, for various reasons, reject the norms accepted by the majority. Therefore, the stated discrepancy can become a challenge for change, for a new delimitation of values and norms. Consequently, there is no reason to be afraid of this or ignore it: in a certain sense deviation it is a part of the culture of an enterprise. However, it is an advantage to have at hand the instruments which are able to regulate it institutionally. It follows that deviation can be settled by means of rules, in the awareness that everything is 'normal'. However, it might be supposed that in the Czech cultural milieu the 'fear of conflict' or at least the fear of negative labelling prevails, which considerably complicates the possibility to define or grasp the deviation.

Data and Methods of Research

The following data originate from the investigation of a representative sample of the *economically active population of the Czech Republic between the ages of 18 and 60 years* (the inclusion of the block of questions on deviations into the omnibus investigation was made possible by grant GAČR 403/95/0189 and Charles University GA 186/95). Collection of data took place in November and December 1996 and registered the opinions of 1,322 respondents. The technique was a standardised interview, the method of quota sampling was used.

Table 1.	Description of the sample (in %)	
Position:	Ordinary employee	52
	Foreman, boss	9
	Middle level manager, clerk	24
	Top level manager	8
	Self-employee, owner	7
Branches:	Agriculture	5
	Industry	28
	Construction	10
	Transport and communication	5
	Sales and services	14
	Education and health care	16
	State administration	5
	Security corps (Army, Police)	1.5
	Others	14.5
Ownership – sector:	State (enterprise, organisation)	28
	Privatised (former state)	28
	Owned by respondent	7
	Private – others	26
	Co-operative	4
	Communal, communality services	2
	Foreign owners	3
Size of the organisation:	Other type	4
	self-employee	2
	up to 5 employees	6
	6-25 employees	20
	26-100 employees	26
	101-500 employees	22
	501-1,000 employees	9
	more than 1,000 employees	16

I am aware that favourable conditions for analyses of these phenomena are offered by one enterprise, where the context is relatively clearly defined and where differences between working places and in the hierarchy of management can be monitored. However, this extensive all-field research makes possible rather a global report on the present situation in the Czech Republic: it makes possible the differentiation of individual branches, enterprises of different size etc. but is oriented rather to a generalisation of conclusions, and to a suggestion of trends.

I would like to stress not only the relevance of the theme in the specific Czech conditions but at the same time provoke a more intensive research of these phenomena. As far as I know, thus far nobody has engaged systematically in this research. In short, it is a question of 'slight nuisances and big methodological problems'.

Anomic Situation as Individual Feeling

Although anomie characterises rather a certain social unit, it also functions as a feeling or opinion in the consciousness of an individual (a summary of possible theoretical attitudes to the problem and application of Srole's A-scale for measuring anomie are offered by Rabušic and Mareš [1996]. An individual can be frustrated by the obscurity or absence of

firm rules of action and deformation of human relations. A certain degree of such uncertainty or outright alienation may influence the occurrence of individual deviation.

In the following battery of statements the first two have most significance. By chance it is just these aspects (they include a cognitive and normative dimensions) that are relatively most claimed by employees. The indices (weighted arithmetic means on a 4 point scale) indicate that the share of optimistic and pessimistic opinions is roughly balanced, item F received the best evaluation.

Table 2. *Considering the present situation in your enterprise would you agree that in comparison with other enterprises the following statements are valid?*

Scale: (1) More than elsewhere, (2) The same as elsewhere, (3) A bit less than elsewhere, (4) Valid little, only exceptionally

	% of 1	Mean
a) The whole system of working and organisational regulations is complicated and difficult to understand	11	2.39
b) The rules are not valid equally for all employees	11	2.38
c) It is difficult to arrange or solve anything without protection and acquaintances	9	2.40
d) In the relations between the people at the working place 'sharp elbows' decide	9	2.59
e) Co-workers cannot be trusted too much	6	2.59
f) Enrichment at the expense of the enterprise occurs everywhere	7	2.73

Considering these indications it should be noted that they point to a certain complex of attitudes: behind the answers a certain global tendency is hidden and the opinions are strongly correlated (e.g. items A and B indicate the correlation gamma 0.55). Of course, it was not the aim to verify whether they form a reliable scale, although this is very probable.

The answers to the first item manifest certain connections with further structures of opinion or factors of social position. Although no statistically significant differences depending on age or sex have been stated, apart from the influence of the size of the enterprise (the bigger is the enterprise, the more complications in regulations), other relatively strong correlation appeared. Unintelligibility of regulations is claimed more often by:

- ordinary workers (especially in comparison with the opinions of owners)
- those who do not trust the management ($G = -0.35$) or indicate disagreement with the management ($G = 0.39$)
- employees generally less satisfied ($G = -0.38$)
- people tending to the left or to the radicals (in opposition to liberals).

In the future it can be expected that general dissatisfaction and frustration will lead employees to more radical opinions. The existing share of roughly one-tenth of 'dissatisfied' does not look bad, however, the answer 'the same as elsewhere' can indicate a certain degree of scepticism.

From the viewpoint of practical utilisation of the results, it might be seen that where a high rate of offences in working discipline occurs there exists something like latent dissatisfaction of a conflicting social climate (expressed by the index value on the

4-point scale, the difference between the very satisfied and dissatisfied is 2.8-2.1). Further investigations in the culture of enterprises confirmed that the employees perceive very sensitively all inequality or injustice in attitude towards them, be it in terms of salary, evaluations of effectiveness or in respect of opinion or initiative.

Employees' Opinions on Negative Phenomena

It is more than difficult to enumerate all possible nuisances or abuses and obtain a representative taxonomic enumeration of the 'soft deviation'. Into our basic battery of questions were included quite current problems as well as those by nature criminal offences. In this respect, those cases are of interest that occur 'often' (at the same time aware of the relativity of this term). In question 35 the mean index is calculated which indicates to what extent the given phenomenon is accepted by public opinion at the workplace. The scale is from one ('normal') to four ('unusual, not acceptable'). However, it should be added that the means are computed after deducting from the data those who indicated that a similar situation cannot come into consideration at all – in some items as much as one-fifth of participants reacted this way.

The extent of these phenomena increases if we include the category 'Occasionally'. It follows from the survey that the *most frequently occurring offences* are:

- the abuse of service telephone (often plus occasionally indicates 60%)
- the abuse of material or equipment (at least occasionally 44%)
- protection (at least occasionally 22%)
- breaking regulations (altogether 18%)
- slandering (gossip)
- mobying, corruption

The first two features show a high degree of acceptance on the part of public opinion – the use of the telephone is something rather frowned upon but tolerated, and for a substantial part of working places really an 'normal' practice. The abuse of equipment is considered as a modern and dangerous phenomenon because there exists the danger of private undertakings of the employees to the detriment of the enterprise, for example, the nuisance of illegal copying of computer programs. Tolerance of these phenomena shows a lower cultural level existing in the enterprises and organisations in the Czech Republic.

More detailed analysis indicates that the occurrence of these phenomena is interconnected with the general *satisfaction of employees*. An evident difference expressed by the index of occurrence can be observed in 'mobying' (very satisfied 3.2-unsatisfied 2.6) or favours (3.0-2.4), it appears also, for example, in the abuse of materials and equipment (2.0-1.8).

Employees consider unacceptable thefts and various financial scheming, and deformations of accounting. A rather 'current phenomenon' was considered by some respondents to be protection and the breaking of regulations (see Graph 4).

The data do not prove that catastrophic processes of moral decay exist in most companies at the micro-level, considering the technique of sampling of the respondents it would be rather a question of individual working places and individual experience. On the other hand, it has been confirmed that the mentioned partial deficiencies prevail, and that they can be encountered in practice, some of them even quite often.

Table 3. Question 34: *How would you characterise your enterprise/organisation as regards the occurrence of various problems or outright negative phenomena:*

It occurs: (1) Often, (2) Occasionally, (3) Seldom, (4) Quite exceptionally, (5) Do not know, (6) Does not come into consideration

Question 35: *If such a situation comes into consideration, how do the people in the organisation react?*

(1) They take it as a more or less current and as a matter of fact, 'normal' phenomenon, (2) It is perceived as something undue, unsuitable, (3) It is already a more or less denounced deviation in behaviour, negative phenomenon, (4) They consider it as absolutely unusual and for the enterprise and for the staff an unacceptable phenomenon

q 34 'Often' (%)	q 35 Index 1-4	ELEMENTS/SYMPTOMS
4	2.82	A. The mobying of a subordinate (e.g. in form of exaggerated control, entrusting with extraordinary tasks, verbal attacks, threatening etc.).
29	1.48	B. The abuse of service telephones for private calls.
16	1.89	C. The abuse of materials or equipment of the company for private purpose (office accessories, materials, service cars etc.).
1	2.93	D. Troubling co-workers with hidden sexual connotations ('harassment' i.e. unpleasant verbal suggestions, gestures, physical contact).
2	2.59	E. Intimate (non-marital) relations between some employees of the enterprise with hidden sexual connotations.
6	2.50	F. Confidential relations between some employees such as intentionally making friends, protection, lobbying groups.
1	3.48	G. Thefts of personal belongings among co-workers.
4	2.75	H. Bribery or favours.
1	3.23	I. 'Black' employment, scheming in payments of insurance etc.
1	3.19	J. Scheming in invoicing, falsifying registrations on sales, services, output, profits etc.
5	2.54	K. Breaking regulations (safety at work, technology, organisational rules).
2	3.08	L. Cheating customers.
5	2.72	M. The slandering of some employees to cause them harm, prevent their promotion etc.

Individual groups of employees differ in connection with nuisances. A rather different situation exists with private owners and entrepreneurs, where usually in small enterprises a normative consensus prevails and – with a certain hope – an even higher absence of the category of cheating customers can be noted. Generally, especially in small enterprises (6-25 employees) the frequency of the occurrence of the problem is the lowest and the reaction most resolute (e.g. mobying does not come into consideration in 70% of cases, harassment 74%, protection 60%). One-third of respondents from big enterprises indicate

the abuse of the telephone. It remains valid that in small organisational units the current system of social control works much more effectively.

Working position is also of importance. Ordinary workers at the lowest level come more often into contact with thefts, mobying, the breaking of regulations, cheating customers, and slandering and protection (as do both ordinary ‘clerks’ at the middle level). Higher management employees come into contact with some offences more rarely, but at this level verbal rejections are more resolute, explicitly in mobying, on the other hand they are more tolerant as regards telephoning. However, we have to consider that these are declarations of attitude in a conversation and many managers might be considered guilty of some offences. It is interesting that, for example, lower managing workers (foremen) manifested lower trust in the management of the company.

Both sets did not show such distinct differences between the opinions of men and women, men mentioned more often the abuse of the materials of the organisation and the breaking of regulations. Differences in age appeared selectively, young people hinting more often at the abuse of the telephone (often 37%), the oldest respondents cited the complexity of regulations and reacted more strictly to abuse of material and equipment. The influence of socio-demographic variables does not generally reach the significance of the size of the company and the working position, and hypothetically also the character of activities of the organisation represented, that is to say the branch.

A Modern Problem – Sexual Harassment

A good example of a certain social constructivism concerning the delimitation of a norm and deviation is offered by the modern problem of sexual harassment. According to the preceding table it seems that it is not a current phenomenon, however, the discussion surrounding this subject has started and the topic itself can be considered a criterion of the culture development of the enterprise. With slight exaggeration it can be understood as a criterion of civilisation, and with some cynicism as something that modern society has itself ‘produced against itself’.

Table 4. *Have you met one of the mentioned forms in such a situation where you were explicitly troubled and wanted to say so or assert your right to redress? (in %)*

1. yes, several times, most often it was	8
2. yes, once, (indicate)	5
3. no	87

The Czech public considers it clear harassment when the boss conditions certain evaluation (remuneration, qualification etc.) by contact, by a certain favour in this field. A large part of respondents also reject physical contacts (in the form of touches etc.), although in our cultural conditions they are not explicitly alarming (nearly 60% of respondents secretly tolerate it). Another group includes usual jokes, commentaries on appearance and provocation by appearance, telling intimate experiences – however, they are only perceived as harassment by roughly every sixth respondent. Almost completely tolerated is a ‘colleague’ kiss at a party, which leads to the conclusion that there exists a high degree of tolerance and liberalism in the Czech milieu.

Of course, we cannot overlook the differences in the position and opinions of men and women, even though the differences are not absolute. Several cases of harassment

were indicated by 10% of women and 6% of men, one case by 9% of women and 2% of men. In a 'definition' of harassment, women indicate more often the following characteristics:

physical contacts	40%	(men 35%)
invitation for a date	40%	
unjustified and insistent demands of social contact	66%	
lewd offers and suggestions	38%	
looks, gestures	39%	(men 33 %)

Table 5. *Can you say that harassment occurs rather in relation of superiors and subordinates or does this circumstance not play substantial role? (in %)*

1. Power position plays a decisive role	32
2. Mostly other circumstances play a role	67

Table 6. *Where can you come into contact with the problem of sexual harassment or abuse (in %):*

1. at the workplace	31
2. in the family, in partnership relations	10
3. in the street, on means of transport, in public	49
4. elsewhere	9

Harassment is a phenomenon with a *high degree of latency*, where a large part of cases remain hidden. About one-third of respondents see the workplace as critical. The factor of power asymmetry is also cited (although higher managers accept this in only 24% of cases). In opposition to this statement, there exists an extended idea that the most risky spaces are those public ones (this opinion is supported by 53% of women, the men emphasise more the working place – 34%). The spread of opinions on the *role of the victim* is interesting: traditionally some respondents lay a considerable part of the blame upon the victim [van Dijk 1985]. However, in the process of work the victim is more often than not at a disadvantage. It seems that some of the public at present do not want to hear about this problem. However, it is the 'victims' who more often point to the fact of power asymmetry, more often indicate the occurrence of this problem at the workplace and more often support the opinion that these phenomena are underestimated (60%).

Table 7. *Imagine the situation that one of your co-employees invites you repeatedly for a date and suggests interest in sexual intercourse. would you be ready: (in %, the rest DNK)*

	yes	no
A. to go to complain to the superior?	9	77
B. to announce the case to the management of the enterprise?	5	83
C. to lodge a formal complaint with the police?	5	82
D. to look for help from co-workers, from your trade union?	20	67
E. to intimate family members, friends?	53	33
F. to take it as something not worth making fuss?	50	29

The research confirms that managers at a lower level of management tend to underestimate the matter – 65% ‘would not make fuss’. A stronger tendency to intimate family and friends can be found with young people and employees of small enterprises, generally rather women (65%) than men (40%). For women, the reaction of their superior is obviously of greater importance, 13% would complain.

Generally, the reaction to the mentioned situation can be assessed as sober, there prevails a tendency to a non-institutionalised solution without unnecessary fuss. On the other hand, the effort to avoid ‘overworking of superiors’ does not indicate a high degree of trust. However, it is valid here that in many cases the victim is in an uneasy situation and an excessive interest can further complicate the situation, there might be fear of revenge from the part of the offender or of so-called secondary victimisation (the reaction of one’s environment). Because the possibilities of solving such problems by self-help have their limits, the manager must be able to master such situations in a sensitive and tactful way, without underestimating their importance. Even in a relatively liberal milieu a certain degree of prevention is justified.

Respect for Authorities and the Law

In the following block of questions we are not so much interested in the opinions of people as regards the importance and ways of solving individual events as the *relation towards the management of the enterprise as a potential authority* or arbitrator. The management of enterprises would be looked to mainly in the case of thefts, the threatening of the environment is perceived in a milder way. The fact that the slight cheating of the customer would cause ‘worries’ to just less than one-half is rather typical. Relation to the client is in the current conditions still a weak point, although this is from the viewpoint of forming the culture of an enterprise without any doubt of key significance.

Table 8. *Even in other situations a person can look for the help of various people or institutions. At which level would you probably solve: (in %)*

	Contact the superior or the management of an enterprise	No fuss
1. the loss of 500 Czech Crown from the purse at the work-place	67	4
2. the cheating of another person (e.g. customer) out of about 100 CZK	47	22
3. the case of threatening the environment by the action of an enterprise	61	5
4. the loss of material or instruments to the value of about 5,000 CZK, for which – of course – you are not personally responsible	70	5

Investigation of the culture of an enterprise cannot overlook the influence of the more general *moral climate in the society*. The willingness to respect the law is a basic condition to subdue nuisances and various criminal acts [Tyler 1990].

Table 9. *People have rather different opinions on how much it is important to respect the law, provisions of police etc. Indicate, your personal opinion (agreement or disagreement) with the following statements:*

	Agree (%)		Index
	Definitely	Somewhat	
A. people must respect the law even in the case that it does not correspond with what they themselves consider correct	33	48	1,88
B. the breaking of the law is seldom justifiable	21	56	2,04
C. it is difficult to break the law without losing self-esteem	15	38	2,38
D. for people like myself there exist only few reasons to respect the law	3	8	3,37

Respondents declare a high degree of respect for the authority of the law, three-quarters would do so even in the case of a different subjective conviction. *Legitimacy* is mainly recognised, as regards moral justification or conscience things are a bit worse. Even in this field there are not such homogeneous opinions. It is interesting that a lower willingness to respect the law is manifested by supporters of the 'firm hand'. The political orientation of respondents also enters into it here: supporters of socialist orientation trust less the authorities and the law, but in the degree of 'non-respect' or the breaking of rules they are in agreement with liberals. The greatest respect for the law is characteristic for the conservatives. The importance of respect for the law is characteristic also for higher managers.

Women are characterised by a generally higher respect for the law. However, more clear-cut is the correlation with age, where conformity increases with age.

In some previous studies [Buriánek 1996] I formulated the hypothesis of a specific '*entrepreneurial pattern of behaviour*', for example, in family relations. This analysis proved that this group is less compliant, that is to say it shows a stronger tendency to the breaking of laws or certain existing norms. In my opinion this confirms the significance of investigating deviations in the milieu of organisations and entrepreneurship generally.

The Specifics of Industrial Enterprises

Although the situation in the key branches of production can be considered worth paying special attention, the analyses did not prove specific differences in respondents representing industrial enterprises (they represented a sub-category of 376 respondents). Their characteristics varied rather in the zone of the average, while the source of significant deviations was more in other branches. For example, the combined category 'education, health care, state administration, security services' (the rough arbitrary grouping of branches followed the efforts to establish statistically comparable sub-categories) differed in many cases more expressively, of course, due to the different character of work and working conditions and also a different qualification structure (in average higher education), as well as representation of women. While in industry the share of men was 63%, in this category it was only 19%.

Consequently, it is not surprising that, for example, the share of experience with sexual harassment in industry is lower – several times 6%, once 5%. Deviation is here expressively bound to *opportunities*, considering the monitored phenomena there seem to be here more possibilities, nevertheless the shares of the marked deviations increase only in certain items. Compared with other categories, we can observe movements from the

category 'does not come into consideration' to the column 'exceptional'. Before passing to the main questions of frequency of contacts with nuisances and reactions to them, it must be remembered that certain specifics can also be represented by closer relations with immediate superiors. This can be documented by the statement that in case of the loss of money 53% would choose to contact a superior. Here we can consider a crystallisation of some specific patterns of behaviour connected with the character and organisation of work. However, it should be mentioned that lower trust in the management of organisations (index 2.9:2.75) can be the result of a greater 'distance' of management from ordinary workers.

In the sphere of the occurrence of individual negative phenomena the data differ in the degree of individual percentage (when we follow key categories 'often' or 'occasionally').

More distinct differences can be found in the items thefts and rule-breaking where industries are involved substantially. In no case can we arrive at the conclusion that the milieu of industrial organisations is more aggravated by risks of the occurrence of undesirable phenomena.

As far as the declared *reaction of 'public opinion'* has been monitored it can be said that the attitude mostly expressed is, slightly more tolerant around the fictitious point 2 ('more or less tolerated'). However, this non-expressive deviation finds its manifestation in taking first place among workers in industry on the scale of tolerance in the following items:

- mobying
- protection
- bribes and favours
- sexual harassment

This milieu is less tolerant to slandering compared with the others. On the other hand, the validity of data from the research is proved also by the fact that in the categories 'commerce, construction industry, transport' a larger share of conciliatory evaluation is included in items 'scheming with salaries' and 'cheating customers'.


The mentioned graph shows the considerable homogeneity of the sample (in the mean values the chosen types of branches showed no distinct differences). In a certain way, it is the general impression which is more important: the curve in its saddle at telephoning designates the most accepted nuisance as well as the prevailing tendency to the rejection of the majority of other deviations (index values higher than 2.5). The effort to specify the position of industry unintentionally changes in a certain summarising balance of cultural-normative climate in the economically active population.

Influence of Privatisation

A sub-file of 829 respondents representing branches with a higher degree of variability of the monitored factor has been chosen for the analysis of the influence of the ownership sector; dramatic changes belong to the key parameters of social transformation. It concerns production branches and the sphere of transport and services. Privatisation, with some minor exceptions (part of the system of health care), did not really touch other sectors (state administration, education, security). The variable 'ownership sector' was transformed by collapsing the categories 'co-operatives' and municipal or communal

enterprises: the category 'others' is also left out, and the category 'foreign enterprise' is treated with extreme caution in view of its size.

Graph 1. Elements of Deviance – Reactions/Attitudes by Branches



The results of cross-tabulations into four items which indicate elements of deviation are seen in Table 10. There are statistically significant differences especially due to the more expressive occurrence of the monitored 'soft deviation' in state enterprises.

Table 10. Elements of Deviance by Sector/Ownership
(In columns percentage of 'often' + 'sometimes')

	Telephone abuse	Mobying	Material + Equip. abuse	Harassment	N of cases
State	65	23	61	10	94
Privatised	60	17	46	7	314
Private ownership	45	8	45	2	66
Private others	56	10	38	4	250
Community + co-operatives	57	20	50	2	54
Foreign	59	21	45	3	29
Total	58	15	45	5	807

Contrary to this, positive reports on the state of 'their' organisations are presented by private owners: this is understandable since these are relatively small enterprises. A certain paradox appears in the item of harassment: while in the global description of the situation the respondents from state enterprises ascribe more importance to this phenomenon, their personal experience is lower (see Table 11). A certain puzzle remains the large share of reported harassment in foreign companies. But even here the small firms of former emigrants might be concerned: the power positions of foreign managers are usually rather strong.

Table 11. Harassment Experience and Trust in Management by Ownership

	Harassed (%)	Trust in Management (% definitely+rather)	N of Cases	% of Total
State	8.5	39	95	11.5
Privatised	12.5	34	314	37.9
Private ownership	18.6	53	70	8.4
Private others	10.8	53	250	30.3
Community + co-operatives	18.5	32	54	6.5
Foreign	26.6	48	30	3.6
Total	13	43	813	

For the evaluation of reactions of the public to deviant elements only the first four items in the list of symptoms will be chosen. In both sets of items a scale of four points was used for the answers which were used for calculating average values of an attitude (1 means agreement, eventual acceptance of the phenomenon).

State enterprises appear usually more anomic, only in the item 'mistrust in co-workers' did foreign companies overtake them, in the item "stealing" communal enterprises or co-operatives are in the first place. If we overlook the support of the self image of entrepreneurs, the most positive climate remains in private firms. Opposing this, the other sectors are in rather rare agreement. This can be interpreted as consensus on values by a large part of society.

Table 12. Anomie and Reactions on Deviance by Ownership
Means on the scale of „acceptance“ (1 = common, accepted, ..., 4 = exceptional)

	State	Privatised	Private owner	Private others	Community + co-operatives	Foreign	Total
Rules compl.	2.0	2.2	3.2	2.6	2.2	2.4	2.4
Inequality	2.1	2.2	3.0	2.6	2.2	2.1	2.4
Protection	2.2	2.3	2.9	2.8	2.3	2.6	2.5
Sharp elbows	2.4	2.4	3.2	2.8	2.4	2.4	2.6
Mistrust	2.4	2.4	3.2	2.7	2.4	2.3	2.6
Stealing	2.4	2.4	3.2	2.9	2.2	2.7	2.6
R-Mobying	2.8	2.7	3.4	2.9	2.7	2.6	2.8
R-Telephone	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.3	1.5
R-Mat.misuse	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.6	1.9
R-Harass	2.9	2.8	3.3	2.9	3.2	3.0	2.9

In the reactions to deviations, foreign firms do not come out well and the employees allegedly in most cases become reconciled with the occurrence of these phenomena (mobying, abuse of telephone, equipment). In the item of reactions to harassment the most reconciliatory attitude was indicated by respondents from privatised enterprises. The question, however, is whether it is a certain situational reaction to the executive transformation and changes of social climate, whether a distinct differentiation of power positions occurred and so on.

While some anachronisms of the disturbed social climate (or the phenomena of postponed change) seem to survive in state-owned enterprises, in the private enterprises we can observe some of the executed changes. Among others, changes in the style of management can be seen, as mentioned in the introduction. In both cases, it can be considered that the feeling of complexity of rules and regulations shows signs of a lower level of effectiveness in the management's activities. The emerging private sector is a bearer of positive trends and shows less symptoms of deviation. In the forming of organisational culture it is surprising that a positive example of foreign firms was not found, although it is not a representative sample. An externally tolerant atmosphere towards soft deviation, however, can be quite well illustrated by the above-described trend to tolerance and to a more open-minded attitude to 'nuisances'. What might be excluded is that it is only a foreshadowing of adaptation to life in a risk society.

Conclusion

Generally, the research confirmed that sexual harassment is not a distinct problem in Czech enterprises or organisations. On the other hand, the faith in managing staff in their ability to solve this is also not too high. *The abuse of equipment of the company for private purposes* (especially telephoning) is one of the main nuisances. While employees are relatively sensitive to *correctness of conduct within the organisation*, that is to say cases of corruption or favouring (or on the contrary mobying) the fate of customers is not so close to their hearts. The fact that part of the respondents do not work in organisations with actual customers increases the relative gravity of this deviant element of culture which also operates in a broader all-society context. In this respect, in the Czech Republic, characteristics of a rather 'eastern concept' of enterprise and trade occasionally survive.

While small enterprises show certain capabilities of normative self-regulation, the question remains as to how the forms of behaviour of entrepreneurs and owners will develop. Many of the monitored nuisances are in direct connection with the *quality of work of the managing staff*. However, many analyses suggest that the main weak points are at present on the agenda of personnel departments, especially when considering the development of human resources and the active forming of the culture of organisations. Of course, some erosive effects at the macro-level cannot be ignored in the normative structure of society as a whole. In brief, the development of corporate culture represents one of the weak points of transition where the nice paintwork has been marred some small but corroding spots.

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On the Emergence of Political Identity in the Czech Mass Media: The Case of the Democratic Party of Sudetenland

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Abstract: Six days after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia on 6th January 1993, an article appeared in the Czech national daily *Rudé právo*. It reported two events – a meeting of the preparatory committee of the Democratic Party of Sudetenland (Cz. *Demokratická strana Sudety*) and a subsequent news conference given by its chairman, Jaroslav Blühmel. The party and its chairman were previously almost unknown to the public. The two events, however, turned out to be politically significant. What Blühmel had said was reported in most of the Czech mass media, and elicited public reactions from major Czech politicians.

The materials we use in this paper include most of the articles in Czech national newspapers during the period which dealt with J. Blühmel and the Democratic Party of Sudetenland (DPS), together with a relevant TV programme. We focus on how the political identity of the DPS was established and contested in the Czech mass media. The category 'DPS' was to begin with almost inter-subjectively empty. We demonstrate how this was fleshed out by binding to it the views, intentions and actions of its incumbents and its opponents. We find that in the case of the DPS the 'fleshing out' was by no means a consensual matter; Blühmel and his political opponents never converged on a common definition of the DPS.

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Introduction

In this paper we investigate the emergence of the identity of a political party – the Democratic Party of Sudetenland (Cz. *Demokratická strana Sudety*) – in the Czech mass media. We begin with an assumption that political identity can be treated as a 'membership category' and analysed using techniques of ethnomethodology, in which the concept originated [e.g. Sacks 1992, Jayyusi 1984, Hester and Eglin 1997, Psathas 1997]. According to membership category analysis (MCA) 'membership categories' are constituted by 'category bound predicates', which may include activities, dispositions to act, aims, beliefs, and values [see Watson 1978]. Categories are organised by members in collections, and together with the rules of application they become 'membership category devices' [Sacks 1972]. Social and ethnic identities have been analysed as membership categories previously [e.g. Moerman 1974, Watson 1983, Nekvapil 1997]; this paper extends the approach to the domain of politics. The domain matters – political parties are usually unique agencies. There is, for instance, only one Conservative and Unionist Party in the

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UK. We could assume that political identity is a category with one member only, but it is also possible to allow predicates to bind to proper names designating political parties. The Democratic Party of Sudetenland (DPS) was certainly a situated collectivity and as such it falls within the scope of MCA [cf. Hester and Eglin 1997: 3]. With this proviso, and for convenience, we will not just treat political identities as categories, but also refer to them in that way.

Much of the work on membership categories has been on relatively crystallised categories (such as 'mother', 'baby') and how these are used in talk. We are dealing with a complementary problem here: how does the social identity of a new political body – a new category – emerge? Such a category obviously cannot be static: it has to be produced, changed and used in new contexts. This typically happens in discourse and, as we shall see, it often involves arguments about which predicates should contribute to the identity. Sacks addressed a similar problem in his classic 'hot-rodder' paper [cf. Sacks 1979]. (From *our* perspective a 'hot-rodder' is a young person who drives souped-up and customised cars.) Sacks was not actually concerned with how the category emerged, but rather with its relationship to other applicable categories (such as 'teenager') and with who 'owned' and 'administered' the category application. We shall nevertheless borrow Sacks's term, and characterise our problem as in part concerning the *administration* of an emergent category.

A new political agency does not emerge in a vacuum. Its relationships to other agencies – contemporary or historical ones – may be an important practical consideration in establishing its political identity. We have observed this to be the case in political mass media debates in the UK which involved Sinn Féin – the participants' focal concern was the relationship between the Sinn Féin and the Irish Republican Army [Leudar 1998]. According to MCA, participants in talk organise categories in, for instance, 'collections', 'classes', and 'relational pairs'. We cannot say in advance of an investigation with which existing political bodies the participants will associate the emerging DPS, nor how they will formulate the relationships. These are practical problems for the participants to address in talk. Our main concern was to establish and make explicit how the participants jointly 'administered' relationships between categories.

Our main interest is therefore in how categories and the relationships between them emerge as interactive achievements. The important aspect of our study is that we investigate the formation of political identity in the mass media – in TV debates, news conferences and newspaper articles. We make use of the concept of a 'distributed discursive network' [Leudar 1995, 1998; Nekvapil and Leudar 1998]. This concept is easy to define as 'conversation', but it draws our attention to the following observations. Politicians speaking on a theme in the mass media frequently address other politicians who are not present in the studio, at a news conference, or a briefing. The mass media are networked (newspapers report what has been said on the radio or TV and people 'on the air' refer to newspaper reports) and both political events and their reports are often loosely duplicated. Political challenges made in the mass media are therefore likely to be heard and responded to (providing, of course, that the opponent has access to the mass media). This means that even opponents who do not wish to be seen meeting face to face can argue in public; sometimes, it may in fact be impossible to establish with any certainty that two politicians are responding to each other. In other words, politicians can engage each other in public without entering into direct communication, which would entail recognising each other as communicative partners. We will demonstrate that the indirect engagement

possible in the discursive networks was one means whereby the DPS was 'dealt with' but denied political status. We shall not, however, describe here the actual network in which the identity of DPS emerged [for details see Nekvapil and Leudar 1998].

It is clear that we are not investigating the emergence of situated categories in 'conversation'. Arguments in discursive networks are obviously not exactly like arguments in 'conversation', especially if we compare their sequential structures and turn-taking. We shall see, however, that MCA formulated in the analysis of conversations is useful in analysing social identity in the mass media [see also Francis and Hart 1997].

Blühmel Network

The following short article appeared in the Czech national daily *Rudé právo* on 6/1/1993.¹

RP/6/1/93²

DP of Sudetenland wants to cancel Beneš decrees

Pilsen (vh) – The cancellation of the so-called Beneš decrees is being demanded by the preparatory committee of the Democratic Party of Sudetenland, which met on Tuesday in Pilsen. The change in the stance of this committee to the past property of displaced Germans is clear. The best solution, as the chairman of the preparatory committee Jaroslav Blühmel told journalists after the meeting, would be, we are told, if it was returned ((to the owners)). If the Czech government is not so generous, the original owners are even ready to buy back their factories.

The report was one of the first mentions of the DPS and J. Blühmel in *Rudé právo*. Like the readers of *Rudé právo* we have therefore a unique chance to witness the emergence of the identity of a new political organisation in the mass media. Leudar [1998] reported on how the political identity of the Sinn Féin and its spokesperson Martin McGuinness was contested in the British mass media (Was he representing a political party aiming for peace or fronting a terrorist organisation?). That 'contest', however, involved an attempt to *change* radically an already crystallised political identity. Our aim here is to document how the identity of the DPS was *formed* in the mass media.

So what did the article RP/6/1/93 say about the DPS? The first predicate bound to the DPS was the goal to cancel 'Beneš Decrees'. The headline formulated this as a DPS 'want', the first sentence as a 'demand' DPS had made. The headline made a claim about a disposition of the DPS; the article warranted this ascription by reporting what the 'preparatory committee of the DPS' demanded. This reporting strategy – disposition-claims by a journalist, warranted by a speech report – is not unique to Czech newspapers. We have also observed it being used in British national newspapers [Leudar 1995, 1998].

¹) We mainly use here articles from *Rudé právo* because of space limitations. This choice is arbitrary but *Rudé právo* gave the DPS affair the widest coverage. We did collect articles on the DPS from all other Czech national papers [for details see Nekvapil and Leudar 1998], and we found that the coverage was very similar. We do use, however, materials from other newspapers when their presentation of the DPS differs from or extends that of *Rudé právo*. All the Czech materials were translated into English by Ivan Leudar. Jiří Nekvapil moderated the translations. We only present here English translations of the original Czech transcripts and of the newspaper articles. All the analysis was, however, conducted using the originals. (On the general situation of the Czech newspapers see [Nekvapil 1996].)

²) In the headings of the news reports, the initials in capitals identify the newspaper, the numerals the date of publication (RP = *Rudé právo*; HN = *Hospodářské noviny*).

The Beneš Decrees are a sensitive issue in the Czech Republic and demanding their cancellation may have been one reason why national papers took notice of the DPS. *Rudé právo* presupposed knowledge of the Beneš decrees, but it described them subsequently as the basis on which 'Sudetan Germans lost their property after the war and had to leave Czech territory' (see RP/12/1/1993 below). Cancelling the decrees would be a necessary condition for returning the confiscated property. The confiscated property is indeed the theme of the article – the journalist VH reported that the DPS

- was concerned with the return of the confiscated property (lines 4-5),
- would prefer the return of property ('best solution... would be if ...', lines 5-6), and
- had privileged knowledge of the displaced Germans' preferences ('the original owners are even ready to buy back their factories', lines 7-8).

Note that the journalist VH did not herself simply define the DPS. Instead, she presented it in the voice of its representative J. Blümel. *He* declared the preference, concern and knowledge, not the journalist. The assessment that the stance of DPS had changed was, however, presented in the journalist's own voice.

The journalist VH also told her readers that the DPS was just coming into being – it had a 'preparatory committee'. In the Czech context this formulation afforded two inferences: that the DPS was not yet recognised as a *political* party, and that public support for the DPS was probably small (since only a body with more than 1,000 active supporters could register as a political party in the Czech Republic).

The article placed the DPS in Pilsen, and so it specified the territory of the party's current activities. Pilsen happens to be the centre of a region bordering Germany which once had a strong German community. The *Rudé právo* article could have been read to imply that the DPS was ethnically aligned – the predicates bound to the DPS jointly afforded the inference that the party had links with the displaced Sudetan Germans. The activities of the DPS were presented in *Rudé právo* in terms of current (democratic) political discourse, and so arguably as legitimate. This was not so in all the papers. All that is necessary is to compare the headlines of the corresponding news reports:

- **DP of Sudetenland wants to cancel Beneš Decrees** (*Rudé právo* – the DPS was presented as a political subject.)
- **Sudetan Germans want property** (*Mladá fronta Dnes* – the DPS was presented as an ethnic grouping.)
- **Sudetans (Cz. *Sudetáci*) in Pilsen** (*Svobodné slovo* – the DPS was presented as an ethnic grouping using the term of abuse *Sudetáci*).

This means that the ethnic connection of the DPS, implicit in *Rudé právo*, was explicit and foregrounded in other national papers. The DPS was an *ethnic* organisation of Sudetan Germans. We shall see below that Blümel denied any such alignment. His problem was not unique: representatives of Sinn Fein had to dissociate it in public perception from the IRA [see Leudar 1998]. Blümel had to dissociate the DPS from organisations generally perceived by Czech politicians as antagonistic. So one problem a new political agency has in establishing its identity is to manage its relationships to the other political bodies, and this involves administering a collection of categories in discourse.

Let us summarise the formulation of DPS by *Rudé právo* and other Czech national newspapers so far. It aimed to get the 'Beneš Decrees' cancelled and the confiscated

property returned. It was presented as an ethnically aligned party or even as an ethnic organisation. Can we say here which of these predicates was crucial to the DPS identity, and were any of them just incidental? We shall see that this was a matter for the participants to resolve.

Three voices were used in the article to achieve the binding. The voice of the journalist assessed the party or rather its preparatory committee. The voices of the preparatory committee of the DPS and of its representative J. Blümel avowed the party's aims, preferences and knowledge. The use of three voices should not however obscure the fact that it was the journalist who administered the category DPS in *Rudé právo*. There were relatively few occasions when the DPS could publicly speak for itself.

The next time the *Rudé právo* reader would hear about the DPS and Jaroslav Blümel was in the following report five days later.

RP/11/1/1993

What ((to do)) with criminality, Germans and Moravia

Prague (zs) – Ten guests on the Sunday programme 'From the political scene' tried to deal with the problematic of Romanies, the criminality in Northern Bohemia, the possible return of Germans into the Sudetenland, and the question of the standing of Moravia.

((the lines dealing with the problematic of Romanies omitted.))

On the theme of the possible return of Sudetan Germans also spoke Jaroslav Blümel – the chairman of Democratic Party of Sudetenland, which is not yet even registered. He said that their goal was to make healthier what was once the territory of Sudetenland, which today, according to him, has the greatest criminality and ill health, and to re-evaluate the question of returning the property of Germans – so guaranteeing the property to those who currently own it.

((the lines dealing with the standing of Moravia omitted.))

The journalist ZS presented J. Blümel as 'the chairman of the DPS', which was, however, 'not yet even registered'. So again, the provisional political status of DPS was kept in view in *Rudé právo*, as it was in most other national newspapers.

The identity of the DPS was further developed in this article by reporting what Blümel himself publicly avowed about the DPS. One aim he declared was to 're-evaluate' the current position on returning the property of Germans. Somewhat paradoxically, this would, according to him, now guarantee the property of current Czech owners. The first *Rudé právo* article (RP/6/1/93) mentioned only that the DPS aimed for a property settlement. The DPS now entertains the possibility that this could involve the return of the former German owners. This would alarm many Czechs, as we shall document below. Not surprisingly these two aims turned out to have been focal in the definition of the DPS in the eyes of the Czech public.

Rudé právo was the only newspaper which reported Blümel saying that the DPS aimed to 'make healthier what was once the territory of Sudetenland' (and actually expressed what this presupposes, that the territory was in a terrible state).³ This aim of the DPS was, as we shall see, *not* taken up subsequently by Blümel's Czech political opponents. This predicate was not contested, it was treated as irrelevant and simply ignored.

³) 'Bringing health' to a territory is clearly itself a categorised activity – it could concretely range from planting trees to closing factories.

So we have seen that the DPS was aligned by the mass media to Sudetan Germans explicitly and in terms of its aims. By focusing its activities on Sudetenland, the party was re-establishing this area as a distinct territory and in need of care. A report in *Hospodářské noviny* three days later is relevant. It presented even the founding of the DPS as disreputable (line 1-2).

HN/13/1/1993

The Assembly of Germans in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia distances itself from the attempt to establish a political party to protect the interests of Germans in Czech Republic. This was said in an interview for ČTK by the president of this organisation, Ervin Šolc. In his view, it is nonsensical that the word 'Sudetenland' should appear in the name of such party, as it does in the case of the Democratic Party of Sudetenland being established in Pilsen.

HN/13/1/1993 used the voice of 'the Assembly of Germans in Czech, Moravia and Silesia' to attack the DPS. Its representative Šolc was reported to have rejected any need for an autonomous *political party* for Germans in the Czech Republic, and the use of the term 'Sudetenland' in its name. This is significant: *Hospodářské noviny* did not attack the DPS in its own voice but instead used a representative of an organisation of *German* residents in Czech Republic. The attack was in the voice of a group one might expect to be an ally of the DPS. The second interesting feature of this short article is that at that time in the Czech Republic rejected political activities were unique to the DPS. *Hospodářské noviny* attacked DPS by attacking the activities uniquely bound to it (see [Sacks 1992, Vol. I: 301], on identifications through naming a category-bound activity). The mere emergence of the DPS became a controversial matter.

The article RP/11/1/93 was one reaction in the mass media to what J. Blühmel had said in the TV programme 'From the political scene' (*Debata*). There were many similar reactions in almost all the national papers. In order to understand why, it is important to bear in mind the nature of occasions on which he spoke. The first article, RP/6/1/93, placed his comments at a provincial press conference. Blühmel's second performance (the one reported in RP/11/1/93) was much more public. *Debata* of 10/1/93 belonged to a series transmitted after lunch every Sunday in the early nineties. The programme discussed the most important events on the Czech political scene that happened during the previous week (the original name of the programme was 'What the week brought'). The debates were attended by important Czech politicians (unlike in the UK, where they rarely meet face to face in the studio). The programme still holds an important place in Czech political culture; the debates are political events in their own right and are referred to in the same evening's main TV news reports.

The context of the debate on 10/1/1993 was further unusual due to its position in the sequence of political events. On 1/1/1993 Czechoslovakia ceased to exist as one state, and independent Slovakia and Czech Republic came to being. *Debata* took place just one week after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia at a time of general uncertainty. The invited guests were almost all eminent politicians who discussed problems likely to be crucial for the new Czech Republic. What was said could be understood as a sign of problems to come. It was therefore not surprising that the DPS became highly visible and Blühmel's public appearance had some influence on how the identity of the DPS was constituted. In fact, a *Rudé právo* article published two days after the debate voiced the complaint that:

‘...the so called Democratic Party of Sudetenland was given *exceptional space* in the Sunday lunch-time debate’ (RP/12/1/1993, our italics).

So what did Blümel actually say in *Debata*? Did it warrant the reports in the national papers? How was the political identity of DPS formulated in *Debata*? The first point is that Blümel had to propose a political identity for the DPS against the background provided by the programme makers in the introduction to the programme. In summary, the introduction claimed that: ‘many Czech citizens fear the possible return of Germans; this has begun already; Germans are here becoming more widespread; if they come as businessmen they could have a positive effect but this may require a total financial settlement over confiscated property’.

ČT1/10/1/1993⁴

001 Hostess: in the Pilsen area er a relatively er vocal political grouping has been forming, the Democratic Party of Sudetenland, er which er as yet is not officially registered or is it?

002 Blümel: not yet. not yet.

003 Hostess: nevertheless this association has a relatively ambitious programme. [...] what are your aims Mr Blümel.

004 Blümel: first I’d want to preface, that I will not be speaking here for any grouping er of Germans in Bohemia, much less for the ger- Sudetan-German Association, with which that is with the leadership of the Sudetan Association we have no we have nothing in common, we have seen Mr Neubauer in newspapers on television but otherwise nothing, we interact with only with er with local groups, [...] in Germany and in Austria, with land associations, and where we determine, [...] their views moods etc etc.

The hostess started the debate in *Debata* by saying that in the Pilsen Region a new ‘vocal political grouping’ was being formed. It called itself the ‘Democratic Party of Sudetenland’ but it was not yet registered (see 001). Blümel (introduced in *Debata* as the chairman of the DPS) confirmed that the DPS was not yet registered and the hostess immediately downgraded it to an ‘association’. So in *Debata*, the DPS had begun as an organisation with an uncertain legal status (a political party, an association, a political grouping?).

The hostess characterised the aims of the ‘association’ as ambitious, and asked Blümel to expand (see 003). This is important – *Debata* was one of those few public occasions when Blümel could himself speak for the emerging DPS. (He was quoted in newspapers previously but this is not the same as speaking for oneself!)

The problem he oriented at in the first place was: Who am I speaking for? Nobody *in the studio* had said that Blümel represented ethnic Germans or their organisations, but it is precisely this categorisation which he tried to forestall. He rejected it explicitly (see 004, line 1-3). As a spokesperson of the DPS he said that he did not represent any ‘grouping of Germans in Bohemia’. And he explicitly dissociated the DPS from the leadership of the ‘Sudetan-German Association’ or ‘Landmannschaft’ (see 004, lines 3-4).⁵ To put it more generally, Blümel started defining the DPS in *Debata* by managing its relationship to other *political* bodies and he used his time to say who his party was *not*

⁴) In the headings of the TV transcripts, the capital initials identify the company, the numerals the date of transmission (ČT1 = Czech Television channel 1).

⁵) ‘Sudetan-German Landmannschaft’ is a term used in Czech Republic to refer to organisations of displaced Sudetan Germans and their descendants.

related to. (This is closely analogical to Sinn Fein representatives appearing on British television having to ensure that they were not seen to represent the IRA, [see Leudar 1998].) This confirms our argument in the introduction that establishing the identity of a new political body involves not just binding predicates but also sorting out its relationship to other categories. Blühmel did accept that the DPS was in contact 'with local groups in Germany and in Austria' and 'with land associations' (see 004, lines 5-6). But this was only logical since, as he went on to say, the DPS was established to solve the problems between Czechs and Sudetan Germans (see 004 cont. 1, lines 1-2). (The interesting point is that the identity work in this part of *Debata* was explicit and need not be inferred by the analyst.)

ČT1/10/1/1993

004 (cont. 1) Blühmel: our party arose, [...] er for one simple reason. we think that if the problem of Sudetan Germans and Czechs is not dealt with. at this time which is a good time. to find [...] a solution. that here er in the future maybe in five ten years will arise problems which, [...] er may end badly. we do not want to spread fear but really, [...] we can see it in Italy, which which inherited a bit of Germany. Tyrol, and to this day power pylons have been blown up over there and so on. so we want to prevent this.

In turn 004 (cont. 1) Blühmel continued to speak in the voice of the DPS, and he was treated in that way by the other participants. This is evident from how he used the pronouns 'our' and 'we' (lines 1, 4, 6) and from what he was invited to comment on by the programme hostess (e.g. see 005). The first DPS aim which Blühmel declared was to decrease the tension between Czechs and Sudetan Germans. He warranted the need for this by saying that otherwise the future might become dangerous. He likened the situation in Sudetenland to that in the Tyrol, warning of the danger of terrorism. The other participants in the studio ignored this predicate, but Blühmel's warning of possible terrorism was taken up as a threat in many subsequent newspaper reports. We cannot provide these here because of the space limitations.

ČT1/10/1/1993

004 (cont. 2) Blühmel: on the other hand we are appalled by the state [...] of Northern Bohemia, [...] the state of Ostrava region criminality. [...] ill-health ci- of the local citizens. the living environment is in such a state. that it will not be seen anywhere else in the world.

005 Hostess: so what is your programme.

006 Blühmel: our programme. [...] first of all. is to bring health into what was once Sudetan territory, we know that it was not a land as such, that it is only. [...] a name of this part of the Czech Republic, but er there is simply concentrated the highest incidence of criminality the highest ill health, these are problems which burn us always, there we want to focus on that territory, and there we want to really [...] achieve something, somehow er to get the people active, so they really do something for that land.(we think it) Sokolov area Most area, there [...] it is awful. Mr Pithart would fly over, the old minister of government, the chair of government, he would look shake his head and fly away, to this day nothing has happened there.

Blühmel went on to describe the desolate state of the territory of former Sudetenland – the criminality, illness and ecological disaster (see 004, cont. 2). This description did not define the propensities of the DPS, and the moderator asked him 'So what is your programme?' (see 005)? In response Blühmel declared another aim of the DPS: to make the former Sudetan territory healthier (see 006, lines 1-2).

The interactive nature of category-work is clearly evidenced by what happened next in *Debata*. The moderator did not accept the DPS aims declared so far by Blühmel as sufficient. He ignored what Blühmel had just said about the state of Northern Bohemia, and instead he himself introduced another aim of the DPS – to negotiate the return of confiscated property to Sudetan Germans (see 007).

ČT1/10/1/1993

007 Host: you had a press conference () last week, and there was talk also about the reappraisal of the return of property to ||Sudetan Germans. ()||

008 Blühmel: ||yes. yes. I did|| only er talk about the first point, [...] the other point is the reappraisal [...] er of the return er of property to Sudetan Germans.

To provide some ethnographic background, the problem of confiscated property is a perennial in Czech-German relationships. This means that the aim of the DPS to ‘re-appraise’ the question of ‘return of property to Sudetan Germans’ was basic and without it its identity would have been incomplete. Blühmel indeed reluctantly confirmed that the DPS had the aim to address the problem of Sudetan property, but on his list it came second (see 008). The importance of a predicate in a political identity can therefore depend on the participants’ perspectives and can be disputed.

The important point is that even though the host introduced this aim of the DPS himself, he did it in the voice of the DPS. We have seen this gambit already in the newspaper articles. But why present predicates in the voice of the agency whose identity is in question? This could simply be a matter of reporting genre. The result was, nevertheless, that the felicity of the DPS presentation was not warranted by the host’s own knowledge, but by the avowal of the DPS representative. Avowals produce commitments and so they can be used normatively to ‘bind predicates to categories’.

How did the other guests in the studio react to the DPS raising the issue of Sudetenland? Vladimír Šuman, the chairman of the ‘committee for judicial defense and security’ of the Czech parliament explicitly rejected not just the return of the confiscated property, but even any consideration of the issue (see 018, lines 2-3). According to him this was unnecessary (because only one of the five *landsmannschaft* organisations demanded property return.) Note also that this aim of the DPS was presented as inconsistent with existing law by the hostess of the programme (see 017).

ČT1/10/1/1993

017 Hostess: Mr Šuman these are demands which are in a direct contradiction to the law of restitution.

018 Šuman: I am sorry. I think that [...] chh not think I am sure that it is necessary in principle to reject all considerations whatsoever about returning property to er Sudetan Germans who were displaced. that is simply a matter which is completely unacceptable, and I also think, that [...] it is unnecessary [...] the formulation of these problems that somebody from Germany from the Sudetan Germans demands it, that this is misleading in the sense that as far as I know there are several organisations of Sudetan Germans in the Wes- in the German Republic. there are I think about five.

019 X: yes. ||yes.||

020 Šuman: ||which|| have quite a different approach to the solving of ||this problem.||

021 X: ||certainly. certainly.||

022 Šuman: and that only one of them er threat- somehow puts forward these er claims.

023 X: yes.

024 Šuman: I think that it is a problem which [...] is not solvable in a short period, which is necessary to solve [...] through long-term dialogue, [...] between our citizens and between the citizens of the German Federal Republic.

Seeking a property settlement had already been established in *Debata* as the aim of the DPS. This aim was now either unacceptable or unnecessary, and possibly against the law. The implication was that the party is either 'unnecessary', 'unacceptable' or even illegal. This concurs with E. Šolc's assessment seen previously in *Hospodářské noviny*. It might well have been asked whether the DPS still belonged among a collection of legal political agencies.

With regard to the aim of the DPS to enable the return of displaced Sudetan Germans to the Czech Republic implied in *Rudé právo* the day after *Debata*, this was not in fact first raised by J. Blümel but by Bořek Valvoda, the Mayor of Most. (Most is a major town in the border region to which the Sudetan Germans would return.) Valvoda asserted that such a return was unacceptable (033, lines 1-2). Blümel only confirmed the return as an aim of DPS later in *Debata* (040, lines 6-8).

ČT1/10/1/1993

031 Host: Mr ||Valvo||da. you are from the north of Bohemia. [...] do you have the same view?

032 Blümel: ||therefore||

033 Valvoda: look, I- I think that it is necessary simply unequivocally to confirm that which has been said. er the return is not possibly. er it is unacceptable. and if the German side want to co-operate with us. and want to invest here. well let them invest, of course because [...] we: need the investment funds. in fact it was obvious there in those excerpts, that the citizens are in fact even now afraid of that- from the- er from the [...] coming of German capital here. so it is a question rather, it is unrelated excuse me I think that it is unrelated to the Sudetenland. the problem of Sudetan of Sudetenland really ought to be unambiguously solved for us, and we should deal in this way with all our German partners. they must also accept in- in all dealings there are two sides. and [...] that our, our approach must be absolutely clear.

Blümel tried to reassure 'Czech people' that there was no danger that individuals would lose property, but he also re-asserted that the Czech government should compensate 'those Germans'. This can be taken as a demand to the Czech Government, which raises whether or not the DPS is a proper political partner for the Czech Government. *Debata's* hostess herself posed this question (see 035 and 037).

The significance of the attempt by the DPS to initiate negotiations with the Czech government was accepted by the participants in *Debata*. The point is that the DPS could not achieve political status until it was accepted as a political party. Would the Czech government reply to the DPS 'demands'? If the DPS had been received by Klaus, this would have reinforced its identity as a political agency. Blümel probably recognised the problem. When the hostess asked 'So did the government react to your demands?', he shifted the topic and did not answer the question put to him (see 040, lines 1-2). Ladislav Body (an MP) however reinstated the topic and formulated the activities of the DPS as

‘coercive action’ (see 051 and 053).⁶ Blümel accepted that as a possible interpretation but rejected it – the DPS was against any coercion.

ČT1/10/1/1993

035 Hostess: you have Mr Blümel also ||addressed [.] the Czech Government. with your
036 X: ||()||

037 Hostess: with your requests. if I remember correctly, then Mr Klaus er several times said that [.] er this theme er for this theme there is for him only one er partner [.] the German government.

038 Blümel: yes yes yes.

039 Hostess: so ||did the government react|| to your de||mands?||

040 Blümel: ||I would not want for us|| ||to look here || as a party somehow that we want to take property from the Czechs, and give it to the Germans. excuse me please not that I did ((say)) here already before (before it started,) I am not a great rhetorician. so you can’t expect from me [.] some verbal turns and dodges. I say what I think. Czechs who live in Sudetenland. have the right to that property. nobody will be taking away from them. the Germans who will request the property. should be [.] enabled [.] conduct business here in the same way as Czech businessmen. so they could return. as Sudetan Germans. and so Czech Germans. grown out of this land, in it they were born. er maintain the property of Czech people who hold it, and to those Germans who ask for it or (who already) would like to return. and live in Bohemia with us. we can give
((11 turns omitted))

051 Body: on the contrary I think, ||()|| Mr Blümel could not

052 Blümel: ||()||

053 Body: it be a coercive action. some () ||()||

054 Blümel: ||no, nobody wants|| a coercive
action||

055 Body: ||we ||will invest, but.

056 Blümel: precisely against that coercive action we will make a stand.

In fact Czech premier Klaus rejected the ‘opinions’ of the DPS without talking to the party or its representatives. His reaction was made public in a statement to the Czech News Agency (ČTK) two days after *Debata*. It was reported in all the main national newspapers, including in *Rudé právo* (RP/12/1/1993).

RP/12/1/1993

Klaus rejects Sudetan demands

Prague – On Monday Premier Klaus described as unacceptable for the Czech Government the demand to cancel the so-called Beneš decrees, on the basis of which Sudetan Germans lost their property after the war and had to leave Czech territory, as well as the demand to compensate them.

“The starting point of the government is that the conditions which were created after the war in agreement with the victorious powers and strengthened over almost fifty subsequent years cannot be changed without disturbing the basic rights of the current citizens of the Czech Republic, without shaking legal certainties, and as a result of this seriously destabi-

⁶) Body was the only participant in *Debata* to address Blümel directly. Neither Šuman nor Valvoda addressed their comments to Blümel, even though he was sitting next to them. This was very clearly so in the video. They were dealing with the points Blümel raised without talking to him.

lising the political situation in the Czech Republic,” said Prime Minister Klaus in a reply provided for ČTK to the question regarding the demand of the chairman of the preparatory committee of the Democratic Party of Sudetenland, J. Blühmel. “The government is obliged by valid legal norms, including in the first place the restitution laws and by its own decree of June of last year, in which it undertook to prevent any change in the legally set limits on restitutions. The creation of the region ‘Sudetenland’ would in present conditions be completely not organic. **The opinions of the chairman of the preparatory committee of the Democratic Party of Sudetenland, Mr Jaroslav Blühmel, are for the Government of the Czech Republic unacceptable,**” states the Prime Minister. (bold in original)

The title of the article RP12/1/93 provided us with Klaus’s reaction to the DPS ‘demands’ – a rejection. But the article RP/12/1/1993 documents that Klaus in fact did not react directly to Blühmel and the DPS. According to RP/12/1/1993 he provided a statement to the Czech News Agency. But at whose instigation? This was clarified in the ČTK release ČTK/11/1/93/22:26.

ČTK/11/1/93/22:26

Klaus: Demands of Democratic Party Sudetenland are unacceptable

Praha 11th January (ČTK) Premier Klaus described the views of the chairman of the preparatory committee of the Democratic Party of Sudetenland, Jaroslav Blühmel, as unacceptable for the Czech Government. Last week he voiced amongst other things the demand for the cancellation of the so-called Beneš Decrees, on the basis of which Sudetan Germans lost their property after the war and had to leave Czech territory.

“The starting point of the government is that the conditions which were created after the war in agreement with the victorious powers and strengthened over almost fifty subsequent years cannot be changed without disturbing the basic rights of the current citizens of the Czech Republic, without shaking legal certainties, and as a result of this seriously destabilising the political situation in the Czech Republic,” said Prime Minister Klaus in a written reply to Czech and Moravian-Silesian Agricultural News in response to a question regarding the demands of the Democratic Party of Sudetenland. The premier also made the reply available to ČTK.

“The government is obliged by valid legal norms, including in the first place the restitution laws and by its own decree of June of last year, in which it undertook to prevent any change in the legally set limits on restitutions. The creation of the region ‘Sudetenland’ would in present conditions be completely not organic. The opinions of the chairman of the preparatory committee of the Democratic Party of Sudetenland Mr Jaroslav Blühmel are for the Government of the Czech Republic unacceptable,” states the Prime Minister.

The representatives of the party hold the view that the property of Sudetan Germans should be returned, or that they should have the chance to buy it back more cheaply. After this step, the Czech Republic would become an interesting country for investment by Austrian and German firms, whose interest, according to the Democratic Party of Sudetenland has ebbed substantially.

The party so far has 600 members and was founded last November in Pilsen. It has, however, to this day not been registered. It wants to be a party of Czechs, Sudetan Germans and of people of other ethnic groups, who live both in and outside ČR. The main aim of the party is to resolve justly questions of Sudetan Germans and of the prosperity of the Czech border country.

(rok pel)

The question was put to Klaus by the daily Czech and Moravian-Silesian Agricultural News (ČMSAN) (2nd paragraph, lines 5-6). However, it was not necessarily the case that Klaus reacted only to ČMSAN, which is not an important national paper. He may well

have been reacting in the light of *Debata* and under its impression. Klaus certainly did not address his reply just to ČMSAN, but also to the Czech national press agency, ČTK (2nd paragraph, line 7-8).

In this way, the representative of the Czech government rejected the 'views' and 'opinions' of the DPS but without being drawn into a dialogical engagement. Klaus did not talk to the DPS, he commented on their 'opinions' (3rd paragraph, lines 4 and 5). Blümel and the DPS had to read the comments reported in national papers like most other people. If Klaus had received the DPS for face-to-face talks he would have thereby ratified their political status. The upshot was that the DPS was not treated as an acceptable dialogical partner.

It is interesting to note what the Czech national dailies ignored in *Debata* and in the ČTK release. The declared aim of the DPS to care for the Sudetenland was left behind. The ČTK release also reported that the DPS aimed to be a party of 'Czechs, Sudetan Germans and of people of other ethnic groups'. This aspiration to become an inter-ethnic political party was not taken up by any national newspaper. Instead, as we have seen, the national newspapers aligned the DPS with ethnic Sudetan Germans and this became the steady state of the DPS.

We are now nearing the twilight of the DPS. RP/5/2/1993 presented Blümel's appearance in *Debata* in terms of Czech reactions: 'it raised widespread protest'. It is therefore not surprising that Blümel was removed from his function by his own party. The journalist reported this in the voice of 'L. Duda, the spokesperson of the preparatory committee' of the DPS.

RP/5/2/1993

Blümel removed

Pilsen (vh) J. Blümel, who as the chairman of the preparatory committee of the Democratic Party-Sudetenland raised widespread protest by his appearance on TV, was removed from his post. This was conveyed to the reporter of RP by L. Duda, the spokesperson of the preparatory committee with the comment that the views presented by J. Blümel do not correspond to the programme of the party. "We are democrats, we do not want to impose our goals by force, but to persuade by discussion," he declared. What is concerned, amongst other things, is the demand to cancel the so-called Beneš Decrees, which, we are told, still creates apprehension amongst potential German investors, because their property could be taken in the future. According to the declaration of L. Duda new members from Olomouc, the Opava region, and Brno are joining the party. The number of members is according to his information more than 800. The new nominee of the preparatory committee for the post of chairman is J. Schottenbauer from Jirkov.

Duda explained Blümel's removal saying "We are democrats, we do not want to impose our goals by force, but to persuade by discussion." The reader may remember that Blümel never threatened terrorism, he warned of its possibility. What mattered was, however, not what he said but the effect he achieved. The change of leader however did not save the party. This is not surprising: the identity which emerged characterised the DPS as a social agency, not Blümel as a person. In any case, the DPS could not raise sufficient public support and was in effect disbanded.

Conclusion

We began this paper by outlining the basics of Membership Categorisation Analysis (MCA). We proposed that the identity of a political agency can be defined in terms of

predicates expressing its agentive propensities such as, for instance, its aims, preferences, common beliefs and activities.

MCA enabled us to follow the development of the identity of the DPS. It emerged – and ceased to exist – as an organisation with a contested identity. It endeavoured to present itself as a trans-ethnic political party to restore Sudetenland, to represent the people there, and to forestall future conflict. In the majority of cases it was received as an ethnically aligned organisation, the aims of which were to facilitate the return of displaced Sudetan Germans, and to secure compensation for the property confiscated after the Second World War. The DPS never secured a political status for itself or, to put it in MCA terms, it did not join other political parties in the collection 'political parties'.

The technical term 'predicate' is a useful shorthand for the activities, aims, and beliefs of a political agency. The main finding of our case study is, however, that 'binding predicates' to a social category (a technical term of MCA) is essentially a mundane dialogical process. In our case study, predicates defining the DPS (for instance, its aims) were typically avowed by its representatives. Where predicates were proposed by the opponents of the DPS, the 'binding' was either done by reporting the speech of the DPS representatives (in their voice) or its ascription was warranted by reporting an avowal. This strategy seems to have been relatively independent of the mass media genre – it was used both on television and in newspapers. The individual avowals were, however, not sufficient for predicates to become aspects of the identity. The avowed predicates had to be accepted by political opponents. We have seen, however, that the proffered predicates could be 'just noted', ignored or rejected. This was in fact the source of the bifurcation of the political identity of the DPS.

It is clear that everything a political agency does or expresses does not become an aspect of its identity. This problem is not addressed in any detail in our paper. One interesting point is, however, that the personal characteristics of the DPS representative J. Blümel were never presented in the Czech dailies. We learned nothing about who he was (for example that he had German father and Czech mother, that he only spoke Czech, that he was a trade unionist and worked as a tram driver.) His identity throughout the affair was very much bound to that of the DPS. The identity of the DPS was partly constituted in his activities but it was not bound to his personal identity.

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Transcription conventions

?	rising intonation
.	falling intonation
,	continuing intonation
:	lengthening of the previous syllable
[.]	a very short, still audible pause
[..]	a longer pause
[...]	a long pause
-	a cut-off of the prior word or syllable
(but)	items enclosed within single parentheses are in doubt
()	no words could be distinguished in the talk enclosed within single parentheses
((cough))	in double parentheses there is a comment by the transcriber
<u>out</u>	underlining indicates emphasis
	the onset and the ending of simultaneous talk of two speakers (overlap)
X	speaker who could not be identified

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Potential East-West Migration

Demographic Structure, Motives and Intentions

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Abstract: This article is based on a large survey which tries to identify the migration potential in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. More than 4,000 persons were asked if they want to migrate, which steps they have undertaken to realise the migration, what their social circumstances are and what they expect of staying and working abroad. One main result was the fact that all scenarios that predict an imminent exodus of people from East and Central Europe are exaggerating the real dimension of East-West migration. The migration potential in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary is somewhere between a possible 4 million and a more likely 700,000 persons. The latter figure is less than 1% of the population over the age of 14. This figure remains, however, higher than the numbers foreseen by the law for annual immigration to Austria and Germany and higher than the numbers that are thought of as politically acceptable. Furthermore the article gives principal information concerning the demographic and social structure of the people who are willing to leave their country and planning a short or longer stay in Western Europe.

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1. Preliminary Remarks

Large-scale East-West migration was characteristic of the late 19th and early 20th centuries [cf. Fassmann and Münz 1994a]. Austria-Hungary, the German Empire and France were the destinations of migrants from East and South-east Europe. With the spread of industrial methods of production from the mid-19th century, with far-reaching improvements in public transport and the liberalisation of laws concerning the right of establishment, East-West migration reached substantial proportions. The industrial centres of Lorraine, the Ruhr and the Vienna Basin joined the European metropolises of Paris, Berlin and Vienna as migration destinations for several hundred thousand people from East and East-Central Europe. Until the Second World War, Berlin was the centre of attraction for Prussians, Silesians, Poles and people from the Baltics, whilst Vienna was for Bohemians, Moravians and Jews from Galicia and Bukowina.

The second stage of East-West European migration was a direct result of the Second World War and its consequences for the post-war European order. According to rough estimates 15.4 million people had to leave their former home countries in the years after the war (1944-50); taken alone more than 12 million East and ethnic Germans fled from the former eastern parts of the German Reich and Poland or were expelled from Czechoslovakia. The national borders settled at Yalta and Potsdam affected not only East

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and ethnic Germans. Poles had to leave their settlements in former Eastern Poland (now parts of Lithuania, Belorussia and the Ukraine), large numbers of Czechs and Slovaks went to the Sudetenland – South Bohemia, South Moravia and the southern parts of Slovakia, and about the same number of Ukrainians and Belorussians had to leave Poland for the East.

The Cold War and the Iron Curtain stopped most East-West migration, but it continued to some extent, even after 1950. About 13.3 million people took part in the migration waves from Eastern to Western Europe that define the third period of European East-West mass migration. The migration of ethnic Germans played the major role during that stage of East-West migration but there was also a substantial proportion of refugee migration, especially in years of crisis and dramatic political events (Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia, 1968, Poland 1981). The events of 1989-90 not only changed the political landscape of our continent but also brought about a completely new view of political asylum and normal migration, particularly East-West European migration. Until 1989 mobility between East and West was reduced to a minimum by administrative hurdles, the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain. As a result the West's 'open door' policy towards Central and Eastern Europe ran no risks but was still of great symbolic importance. The mass exodus of East Germans to West Germany and the rapid increase from 1989 onwards in asylum-seekers and migrants, not only from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe no longer ruled by Communists, but also from Turkey and the countries breaking away from the Yugoslav Federation, brought about a change in public opinion and led to a policy U-turn. Most of the Western European countries passed more restrictive migration laws.

But more than by the increasing numbers of East-West migrants, the general public in Western Europe was made to feel insecure by a series of opinion surveys on the possible extent of East-West migration. Depending on the questions asked and the methodology used, they suggested that the number of immigrants from the countries of East-Central Europe would be between several hundred thousand and several million people. Many such surveys, however, do not meet even the most basic requirements of modern empirical social science research. Nevertheless, the results are used to fan fears of a new exodus – fears, which, to some extent, are irrational and superficial.

2. Migration Potential in East-Central Europe: Methods and Results

2.1 Methodological aspects

Austria is one of the countries located directly beside the former Iron Curtain. Therefore the public opinion and the political decision makers are very interested in knowing more about potential East-West Migration. To clarify the diffuse and contradictory knowledge, the Austrian Federal Ministry for Science, Transport and the Arts commissioned a research project with the main aim of empirically determining potential migration. From the beginning it was clear that only a short-term estimate of migration potential is possible with survey methods. A longer-term estimate could be achieved by using demographic and economic forecasts based on the variations in population developments in potential countries of origin and destination, and prevailing income differences there; any forecasts for the following one, two or even five years based thereon would, however, be inaccurate.

Questions on the readiness of people to migrate play a central role in a survey concerning migration potential. How many people articulate such a readiness and what economic characteristics this group exhibits are among the most revealing questions. It is well-known that the proportion of people prepared to migrate as a percentage of the total population is not very high and so the sample must be large enough to allow later disaggregations concerning migration potential. If the sample includes only 100 persons, and only one in ten of the persons interviewed declares a readiness to migrate, this leaves a sample of only 10 persons, which certainly cannot be differentiated by further criteria.

It was therefore necessary to use a larger sample in order to be sure after the interviews that the number of persons declaring a readiness to migrate did not fall below a statistical confidence interval. The sample on which the foregoing analysis is based meets these requirements. It comprises a total of 4,392 persons who were chosen on the basis of a quota sample out of the total population over the age of 14. The type of survey chosen was a one-issue survey (a one-issue survey deals only with a questionnaire on the issue concerned – unlike multi-issue surveys in which one issue is combined with others).

The questionnaire was administered in the form of personal interviews conducted in the interviewees' homes. The interviews lasted an average of 45 minutes. The feedback of the interviewers on the methods used was extremely positive. There was a general interest in the issue and a readiness to answer the question truthfully. The small proportion of missing responses that can be attributed to a refusal to answer the questions is perhaps an indicator of this.

The interviews took place in June and July 1996 in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. They were carried out by the Austrian Gallup Institute together with its Central European partners in the countries concerned. The survey itself was designed by the authors of this article. It consisted of about 50 questions which comprised a series of issues: the intention to migrate, experience of migration, reasons for the intended migration and settlement, and basic socio-demographic characteristics [cf. Fassmann and Hintermann 1997].

2.2 The general, probable and 'real' potential for migration

Determining the potential for migration is a complicated issue. It is certainly not enough just to ask people whether or not they would like to live abroad for some time. Every intention to migrate involves a varying degree of probability. Such an intention may be very general and unspecific or very concrete and specific. Depending on the questions used, it is easy to achieve extremely high or very low numbers of potential migrants. Because of the political sensitivity of this topic it is very important to handle the definition of a potential migrant very carefully.

In the following empirical analyses the term 'potential' is differentiated into three different categories which vary from a very general potential to a 'real' potential. The definition of the categories is based on three questions:

1. *I have thought of going abroad.*
2. *I have at least gathered information about the target country in question.*
3. *I have already applied for a residence permit or a work permit.*

The general migration potential comprises all people who answered yes to the first question (i.e. those people who merely declare a desire to migrate without taking any further

steps in this direction). The probable migration potential sums up all those who answered yes to the second question. Those who gave a positive answer to the third question and thus have begun to make their migration a reality are eventually comprised in the real migration potential.

When we start by considering the general migration potential, the above-mentioned migration scenarios created in the early 1990s appear to be confirmed. About 20% of the Czechs interviewed claim to be thinking of migrating. The corresponding figures for Poland are 17%, for Hungary about 20% and for Slovakia as high as 30%. If extrapolated in line with the total population over the age of 14 concerned, this would produce a gross migration figure of about 10 million.

A full realisation of this general migration potential appears unlikely. Links with the native country, difficulties and problems in preparing migration, and the high material and psychological costs involved with migration are often underestimated and, though migration may be desired in a general way, it often remains unrealised. In addition, the immigration policies of the potential target countries act as a very effective restraint on possible migration movements. Quota regulations like those in Austria allow a longer period of residence and work only to a quantitatively very limited number of foreigners selected in line with qualitative criteria.

Table 1. General, probable and 'real' migration potential

	General		Migration Potential			
	Total	in %	Total	in %	Total	in %
Czech Republic	1,673,176	20.1	988,848	11.8	177,356	2.13
Slovakia	1,251,456	30.3	730,850	17.7	90,105	2.18
Poland	4,923,244	16.6	1,644,363	5.5	393,859	1.33
Hungary	1,717,018	20.5	721,147	8.6	60,095	0.72
Total	9,564,894	18.9	4,085,208	8.1	721,415	1.43

* as % of total population over 14.

Sources: Gallup Survey, June-July 1996; official statistics of countries concerned, own figures.)

Even if the general migration potential in East-Central Europe is still about 10 million, the probable migration potential can be estimated at only about 4 million. This figure decreases even further when only the 'real' migration potential is considered. It then falls to around 700,000 persons. As a percentage of the population aged over 14, the 'real' migration potential is about 2.1% in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, 1.3% in Poland and less than 1% in Hungary.

What is important is the fact that 68% of those who can be classified as 'real' potential migrants do not want to stay forever in the target countries. Half of them prefer a short term stay up to two years, only about 10% want so stay forever and about 62% do not only consider a permanent but also a pendular migration. This empirical intention is important because it illustrates the different character of the 'new' East-West migration which can better be interpreted as a new form of spatial mobility and cannot be compared with the classical emigration from East to West in the 19th century and after 1945.

This does not mean that all potential migrants who declare a short term stay abroad are really going to stay only for the intended time period. It is well-known that in most cases the actual stay abroad exceeds the intended stay but it shows that with the fall of the Iron Curtain 'normal' labour market regions will return. In the case of Vienna, for example, one can assume that the catchment area for pendular migrants will expand to Slovakia in the same direction and distance as to Lower Austria and Burgenland [cf. Fassmann and Kollar 1996].

3. Structural Characteristics of Potential Migrants

Which population groups consider migrating? Those who can be seen as losers in the transition process and for whom taking a job in Western Europe is a way to secure their existence? Or those who are perfectly successful and almost established in their own country but who want to enjoy higher incomes in the potential target countries? Both of these are possible and it is possible to argue both these motives.

3.1 Demographic and social characteristics

3.1.1 Age and gender distribution

The potential migrants are predominantly male. They account for two-thirds of those expressing the desire to live abroad. The phenomenon of 'new' potential migration from East-Central Europe is thus in an early stage for it can often be seen that men migrate first and then only later get their wives, children and close relatives to join them.

This gender proportion of potential migrants changes when the countries surveyed are considered separately. The country with the highest percentage of women who would like to emigrate is Hungary with 40.1%, whereas the Czech Republic has the lowest percentage with 33.9%. The results for Poland, whose proportion of potential women migrants (36.4%) is even somewhat below the average of the countries surveyed, thus contrast with the 'real' migration behaviour observable during the 1980s. At that time the proportion of women was annually over 50% [Grzegorzewska-Mischka 1995: 65].

Table 2. Gender Distribution and Age Structure of Potential Migrants
(in percentages)

	Male	Female	Under 24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50+
Czech Republic	66.1	33.9	43.4	14.3	17.0	17.9	7.4
Slovakia	60.1	39.9	39.2	11.0	27.4	15.3	7.1
Poland	63.6	36.4	38.2	12.9	26.7	15.3	6.9
Hungary	59.9	40.1	41.3	13.0	18.9	15.9	10.9
Average	62.4	37.6	40.5	12.6	22.8	16.2	7.9

Source: Gallup Survey, June-July 1996

The age distribution of potential migrants is at least as characteristic of an early phase of migration as the gender distribution. About 76% are under 40 with those under 24 accounting for 40.5% alone. This means that nearly half of all the under-24s consider migration. A comparison between the countries shows only minor divergencies in this respect. In all four countries surveyed the proportion of those under 40 is over 70%.

3.1.2 Marital Status

Together with age and gender, marital status also influences the intention to migrate. The results show that more than half of those in the survey who consider migration are single with unmarried people forming the largest group. This is not surprising given that almost 50% of the potential migrants are under 25.

Table 3. Marital Status of Potential Migrants (in percentages)

	Unmarried	Married	Divorced	Separated	Widowed
Czech Republic	50.4	34.5	13.4	0.4	1.3
Slovakia	45.7	43.5	8.3	0.6	1.9
Poland	50.8	45.6	2.6	1.0	/
Hungary	48.0	44.5	5.2	0.4	1.9
Average	48.4	41.8	7.9	0.6	1.3

Source: Gallup Survey, June-July 1996

Somewhat more surprising is the strong readiness to migrate of married people. About 42% of those considering migration are married. The existence of a family is thus no grounds for not considering migration. Quite the contrary. Working abroad is a strategy followed by many married people to increase the family income and to minimise the risk that several family members may become unemployed at the same time. Nevertheless the intended length of stay abroad has to be taken into consideration. In most cases, people do not intend to stay abroad forever and therefore family ties are not so important.

3.1.3 Educational Qualifications

The high educational qualifications of potential migrants accord with the reality of East-West migration. A 'brain-drain' – an outward flow of human capital – at the expense of the countries of origin and a 'brain-waste' – a waste of knowledge and training – in the target countries is the result. Despite this general finding, analyses show that at least for certain groups of migrants, higher levels of education and training eventually help potential migrants to achieve a better job on the labour market and a greater degree of integration in the target country [Hintermann 1995].

The potential migrants from East-Central European countries display an extremely high educational level. Of those who are in general positive about a migration 12.2% are university graduates; 43% have successfully completed a middle or higher level school; 31.4% have completed a vocational school course and only 13.7% have 'only' gone through compulsory schooling.

Table 4. Educational Level of Potential Migrants (in percentages)

	Compulsory School	Vocational School	Middle and higher level school	University
Czech Republic	15.7	29.2	45.7	9.4
Slovakia	14.3	29.7	42.7	1.3
Poland	20.1	29.4	42.7	7.8
Hungary	3.6	39.2	38.5	18.7
Average	13.7	31.4	42.7	12.2

Source: Gallup Survey, June-July 1996)

Of the four countries surveyed, the one suffering the highest potential 'brain-drain' is Hungary; 18.7% of those positively inclined towards the possibility of migration, possess a university degree and 30.7% are qualified for university entrance. Compulsory school leavers, on the other hand, very seldom consider migration. By contrast, Poland displayed the lowest outflow of human capital. Even though these figures should not be taken for granted as reflecting the 'real' migration picture, there is still reason to question the claim of some observers that the 'brain-drain' from East-Central Europe has already peaked [Okoloski 1994].

3.1.4 Occupation

One of the most important features of the profile of potential migrants concerns their occupation. What kind of people with what occupational background consider migration?

Table 5. Last Jobs of Potential Migrants by Occupational Group
(in percentages)

	Average	Czech Rep.	Slovakia	Poland	Hungary
Unemployed	14.0	7.4	22.4	16.4	9.8
Office, administration	10.6	9.4	11.3	13.0	8.6
Production	10.5	10.4	8.7	7.9	14.5
Pupils, students	9.7	9.8	4.5	19.6	4.5
Trade, transport	8.6	9.7	8.7	6.8	8.6
Construction	7.9	13.5	12.0	3.9	1.6
Technical jobs	6.4	9.5	7.5	1.9	6.4
Not in active life*	5.5	4.3	2.7	7.0	7.5
Workers unspecified	4.8	3.8	2.6	3.8	8.6
Health Service	3.9	5.5	4.3	3.3	2.3
Other jobs	3.8	1.9	1.3	/	11.5
Agriculture, forestry	3.5	/	0.3	8.0	5.2
Teaching, research	3.5	1.9	3.4	4.4	4.0
Service jobs	3.3	7.5	6.9	0.6	3.5
Self-employees	3.1	5.4	2.9	0.0	2.8
Labouring jobs	0.9	/	0.5	2.5	0.6

*) 'not in active life' includes pensioners, housewives and those on maternity leave.

Source: Gallup Survey, June-July 1996

The findings show 14% are unemployed, 9.7% are school pupils and university students, 10.6% are office and administrative workers while 10.5% work in production. As a proportion of the totals for their respective occupational groups, employees in production branches and in construction consider migration markedly more often than those in office and administrative jobs, trade and transport or in certain service sector jobs. The lowest potential migration rates are found among those working in agriculture or forestry and among those who are not active at the moment.

The average figures show, however, that the picture for the different countries can vary quite strongly. The differences in construction stand out in particular. In both the Czech Republic (13.5%) and Slovakia (12%) they account for the largest and second largest group of potential migrants. The respective figures for Poland and Hungary are only 3.5% and 1.6%. The number of unemployed also varies, reflecting national em-

ployment conditions. Slovakia and Poland have the highest proportion of unemployed among the potential migrants, with the lowest proportion in the Czech Republic.

3.1.5 Income Distribution

In order to establish a clearer social profile of potential migrants, those surveyed were asked to state the income they earned in their last job in their home country. Those income groups that tend to consider migration might have been assumed to be those with low incomes in their home country who safely expect to earn more on West European labour markets, or conversely successful people who look to climb further up the economic ladder. It was necessary to find out if those surveyed really fit the theoretical 'push-pull' model which sees income differences and poor job prospects as influencing or even determining migration.

To eliminate inaccuracies, the earnings data were classified into three income groups.¹ Three income groups were formed to represent a bottom third, a group in the middle and a top third. The income distribution of the potential migrants shows very clearly an over-representation of those in the middle third and, to some extent, those in the top third income groups. Those in the bottom third income group much less often express a wish to migrate. Considering the low average age, it becomes clear that the migration potential is much more a selection of the economically successful. Those considering migration are not the poorest people in their country. Such people do not have the means to cover the costs that ensue from migration and often have no access to the required information.

Poland diverges most from this general pattern. There the proportion of low earners almost corresponds to the expected figure of 33%. Conversely, Slovakia diverges upwards, where it is the above-average earners that tend to be prepared to migrate.

Table 6. Potential Migrants by Income in their Home Country (in percentages)

	Low	Income Medium	High
Czech Republic	20.2	45.7	34.1
Slovakia	14.6	48.9	36.5
Poland	28.7	45.6	25.7
Hungary	17.7	52.9	29.4
Average	19.5	48.2	32.3

Source: Gallup Survey, June-July 1996

3.1.6 Previous Experience of Migration

Another of the human capital factors influencing people's inclination to migrate is the extent of their previous geographical mobility. It can be assumed that people who have already moved once or more often are also more likely to consider migration in the

¹) The division into three income groups refers to the monthly household income of the people interviewed and does not necessarily correspond with official income classifications. Members of the lowest income group earn up to ATS 3,000, as calculated with the exchange rates at the time of the survey period. The middle third earns between ATS 3,000 and 6,000 and the highest income group more than ATS 6,000.

future as a result of their higher level of mobility in the past. This assumption can be summarised by the idea that mobility produces mobility.

The data presented here confirm this assumption. Participation in potential migration increases with the number of times people have moved. Of those surveyed who have moved at least once in the past 36.8% consider migration, as compared with only 19.6% of those who have never moved.

This greater preparedness to migrate increases when the previous move(s) had already included a move abroad. Of the 9.7% of those surveyed who have already lived abroad, 45.3% are considering migrating again, but only 19.3% of those with no experience of living abroad are considering migrating. The link is particularly close in Slovakia and Hungary; in both cases more than half of those surveyed who are experienced 'migrators' respond positively to the idea of migrating again.

3.2 Target Areas of Potential Migrants

The target areas of the potential migrants are not surprising. Austria and Germany remain the most significant potential target countries for migration from East-Central Europe. More than a third of all those surveyed – about 37% – would choose Germany as their migration destination and about a quarter – 24.4% – Austria.

Germany is mentioned most often in the Czech Republic and Austria in Hungary – a finding that underlines the importance of geographical distance when choosing the target country.² The lowest proportion (55.2%) of potential migrants to Germany and Austria is found in Poland, compared with over 60% in the other three countries. Austria, in particular, is chosen less often by Poles than by Czechs, Slovaks and Hungarians. This is probably not due to the greater geographical distance as to the privileged treatment in Germany of Polish migrants who have German roots [Fassmann, Kohlbacher, and Reeger 1995].

Table 7. Target Countries of Potential Migrants (in percentages)

	Average	Czech Rep.	Slovakia	Poland	Hungary
Germany	37.0	42.6	36.3	37.4	31.4
Austria	24.4	22.6	25.9	17.8	30.5
Switzerland	9.1	8.3	13.0	7.7	5.7
Great Britain	6.4	9.2	7.1	4.5	3.8
France	4.1	2.9	4.1	5.4	4.3
Italy	3.9	5.8	2.6	5.1	2.3
Scandinavia	3.3	2.7	2.5	3.1	4.9
Netherlands	2.8	3.4	2.3	3.5	2.2
East European country	2.8	2.5	6.3	0.5	/
Other (esp. USA, CAN)	6.4	/	/	15.0	14.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Gallup Survey, June-July 1996)

²) According to the distance model people living in border districts to Western European countries should show a greater readiness to migrate. It is not however possible to confirm this on the basis of the existing data because the territorial representativity is unfortunately not fully given (some districts are missing). But what can be followed with certainty is the significant role distance patterns play in the decision for a particular destination country.

All other countries in both Western and Eastern Europe play a very subordinate role as potential target countries for migration. Switzerland continues to assert a relatively high claim with an average of 9.1%, but the other countries are well below 10%. France, Italy, Scandinavia and Eastern Europe are under 5%. The high proportion (15%) of both Polish and Hungarian potential migrants expressing a preference for target countries other than those named is striking. Within this group there is a clear preference for the United States and Canada followed by New Zealand and Australia.

3.3 Reasons for Migration

The results of the analysis of people's motives are unambiguous. The most important reason given by those people in East-Central Europe that consider migration is 'the higher earnings possibilities' abroad. More than 90% of all those surveyed stated that was 'very important' or 'important'. The 'better working conditions abroad' come second as a reason for a potential migration; about 80% said this was 'important' or 'very important'. And an average figure of 79% cited 'curiosity and spirit of adventure' as a reason.

Table 8. Important Reasons for Migration (in percentages)*

Reasons	Average	Czech. Rep.	Slovakia	Poland	Hungary
Higher earnings	96.2	96.8	96.8	96.4	92.6
Better working conditions	79.9	74.5	83.6	75.6	81.2
Curiosity, adventure	79.0	87.6	71.2	79.5	80.1
Better career chances	52.0	47.5	41.6	53.1	74.4
Further education chances	48.9	54.1	39.1	42.0	65.8
Unemployment	33.8	35.5	44.1	26.6	21.0
Political situation	31.1	22.7	38.9	27.3	34.0
Bad environment	30.8	21.5	26.9	27.5	40.2
Family abroad	27.7	27.2	26.4	29.8	28.2
Ethnic minority	7.7	11.4	7.7	7.1	3.4

*) The categories 'very important' and 'important' were added together and represented in one category.

Source: Gallup Survey, June-July 1996

The first three reasons for migration are seen as particularly important in all the countries. Thereafter, however, there are some considerable differences. Hungarians see 'better career chances abroad' and 'better living conditions' as particularly important. The high value given to 'unemployment' is especially striking in Slovakia, where it ranks fourth on the hierarchy of reasons for migration at 44.1%, as compared with Poland and Hungary where it plays only a subordinate role – despite equally high actual rates of unemployment.

Against the background of the 'push-pull' model, the analysis of the findings indicates that at least one of the model's hypotheses – the income-differential hypothesis – plays a substantial role in explaining the migration motives of potential East-Central European migrants. Income differences between the country of origin and the potential target country, the chance to improve living conditions, better working conditions, further education opportunities and better career chances are among the most important reasons given by those in the survey who stated they would consider migration. The second main

hypothesis of the 'push-pull' model – the job-vacancy hypothesis – does not achieve in practice the status attributed to it in theory. Although unemployment is seen by about a third of those surveyed as an important or very important reason for migration, the loss of their jobs does not directly lead the large majority to consider migration.

3.4 Future Prospects

3.4.1 Job and income expectations

One main aspect of the survey's questions aimed to clarify the expectations potential migrants have of their potential residence abroad. Do these expectations correspond to reality or is most of Western Europe seen as an El Dorado where earning money is very easy? The answers are in general remarkable. They show that the majority of those who intend to work abroad have a good knowledge of the labour market situation in Western Europe. Only few potential migrants expect it to be easy to find a job and a high income. Most are sure that it will be difficult to find an adequate job abroad. The 'optimists' are mostly to be found in the Czech Republic and Hungary, the 'pessimists' in Poland.

The overwhelming majority of those surveyed who incline to migration state that they would also take a job abroad below their level of training. On average, 77.4% are not only aware of the fact that foreign workers on Western European labour markets are very often employed under their level of qualification, but also accept this in their own case. The proportion is highest in Slovakia (82.6%) and lowest in the Czech Republic (70.6%).

The answers to the question concerning earning expectations in Western Europe also display a strong realism and an extensive knowledge of wage levels in Western Europe. More than half of the population of East-Central Europe that is positive towards migration reckon with an income of up to ATS 10,000; 32.2% reckon to be able to earn between ATS 10,000 and ATS 20,000 and only 9.8% expect to earn more. This income distribution is probably very close to what foreign workers can expect to earn in Austria in the short term.

The people who were surveyed in Hungary are especially 'pessimistic', with 85.1% expecting to earn only the lowest-level incomes. It is the Poles that link the highest income expectations with potential migration. About 17% of them expect an income of more than ATS 20,000. The highest expectations of high incomes are entertained by those who want to migrate to Switzerland and Scandinavia. The same is true of those heading for France, whereas the wage expectations of those destined for Austria are rather low – 74% think that they can earn no more than ATS 10,000 and only 3% expect more than ATS 20,000. Only those few people who want to migrate to another East European country have equally low income expectations.

3.4.2 Investment Plans and Use of Income

Given that the possibility of higher earnings abroad is the most important reason for migration for the large majority of potential migrants, the question arises as to the extent to which they already have clear ideas of how to use the income they aim to earn abroad. This is important because very often the optimistic idea prevails that the income will be used by the migrants to create an independent existence, to set up their own firm

or business. The period of residence abroad would thus serve to improve capital resources and to modernise the home economy.

An analysis of the data suggests a different picture. The overwhelming majority of potential migrants (about three-quarters) need the increased income to 'finance their everyday lives'. The frequency of this response is highest among Czechs (86.7%) and lowest among Poles (58.3%). High status is also ascribed to 'the children's education', for which 43% of potential migrants would use the income earned abroad. In third place comes 'the purchase of expensive consumer goods', on which 42% of those surveyed would either probably or certainly spend their increased income.

Table 9. Purpose for which income earned abroad would be used
(in percentages)*

	Average	Czech Rep.	Slovakia	Poland	Hungary
Financing everyday life	75.3	86.7	74.1	58.3	79.8
Children's education	43.1	39.8	46.6	38.4	46.1
Expensive consumer goods	41.8	42.5	46.2	43.3	30.7
Sending money home	39.0	39.7	43.9	33.3	45.8
Building/purchase of own home	35.0	39.4	30.2	37.6	35.1
Purchase of own flat	32.9	28.4	34.9	33.7	34.3
To start own firm	20.6	15.9	15.4	35.5	19.3

*) The responses 'Yes, certainly' and 'probably' were added together and expressed in one category.

Source: Gallup Survey, June-July 1996

These priority uses are followed by 'sending money home' (40%), 'the purchase or building of one's own flat or house' (35% / 33%). Only a minority aims at 'setting up a firm'; around 20% (and an exceptionally high 35% in Poland) intend to invest their increased income in this way in their home country. This means that great expectations concerning the stimulating effects of the prospective work abroad on the economies of the home countries are not very realistic. The majority of potential East-Central European migrants want to improve their immediate living conditions, their aims being short rather than long-term.

4. Outlook

All scenarios that predict an imminent exodus of people from East and Central Europe exaggerate the dimension of the expected flows. The migration potential in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary is somewhere between a possible 4 million and a more likely 700,000 persons. The latter figure is less than 1% of the population over the age of 14. This figure remains, however, higher than that foreseen by the law for annual immigration into Austria and Germany, the two most important target countries, and higher than figures that are thought of as politically acceptable, but much lower, however, than those implied by the scenario of mass migration.

The phenomenon of 'new' and largely only potential migration from East-Central Europe is still in an early phase. This is indicated by the structural qualities of the population that expresses a readiness to migrate. Two-thirds of those expressing the wish to live abroad for some time are men; three-quarters are under 40 and two-thirds of them

want to leave their own country alone, without relatives. Another characteristic of those who come into the category of potential migrants is their high level of qualification.

The intended duration of the stay abroad corresponds no longer to the image of classic emigration but can generally better be seen as high spatial mobility. The majority of those who want to live and work in foreign countries want to do this only for a shorter period of time. Nearly half of all potential migrants would stay abroad no longer than two years. This fact could be interpreted as a sign of the early stage of the migration but also as an indicator of the emergence of new regional labour markets with daily, weekly or seasonal pendular migration. The survey also indicates why people consider migration or pendular migration. The main reasons are the pull factors of the West European labour market such as higher earnings, better working conditions and career chances and better opportunities for further education. Push factors like high unemployment, the political situation and unfavourable environmental conditions at home are more peripheral.

The expectations concerning the jobs abroad and the achievable incomes are not very optimistic. A third believe it will be very difficult to find a suitable job. On average, 77.4% are not only aware that foreign workers usually have to work below their level of qualification but also expect this for themselves. This points to a phenomenon which was described as 'anticipated dequalification' in a previously-published ISR study [c.f. Fassmann, Kohlbacher and Reeger 1995].

The survey shows very clearly that despite the actual fall in migration, the potential for migration remains stable. This different dynamic between 'real' migration potential and the legal possibilities for migration produces increasing political problems which cannot be solved by strict border controls. The growing gap between potential and possible migration leads, on the one hand, to an increase in those travelling as tourists and working illegally in Western Europe, and on the other hand to a general break with the ideals of Western Europe that has demanded the freedom of movement for East and East Central Europe for years. The number of workers from Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria or Hungary working without permission is growing. They are paid poorly and are without any legal rights [cf. Mydel and Fassmann 1997]. The restricted possibilities of legal employment produce a new social underclass which is a serious problem both for the native population as well as for the foreigners.

On the other side, it would be naive to ignore the existing migration potential and to guarantee freedom of movement all at once in the case of EU-enlargement towards Eastern Europe. It is clear that a special and temporary restricted regulation is necessary to control and to limit the freedom of movement.

What is necessary in any case is an approach that includes more realism and rationality in the judgement of a possible or probable migration potential, but also a clear acceptance of the fact that East-West migration is not the exception but a new normality within an integrated Europe.

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Changes in the Perception of Poverty and Wealth: The Czech Republic, 1991-1995*

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Abstract: The objective of the paper is to explain the change in the perceptions of factors determining economic inequality and to show how these perceptions affect distributive system legitimacy and political orientations. A comparison for the Czech Republic for the years 1991 and 1995 is carried out based on the data from the survey 'Social Justice'. The following basic trends can be found in regard to perceptions of the causes of poverty and wealth: the stability of a strong tendency to attribute poverty to failures of the poor themselves (blaming the poor), a decrease in the tendency to attribute the rise of poverty to structural failures (blaming the state), and the growth of the role of meritocratic explanations of wealth, without any weakening in the tendency to blame the system for providing opportunities for unfair profit.

In addition to the above-mentioned tendencies, hypotheses are also tested in regard to the structure of beliefs about poverty and wealth (confirmatory factor analysis) and the relationships between these beliefs, a person's position in the stratification system (objective and perceived social status), and political orientations (structural model). The results of the analysis support the hypothesis that these relationships strengthened during the period under study, bringing the situation in the Czech Republic closer to that in western democracies.

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Economic inequalities in societies

A society without inequalities is a myth – an observation which aptly summarises Pitirim Sorokin's fundamental contribution to the broad range of analyses of social stratification [Sorokin 1959]. Specific attention to inequalities in the distribution and in the accessibility of individuals and groups to material wealth, power, and prestige was later put forward by Gerhard Lenski [1966]. It has since become clear that economic inequalities are only one of several aspects according to which society is stratified. At the same time, different types of societies may be classified according to the degree of inequalities, their origins, and the attitudes of people towards them. With regard to the significance of economic inequalities, in this context Lipset's thesis must be stressed: from a political standpoint, inequalities and, above all, their interpretation influence political preferences and the stability of a given regime [Lipset 1960: 61-67].

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Inequalities in societies become problematic only when it is no longer possible to justify them satisfactorily. While in the great majority of cultures people have been considered to be naturally unequal – *homo hierarchicus*, modernity brought with it the notion of social equality. But even this ideal has been transformed over time. Beginning with the original demand of a new bourgeoisie for an equal chance to gain scarce resources, the notion of social equality later developed into the right to an equal share of them.

The notion of social justice, born of the conflict between actual social inequalities and the ideal of equality, only became meaningful in the modern period. Let us assume that we understand it to be the demand for certain methods in the distribution of material wealth, social standing, prestige, and positive and negative sanctions. If we use the question of justice to address the problem of the division of material wealth (calculable in money), that is, questions of who, what, and how much is to be gained, we may speak of distributive justice. According to Homans [1974], distributive justice is always based on the idea of the proportionality between investments and rewards.

Members of society, even those who are structurally disadvantaged, have always tended to justify the existence of inequalities. When this justification fails, the system loses legitimacy. We may then say that *a system is legitimate when it is accepted even by those who are disadvantaged by it*. Doing away with the ideal assumption of absolute legitimacy, this definition allows us to move from the degree of acceptance of inequalities to the degree of their legitimacy.

It is possible to describe the manner in which the system legitimacy is upheld on the level of individual consciousness, even when it seems to be in opposition to individual interests, with two principles: *the equity principle*, and *the status attribution principle*.

According to the first principle, each investment and contribution (in the form of expended energy, money, or the acceptance of responsibilities) should in the end result in profit. This distribution principle was described and empirically documented on small groups [Leventhal et al. 1972, Homans 1974]. Its relevance for the macro-theory of the legitimisation of inequalities has been pointed out by Lerner [1975] and Walster and Walster [1975].

Status attribution theory [Berger et al. 1972, Webster and Driskel 1978] illustrates how an individual assesses the status of others when only some status relevant characteristics are known. While trying to preserve their own cognitive consistency, people generalise from what is evident and assume that the unknown social signs are consistent with known ones. It means that they assess retrospectively an individual's contributions according to observed rewards. The whole process is, then, circular [Cook 1975], resulting in the *self-reinforcing* nature of the entire legitimising process.

With respect to the relevance of these two theses, from individual positions on the social ladder the perception of perfectly legitimate inequalities could be summarised as follows: "the wealthy and powerful think they deserve their advantages, and the poor and powerless see their own disadvantages as justified, though not pleasant." [Della Fave 1986: 479].

Even with the previously mentioned self-reinforcing nature of the process from which legitimacy emerges and is maintained, there remains the possibility of the delegitimisation of stratification. Della Fave suggests that this could happen if in certain conditions a distributive counter-norm is created which is based on the principal of equality

rather than equity. Then legitimating norms and counter-norms exist in a state of continual tension [Della Fave 1986: 480].

As James Kluegel has suggested, the universality of the assumptions about the legitimacy of economic inequalities could be undermined if large segments of the population experience poverty and unemployment during periods of economic recession or stagnation [Kluegel 1987]. Robinson and Bell had before him attempted to summarise the varying tendency of different social groups towards egalitarianism, on the basis of three hypotheses: the *underdog hypothesis*, which, similar to Kluegel, predicts a stronger tendency to equalise among lower social groups; the *enlightenment hypothesis*, according to which educated people would exhibit a stronger sense of egalitarianism; and the *Zeitgeist hypothesis*, which attempts to explain the growth of egalitarianism as a long-term process in western societies [Robinson and Bell 1978]. The latter two are, however, debatable. In his attempts to explain the tendency to equalise, Adam Szirmai found only the first of these hypotheses to apply unambiguously [Szirmai 1986: 165]. Subsequent studies have even supported the enlightenment hypothesis, which *de facto* represents its opposite [Kluegel and Matějů 1995].

Let us consider the first case: the egalitarian distributive counter-norm should be socially specific and egalitarianism should be maintained among lower status groups. The rise of this distributive counter-norm, however, does not necessarily require the rejection of the original one. As suggested by the *split-consciousness theory* [Lane 1962], they may coexist, each occupying a different part of one's mind. In practice, this means that it is not possible to rank both of these approaches on a single scale (i.e., the stronger the one approach, the weaker the other), and so it becomes necessary to find two scales.

Why the poor are poor...

Kenneth Galbraith divides modern poverty¹ into two categories [Galbraith 1967: 302]. On the one hand, poverty results from personal characteristics (e.g., lack of education, alcoholism, and inability to maintain the tempo of modern economic life or even due to psychological inferiority), a position often taken up by liberal-oriented people. Responsibility for this condition of poverty is attributed to the individual; the fact that others have successfully defended themselves against it is in itself taken as proof that poverty is not an inescapable human condition.

¹) Throughout all of known history, Galbraith argues, nearly all nations have been poor, with the exception of the past several generations of inhabitants in certain parts of Europe, and their descendants. Here, destitution no longer applied to society in general: that is, the general became the specific, giving the problem of poverty its unique, modern character [Galbraith 1967: 300].

The old economic world of the "iron law of wages" was step by step being replaced by the world of economic merit. Here, the wage was no longer determined by the standard of living conditions, but by a marginal product dependent upon the education and talents of a given individual. Because self-improvement requires some investment, it resulted in the logical assumption that, as land brings rent, this investment should be rewarded in economic terms.

In a society of traditional political economic thinking, i.e., *laissez faire* societies, social inequality should result from the different successes of certain actors in economic competition. More qualified, effective, and industrious workers and entrepreneurs are automatically rewarded, while the unsuccessful are punished for their inability or indolence.

On the other hand, we should consider the phenomenon called 'regional poverty', which cannot be explained simply as stemming from the individual. It is possible to claim that an individual is unqualified, but it is not possible to make the same claim for all inhabitants of an entire region. People afflicted with 'regional poverty', according to Galbraith, are to a certain extent victims of the environment in which they live.

James Kluegel has in a similar way classified beliefs about the causes of poverty in American society. Between 1969 and 1980, the great majority of Americans identified the cause of poverty as the poor themselves (including poor management of money, lack of will, abilities and talents, poor morals, and alcoholism). However, not even poverty as the result of structural disadvantage (few opportunities for study, low wages in certain fields, few job possibilities, prejudice, and discrimination...) was omitted from these responses [Kluegel 1987].

The case of *blaming the poor* coincides with the dominant distributive ideology (*equity*). The tendency to argue that poverty emerges from the structural aspects of society and is out of the control of any one individual, (i.e., *blaming the state*), suggests a tendency towards the challenging egalitarian counter-norm. These two approaches to poverty may be defined as *merited poverty* (the fault of the individual) and *unmerited poverty* (the fault of the system).

Oscar Lewis [1968] proposed a third response to why poor people are poor, which may be referred to as *fatalistic poverty*. His "*culture of poverty*" thesis may be summarised as follows: the culture of poverty is the inability to take advantage of present opportunities, which is transmitted over several generations. If an individual is born in a family environment characterised by missed opportunity, he/she is unlikely to abandon this environment in future life. Here, the focus is on a somewhat different point: we have been considering not the origins of poverty but its maintenance. Thus, we are standing somewhat outside of the original individual-system dichotomy. In contrast to the first two theses, it is difficult to establish a concrete link between the fatalistic explanation of poverty and any kind of political orientation or society-wide ideology; doing away with poverty, breaking its "vicious circle...": a promise of liberals and conservatives since time immemorial [Novak 1992: 250-251].

...and the rich rich

If we are going to proceed in the world of economic merit, one simple claim shall suffice: the wealthy deserve their wealth, or, if you like: "property is the compensation due to its creator" [Galbraith 1967: 56]. This world is, however, an exclusive one and many people do not believe in it any more. Egalitarianism will again play its role, rejecting the legitimacy of wealth. The discourse of egalitarianism defines wealth as the result of an unjustly organised economic system: it allows owners to turn a profit unjustly, and to do so the off labour of others. In its most extreme form, this egalitarian approach would lead to the absolute rejection of private ownership: "Ownership is a crime," wrote Proudhon [cited in Friedman and Friedmanová 1992: 5].

To a significant degree, socialist ideas and parties, which are direct descendants of the working classes and their interests, owe their popularity to the idea of a more equal distribution of wealth in society. They emerged as a direct reaction to the socio-economic conditions that produced the industrial revolution. They illustrate the capacity of sentiments of injustice and illegitimate inequalities to influence politics. For that matter, the

decision on the organisation of economic life, in agreement with Aron's articulated primacy of politics, is always a political one [Aron 1993: 15-20]. Thus it is no surprise that state representatives will always bear responsibility for the rejection of the legitimacy of the system; even though the mechanisms of the legitimacy of inequality are created in society spontaneously and have a self-reinforcing character [Della Fave 1980, 1986]. Politicians may be responsible not for the public acceptance of a given distributive system, but for the possible rejection of it. The challenging distributive ideology may be caused by personal experience with poverty, yet this experience need not be of absolute deprivation, but 'only' of the subjective one, a sentiment that stems from *relative deprivation* [Stouffer et al. 1949]. The manipulation of this sentiment and its development (e.g., questioning the distributive system) may be a very effective component of political competition.

Pierre Bourdieu [1986] posits a third possible source of wealth in his theory of different forms of capital and their convertibility. Social capital, in the form of broad-based cognisance and web of contacts, may be transformed not only into earnings in the form of the exchange of services and favours, but also directly into economic profit.

In summary, three possible and alternative interpretations of the sources of poverty have been discussed (the fault of the individual, structural causes, and the fatalistic interpretation of simply being born in the wrong place) and wealth (merited, unmerited, and wealth from social capital).

At least the first two pairs of each group of three interpretations have presumed counterparts in human consciousness (in the form of distributive ideologies), but also in practical politics or in the plane of political ideas. In the same way that we may say the concepts of poverty and wealth are inseparable,² it is equally possible to link the opinion of the individual causes of one with the conviction about the individual causes of the other. Likewise, we may link assumptions about the systemic sources of poverty with those about the dishonest (due to the system) acquisition of wealth.

The assumptions described above should in theory apply universally. Nevertheless, in the Czech Republic we may predict a transformation of the mutual relations of both principles (individual and system), with the figurative emphasis of one upon the other, and the transformation of their relations within the framework of the social structure of Czech society.

Poverty and wealth in transition

In socially stable countries like the United States, the equity principle is in a dominant position and egalitarianism is in the position of challenging distributive ideology, each with its own specific relationship to the social structure [Ritzman and Tomaskovic-Devey 1992]. It would be difficult to find such a degree of unambiguity in a country in transition, and especially in one that is in the process of the transition from a system dominated by socialist egalitarian ideology to an ideology of merit. In this period between the fall of the first ideology and the establishment of the second, i.e., in the course of revolutionary change, *collective mobility* is usually a more important element of legitimisation, than

²) It is argued here that it is impossible to separate the terms poverty and wealth: one is always the flip side of the other, and as one changes the second changes as well. As Mareš and Rabušic put it: "poverty and wealth are complementary terms" [Mareš and Rabušic 1996: 297].

individual mobility [Wesolowski and Mach 1986a, 1986b]. Rather, society becomes differentiated according to the subjectively perceived change in *life chances* [Dahrendorf 1979]. Segments of the population defined by their positive or negative change in life chances become supporters of both distributive ideologies.

Individuals who in the course of the transition experience a significant positive change in their own life chances, are likely to align themselves with the advocates of meritocratic distributive principles. Likewise, those who view the change in their life chances negatively, tend to identify with the systemic principle of egalitarianism. Old egalitarianism is thus driven out by the principle of merit, which does not have the character it should have according to Della Fave's argument.

Thus, distributive principles in transforming societies do not show patterns similar to those found in relatively stable western societies. In principle, it is not possible to determine with any certainty if the equity principle or the equality principle will occupy the position of the dominant distributive ideology. At the same time, the transition of the nature of things will remain incomplete, argue Wegener and Liebig, as long as these principles do not have the structure and consistency identical to those found in the West [Wegener and Liebig 1995: 258]. The crystallisation of the norms of distributive justice, in their mutual relationship (their negative correlation) as well as in their relationship to social status, has already been demonstrated in the case of the Czech Republic [Matějů 1997].

Yet at the same time, during transition periods, the original and subjectively defined social groups [which may be called the 'winners' and 'losers' of the post-communist transition – see Matějů 1996] also undergo transformation: their original subjective characteristics become complemented by objective ones. With reference to these facts we can argue that in the course of transition, the relationship between individual and systemic models of economic approach to inequalities will become increasingly sharper, while at the same time the relationship of each to social status undergo transformation.

If it is true that Czech society should in the course of transition become closer to the western societies in its characteristics, the development can be expected to be as follows: the equity principle will be more socially universal, while the equality principle becomes more socially specific.

At the beginning, the only thing that should be significant from this standpoint is this relationship to subjective social status. By the later phases of development, however, the objective attributes of stratification should begin to play a role. If this is the case, it would confirm the adequacy of expectations formed at the beginning of the transition: it would mean that individuals who in the initial stages of the transition felt a significant positive change in their life chances have in the new market environment actually become economically successful. Yet many people will never achieve the expectations they had during the first stages of the transition, while others simply never held any positive expectations. At the moment when the channels of mobility open up, some people undergo a shock resulting from their relative deprivation in comparison with the more successful. In addition, if people believe that the wealthy have acquired their property through dishonest means, here can be found some possible sources of egalitarianism in transforming societies. So in the eyes of some people, the new economic and political system creates the impression of having been a failure and is thus unacceptable.

The dependence of both distributive principles on social status should then acquire the following form: the egalitarian structural explanation of inequality will be stressed among lower social strata, while higher social status will imply the rejection of the systemic and the predomination of the individual model.

The theory of voting behaviour and hypotheses of development

It is possible to explain voting behaviour from two perspectives: instrumental and expressive. In the first case, the concern is a rational act driven by economic interests, while in the second case it is prevalently a social act that expresses the values of an individual reference group.

The economic theory of voting behaviour [Downs 1957] is based upon the following argument: people try to maximise their profit even through the act of voting. Lower social classes give preference to left-wing parties, which support greater equality and the politics of a stronger welfare state. If the left-wing parties win, the tax burden for the lower classes might be smaller than their earnings from the state budget. In contrast, the propertied groups are likely to vote for right-oriented parties that support a smaller welfare state and minimal state redistribution.

The second theory, labelled by Heath et al. [1985] as “expressive”, is based on the assumption that there is a stronger relationship between certain social groups and certain political parties over time. “(Individuals) will vote as their class members traditionally vote” [De Graaf et al. 1995: 999]. Parties are thus guaranteed relatively stable support from certain social strata. It is argued that some form of collective identity develops. People accept the opinions and even the ideology of the preferred political movement. In their above-mentioned study, Robinson and Bell [1978] put forth the following idea, which is only a variation on this theme: people express a stronger tendency towards egalitarianism on the basis of their identification with the working class or with the lower classes in general.

This model of class-party alignment as deriving from economic interests has been the subject of much criticism. Some authors have questioned the notion of class-based social divisions [Clark and Lipset 1991] or the significance of classes to political action [Clark et al. 1993]. These arguments may be summarised in five points [see Manza et al. 1995]: increased rates of mobility, the individualisation of inequalities, cognitive mobilisation, post-material values, and structural mobility (the drop in ‘membership’ in the working class).

However, the exact opposite model is often used to describe post-communist countries. As these countries progressively become distanced from state socialism and move closer to the model of democratic, market societies, the right-left axis of the political spectrum shall become even more relevant, and economic differences and class divisions shall play an even greater role in elections. Iván Szelényi and his colleagues have called this process the shift from “the politics of symbols” to “the politics of interests” [Szelényi et al. 1997].

Hypotheses

The above mentioned hypotheses may be summarised as follows:

Hypothesis H1: There are three latent sources influencing the opinions of the causes of poverty (merited, unmerited, fatalist).

Hypothesis H2: There are three latent sources influencing the opinions of the causes of wealth (merited, unmerited, social capital).

Hypothesis H3: The opinions of merited wealth and poverty may be summarised by the phrase merited inequality (the so-called individualist model).

Hypothesis H4: The opinions on unmerited wealth and unmerited poverty may be summarised by the phrase unmerited inequality (the so-called systemic model).

Hypothesis H5: Both factors of merited and unmerited inequalities are dependent upon social status.

Hypothesis H6: At the beginning of the transition process, the key factor is subjective status, but the importance of the role of objective position within a stratified system increases thereafter.

Hypothesis H7: In the course of the transition process, the dependence of systemic factor upon social status increases.

Hypothesis H8: In the course of the transition process, the individualist and systemic principles become more sharply defined (their negative correlation grows).

Hypothesis H9: A stronger belief in the merit of existing inequalities leads to greater satisfaction with the political system.

Hypothesis H10: The growth of the conviction that existing inequalities are unmerited (structural factor) causes dissatisfaction with the political system.

Hypothesis H11: The degree of satisfaction with the political system influences political preference (in the case considered, the more satisfied people support right-oriented parties and the less satisfied support left-oriented ones).

Hypothesis H12: Social status influences the degree of satisfaction with the political system.

Hypothesis H13: Social status influences political preference.

Hypothesis H14: The influence of social status on political preference grows over the course of transition.

Hypothesis H15: Political orientation influences the opinions of merited and unmerited economic inequalities.

Hypotheses 3 and 4 are taken from Della Fave's discussion of legitimating norms and counter-norms [Della Fave 1980, 1986]. Hypothesis 5 is taken from Ritzman and Tomaskovic-Devey [1992], Hypothesis 6 addresses the modification of the subjective definitions of 'winners' and 'losers' in objectively existing social groups. Hypotheses 7 and 8 correspond to the assumption of the crystallisation of distributive norms [Wegener and Liebig 1995]. Hypotheses 9 and 10 are, in general, linked to the system which, on behalf of its right-wing political representatives, is defined as based on the principles of merit. Hypothesis 13 is related to the instrumental theory of voting behaviour, and Hypothesis 14 to Szelényi's shift to a "politics of interests." Hypothesis 15 is based on the notion of collective identity [cf. Robinson and Bell 1978].

Methods to test the hypotheses³

Hypotheses H1 and H2 were tested with the aid of confirmatory factor analysis. This has the following form:

$$y = \Lambda_y \eta + \varepsilon, \quad (1)$$

where y is the vector of the directly measured variable, η is the vector of latent variables, Λ_y is the factor loading matrix expressing the dependence of the measured variables on the latent variables, and ε is the vector of measurement errors by the y variable.

We may test hypotheses H3 and H4 putting together parts of the original measurement models of the causes of poverty and wealth (1) to one model with the particular variables y , η , ξ .

This gives up the model of the second order factor analysis of the given set:

$$\eta = \Gamma \xi + \zeta \quad (2)$$

$$y = \Lambda_y \eta + \varepsilon, \quad (3)$$

where (3) agrees with (1) and for equation (2) ξ is the vector of the second order factors, ζ is the vector of the measurement errors for the first order factors and Γ is the matrix expressing the relationship of the factors of the first and second orders.

We intended to go on working with the second order factors when testing hypotheses H5-H7, and H9-H15. Their best formal expression is the structural equation model. The original second order factors (in the ξ form) appear in these hypotheses both as dependent and independent variables. In the structural equation model, the ξ variables are in the position of dependent variables, i.e., their variation is not explained [Bielby and Hauser 1977; Jöreskog and Sörbom 1989: 5]. This means that it is technically impossible for the model (2) (3) to be a direct component of the comprehensive model. For this reason we derived the factor scores of the ξ variables from the measured variables and the factor scores regression.⁴

³) For this analysis the Social Justice database from 1991 and 1995 is used, with the combination of data originating from two national questionnaire surveys as part of the Social Justice Project. The investigation in 1991 was defined as an international comparative research project to address social justice and inequalities in thirteen countries. The Czech team repeated this study in 1995. In both cases, data collection was conducted by STEM (Centre for Empirical Research). The method was multi-level random sampling (region and household). In households, persons older than 18 were interviewed (the concrete persons were chosen on the base of a random procedure). There was a total of 2,056 respondents (810 in 1991 and 1,246 in 1995).

The cornerstone of our argument is the grouping of opinions on the causes of wealth and poverty. Through two rounds of questions, we tried to get the respondents to express why certain people are wealthy and others are poor in the Czech Republic. As an indicator of objective social status, we use the International Socioeconomic Index ISEI [Ganzeboom, De Graaf, Treiman 1992], as a measure of subjective positions on the social ladder we use the SUBST variable (subjective status = self-classification within the social hierarchy). We worked with the self-classification of the respondents on the left-right axis (POLOR variable), and with their satisfaction with the political system (SATIS). Further variables, created on the basis of the above-mentioned, are described in the text. The exact wording of the questions is in appendix 1

⁴) Description of the calculation procedure:

(1) We standardised the measured variables (y) to the form of z-scores.

(2) In the second order factor analysis, we calculated the factor scores regression.



The summary of the above mentioned hypotheses creates a structural model in the following form:

$$y = \Gamma x + B y + \zeta, \quad (4)$$

where x represents the vector of the exogenous variables, y is the vector of the endogenous variables, Γ is the matrix of mutual relations between the exogenous and endogenous variables, B is the matrix of mutual relations among endogenous variables, and ζ is the vector of the structural disturbances of the endogenous variables.

The entire model which emerges may be applied in the form of multi-sample analysis of the data for both years when the Social Justice Project was conducted in the Czech Republic, and from the comparison of individual coefficients we can determine what the results will be in the case of the hypotheses H6, H7, and H14.

Finally, we can test hypothesis H8 with the aid of Pearson's correlation coefficient between latent constructs from the second order factor analysis.

Poverty and wealth – a basic description

First is an overview of the distribution of the main variables entering into the analysis. Of particular interest is their absolute sequence, i.e., what people actually find most commonly to be the determinants of wealth (poverty), as well as the development of this distribution between 1991-1995.

With regard to Table 1 (the causes of poverty), the following may be argued: according to the opinions of respondents, the more important causes of poverty are the people themselves (poor morals and lack of effort). Following them in absolute sequence, the tendency to blame the system for poverty can be seen (insufficient opportunities, a bad economic system, discrimination). With regard to wealth (Table 2) the exact opposite responses can be found: among all the proposed causes, the systemic explanations (connections, a bad economic system, and dishonesty) were more common than individual ones (hard work and talent). In Table 3 we tried to order the causes of poverty hierarchically according to the sequence in the framework of the given round and place their approximate equivalents towards wealth in the same row on the table (in both cases according to the hierarchy of causes). The column "trend" shows the change in mean for the given period.

It can be seen that the corresponding pairs are in approximately the same relative position in the framework of columns, and it would appear that they have a concrete relationship to the shared value system. From the viewpoint of the extremely different positions in both hierarchies, there is only one notable point: Lack of effort very often leads to poverty, but hard work in people's eyes only rarely secures a high standard of living (one

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- (3) We used the factor scores regression and values of the standardised variables in the regression equations to the calculation of the values of the factor scores of the first order factors (η).
 - (4) We respecified part of the original model of the second order factor analysis (the relation between the ξ and η variables) to the form of the first order confirmatory factor analysis.
 - (5) In this model we again calculated the factor scores regression.
 - (6) Using this factor scores regression and factor scores values (η in the (2) (3) equations), we calculated second order factor scores (ξ in (2) (3)). All figures and coefficients for their calculation may be obtained from the author.

explanation would be the commonly held notion that with work comes a comfortable standard of living, but in most cases not an unusually above standard one).

Results⁵

The models applied to test the assumptions about the internal structure of the causes of poverty and wealth (Model 1 and 2) turned out to be statistically plausible (see Tables 4 and 5). And the initial assumptions about the structure of explanation of the origins of poverty and wealth, expressed in hypotheses 1 and 2, appear to accurately describe how people interpret the sources of economic inequalities.⁶

A more detailed analysis has been done [see Kreidl 1997] which attempted to classify individual countries according to their position on all six factor scales. In all cases, considered generally, countries of the former Eastern Bloc remain polarised from those in the West. In cases where one group of countries shows a high value of the factor score, the second group scores low, and it is even possible to notice a certain degree of clustering inside these groups. Generally, people from countries which have experienced a socialist order are more inclined towards a systemic explanation of economic inequalities (this trend is most visible in Russia, Bulgaria, and Estonia).

With regard to the changes in opinions in the Czech Republic, it can be concluded:

- the system is increasingly less considered to be the cause of poverty (from the standpoint of the legitimacy of the system of economic inequalities, we may interpret this as a positive shift); on the scale of the systematic causes of poverty, the Czech Republic in 1995 ranked among the advanced western countries.
- the failings of the system in the creation of wealth continues to be considered on the same level and is, similar to other post-communist countries, rather significant (this means that people continue to cite failures in the system to explain the possibilities for illegitimate wealth).
- the conviction that wealth is the product of individual merit has increased considerably (even here the Czech Republic ranks among western countries).
- there remains a strong tendency to ascribe poverty to the failings of the individual.

From the standpoint of the stability of the system of economic inequalities, this high degree of the legitimacy of poverty, based upon the explanation of individual failings, together with the conviction that the economic system is having increasingly less influence upon the origin of poverty, may be taken as a positive sign. In comparison with Western Europe, however, it turned out that the tendency to blame the poor for their poverty is extraordinarily strong in the Czech Republic.

For supporters of the merit principle, there is more good news: the idea that wealth is the reward for work and ability is becoming more and more common in society. On the

⁵) All structural models mentioned in the text have been tested using the LISREL program. The input files and the correlation matrices that were applied may be obtained from the author.

⁶) In order to support the general applicability of our thesis, i.e., a parallel structure of assumptions among people in other countries, we tested this same model in the case of The Netherlands [see Kreidl 1997]. The most significant result from these studies in the Czech Republic and in The Netherlands suggests that the great importance of luck to one's degree of economic success in the Czech Republic contrasts with the relatively low factor loadings of these items in The Netherlands.

other hand, many still believe that the accumulation of wealth remains the result of problems with the economic system, and this opinion still predominates. What is the reason for this schizophrenia? It would appear that people recognise the parallel existence of both phenomena. That is, the rich are probably not viewed as a single group, but at the very least as two distinct groups. In their responses, people reacted both to merited wealth as well as its unmerited manifestation.

The greater legitimacy of wealth in western countries, which is most likely based upon acceptance of meritocratic principles, is there contrasted with the rejection of the individual causes of poverty. Thus in the West, the poor are not attributed with such a degree of responsibility for their poverty as they are in the East.

To proceed in testing out the hypotheses we now move to the two general attitudes towards inequalities. The individual sources of poverty and wealth were labelled with the single term 'merited' (Hypothesis 3) and the systemic causes of poverty and wealth with the single term 'unmerited' (Hypothesis 4). The notion about how these general approaches influence the measured variables is expressed with the second order factor analysis (see Model 3).⁷

Because this model is statistically plausible (see Table 6) we continued putting the so-called individualist and systemic models into the wider context of social stratification⁸ and political behaviour. By this context is meant the relation of both mentioned variables to status relevant measures and the consequences both opinions (merited and unmerited inequalities) should have in the field of politics (hypotheses H5-7, 9-15). The general notion about these relations is expressed in Model 4 (see Diagram 4). The goodness of fit statistics for this model are found in Table 7. These data strongly support the legitimacy of the general hypothesis expressed by the model. From the parameters of the model in matrix **B** and Γ , we may judge the development through time.

The dependence of the systemic explanation of inequalities (UNMERIT) upon social status had grown: the degree of dependence on both the objective and subjective status had increased considerably (γ_{21} for the objective status increased from -0.02 to -0.10 ; γ_{22} for the subjective status increased from -0.12 to -0.19 ; see Table 7) and in 1995 both were statistically significant. The relation between the objective social status (ISEI) and MERIT variable also strengthened (from -0.05 to 0.07). Neither of both coefficients varied significantly from 0, however, their statistical difference remains significant. The statistical insignificance of these coefficients shows that people with different objective

⁷) In the course of the analysis, it became necessary to do away with the original 'symmetrical' assumptions about the order of relations in this framework. As observed initially, however, the additionally added causal relationship (λ_{33}) may have a sufficiently strong interpretative capacity (see table 6). This does not depart significantly from the theoretical construction outlined above.

During the calculation it also became clear that it is difficult to support the assumption of a multivariate normality, on which the calculating method of maximal likelihood is based. For this reason this method was replaced with unweighted least squares where this presupposition is not required.

⁸) It is hoped that this attempt will be interpreted as direct response to what Jiří Večerník claimed in his today already classical text dealing with the problem of poverty in the former Czechoslovakia. "The logically consequent step," he wrote in his introduction to the Study of Poverty in Czechoslovakia, "would be to put the problem of poverty into the frame of social stratification research." [Večerník 1991: 577].

social status do not differ in their acceptance of the individualist model of inequalities. Nonetheless, if we take into account the development tendency, we see that should the trend continue, the belief about merited inequalities would lose its social universality.

It is evident that during the observed period the belief that economic inequalities are due to the economic system and its characteristic was becoming socially specific, while the individualist model of economic acquisition remained universal with respect to objective social position and there was an evident decrease in its relation to the subjective social status. These results suggest that in 1995 the individualist model was closer to the position of universal and thus the dominant distributive norm.

The relation between status characteristics (ISEI, SUBST) and political orientation (POLOR) also became stronger. The tendency of higher status groups to vote to the right and the lower ones to the left strengthened. This tendency is evident in the case of subjective status (γ_{42} increased from 0.04 to 0.14). However, this increase was not statistically verifiable in the direct relationship between the objective status and political self-classification of the respondents (expressed with the γ_{41} relation in Model 4): in 1991 it was -0.04, in 1995 it reached 0.03.

The above-mentioned coefficients only represent the direct relation, but there are also indirect effects mediated by other variables included in the model. Thus a clearer picture is obtained if we measure the total effects of the exogenous variables (ISEI, SUBST) on the fourth endogenous variable (POLOR): the total standardised effect of the ISEI variable on the POLOR grew from 0.00 (t-value -0.06) to 0.12 (t-value 2.19) and the total standardized effect of SUBST variable on POLOR grew from 0.07 (t = 1.83) to 0.18 (t = 3.56). This means that in 1995 it was possible to demonstrate statistically the influence of both status variables on political orientation and its increase. If nothing else it gives strong evidence supporting Széleányi's thesis about the shift to the politics of interests.

Even the POLOR-UNMERIT relation expressing how political self-placement on the left-right scale influences the opinion of unmerited inequalities (β_{24} in Model 4) increased significantly (from 0.03 to -0.11). Thus, if in 1991 political self-classification did not influence the acceptance or rejection of the systemic, unmerited origins of economic inequalities, it was different in 1995. Two years after the November revolution, it was not yet clear, either on the left or right, whether economic inequalities were the remnants of the old socialist system or the result of the new capitalist one, and so it was not clear to potential critics who to blame. By 1995, economic inequalities were more likely to be associated with the new liberal system. Notably, in the same year much of the questioning of the distributive processes had its origins in the self-identification of individuals with the political left.

From the standpoint of rebuilding consistencies in Czech society, it is important to underline that the correlation between objective and subjective social status increased significantly (ϕ_{12} between the ISEI and SUBST variables increased from 0.20 to 0.35).

It is now necessary to draw some conclusions from the mutual crystallisation of the merited and unmerited principles. The situation here is, however, rather complicated. Even though the correlation between both of these principles increased somewhat during the period of observation (from -0.23 to -0.27), the growth was expected to be more substantial. It appears that the problem is hidden in the complexity of the item. According to the model of the causes of poverty with the invariable factor loadings matrix, the negative

correlation between the MERIT PRTY variable (merited poverty) and UNMERIT PRTY (unmerited poverty) grew from -0.20 to -0.35 (see Table 4 – common metric standardised solution). This strongly supports the thesis of the crystallisation between the individualist and systemic principles. But the same did not happen in the case of wealth (the negative correlation between the MERIT RICH and UNMERIT RICH variables in Model 2 had the same value in both years: -0.54; see Table 5). It seems that the persistent and widespread feeling of unmerited wealth is the one remaining stumbling block.

Conclusions

The basic aim of this analysis has been to show where people search for the sources of poverty and wealth, and why they conclude that some people are poor while others are wealthy. It tried to map out one particular assumption about the internal structure of these opinions, and place it within the wider context. The focus has been the relations to the legitimacy of economic inequalities, political preferences, and their grounding both in subjective and objective social characteristics.

The existence of three latent variables structuring the assumptions about the origins of poverty was confirmed. In other words, in principle, people explain poverty in three different ways: first, the insufficient efforts and lack of morals among poor people (merited poverty); the second places blame for poverty on the system and its failures (discrimination and lack of opportunities); and third termed “fatalistic”, with its “culture of poverty”.

Similarly, people assume three possible sources of wealth: individual merit (abilities, hard work); systemic problems (a poorly organized economic system which makes it possible for certain individuals to accumulate wealth dishonestly); and finally the understanding that wealth is based in social capital, i.e., in connections and contacts which give certain individuals a head start in economic competition.

I have tried to illustrate the duality of possible individual and structural sources of poverty and wealth with a model of two latent constructs: the factor of merited (the individualist model) and unmerited (systemic model). In itself the success of their applicability is significant. That is, their results suggest that both terms do not necessarily complement each other, but represent two distinguishable characteristics. In general, at the same time it is possible to be a strong defender of both individualist and systemic models of the origins of inequalities.

Several sociologists have argued that the equity principle is the basic legitimising element of the economic stratification of society and its universality may be disrupted by presence of egalitarianism, which emerged and has been maintained by disadvantaged social groups. In advanced societies then, egalitarianism represents a challenging distributive counter-norm. With the understanding of the development of distributive ideologies in the Czech Republic [Matějů 1997], I have tried to document the development of individualist and systemic explanations of inequalities between 1991 and 1995. The conclusions here agree with those of the above mentioned study.

The opinion that economic inequalities are unmerited has increasingly become specific to members of lower social groups and to people who view themselves as strongly politically on the left. The tendency to explain inequalities on the basis of individual merit was, in the first phase of the transition, the ideology of those who, from the standpoint of the subjective optimism of one's life chances, may be defined as the ‘winners’ in

the post-communist transition. In the later stages, this tendency has also begun to merge with objective social characteristics.

Does this then mean that the transition has entered its second phase? This is quite possible. The inclination towards an individual model is already not as strongly determined by subjective social status, and the influence of objective classification on the imagined social ladder, no matter how much its role has increased, is still not significant. This is without doubt in agreement with the thesis that between 1991 and 1995, the principle of merit was attaining the position of a dominant legitimating principle.

This change in the position of distributive ideologies is also in agreement with an equally important theme: the acceptance of a merit-based or systemic model of the interpretation of inequalities (as well as their rejection) may increasingly be interpreted as an expression of the formation of economic interests in society. It would appear that the Czech Republic really is undergoing the transition from the “politics of symbols” to the “politics of interests”: economic interests continue to play a greater role on the level of distributive ideologies and the interpretation of inequalities, as well as directly on choices between individual political directions, which undoubtedly suggests the strengthening of the materialist definition of the left.

In his book *What is Democracy?*, Giovanni Sartori argues that the new definition of the left is the basic touchstone of the further development of western societies [Sartori 1993]. The relevance of this to us is that Czech society is still awaiting the resolution to a related problem : the left and the assumptions about unmerited economic inequalities tend more and more to represent themselves as a result of forming economic and class-based interests [see also Matějů and Řeháková 1997].

It is possible to find two potentially problematic issues in the attitudes of Czech society towards economic inequalities:

- 1) During the period of observation, the tendency to locate the sources of wealth in the economic system, which allows certain people to amass economic profit through dishonest means, has prevailed. The persistence of this opinion may be interpreted as one phenomenon capable of undermining the stability of the system in the future. While this opinion might be expected to stem from an egalitarian personal stance, this assertion does not seem verified. Taking into account its extent, the criticism of ‘dishonest wealth’ may be rooted not only in the radical egalitarian counter norm. There are people who on the one hand tend to explain poverty in accordance with the equity principle and on the other hand criticise wealth as unjust. In this point one could be satisfied with the observation that populations in all post- communist countries show a great tendency to describe the sources of inequalities in systemic terms and with the conclusion of Matějů and Vlachová, when comparing the Czech and Netherlands populations in their attitudes towards social justice, that the Czechs were much more confused in the sense of distinguishing the equity and equality principles [Matějů and Vlachová 1995: 233]. A further task could be to find out whether there are other plausible explanations.
- 2) With great regularity, poverty continues to be attributed to the faults or limitations of the individual. Czechs continue to believe that “*the poor alone are to blame for their poverty*”. This sentiment represents an undoubtedly strong obstacle to any displays of solidarity. If it is true that poverty is above all a type of social status, a relationship between people [Sahlins 1974: 1-39], it is because of the absence of reflexivity in the Czech Republic that poverty so defined still does not exist.

In order to explain this, it is necessary to consider the specificity of Czech poverty in the post-communist era. Using objective poverty measures, there was a very low poverty incidence in the observed period.⁹ Despite this fact, vulnerability to poverty is still high [Večerník 1996: 113] and expectations of poverty exceed its real incidence [ibid.: 95]. In addition, when employing subjective poverty measures it turns out that feelings of being poor are very high, even higher than in the western countries. It is worth stressing here the previous findings of other authors that support the importance of the concept of relative deprivation when analysing the post-communist countries. It has been shown elsewhere that feelings of subjectively asserted deterioration of one's social standing and the risk of the feeling of being under-rewarded (in financial terms) are much greater in transforming societies [Řeháková and Vlachová 1995, Řeháková 1997]. Despite the fact that there was no significant increase in the incidence of objective poverty, in 1995, 66% of all respondents assumed that there were more poor people in the Czech Republic than there had been before 1989 [Mareš and Rabušic 1996: 297]. The relatively large disproportion between objective and subjective poverty indicators that is reported for the Czech Republic, may, as some sociologists argue, result in societal tensions [cf. Mareš and Rabušic 1996: 312]. I am convinced that the fear of future poverty and the feeling of being vulnerable to it could result in blaming the poor for their poverty. As Michael Lewis put it, people may produce psychological distance between themselves and the poor by blaming the poverty on the weaknesses and failures of individuals [Lewis 1978, cit. in Kluegel 1987: 84].

The unjust wealth issue and the case of blaming the poor represent challenges, which, in the long run, should not go without response. In both of these cases it is rather difficult to judge the actuality of the situation; this difficulty may come from the fact that in the study of human behaviour, it is often more important to consider how people define reality than reality in itself. Thus it is certain that if the tendencies observed in 1995 continue, or even increase, neither the poor nor the rich are going to be well off in the future.

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⁹) According to Večerník, there were both in December 1990 and November 1994 2% of households under the legal poverty line [Večerník 1996: 102].

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Table 1. The causes of poverty

	1991	1995	both years	α
MORAL	3.81	3.72	3.75	0.052
NO EFFR	3.18	3.36	3.29	0.000
NO OPRR	3.17	3.18	3.17	0.988
P SYST	3.33	2.99	3.12	0.000
ABIL	3.05	3.12	3.09	0.131
BLUCK	2.62	2.76	2.71	0.003
DISKR	2.53	2.42	2.46	0.023

The average values on the scale: 1 - never, 5 - very often

α - significance level for the independent samples t-test for the comparison of means

See Appendix 1 for the variable names.

Table 2. The causes of wealth

	1991	1995	both years	α
CNEX	4.00	4.18	4.11	0.000
UNFR	3.97	4.01	4.00	0.373
ABIL	3.54	3.72	3.65	0.000
R SYST	3.60	3.65	3.63	0.340
OPPR	3.45	3.64	3.57	0.000
HARD	3.04	3.47	3.30	0.000
LUCK	2.77	3.30	3.09	0.000

The average values on the scale: 1 - never, 5 - very often

α - significance level for the independent samples t-test for the comparison of means

See Appendix 1 for the variable names

Table 3. The causes of poverty and wealth

poverty	Trend 91-95	wealth	Trend 91-95
MORAL (1)	0	UNFR (2)	0
NO EFFR (2)	+	HARD (6)	+
NO OPRR (3)	0	CNEX (1)	+
P SYST (3)	-	R SYST (3)	0
ABIL (5)	0	ABIL (3)	+
BLUCK (6)	+	LUCK (7)	+
DISKR (7)	-	OPPR (5)	+

The number in parentheses indicates the sequence according to the average.¹⁰

The trend of the fall (-) and growth (+) at the 0.05 significance level (independent samples t-test)

¹⁰) If these numbers do not vary, it means that the difference in the following values is not statistically significant ($\alpha > 0.05$).

Table 4. Confirmatory factor analysis: the causes of poverty (*multisample*):
Parameters of the model

Invariant factor loadings: LAMBDA matrix

	FATAL	MERIT PRTY	UNMERIT PRTY
NO ABIL	0.67 [@]	—	—
BLUCK	0.35 [*]	—	0.33 [*]
MORAL	—	0.43 [@]	—
NO EFFR	—	0.70 [*]	—
DISKR	—	0.28 [*]	0.40 [@]
NO OPPR	—	—	0.59 [*]
P SYST	—	—	0.55 [*]

PSI matrix (common metric standardised solution)

	1991	1995
FATAL-MERIT PRTY	0.19	0.34 [*]
FATAL-UNMERIT PRTY	0.11	0.08
UNMERIT PRTY-MERIT PRTY	-0.20	-0.35 [*]

^{*}) the coefficient is statistically significant ($\alpha = 0.05$)

[@]) fixed coefficient

Goodness of fit statistics: $N = 1,023$ (417 + 606); $\chi^2 = 33.96$ (df = 31; $\chi^2/\text{df} = 1.10$; $p = 0.33$); RMR = 0.031; GFI = 0.99

Table 5. Confirmatory factor analysis: the causes of wealth (*multisample*):
Parameters of the model

Invariant factor loadings: LAMBDA matrix

	MERIT WLTH	UNMERIT WLTH	SOC CAPIT
ABIL	0.55 [@]	—	—
LUCK	0.37 [*]	—	0.41 [*]
UNFR	—	0.64 [@]	—
HARD	0.69 [*]	—	—
OPPR	—	—	0.61 [@]
CNEX	—	—	0.50 [*]
R SYST	—	0.68 [*]	—

Both models were calculated with the freed parameters $\Theta_{\epsilon_{63}} (-0.16^*)$, $\Theta_{\epsilon_{42}} (-0.13^*)$

PSI matrix (common metric standardised solution)

	1991	1995
MERIT WLTH-UNMERIT WLTH	-0.54 [*]	-0.54 [*]
MERIT WLTH-SOC CAPIT	0.00	-0.05
UNMERIT WLTH-SOC CAPIT	0.62 [*]	0.94 [*]

^{*}) the coefficient is statistically significant ($\alpha = 0.05$)

[@]) fixed coefficient

Goodness of fit statistics: $N = 1,122$ (456 + 666); $\chi^2 = 39.72$ (df = 30; $\chi^2/\text{df} = 1.32$; $p = 0.11$); RMR = 0.024; GFI = 0.99

Table 6. Second order factor analysis (multisample):
Parameters of the model

Invariant factor loadings: LAMBDA matrix

	MERIT WLTH	MERIT PRTY	UNMERIT WLTH	UNMERIT PRTY
ABIL	0.60*	—	—	—
HARD	0.63@	—	—	—
MORAL	—	0.84*	0.43*	—
NO EFFR	—	0.44@	—	—
UNFR	—	—	0.56*	—
R SYST	—	—	0.78@	—
NO OPPR	—	—	—	0.41*
P SYST	—	—	—	0.79@

Both models were calculated with the freed parameter $\Theta_{\varepsilon_{54}}$ (0.22* in 1991 and 0.06 in 1995)

Invariant factor loadings: GAMMA matrix

	MERIT	UNMERIT
MERIT WLTH	0.80*	—
MERIT PRTY	0.59*	—
UNMERIT WLTH	—	0.82*
UNMERIT PRTY	—	0.71*

*) the coefficient is statistically significant ($\alpha = 0.05$)

@) fixed coefficient

Goodness of fit statistics: N = 840 (420 + 420); $\chi^2 = 55.63$ (df = 35; $\chi^2/\text{df} = 1.59$; p = 0.015); RMR = 0.038; GFI = 0.99

Table 7. The causes of inequalities in a structural model
Common metric standardised solution

BETA matrix

	1991				1995			
	MERIT	UNMERIT	SATIS	POLOR	MERIT	UNMERIT	SATIS	POLOR
MERIT	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
UNMERIT	—	—	—	0.03	—	—	—	-0.11*
SATIS	0.15*	-0.23*	—	—	0.17*	-0.31*	—	—
POLOR	—	—	0.40*	—	—	—	0.38*	—

Both models were calculated with the freed parameter Ψ_{12} (-0.17* in 1991, -0.21* in 1995)

GAMMA Matrix

	1991		1995	
	ISEI	SUBST	ISEI	SUBST
MERIT	-0.05	0.25*	0.07	0.14*
UNMERIT	-0.02	-0.12*	-0.10*	-0.19*
SATIS	0.10*	—	0.17*	—
POLOR	-0.04	0.04	0.03	0.14*

*) the coefficient is statistically significant ($\alpha = 0.05$)

Goodness of fit statistics: N = 948 (384 + 564); $\chi^2 = 6.48$ (df = 4; $\chi^2/\text{df} = 1.62$; p = 0.17); RMR = 0.018; GFI = 1.00.

Appendix 1 (List of Questions)

The causes of poverty

"In your opinion, which factors are most often responsible for poverty in the Czech Republic today?" Responses to the following items were measured on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 = very often, 5 = never)¹¹

NO ABIL	insufficient abilities or talents
BLUCK	bad luck
MORAL	lack of ethics or alcoholism
NO EFR	insufficient efforts of the individual poor
DISKR	prejudice and discrimination towards certain groups in Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic
NO OPPR	lack of equal opportunities
P SYST	poorly functioning economic system

The causes of wealth

"How often are the following factors responsible for how people become rich in the Czech Republic today?" Responses to the following items were measured on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 = very often, 5 = never).

ABIL	abilities or talent
LUCK	luck
UNFR	dishonesty
HARD	hard work
CNEX	good personal contacts and connections
OPPR	better opportunities given at birth
R SYST	an economic system which allows the rich to accumulate wealth dishonestly

Subjective status (SUBST)

"In Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic, some people occupy high social positions while others occupy lower ones. In your own case, where would you place yourself on this scale?" (1 = lowest, 10 = highest).

Satisfaction with the political system (SATIS)


"How would you rate your satisfaction with the political system in Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic? (1 = completely dissatisfied, 7 = completely satisfied).

Political orientation (POLOR)

"Often in reference to politics, people use the terms 'left' and 'right'. Here we are using a scale with different political positions from left to right. Mark where you would place yourself on this scale." (1 = left, 10 = right).


¹¹) Before each individual analysis, the values of these variables were multiplied by the number (-1), in order for us to maintain its relevance of orientation, that is, so that the higher score would express a stronger agreement. We also recoded the variables relating to the causes of wealth.

Diagram 1. Confirmatory factor analysis: the causes of poverty




Explanation of the variables. FATAL = the factor of the fatalistic causes of poverty, MERIT PRTY = the factor of merited poverty, UNMERIT PRTY = the factor of unmerited, systemic poverty. See Appendix 1 for the other variables.

Diagram 2. Confirmatory factor analysis: the causes of wealth




Explanation of the variables: MERIT WLTH = merited wealth; UNMERIT WLTH = unmerited wealth; SOC CAPIT = wealth coming from social capital. See Appendix 1 for the other variables.

Diagram 3. Second order factor analysis



Explanation of the variables: MERIT = factor of merited inequalities, UNMERIT = factor of unmerited inequalities. See Diagram 1, 2 and Appendix 1 for the other variables.

Diagram 4. The incorporation of the causes of poverty and wealth in a structural model



Explanation of the variables: ISEI = international measure of socio-economic status, SUBST = subjective status, MERIT = factor of merited inequalities, UNMERIT = factor of unmerited inequalities. See Appendix 1 for the other variables.

Structural Changes and Social Mobility 1988-1995 in the Czech and Slovak Republics

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Abstract: The paper is devoted to the mapping and comparing of socio-professional mobility in the Czech and Slovak Republics. The data from complete state statistics are exploited that impart ownership and structural changes connected with the social transformation after 1989. These macro-level statistical data are confronted with the individual mobility trajectories that were identified in sample surveys. In addition, contemporary mobility is also compared with the situation as it was in the middle of the eighties. An analysis of the subjective perception of individual and group mobility is carried out in the conclusion.

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The last published data concerning structural changes and social mobility and the perception of them in the course of post-communist transformation come mostly from the international stratification and mobility survey that was carried out in 1993 and led by D. J. Treiman and I. Szelényi from UCLA [Domański 1996; Machonin, Tuček 1996; Matějů 1996; Řeháková, Vlachová 1995].

Since that time there have been further analyses concerning mainly the perception of social changes and mobility from surveys on social justice [Matějů 1996].

In the summer of 1995, the survey 'Strategies and Actors of Social Transformation and Modernisation' was carried out in the Czech and Slovak Republics on samples of 1219 and 956 persons, representing the populations between the ages of 20 and 59 years respectively. The representativity for the basic sample of individuals was achieved by re-weighting the original randomly selected samples of households units. The survey was part of the international comparative French-Polish-Czech-Slovak-EC project entitled 'System Change and Modernisation'. The data were collected by the Centre for Empirical Research (STEM) in Prague. The survey instruments, elaboration of data, data analysis and interpretation were prepared by a team from the Sociological Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic in Prague led by Pavel Machonin in co-operation with the Sociological Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, a team from which was led by Ján Bunčák.

The contents of the questionnaire and the character of the samples enable us to supplement the knowledge of the process mentioned above with data from 1995 and use them to describe and analyse differences between the Czech and Slovak Republics. Of course, other statistical and sociological data are also used for this purpose.

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1. Changes in Ownership and Branch Structure in the Czech and Slovak Republics

When Czechoslovakia was established in 1918, the Czech Lands were already industrial in character while Slovakia was strongly agricultural. During the First Republic (which lasted until 1939) there was a sustained progression and modernisation of industry in the Czech part, with Slovakia remaining mostly agricultural. After the renewal of Czechoslovakia and the establishment of the state socialist system in 1948, a second industrialisation (re-focusing on heavy industry) was implemented in the Czech Lands, including the rapid industrialisation of Slovakia. The process of 'harmonising' both parts of the state was achieved in the late 80's when a similar branch structure could be found in both republics, along with an almost identical social class structure. (According to the Census of 1991 there were 43.1% manual workers, 45.5% non-manual workers, 6.1% farm workers and 2.0% self-employed in the Czech Republic, and 44.1% manual workers, 43.6% non-manual workers, 7.2% farm workers, and 1.2% self-employed in Slovakia.) This similarity was also partially due to a certain stagnation of economic development in the Czech Lands over the period of the 70's and 80's.

There were many important changes in the structure of the national economies during the six years of transformation of the Czech and Slovak societies between 1989 and 1995. The most important change occurred in the ownership sphere. Up until the end of 1989 there existed practically only two types of ownership of firms in Czechoslovakia – state and co-operative enterprises. The co-operative firms operated mostly in the sphere of agricultural production. Soon after 1989 new laws paved the way for private enterprise. This initially began to grow in the business and services spheres, including communal services and transportation. The 'small' privatisation (concerning the trade net, communal services, etc.), partly also property restitution, and most significantly the great unsatisfied demand brought almost 1 million people into private entrepreneurship within two years (by 1992) in the Czech Lands and 300,000 in Slovakia, which was about one-fifth of the population in productive age in the Czech Republic and one-eighth in the Slovak Republic. (Statistical Yearbook 1993.) In the following years the number of private entrepreneurs did not further increase: in 94/95 there was even a decrease of around 10% due to natural processes leading to the rise of small and middle-sized firms on the one hand, and to the return of unsuccessful entrepreneurs to regular employment on the other.

At the beginning of private enterprise many people conducted business activities alongside their primary jobs. This duplicity of individual economic activities subsequently decreased. At present, a qualified estimate states that two-thirds of the self-employed work exclusively in their business. This revitalisation of individual private enterprise caused, at least to those who are full-time self-employed, changes in their occupational status and even changes in the character of the work done.

Although the boom in self-employment petered out in the final period of the existence of the Czechoslovak Federation, the different percentages of self-employment in both countries signifies that the conditions for this kind of activity were different. It may be difficult to estimate though to what extent these differences were affected by the geopolitical situation of the countries in question (the Czech Republic neighbours Germany and has a long border with Austria), by the attractiveness of Prague for tourists, by the diverse political climate and by public opinion. However, it remains clear that at the time of the split of Czechoslovakia the share of self-employed in Slovakia was one-third lower than in the Czech Republic. This situation has so far remained unchanged.

The privatisation of larger companies and firms (so-called 'large privatisation') was carried out in different forms and has been implemented in several stages. Whether it was voucher privatisation or direct sale to domestic or foreign investors on the principle of various forms of tenders, it mostly led to the dissolution of state ownership. The change of owner in many cases brought about various organisational and personnel changes, a reduction in the number of employees, and so on, but for the time being it only amounts to a partial change in the branch structure and, in productive structures of individual plants leading to modernisation. The processes of the major ownership changes in both republics after 1989 can be observed in Table 1.

Table 1. The proportion of persons working in various ownership sectors 1989-1995 in percentages

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
<i>Czech Republic</i>							
State (communal)	84.3	79.6	70.5	60.2	40.2	35.8	24.5
Co-operative	12.9	12.3	9.6	7.5	5.7	4.8	4.2
Private	1.3	7.0	18.8	31.1	47.1	53.0	57.2
Mixed			0.3	0.3	6.4	5.9	13.4
<i>Slovak Republic</i>							
State (communal)	81.1	78.9	72.5	71.6	59.2	47.2	45.8
Co-operative	16.5	15.0	13.1	11.3	8.6	8.1	7.5
Private	1.0	5.0	12.5	17.1	32.2	44.7	46.7

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Czech Republic 1996 and Statistical Yearbook of the Slovak Republic 1996

The process of moving the Czech and Slovak economies to closer Western standards has actually only just begun. The change in ownership and organisational structures in 'large privatisation' did not result in a remarkable shift in the labour force in the sense of occupational mobility (re-qualification, etc.) even though – when compared with the late 80's – there was a significant increase in this respect as will be seen later.

Nevertheless, the data on the changes in number of workers in some branches that are important from the point of view of transformation and modernisation indicate that certain processes have at least started. In spite of the fact that the relative number of work opportunities in some branches is low (e.g. finance), the basic statistics concerning the increase and decrease of branch employment is a good illustration of the ongoing processes (Table 2).

Between the years 1989 and 1995 there was a decrease in the number of people working in agriculture and industry by about one-third in both states. This corresponds with the data on the decrease in production attended by stable work productivity as is proved by statistical records. Commensurable to the decrease, the number of people working in services of all kind (tertiary and quaternary sectors) increased. The increase in some of the spheres of these sectors however was much more distinct, mainly in finance and business services (banking, insurance, and information). This rapid increase corresponds to the system change: a market economy cannot do without a 'financial' and 'information' infrastructure. (The change in the role of banking also led to an exceptional growth in average earnings in this branch.) However, the increase of state administration cannot be fully explained in terms of the emergence of institutions essential for a well-

functioning market economy (financial offices, labour offices, etc.). It is rather the expression of the ongoing bureaucratisation of society under conditions of surviving etatism.

Table 2. Percentages of workers in selected branches of national economy as a portion of 1989 levels (1989, resp. 1990 = 100%)

	1989	1990	1992	1993	1994	1995
<i>Czech Republic</i>	Thousands					
Agriculture	569* = 100	97	61	49	50	45
Industry, total	2117* = 100	96	85	81	76	77
Wholesale and retail trade		523* = 100	104	116	134	143
Hotels and restaurants		89* = 100	112	124	153	158
Financial intermediating	25* = 100	108	200	256	304	336
Public administration	79* = 100	120	155	167	184	203
<i>Slovak Republic</i>	Thousands					
Agriculture	304 = 100	97	85	86	70	68
Industry, total	835 = 100	99	79	77	74	76
Wholesale and retail trade	229 = 100	93	99	130	128	132
Hotels and restaurants	23 = 100	93	123	164	158	170
Financial intermediating	10 = 100	114	195	240	308	339
Public administration	36 = 100	137	234	203	203	218

*) After 1991 there was in some cases a change in the branch classification listed in statistical yearbooks that does not allow a simple comparison with past figures.

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Czech Republic 1996 and Statistical Yearbook of Slovak Republic 1996

2. Mobility of Individuals among Ownership Sectors and Branches

The statistical description of changes in ownership structures completed and concretised by survey data on the mobility of individuals can be seen in Table 3.

The 1995 survey results concerning employment of respondents within the various ownership sectors are in agreement with the data from national statistics. If we include students in 1988, the data indicates that in 1995 there was already more than one half of economically active people working in the private sector in the Czech Republic. The ratio of employees to private entrepreneurs has stabilised at 5:1. Co-operative farmers or members of transformed co-operative unions plus employees of co-operatives count for about 7%. It is significant that the newly-educated generation is entering the private rather than state sector. This is probably due to the differences in wages between these two sectors.

In Slovakia, only one-third of respondents work in the private sector. This corresponds to the differences already seen in national statistics. The ratio of employees to the self-employed is about 12:1. Although the younger generation is joining private companies as with their the Czech counterparts, the share of self-employed among the upcoming generation is ten times lower. This means that the differences in this category have grown apart and are a factor distinguishing both economies.

Table 3. Economically active population according the ownership sector of firms: the change between 1988 and 1995 (row and column percentages)

1988	1995					Total
	State	Employee of firm Co-operative	Private	Member of co-operative	Self-employed	
<i>Czech Republic</i> (N = 765)						
Employee	51.2	0.5	33.2	0.3	14.7	86.5
state firm	97.8	14.8	86.8	6.7	86.2	
Employee	1.8	40.2	40.9	4.9	12.3	4.2
co-operative	0.2	63.2	5.1	5.1	4.6	
Member of	8.8	9.0	13.3	54.5	14.5	6.5
co-operative	1.3	22.0	2.6	88.2	7.3	
Total	45.3	2.7	33.1	4.0	14.9	
<i>Slovak Republic</i> (N=552)						
Employee	66.8	0.4	24.9	1.4	6.5	86.5
state firm	99.5	7.2	89.3	22.9	88.1	
Employee	6.2	73.0	20.9			4.5
of co-operative	0.5	69.7	3.8			
Employee in		17.0	63.8	10.7	8.5	1.8
private firm		6.6	4.7	3.7	4.0	
Member of		14.1	9.3	71.0	5.6	6.5
co-operative		16.5	2.1	73.5	7.9	
Total	59.1	4.7	24.5	5.3	6.3	

Even though the size of the sample limits the validity of the statements concerning the branch structure, the recorded mobility again corresponds to national statistics. It was found that, in the Czech Republic, of those who were employed both in 1988 and in 1995, the most people moved into services (from industry, and education) and finance (from education). The most stable branches were agriculture, mining, metallurgy, transport, and health care (85-90% of people remained working in the same branch). The number of those who were studying or were in vocational schools in 1988 and entered finance and state administration was about three times higher than those entering heavy industry, mining transport and partly machinery.

The changes become clearer when comparing the present situation with the situation in the late 70's and early 80's. This can be illustrated by comprising the branch structure of employment of the young and total economically active population in Table 4. With the exception of agriculture, there was a distinct stability of branch structure. Each newly-educated generation entered the various branches in corresponding ratios to the overall structure of employment, which consolidated the firmness of branch structure.

Table 4. What branches young people entered between 1977 and 1984. A comparison with the economically active population structure in 1984 in percentages*

	Czech Republic		Slovakia	
	Young	Total	Young	Total
Agriculture	9.6	13.9	9.2	18.0
Heavy industry	7.7	8.6	8.6	7.0
Machinery, electro	15.4	15.4	16.8	12.7
Other industry	14.1	13.4	12.9	12.5
Building	9.3	7.8	9.6	9.7
Transport, communications	6.1	7.0	5.1	6.1
Trade	11.3	8.0	11.1	8.0
Services	5.9	5.7	4.5	4.7
Science, research	1.0	1.2	1.9	1.2
Education, culture	6.5	7.0	7.5	8.1
Health care	7.2	5.5	6.6	5.5
Administration	2.4	3.0	2.2	2.7
Other	3.4	3.5	4.0	3.9
N	1104	8600	778	4253

*) The data come from the Class and Social Structure Survey 1984 that was carried out by the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology and Czechoslovak State Statistical Office in 1984 as a sample survey of the population over 16. The sample contained 18,829 respondents from Czechoslovakia.

3. Changes in Occupational Structures

From the total of the economically active population there were two-fifths of respondents who had changed their original occupation in the Czech Republic and more than one-quarter in Slovakia. The most frequent change from the point of view of class-occupational structure in 1988 occurred in the group of higher professionals (56%), followed by manual workers in agriculture (47%) and skilled workmen (42%). From the point of view of structure in 1995 the change in occupation is naturally linked mostly to the emerging private entrepreneurial activities – 80% of the self-employed have changed the occupation that they had in 1988.

We use similar data for socio-occupational groups in 1977 and 1984. Although a direct comparison is impossible because of the different definitions of the categories, the data testify once again to a much greater stability in the 70's and 80's when compared with the high occupational dynamics of the 90's, which is connected mainly with the emergence of self-employment.

Table 5. Changes of occupation 1988-1995 in percentages of class occupational categories (CZ N = 765, SK N = 540)

	Czech Republic Status in		Slovak Republic Status in	
	1988	1995	1988	1995
Higher professionals	55.8	44.5	36.6	33.2
Lower professionals	37.2	32.6	22.6	31.7
Routine non-manual	29.9	36.3	28.3	21.5
Skilled manual	42.0	28.6	25.3	21.3
Semi- and unskilled manual	35.6	31.0	23.7	24.9
Manual in agriculture	46.7	28.6	51.9	19.5
Self-employed with employees		79.7		92.0
Self-employed without employees		79.7		67.0
Total		38.8		27.3

4. Mobility of Individuals among Class-Occupational Categories

Despite the late start for private enterprise after 1989, a significant movement in social structure began, mainly in the Czech Republic. Here nearly a third of respondents from the 1995 sample significantly changed their class-occupational position (Table 6). This movement was distinctly less frequent in Slovakia as a consequence of the slower development of self-employment. Nevertheless, this still affected nearly a fifth of respondents. (Note: in our simplified categorisation, we do not consider mobility between agricultural and industrial unskilled and semi-skilled workers, which was more frequent in Slovakia and which would significantly alter the total mobility rate.)

Table 6. Change of class-occupational status between 1988 and 1995 – row and column percentages

<i>Czech Republic</i> (N = 778)		1995					
1988		1	2	3	4	5	Total
1 Unskilled and semi-skilled workers		78.4	7.6	7.2	3.8	3.0	37.0
		83.7	9.5	26.9	9.6	9.8	
2 Skilled workers and routine non-manual		12.9	63.5	13.1	5.8	4.7	36.7
		13.6	79.8	48.4	14.8	15.2	
3 Self-employed, private entrepreneurs							
4 Lower professionals		2.8	14.8	5.5	67.4	9.5	13.9
		1.1	7.0	7.7	64.8	11.8	
5 Higher professionals		4.3	11.1	13.8	12.7	58.1	12.3
		1.5	4.6	17.0	10.7	63.2	
Total		34.7	29.6	10.0	14.5	11.3	

Contingency coefficient 0.73

Percentage of stable respondents 68.8%

<i>Slovakia</i> (N = 540)		1995					
1988		1	2	3	4	5	Total
1 Unskilled and semi-skilled workers		84.2	8.6	2.3	2.7	2.2	37.6
		89.6	9.3	31.2	6.8	6.8	
2 Skilled workers and routine non-manual		8.8	78.0	3.1	5.7	4.4	37.9
		9.4	89.2	41.9	14.2	14.1	
3 Self-employed, private entrepreneurs							
4 Lower professionals		0.9	10.5	1.1	75.1	12.4	13.5
		0.3	4.1	5.5	66.8	14.0	
5 Higher professionals		2.1	4.3	4.5	17.2	71.9	10.8
		0.6	1.3	17.4	12.2	65.1	
Total		35.3	34.7	2.8	15.2	11.9	

Contingency coefficient 0.81

Percentage of stable respondents 79.3%

Of those who were economically active both in 1988 and 1995 more than 30% (in the Czech Republic) and 20% (in Slovakia) changed their positions according to the listed categories. It is necessary to add that there were 9.5% of respondents unemployed in Slovakia while only 3% in the Czech sample (the data correspond with national statistics on unemployment). If this information is included in our mobility calculations we can estimate that there has been a similar extent of changes in broadly conceived mobility in both countries. The difference consists in the number of respondents who started their own business on the one hand, and the different number of unemployed on the other.

When evaluating the vertical aspect of mobility, it is necessary to take into account that the class-occupational structure common in Western industrial countries has not yet attained a stable form in the Czech Republic nor in Slovakia: there remain many inconsistencies from the past, for instance, in the earnings and prestige of many occupations, in education and in standard of living.

If we consider the status 'unemployed' as a mobility decrease and any entry into self-employment as an increase then the mobility increase prevails (three-quarters of the total mobility) in Czech society, while in Slovakia there is more of a mobility decrease

(two-thirds of mobility changes). This certainly can explain many differences in attitudes and political behaviour in the two parts of the former federal Czechoslovakia. The structure of other mobility paths (those which do not relate to entering self-employment nor to lost employment) are similar in both republics. They apply to about 20% of respondents and involve nearly equal proportions of ascending and descending orientations. Most increases and decreases relate to more or less professional non-manual work on the one hand, and more or less qualified manual work on the other. More radical mobility changes are exceptional.

5. Comparison of Individual Mobility 1988-1993 and 1988-1995

The analysis of the historical mobility of individuals in 1988-1995 presented in the previous chapter is based on a certain re-categorisation of the EGP scheme, which has some advantages, above all the stress laid on important mobility paths concerning the self-employed and private entrepreneurs. Solving a similar task in the framework of the output from the International Social Stratification and Mobility Survey of 1993 for the Czech Lands [Machonin, Tuček 1996: 142-150], the author of the chapter on intragenerational mobility used another categorisation. (For detailed information concerning the operationalisation, see the same source.) He divided the populations of economically active both in 1988 and in 1993 into five categories: (1) higher professionals plus private entrepreneurs with employees, (2) lower professionals plus self-employed without employees, (3) routine non-manual, (4) skilled workers, (5) semi-skilled and unskilled workers plus manual in agriculture. This scheme makes unclear the role of property relations. On the other hand, it approximately represents an existing and empirically proven vertical status differentiation and thus makes possible the application of colloquial measures of vertical mobility/stability. For this reason we decided to use the same scheme for the data from the Czech and Slovak Republics collected in 1993 and 1995 (with the unified age structure corresponding to the sample of the 1995 survey, this being 20-59 years) in order to compare the main standard measures of stability/mobility patterns 1988-1993 and 1988-1995.

Table 7. Main mobility/stability measures for the economically active

	1988-1993		1988-1995	
	CR	SR	CR	SR
N	2,811	2,912	791	546
Stable (%)	79.2	82.4	67.5	78.9
Gross mobility (%)	20.8	17.6	32.5	21.1
Index 1995/1993	100	100	156	120
Upward (%)	14.0	11.2	19.8	13.2
Downward (%)	6.8	6.4	12.7	7.9
Upward/downward	2.06	1.75	1.55	1.68
Net mobility (%)	7.5	7.6	13.3	12.6
Structural mobility (%)	13.3	10.0	19.2	19.9
Net/structural mobility	0.56	0.75	0.69	0.63

The table shows high mobility rates in the Czech Republic and somewhat lower, though not insignificant rates in Slovakia. The gross mobility rate continued to increase after the

separation of the Czechoslovak Federation, very rapidly in the Czech Lands, but much slower in the Slovak Republic.

Upward mobility prevailed in both countries and in both time periods, however in 1988-1993 it developed much more, and in 1988-1995 somewhat more rapidly in the Czech Republic. After the split, upward mobility substantially increased in Slovakia. Structural mobility, that is mainly the move of previously dependent persons to the newly created private property positions, prevailed in both countries, before the split as well after it. The differences demonstrate various paces of privatisation, mainly before the split, when continuing privatisation at the detriment of manual workers' positions in the Czech Republic led to a more distinct prevalence of structural mobility than in Slovakia.

The analysis of stability/mobility paths based on the data concerning people economically active both in 1988 and 1993 or 1995 does not take into account neither the moves of the economically non-active to working jobs, which can be considered some kind of upward mobility, nor the changes from economic activity to non-activity caused by retirements or loss of jobs due to becoming unemployed or a housewife. These can be seen as a kind of downward mobility. Of course, in samples limited by age to persons between 20 and 59 years, the retirements are less numerous than in the adult population with full representation of elderly people. If we involve the cases of those interviewed who started or left their occupational careers between 1988 and 1993 or 1995 into the data, the picture of stability/mobility patterns changes.

Table 8. Main stability/mobility measures for the population aged 20-59 years

	1988-1993		1988-1995	
	CR	SR	CR	SR
N	3,971	4,079	1,219	956
Stable (%)	63.0	64.0	54.5	59.0
Gross mobility (%)	37.0	36.0	45.5	41.0
Index 1995/1993	100	100	123	114
Upward (%)	20.5	16.8	25.5	19.0
Downward (%)	16.5	19.2	20.0	22.0
Upward/downward	1.24	0.88	1.28	0.86
Net mobility (%)	21.3	17.2	24.5	18.7
Structural mobility (%)	15.7	18.8	21.0	22.3
Net/structural mobility	1.36	0.91	1.17	0.84

When including the transfers of people from and to non-active positions, the gross mobility becomes enormous, revealing how profound and rapid were the social shifts in the population as a whole after 1988. In this case, the mobility rate in Slovakia was nearly equal to the Czech rate, due to the large number of unemployed and also of young people starting their occupational careers. The high unemployment rate is the main reason why downward mobility prevails in the Slovak Republic. Retirements and females exiting the workforce led, in the Czech Lands, to a lower, but still important prevalence of upward mobility when compared with the sample of economically active persons. One of the reasons for this is the exclusion of old people from the analysed samples. However, even the inclusion of pensioners could not change the main specificities: the downward mobility in Slovakia was characterised by a mighty stream of people losing their jobs, while in the Czech Republic rather the share of retirements was important. In the Czech case, as in

the Slovak many young people started their first jobs, a factor that stimulated both upward and structural mobility. The increase of structural mobility is a consequence of taking into account the positions of economically non-active persons. All shifts between economic activity and non-activity are in this kind of analysis naturally seen as structural.

For the analysis of concrete social stability/mobility patterns, it was necessary to create more numerous categories in order to get statistically significant results. This was done the same way as in the above quoted intragenerational historical mobility study. [Machonin, Tuček 1997: 142-150] The samples were divided into three categories: (1) UPPERCAT (higher professionals plus entrepreneurs), (2) MIDDLECAT (lower professionals plus self-employed without employees plus routine non-manual), (3) LOWERCAT (all manual occupations). This re-categorisation means that only the more radical mobility changes are registered.

The mobility table of the economically active showed after this simplification a somewhat lower level of mobility (after the exclusion of the not too numerous moves between routine non-manual and other middle-range groups, and of moves between skilled and unskilled workers). However, the main standard measures as a whole repeated in principle the same structure as analysed above in the case of five categories.

From the mobility table, a typology of stability and mobility patterns was constructed with the following results:

Table 9. Stability/mobility patterns of the economically active in percentages^{*}

	1988-1993		1988-1995	
	CR	SR	CR	SR
Stable in UPPERCAT	7.9	8.8	4.8	5.9
Upwardly mobile to UPPERCAT	4.1	4.0	4.5	4.3
Stable in MIDDLECAT	28.5	31.6	26.5	29.0
Upwardly mobile to MIDDLECAT	6.7	5.0	11.4	4.7
Downwardly mobile total	3.8	3.9	7.9	4.4
Stable in LOWERCAT	49.0	46.7	44.9	51.7
Total	100.0	100.0 [*]	100.0	100.0

^{*}) N is in all the columns equal to the size of samples indicated in Table 7. This means that the quantitative characteristics of the patterns' structures concerning the years 1988-1995, particularly in the cases of less numerous categories and mainly in the Slovak case, have from the statistical point of view rather an illustrative character.

Curiously enough, after the simplification of the basic vertical scale, the structure of stability/mobility patterns of economically active persons in the Czech and Slovak Republics become rather more similar than divergent. In both cases, the amount of mobile individuals is increasing in the process of transformation, though the number of stable in the broad categories remains relatively high. The number of actual 'winners' in the transformation processes, encompassing mainly the first two patterns, is very limited in both countries, especially in Slovakia. On the other hand, the number of stable manual workers remained very high in both republics. The most important difference between the Czech Lands and Slovakia consists in the more distinct prevalence of upward mobility to the middle category in the Czech Lands – a consequence of more 'small' privatisation processes. This situation among economically active people was additionally sharpened by a

larger level of unemployment in Slovakia. This picture can to a certain extent explain the differences in attitudes and political behaviour characterising the analysed populations in the period 1988-1993-1995. However it cannot explain the significant changes in attitudes and behaviour in the years 1995-1997, above all in the Czech Lands. This is partly because the rough character of the EGP scheme, from which the stability/mobility patterns were deduced does not allow a detailed analysis of multi-dimensional social statuses and, particularly, their intrinsic inconsistencies, typical in 1995 mainly of the middle strata.

6. Perception of Mobility

In a situation when social stratification is characterised by many inconsistencies and is affected by relics of state socialism (still existing relative material preferences in favour of manual occupations) on the one hand, and is influenced by certain simplified images held by the population as regards stratification in advanced countries (a distinct over-estimation of the self-employed irrespective the field of their activities) on the other, the self-ranking and the feeling of social increase/decrease provide additional information concerning the ongoing social changes in society. This view can to some extent verify the previous conclusions about ascending or descending objective mobility. When analysing this 'subjective mobility', it is also clear that it cannot be reduced merely to a self-evaluation of the moves concerning those who changed occupational positions. No less important is the self-evaluation of those who have not been through any changes in their occupations. In this case, a subjectively evaluated increase or decrease of each occupational group as a whole in the social hierarchy undoubtedly has its own objective sources in so-called collective mobility. One must not forget, however, that the subjective self-evaluation of social status and mobility can in any cases be seriously biased due to many factors of both objective and subjective nature.

One half of Czech respondents who were economically active in both 1988 and in 1995 evaluate their social status to be the same in both years. The other half divides into groups of those who think that their actual status is higher than it was and those who feel a status decrease. The difference between these two groups is about 8% in favour of the decrease. All this represents a substantive deviation from the objective findings referred to in the previous chapter. It should be remembered that in the Czech Lands 38% of the economically active changed their occupation in the period concerned. This change caused a shift into another class-occupational category for 31%.

The situation is different in Slovakia where a relatively lower number of changes in occupations (27%) and changes of class-occupational categories (21%) occurred. Here only 45% of the economically active evaluate their social status as stable. Consequently, a larger part of those who have neither changed their occupation nor class occupational category perceive their present status as mobile when compared to the past. The respondents who in this connection perceive a decrease prevail over those who feel their status to have increased by 8%, as was experienced in the Czech Republic.

In order to obtain a complete picture, it has to be added that the situation is different among those who left economic activity within the analysed period. In the Czech Republic only a third of these, mostly retired persons, considered their positions as being stable and more than a half as decreasing, with 29% feeling a substantial decrease. This stands in opposition to the self-evaluation of those who entered economic activity during the period in question. The situation is similar in Slovakia, except for the fact that the

respondents are far more restrained in their evaluations. In the case of the retired, a distinct decrease evaluation is recorded, while the upcoming generation declares a distinct increase. However, these feelings are twice weaker than in the Czech Republic.

The following tables illustrate the differentiation in perceptions of change in social positions between those who either did not or actually did change their occupation.

Table 10. Feelings of social increase/decrease among those who did not change occupation in percentages

	Substant. decrease	Moderate decrease	No change	Moderate increase	Substantial increase	Total
<i>Czech Republic</i> (N = 467)						
Unskilled workers	6.9	17.6	63.8	11.1	0.6	36.3
Skilled w. and routine non-man.	6.9	16.6	60.3	15.4	0.9	33.3
Self employed	0.0	10.7	34.0	29.4	26.0	3.4
Lower professionals	10.8	22.0	53.1	10.6	3.5	17.5
Higher professionals	0.9	13.2	61.5	22.3	2.0	9.6
Total	6.8	17.4	59.5	14.1	2.2	
Contingency coefficient 0.34						
<i>Slovak Republic</i> (N = 383)						
Unskilled workers	9.8	25.7	50.4	12.6	1.4	37.2
Skilled w. and routine non-man.	6.3	20.4	48.8	24.5	36.4	
Self-employed	0.0	0.0	34.2	15.1	50.7	1.0
Lower professionals	6.1	20.5	51.8	20.6	1.4	15.9
Higher professionals	1.0	25.4	54.8	13.3	5.4	9.6
Total	7.0	22.8	50.2	18.3	1.8	
Contingency coefficient 0.39						

Those who did not change their occupation in the analysed period (but were able to change their class-occupational category by becoming self-employed, for example) often evaluate their positions as stable, 60% in the Czech Republic and 50% in Slovakia. The others are inclined to evaluate their position on the 'social ladder' as moderately decreasing. Here the situation differs in both republics in various class-occupational groups.

In the Czech Republic the feeling of decrease is the most apparent among lower professionals (a third of this group). Conversely, the tertiary educated professionals or managers feel rather a certain social increase. This feeling may not be a consequence of income de-equalisation (which has not yet been realised, for example, as far as the budget sphere is concerned); it can also be caused by the global change of social climate (prestige of expertise, personal prospects, new position of management, etc.) The results do not support the widespread view about the general social decline of workers since 1989. It is true, among both skilled and unskilled workers, there are about twice as many of those who feel a decrease than those declaring an increase; however, at the same time more than 60% evaluate their position in society as stable.

In Slovakia, a strong feeling of decrease can be found among unskilled workers (35.5%). In other groups, except for the self-employed, the feeling of decrease is almost 10% lower than among this group. In contrast to the situation in the Czech Lands, the Slovak higher professionals rather tend to decrease than to increase in their evaluations, while skilled workers in almost equal proportions declare both increase and decrease.

Since these feelings actually mirror the objective group mobility, and thus correspond to the experience of people, the observed differences are in our opinion essential. They undoubtedly have a big influence on the attitude of these groups towards the societal changes taking place in both countries. Thus, it can be hypothesised that these objectively grounded differences in evaluation of changes in social status of the key groups has become one of the vital factors forming the different political scenes in the Czech and Slovak Republics.

Table 11. Feelings of social increase/decrease among those who changed occupation in percentages

	Substant. decrease	Moderate decrease	No change	Moderate increase	Substantial increase	Total
<i>Czech Republic (N = 267)</i>						
Unskilled workers	16.6	25.9	44.7	12.1	0.7	27.2
Skilled w. and routine non-man.	13.0	26.2	34.4	20.9	5.5	24.2
Self-employed	9.7	14.0	22.8	32.4	21.1	21.4
Lower professionals	11.0	20.6	31.5	25.9	11.0	11.8
Higher professionals	4.2	20.3	36.6	26.8	12.1	15.5
Total	11.7	21.9	34.7	22.5	9.2	
Contingency coefficient 0.33						
<i>Slovak Republic (N = 143)</i>						
Unskilled workers	18.4	18.0	43.1	14.8	5.7	31.3
Skilled w. and routine non-man.	17.8	32.1	39.8	5.7	4.6	26.6
Self-employed	2.9	9.9	21.5	48.2	17.5	7.3
Lower professionals	6.1	25.1	39.6	29.2	17.0	
Higher professionals	9.6	26.0	26.2	26.6	11.6	17.7
Total	14.1	23.6	37.3	18.8	6.4	

Contingency coefficient 0.37

The evaluation of change in social status of those who have changed their occupation is slightly different. In their case, there is not a feeling of collective mobility at issue, but the evaluation of individual mobility. Let us remember that the change in occupation caused a change in class-occupational categorisation in three-quarters of cases, while half of these changes can be found among the self-employed.

First, it is necessary to remark that the change in occupation has not affected the evaluation of social status among more than one third of respondents in both republics. In the Czech Republic another third of respondents evaluate their occupational mobility as increased, the remaining third as decreased. In Slovakia, the negative evaluation prevails in a ratio of 3:2. Similar findings in both national samples prove that the feeling of decrease prevails among workers occupations. It is likely that within the groups of workers occupations that were the most affected by structural changes after 1989 (the decline of agriculture, mining, the fall in the production of machinery, electronics etc.) there were many who were forced to descend to 'worse' posts. The prevailing negative evaluations of occupational careers within the workers and unskilled non-manual occupations also imply in this case a realistic perception of the objective collective mobility of these groups. Those who are mobile feel the fall of these groups more than the non-mobile.

This means that the necessary restructuring processes in the production spheres of the national economies will probably cause the emergence of conflict situations.

As for the self-employed, it is remarkable that almost one-quarter of the Czech and more than one-tenth of the Slovak members of this category consider their present status as a descent on the 'social ladder' as compared to their status in 1988. These findings along with the evaluation of status changes of those self-employed who remained working in their original occupation support our assumption about the ambiguous self-ranking of the self-employed.

The most distinct difference between the two republics consists in the distribution of answers among professionals and managers. In Slovakia, there are 10% more of those who view their professional career between 1988 and 1995 as a lowering in their social status. This information is in agreement with the previous assumption about the differently reflected collective mobility of this group.

Conclusions

The data from the transformation and modernisation survey along with the data from the late 80's and the beginning of 90's confirmed that the essential changes at the macro-economic level since 1989 were attended by corresponding changes at the micro-economic level. The socio-occupational mobility of the Czech population radically increased over the last five-year period to 1995, when compared to the late 80's and the beginning of the 90's (the period of stagnation in industrial development). This radical increase cannot be solely attributed to the rise of private enterprise. There are other changes of a structural character that correspond not only to the conversion to market economy, necessitating a certain infrastructure, but also certain modernisation tendencies in the branch and institutional structure of the production and non-production sectors. Along with the transformation of the socio-occupational structure there is also occurring a change in social differentiation. The widening income inequalities, the inequalities in accessibility to decision making (economic power) and information, and so on, change not only the objective social status characteristics, but also how they are subjectively perceived. The development of the socio-occupational structure of society in the Czech Republic after 1989 was caused mainly by the transformation processes in the national economy. These changes were realised without major shocks and in an atmosphere of prevailing social consensus. However, a part of the data concerning attitudes shows that in 1995 a certain disillusion and various dissatisfactions were emerging.

In Slovakia, the processes of changes in social structure have taken a distinctly a different shape. The data from the late 80's and the beginning of the 90' indicate an almost identical situation in both parts of former Czechoslovakia. Moreover, the data from the 1993 survey confirm the resemblance of objective social structures. However, all findings from national statistics and also from the 1995 survey confirm that the development has been different since the split of Czechoslovakia. The changes in Slovakia, whether they concern ownership or the branch structures or mobility of individuals, appeared in our survey as less distinct. This is undoubtedly caused by the different speeds and progress of privatisation along with the different structures of national economy on the one hand, and the different social situation of the populations on the other (unemployment rate, restricted labour market etc.). From the Slovak respondents' point of view (change in self-ranking), between 1988 and 1995 there were stronger feelings of a decline in social standing among both those who are professionally stable and those who changed

their occupation. The differences vary at around 5-10%, when compared to the situation in the Czech Republic. This means that in spite of the fact that there are objectively fewer changes among the economically active population in Slovakia, there was a less favourable development in attitudes than in the Czech Lands.

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From Marxist Revolution to Technological Revolution

Changes in the interpretation of social reality in Eastern Europe
in the eyes of Gerhard Lenski

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Abstract: In 1996, an paper by Gerhard Lenski appeared in the *Czech Sociological Review* entitled, "Ecological-Evolutionary Theory and Societal Transformation in Post-Communist Europe". This article is a critical response to it and what the author sees as Lenski's changing and flawed interpretation of social reality, as can be followed in his work dating back to 1978. The author criticises Lenski's theoretical perspectives, and also the scientific methods by which he arrives at his "Ecological-Evolutionary Theory".

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"...the Marxist era of experimentation is far from over. Marxist societies of the early twenty-first century will almost certainly differ from those of the present as much as those of the present differ from Stalin's Russia in the nineteen-thirties. Thus, the challenge to sociology to monitor these experiments continues. In fact, I would argue that it becomes more important with each passing year." [Lenski 1978: 381]

With these words, which undoubtedly sound like the gloomy prophecy of Cassandra to a large majority of the inhabitants of the former Soviet bloc, Gerhard Lenski concluded the 1978 essay "Marxist Experiments with Destratification: An Appraisal". Eighteen years on, his article concerning the social transformation in post-communist Europe was published in the *Czech Sociological Review*. This article predicts yet another revolutionary future for our region. In this case, it is not a Marxist future, but instead a technological one [Lenski 1996]. In covering the ground between these two viewpoints Lenski embarked on an intellectual pilgrimage, an adventure which might be followed with interest.

In 1978 Lenski came upon the fact of how little attention social scientists in the western world devoted to what he calls "experiments carried out by Marxist regimes". He claimed that the main obstacle, insufficient information, disappeared with "the thaw" of the mid 1950s. A number of information sources were available:

- official government statistics, the credibility of which corresponded to western standards of the period,
- studies by Eastern European sociologists,
- data and analysis by dissidents (e.g. Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn),
- literary works examining repressive practices (e.g. the misuse of psychiatry),

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- reports from the Eastern European and Soviet press,
- the work of émigré sociologists,
- reports by western analysts.

After a methodological observation devoted to the credibility of the official statistics, Lenski depicted the successes and failures of Marxist societies, the first of which he finds in the economic sphere:

“...one of the most impressive successes of Marxist societies has been the demonstration that modern societies do not require the private ownership of the means of production or a free enterprise system to enjoy the fruits of rapid economic growth.” [Lenski 1978: 369]

Lenski attributed other successes to decreases in social and income inequalities.

He listed five failures, and cited the first and most obvious, as “political inequality” [Ibid.: 371], which was especially expressed in the enormous number of political prisoners. He saw the source of “political inequality” in the inflexibility of the communists concerned with their monopoly on power and authoritative rule, but all the same he adds:

“This is not to deny that other segments of the population can make their influence felt, as in the case of the Polish worker’s riots in December 1970...” [Ibid.: 371]

The second failure could be perceived in the inability to remove differences in the attractiveness of different kinds of work. The third resided in the position of women, which was recognised as being worse than in non-Marxist societies. The fourth failure was the continued inequality felt between urban and rural areas, and the fifth, and according to Lenski the most serious, refers to “the limited progress that has been made in the efforts to create ‘the new socialist man’” [Ibid.: 375].

Lenski differentiates between various generations of Marxist societies. The first was made up of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites. The second generation was considered the regimes established in the 1960’s: Maoist China, Castro’s Cuba, and the third being the states of the Third World: Laos, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola, which, he believes, can be safely ignored. But this does not hold for the fourth generation, he states:

“It may not be safe, however, to do the same with what could become in the years ahead a fourth generation of Marxist societies in western Europe – in Italy, Spain, and France. For in these countries, there is increasing evidence that a significant part of the leadership of the Communist parties has, indeed, studied the failures of Soviet society and is prepared to learn from these failures. I am referring, of course, to the emergence in recent years of the varied tendencies that have collectively been dubbed Eurocommunism.” [Ibid.: 378]

In the conclusion of his article, Lenski considered the relationship between the spheres of economics and politics. He inquired if “extreme political inequality” was not the unavoidable price for minimising “economic inequality”:

“This may well be one of those unpleasant situations where two noble ideals are mutually subversive, and some kind of unpleasant trade-off is required. In other words, gains in *political* equality come at the expense of losses in *economic* equality – and vice versa.” [Ibid.: 380]

Lenski is convinced that the answer to this question will be provided by the future development of Marxist societies, as the citation introducing this contribution also proves.

Although his honesty is not in question, one does not need to scrutinise too closely to come to the conclusion that throughout this endeavour the world of socialist realism

has remained incomprehensible for Lenski. However, it is far more interesting to look for the answer to the question of how it happened that he was so mistaken.

To obtain the answer it will be best to consider his method. At first we must consider the fact that Lenski locates the beginning of available, credible information concerning Russia from the second half of the 1950s to the time of the Khrushchev "thaw". We can accept this only if we classify a non-Marxist critique of the Soviet system as unreliable.

If Lenski respects literary inspiration, how can he overlook the fact that many authors had already written about the horrors of Leninist communism between the wars, among them literary figures of such standing as Vladimir Nabokov? Moreover, it is almost completely incomprehensible how Lenski's work on stratification can omit an author who has contributed to the theoretical state of this discipline as no other, namely Pitirim Sorokin. As Kerenski's personal secretary, Sorokin had a shocking experience with practical Marxism, which was projected into his works [Sorokin 1994].

Three years before the publication of Lenski's essay, Václav Havel wrote a letter to Czechoslovakia's president at that time, Gustáv Husák. These lines are to be found in his introduction:

"In our factories and offices work is done with discipline, the work of the citizens has visible results, moderately raising the standard of living, people are building houses, buying cars, having children, enjoying themselves, living." [Havel 1990: 19]

Only the very superficial observer, limited to macroeconomic and other statistical data, is able to maintain faith in this line of thought. It seems that Lenski is exactly this type of observer; otherwise he would not be able to write: "Above all, socialist ideals apparently have won the respect of the great majority of citizens in Eastern Europe." [Lenski 1978: 375] It is unfortunate that Lenski never read the rest of Havel's letter, for he would have read:

"The basic question which it is necessary here to ask goes: why in actual fact do people behave as they do; why do they do everything that in its entirety creates the stately feeling of a totally united society which supports its government? I think that for every unbiased observer the answer is clear: *fear* drives them to do it." [Havel 1990: 20]

It is truly this text which, in spite of not coming from a sociologist's pen, represents a far more delving sociological imagination and would have helped Lenski to realise how the academic separation of the political from the economic sphere is professionally unacceptable and morally depressing.

The open disrespect for individual human destiny that Lenski shares with Marxists most flagrantly appears in his remarks concerning the beginning of Maoism (despite describing Maoist horrors quite colourfully a few lines later):

"This was a heady period and Marxist intellectuals in this country and Europe can certainly be excused for reviving the old claim (first stated by Western visitors to the Soviet Union in the nineteen-twenties), 'I have seen the future and it works.'" [Lenski 1978: 376]

Perhaps in 1978 Lenski was not a Marxist, and surely did not openly confess to this. However, it must be asked whether he shares with them the information resources; the belief that social reality can be revealed through means of economic, and for that matter, other statistical data; convictions regarding the principal advantages of economic equality; and the neglect of the individual. It must be asked how Lenski's opinion differs from that of the Marxists.

The collapse of the Marxist regimes, which by its suddenness surprised the huge majority of laymen, as well as experts, and which certainly surprised Lenski to the same degree, offered him an appropriate opportunity to bid farewell to old mistakes. It must be said right here that he lost this opportunity in an article entitled "New Light on Old Issues: The Relevance of 'Really Existing Socialist Societies' for Stratification Theory". [Lenski 1994]

The passage from Lenski's 1994 essay on the world of socialism that is probably the most worthy of consideration is the sentence which summarises his evaluation of the article from 1978: "Looking back, I believe these conclusions have stood the test of time fairly well." [Ibid.: 56] Since up to this point the criticism has focused solely on Lenski's theoretical perspectives, it is now necessary to turn attention to his scientific method, the rules of which he breaks in order to defend his personal integrity.

As documented above, in his original work, Lenski names two major successes and five failures of Marxist societies. In his 1994 summary of this earlier thesis, as far as concerns successes, the achievement seems to be simply "reducing economic inequality," whereas on "the fruits of rapid economic growth without private ownership," which originally for him was "one of the most impressive successes" of the Eastern bloc societies, he remains innocently silent. Similarly, as concerns the number of failures, where he once had five, we find only two [Ibid.: 56]. This hesitancy is only magnified by the way in which Lenski has revised his previous conclusions: for example, there were bigger economic differences than were supposed, which he documents with a journalistic reference to the personal wealth of communist dictators. Even though he writes of the substantial spread of poverty, it remains evident that the basis of the "economic equalities" he propounds, as witnessed by the experience of one of the most advanced socialist countries of the 1980s, where a labourer might meet a university professor in a queue for scarce toilet paper, continually escapes Lenski due to his superficial concern for statistics.

Lenski rests his essay on two theses. First, with great emphasis, he elaborates on his original idea, according to which Marxism failed due to "unrealistic assumptions about human character." This is admittedly true, but it is not Lenski's revelation. Already, as early as the 1940s, Ferdinand Peroutka, in his "Answer to the Left," had written:

"We should not pretend that the sheer fact of adopting the socialisation plan brings immediate salvation to everything and everyone. Each work encompasses both the intention and the realisation. Some are satisfied when they adopt the intention. They overlook the realisation. Socialism has its noble moral and its practical productive sides. The political and moral side of socialisation is over, solved and adopted; now we have to face to the hard needs of production. Once again, economic life will require reason rather than passion, rather more work ethics and discipline, rather more expert work and cool calculation. Without this the socialisation will break down and will turn into a slough of dearth and poor living standard". [Peroutka 1947: 128-129]

And this idea in my opinion is not advanced by Lenski.

The second thesis can be found at the end of Lenski's essay. It claims, "to paraphrase Marx", in that contemporary western societies allocate rewards partly on the basis of need, partly on the basis of work and partly on the basis of property:

"In short, they combine elements of communism, socialism, and capitalism and are the product of trial-and-error experimentation guided, in large measure, by a spirit of pragmatism." [Lenski 1994: 59]

In this way Western societies have accomplished what scholarly theorists have failed to achieve, since in practice "they have created a workable synthesis of out of seemingly contradictory principles of allocation" [Ibid.: 60]. Face to face with this truly dialectic argumentation we have to surrender. In this light, the fatal collapse of Marxist ideas in the Eastern bloc, with the wave of a magic wand, has turned into compromise, but into victory all the same. Consequently, can it not be said that the welfare states of Western Europe are classless societies?¹

This is not to say that the result of the conflict of the superpowers in the second half of the twentieth century has been fully awarded to the West – simply because it won. New dominating issues have arisen to confront the modern world, ('North-South' conflict, ecological crises, the growth of social problems) which cast doubt upon the concept of industrialism as such. The fact that Lenski's scant attention to these phenomena in 1978 is equally absent sixteen years later only goes to further support the conclusion concerning the lack of initiative in his methods and theoretical perspectives.²

How much more sociologically productive is an approach that places the situation of the individual in a social context at the centre of attention, instead of general information about the whole, can be seen in the already quoted 'non-sociologist' Václav Havel. The following passage from the essay "Power of the Powerless", completed under the actual circumstances in 1978, convincingly documents the depth he reached:

"...it does not seem that traditional parliamentary democracies offered a way to fundamentally confront the 'juggernaut' of technical civilisation, as well as industrial, and consumer societies; but they are dressed as such and therefore helpless; only, a manner which manipulates the person is eternally more gentle and refined than the brutal manner of the post-totalitarian system." [Havel 1990: 127]³

At this point we could take our leave of Gerhard Lenski, as with the type of left-oriented western social scientists, for whom the Eastern bloc made up a "unique set of laboratories for observing the effects of 'truly existing socialism'" [Lenski 1994: 55] and who today, after the loss of these laboratories, poorly hide their hesitancy. We could have done this only if the benevolent *Czech Sociological Review* had not published the essay "Ecological-Evolutionary Theory and Societal Transformation in Post-Communist Europe," [Len-

¹) There is perhaps no reason why we should deny Marxists the joy of this eventual victory. After all, from their point of view Lenski's reinterpretation of reality may be solid. The principal reason of my reservations towards them rests with the fact that their theoretical and methodological devices, as I have tried to document, are cumbersome, misleading, and ethically inferior.

²) It is necessary to emphasise that this method leading to similar picturesque conclusions regarding the Eastern bloc has even been used by social scientists hailing from (neo-)liberal positions. Larry Summers offers an extremely threatening example. In October of 1991, as one of the foremost economists of the World Bank at the annual meeting in Thailand, he predicted a bright future for Russia. According to him "after seventy years of Communism Russia can still take advantage of a real work ethic" and from the "clear entrepreneurial powers of the black market." [George and Sabelli 1994: 105]

³) Havel used the term "post-totalitarian system" to describe the former Marxist society.

ski 1996] in its fourth volume. In this article, Lenski places his "old issues" once again into a "new light."

Ecological-Evolutionary theory, Lenski's new theoretical device, rests on the thesis according to which the character of human society is determined by three main factors:

- our species' genetic heritage,
- the biophysical environments to which societies must adapt,
- the technologies that societies possess [Ibid.: 149-150].⁴

From these standpoints there are two conclusions. The first we already know well: Marxism failed because of mistaken assumptions concerning human nature. In the interpretation outlined in Lenski's new theoretical concept, Marxist ideology came into conflict with the potentialities of modern technology, and therefore succumbed to it. This is definitely a unique criticism of Marxism: Lenski reproaches Marxism for not being materialistic enough and in relation to human nature calls it "a secularised variant of classical Christian doctrine." [Ibid.: 151] The true materialistic concept of history according to Lenski, is however ecological-evolutionary theory. Therefore, the failures of Marxism can consequently be explained best by those features where it deviates from this theory. Marxism placed the importance of ideology above technology, and in reality the reverse is true.

Here it is possible to note another serious deficiency of Lenski's conception. Despite the title of the theory, which he supports, it seems that Gerhard Lenski has remained unaffected by the literature warning of the *ecological limits of technological development*. However, it is here where the strong tension within the ecological-evolutionary theory lies, and this tension is today growing rapidly. By overlooking this, Lenski removes the major supportive motive of his theory and as such severely decreases its credibility, which is already shaky due to the omitted ethical foundations of social behaviour.

Literature on this subject has flourished since 1962, when the seminal work of Rachel Carson, *Silent Spring* [Carson 1962], was published, creating an unprecedented sway. Recently, the literature has been exploring other notable topics, with which Lenski deals only superficially concerned with the relationship of technology and ideology. As Jerry Mander convincingly proves, technological development can itself be a rigid pillar of ideology [Mander 1991].

Lenski's second conclusion is some kind of vision of post-communist Europe's future. With the use of topics currently occupying the sociological discourse (post-industrial society, social impacts of modern technology, the results of economic globalisation) he predicts the future for us, determined to a certain degree by the tension between the possibilities and threats which modern technology allows:

"the most revolutionary force at work in the world at large today is technological innovation. And, I would add, the prospects for slowing this force in the near-term future seem negligible,..." [Lenski 1996: 155]

⁴) The obvious unmanageability of this simplifying concept is displayed well by Europe of the 1940s. According to such criteria, there should not be any serious difference between Britain and Germany of the time. It is clear that the ethical foundations of social arrangement cannot be omitted.

If we agree with those ecologically-oriented authors who believe that it is truly this “most revolutionary power” which is responsible for the majority of global devastation,⁵ then there is nothing left for us but to hope that the course of time will prove Lenski’s current predictions as adequate as those he made in 1978.

Translated by Chris Guilds

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⁵) These works are well known also on the Czech sociological scene [Keller 1993, Librová 1994].

Ivan Gabal (ed.): The 1990 Election to the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly. Analyses, Documents and Data

Berlin, Ed. Sigma 1996, 198 p.

The years 1990-1992 meant many things in the history of Czechoslovakia. The book is concerned primarily with one of them – the transition from a totalitarian regime to democracy and shaping the political system. It could be concisely called “a historical study of a non-existent state and its non-existent political system” and has the character of an historical document about this unique period in the history of Czechoslovakia and, of course, both the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Nine chapters provide information and analysis of the historical context which cover: past experiences with elections, current legislation regulating elections, including relevant sections of the constitution, the election laws and laws regulating political parties, the political parties and their programmes, the social and political characteristics of candidates for parliament, and the election results – state and regional, social, structural and attitudinal characteristics of voters from pre- and post-election surveys, and the formation of government.

The book originated in co-operation with several scholars from the related fields – sociology, political sociology, political science, political geography, history and legal science. Chapters were drawn from original historical materials produced immediately after 1990, accentuating the historical aspects and extending the historical perspective to long before 1990 into the period prior to the communist take-over, and make use of the available documentation and the broadest possible data base.

In the first chapter *Czechoslovakia: The General Context of the 1990 Election* – Ivan Gabal recalls the events of November 1989 and subsequent development, the new course of foreign policy and security, economic policy, and the preparation of the first democratic election after forty years of the non-democratic regime. He sums up many politically significant facts of the 1990 period.

Eva Broklová – the author of the second chapter – *Historical Roots for the Restoration of Democracy in Czechoslovakia* – concen-

trates on the First Republic, its Constitutional Chamber based on political and constitutional postulates of democratic constitutions, the legal background having roots in the Austro-Hungarian empire, the political system, electoral law and main political cleavages, and the parties and programmes.

Lubomír Brokl a Zdenka Mansfeldová are the co-authors of the fourth chapter *A Short History of the Czech and Slovak Parties*. The chapter reminds us of the history of political parties existing during the period 1946-1989, the existence of the ‘National Front’ formed by six existing parties under the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the role of the National Front in the establishment of totalitarianism. The leading role of Civic Forum – the heterogeneous political subject that was united in opposition to the Communist Party is mentioned there along with the role of other parties in that period.

In *Candidates in Czechoslovak Parliamentary Election in June 1990 – Their Structure, Views and Attitudes* – Vladimír Rak analyses the occupational and demographic structure of candidates in the first free Czechoslovak elections, their expectations of elections results, views of the political and economic situation, development and problems faced by the society, views of Parliament, its work and its relation to other institutions.

In the chapter *Political Climate Before Elections – Attitudes, Preferences, and Expectations of the Czechoslovakian Public* Marek Boguszak, Vladimír Rak and Ivan Gabal focus on the formation of the party structure and the support of individual parties, the development of the main election issues, the formation of the new political structure and the determination of political attitudes.

Political and Legislative Conditions for the Creation of a Democratic Political system was written by Zdenek Jičínský. It describes the process of the establishment of the political system in 1990, encompassing the leading ideas of that time, legal acts concerning political parties influenced by these ideas, and the author’s explanations of both.

Ivan Gabal in *Election Results and Government Formation* sums up the results of the 1990 Elections to both Chambers of the Fed-

eral Assembly and both national parliaments - the Czech and Slovak National Council, and the formation of coalitions and the government. Tomáš Kostecký in *Results of the 1990 Election in a Regional Perspective* analyses the results of parliamentary elections on the level of both parts of federation and on level of districts.

Although the book is dedicated primarily to the first democratic elections in Czechoslovakia and the shaping of the political system, it sometimes (in the first chapter) refers to many facts, that are redundant for the 1990 elections but rather more important for the explanation of the 1992 elections. These facts of secondary importance are the source of a number of inaccuracies taken from the many lay debates during in years 1990-1992. The first inaccuracies are concerned with economic terms used by the author of the first chapter. Among the politically significant facts it is included that: "The macro-economic and monetary approaches, which governed the policy of Civic Forum and thus the federal and the Czech governments, ignored geographical and regional specificities, structural differences between the Czech and the Slovak economies..." (p. 23). Monetary policy together with fiscal policy are parts of macro-economic policy. Monetary policy is based on the money supply, interest rates and credits, and could not be a structural policy - by nature it ignores geographical and regional specificities. Also, among politically significant facts it is stated that: "Problems with implementing the federal budgetary, monetary and restrictive policy in Slovakia led the reformist, mostly monetary economists in power to gradually adopt the variant of 'either a strong federation or a split'" (p. 23-24). In addition to fiscal (that were by the author called budgetary) and monetary policy he creates "restrictive policy". Here it is necessary to note that both fiscal and monetary policy may be restrictive or not, but "restrictive policy" does not represent a special category of macro-economic policy. It might be discussed whether the government's fiscal policy was desirable or not and how much it was influenced by monetarists, but the central bank's monetary policy had to be the same for the whole federation.

Otherwise there arises the serious question 'a federation or not'.

The second inaccuracy deals with the long lay debate on the federation. The new budget design for the year 1990 modified money flows to both countries. This fact led Slovak politicians to call for a separation of macro-economic policy. For example, they demanded three banks of issues. One functioning state always means one monetary and fiscal policy (i.e. income side of fiscal policy - uniform taxation). The separation of central banking and the complete separation of fiscal policy leads naturally to separation of countries. Otherwise, two macro-economic policies in one country would become a dangerous source of macro-economic instability (there is no difference here in the opinions of monetarists, Keynesians or others). The images of macro-economic policy among Slovak politicians were, among other things (finally codified in the Slovak constitution), the cause of the political separation of the federation.

The third inaccuracy appeared in the chapter dedicated to political parties. The chapter indicates how much the existence and role of extremist parties (KSČM and SPR-RSČ) in the society was underappreciated by social and political scientists. The Communist Party (KSČ) in 1990 is described as progressive left, in favour of a democratic, human and socially-just society. In fact, it probably was and its the most significant successor still is a very extreme left-wing party with an extremist programme inspired by communist ideology (they do not hide their preferences for a different regime, social equality, opposition to EU and NATO). The Communist Party is a party with a loyal electorate of the same ideological orientation and attitudes. From 1990 until today communists has adopted the role of a parliamentary opposition party and plays the game of parliamentary democracy.

The Republican Association-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSČ) in 1990 is presented as successor to the Republican Farmer's Party of pre-Munich Czechoslovakia. In fact, SPR-RSČ never maintained the tradition of Republican Farmer's Party and probably never presented itself as a successor to it. Their label may be inspired by western repub-

lican parties, since without doubt it is an extreme right-wing (or extreme centre) party of the type that can be found, for example, in Austria (Freedom Party) or France (National Front). The programme of this party contains elements of isolationism (from West European structures and international organisations), nationalism (against Germans), ethnic hate (against Gypsies) and economic and political populism.

Along with the question of extremist parties another very topical issue that is widely discussed in the book is the electoral system. Two chapters recall the process of the selection of the proper electoral system for the new democracy. The problem of whether to apply the majority principle or that of proportional representation in the first elections were the most controversial and the most discussed question within Civic Forum. Finally, it was the proportional system that was established, partly because of its tradition in the First Republic and the strong national cleavage in the two nations of Czechoslovakia. The main arguments against the majority system were that it could result in the absolute victory of one party and halt the evolution of other political parties. There was also the fear of a victory for the Communist Party.

The book tells us that President Havel belonged at that time among the defenders of

the majority system or at least some combined system, over proportional representation. He was inspired by his idea of non-political politics and believed in a system that could lead to the electoral choice of personalities rather than political parties. The idea of personalities rather than parties was to awaken again at the time of the first Senate elections in 1996, but turned out to be a false dawn. Politics have become an affair of parties, not isolated personalities. Despite this, many reasons have been put forward in favour of modifying the electoral system such as the dominant socio-economic issue, the national and language homogeneity of the country, the equal power of the two biggest parties and main competitors – right-wing ODS and left-wing ČSSD, the inability to create any majority government, and the problem of irresponsible and obstructive extremist parties.

With the exceptions of those parts mentioned previously, the book gives a true and colourful picture of a short historical period and the first stage in the development of the political systems of the contemporary Czech Republic and Slovakia. It describes both the ideas and events, and shows the possible roots of the positive and negative features of the political systems that have evolved in both countries in the subsequent years.

Klára Vlachová

Czech Germans, or German Czechs?

Biograf 1997, No. 10-11.

Number 10-11 1997 of the Prague sociological magazine *Biograf* (subtitled the Magazine for Biographical and Reflexive Sociology) is devoted to qualitative research of German ethnicity with a language puzzle in the title 'Czech Germans, or German Czechs?' (Čeští Němci, nebo němečtí Češi?). When reading *Biograf* one must remember that this prestigious magazine has its beginnings in the early nineties, beginnings comparable with the famous *samizdats*. A group of sociologists using qualitative research methods (Josef Alan, Jaroslav Kapr, Zdeněk Konopásek, Olga Šmídová, Eva Stehlíková) founded a little non conform (the first subtitle of *Biograf* was 'the Magazine for

Defense of People against Sociology'), but a very vivid and intellectually attractive medium, an open space for the presentation of qualitative sociological research, methodological discussions, and early presentations of students of sociology – whether believers or non-believers in qualitative sociology. Thanks to Zdeněk Konopásek and Eva Stehlíková this magazine met high standards of scientific discourse, though up until today it has lived a little behind scenes of the mainstream of Czech sociology.

'Czech Germans, or German Czechs?' is a shortened presentation of a substantial and long-lasting research into those German people who lived in Czechoslovakia and have continued to live in the Czech Republic all of their lives regardless historical 'offers' such as the

transfer in 1945, the possibility to emigrate in the late sixties, or when the iron curtain disappeared in the early nineties. The authors (Eva Stehliková, Olga Šmídová, B. Trávníková, J. Nekvapil) have transcripts of interviews with 22 Czech Germans, 7 of their Czech neighbours, 5 Czechs living in Germany, and 6 Germans living and working in the Czech Republic. Interpreting this data was aimed at:

- describing Czech-German relations in a historical perspective leading up to the present state
- studying not only ethnicity but also the biographies of those who live like foreigners in their territory
- providing empirical data for minority-majority interrelation in frames of political and power interventions (e.g. Nazi, communist, post-nazi, democratic conditions)
- reformulating (newly formulating) questions relevant for Czech-German relations and their perspectives (pp. 11-12)

The authors believe that the transcripts and emphatic interpretations of propositions and attitudes that were presented enable them to reveal natural stereotypes, or even hetero-stereotypes of Czech-German behaviour, and also allow them to separate ideological proclamations from the living world, beliefs from *Erlebnisse*. This aim is very noble and the members of the research team have striven to achieve it. I do not doubt that their interpretations are reliable, and that the transcripts are very sad as regards the relations of the post Second World War majority (Czechs) with the minority (Germans). It is also true that it is difficult to identify history, or even historical data in the living world. Furthermore, the descriptive and interpretative texts are very persuasive, not to mention quotations from the transcripts. However, it should be asked whether the aims of study are not too ambitious, whether the metonymical transfer from personal views to ethnic coexistence are not too courageous. My objections are partly theoretical, partly methodological, without reference to the transcripts and the enormous effort behind them.

From the theoretical point of view Czech-German coexistence on the same territory has

features that can be covered by the umbrella term *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. I am afraid that 'community' relations can be and usually are the object of interview. All those golden and co-operative times when language, nationality, political views were not distinctive, may be interpreted as features of a community structure of coexistence. The modern state, division of work, common market, intensive national and political life are features on the other hand which define 'society', and are reflected in interviews indirectly, transformed into a person's fatal happiness or disaster.

It is necessary to interpret the birth of Czechoslovakia, the Munich Agreement, the expulsion of Czech people from border territories, the Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren, the Second World War, the Transfer, the end of the Cold War, and the end of Soviet Union as societal modernisation on this territory, which continues and is still open. In this view Czech and Germans are competing nations and their positions are dependent upon the status quo in Europe. In the same frame, it is true that Germans are mostly active, and Czechs passive subjects of history. Neither the best community relations, nor the generalisations from transcripts of interviewed persons can change this determination. The logical question then follows: How restricted are the aims of research?

From the methodological point of view it is necessary to stress (I am strongly persuaded that the authors are of the same opinion) that the interview is a co-operative speech act. Grice's maxim of relevance, maxim of quality and especially maxim of manner rule over the researcher's and interviewed person's interaction (even more than language skills). And therefore so called shared information has the same value as propositions and attitudes that are mentioned in conversation. During the speech act there are meanings present in communication that are not mentioned and without the chance to be part of the transcripts, in spite of their importance. All that which is not mentioned has equal value, thanks to the good manners of the people involved in communication. Every speech act has its pragmatic presuppositions, which should form part of the research and interpretation. If we pretend that

pragmatic presuppositions are out of our scope, the result is incomplete.

Rather more different is the article of Jiří Nekvapil dealing with the interrelation of language and ethnicity (*K nesamozřejmým vztahům jazyka a etnicity, aneb jak Němci mluví německy a Češi nemluví česky*). At the beginning of his study there are four items (Czech, German, Czech language, German language) integrated into the mechanical combinations: Czech speaking the Czech language, Czech speaking the Czech and German languages, Czech speaking the German language, German speaking the German language, German speaking the Czech and German languages, and German speaking the Czech language, which is frame rich enough to follow how this theoretical combination became reality over history and in evidence with the interviewed persons. The sociolinguistic status of the Czech and German languages is not mentioned at the beginning and so it seems that all combinations are equal. Even the historical fact that both

languages were connected once with the winners at war and once with the losers at war is not mentioned. The resulting interplay is to my view partly artificial and partly denying the dominant position of the German language, which has its consequences in the sociolinguistic behaviour of the interviewed persons. Also, sociolinguistic presuppositions are part of the research. Nevertheless the study of Jiří Nekvapil is prepared as an independent article-like text that thoroughly explains its results within its frame.

In spite of these two remarks, I must commend the many qualities of the presented texts. They raise many important questions connected with Czech-German relations, they present many authentic views from transcripts, and they interpret the presented views as correctly as it is possible. I can recommend that those who are interested in taboo Czech-German relations should read the articles and acquaint themselves with the transcripts.

Otakar Šoltys

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