Sociologický časopis

Czech Sociological Review

Volume 39 (2003): 6

Sociologický časopis
Czech Sociological Review

Vydává Sociologický ústav
Akademie věd České republiky

České vydání:

Marek Skovajsa, *šéfredaktor*

Published by the Institute of Sociology
Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic

English edition:

Jiří Večerník, *Editor-in-Chief*

Redakce/Editorial Office
výkonná redaktorka/Managing Editor
Jitka Stehliková
anglická redaktorka/English Editor
Robin Cassling
sekretariát/Secretary Eva Strnadová
sazba/Typeset by Martin Pokorný, Hostouň
tisk/Printers Tiskárna ÚJI, Praha 5
návrh obálky/Cover Design Filip Blažek

Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review (ISSN 0038-0288). Objednávky přijímá Postservis, Poděbradská 39, 190 00 Praha 9, tel. 800 104 410, e-mail: predplatne@prstc-p.cpost.cz a redakce. Objednávky do zahraničí přijímá redakce. Vychází 6 čísel ročně (4 česky, 2 anglicky). Cena 44 Kč, v zahraničí 14 € (14 $), Slovensko 65 Kč, roční předplatné v ČR 264 Kč.
Časopis je citován v *Current Contents/Social&Behavioral Sciences (CC/S&BS)*, v počítačové databázi *Social SciSearch* a v aktuálních oznámeních *Research Alert*, publikacích Institute for Scientific Information, USA. Obsah časopisu (od roku 1993) je uveřejněn na internetu na URL http://www.soc.cas.cz

Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review (ISSN 0038-0288) is published bimonthly (4 issues in Czech, 2 issues in English) by the Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. Orders: Czech Sociological Review, Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic, e-mail: prodej@soc.cas.cz. One issue costs 14 $ (14 €).
The Review is cited in publications of the Institute for Scientific Information, *Current Contents/Social &Behavioral Sciences (CC/S&BS)*, *Social SciSearch* and in *Research Alert*.
Contents of the Review (since 1993) are published on the Internet URL http://www.soc.cas.cz

Podávání novinových zásilek povoleno ŘPP Praha, čj. 1043/95 ze dne 20. 3. 1995. MK ČR E 4901.

Sociologický časopis
Czech Sociological Review

ROČNÍK (VOLUME) 39 - 2003

Adresa:
Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Česká republika
Telefon: (+420) 222 221 761
Fax: (+420) 222 220 143
E-mail: sreview@soc.cas.cz

ISSN 0038-0288

STATI / ARTICLES

GENDER

ZE SOCIOLOGICKÝCH VÝZKUMŮ

Z EMPIRICKÝCH VÝZKUMŮ

METODOLOGICKÁ RUBRIKA

ZPRÁVY A INFORMACE / INFORMATION

ANOTACE

VOLUME 39, NUMBER 6, DECEMBER 2003

Sociologický ústav AV ČR, Praha
Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic

Sociologický časopis
Czech Sociological Review

(ISSN 0038-0288) vydává Sociologický ústav Akademie věd ČR v Praze. Vychází 6x ročně (4 čísla v češtině a 2 v angličtině)

Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review je recenzovaný oborový časopis zaměřený na oblast sociologické teorie a metodologie, přinášející výsledky a interpretace sociologických výzkumů. Zaměřuje se na rozvoj oboru a jeho výuku a zároveň chce být užitečný při řešení praktických problémů české sociální a ekonomické politiky.

Nabídka rukopisů

Redakce přijímá tři tištěné kopie, které neobsahují jméno ani pracoviště autora, recenzní řízení je oboustranně anonymní. V průvodním dopise uveďte úplnou kontaktní adresu včetně telefonního čísla a e-mailové adresy. Nabídnout rukopis jinému časopisu, zatímco je posuzován naším časopisem, je považováno za neetické.

Formát rukopisu: Rukopisy musí být psány na stroji nebo tištěny na tiskárně počítače a musí splňovat ČSN 880220, tj. řádkování 2, 60 úhozů na řádce, 30 řádek na stránce A4, anebo používat velikost písma 12 a řádkování 2 v textovém editoru. Stati, výzkumné a metodologické texty nesmí přesahovat 20 normostran (1 NS = 1800 znaků), recenze 7 normostran, zprávy a informace 5 normostran, anotace 1 normostranu. V elektronické podobě se příspěvky zasílají redakci buď na disketě formátu IBM PC, nebo e-mailem, text a tabulky v editoru Word pro Windows. Pro grafy a obrázky vyžadujeme zdrojové soubory (soubor, v němž byly vytvořeny), grafy nejlépe v programu Excell, obrázky nejlépe ve formátu TIF nebo EPS. Rukopis musí obsahovat vedle vlastního textu *abstrakt* (20 řádků) a *název stati v angličtině a češtině, abecední seznam citované literatury* a *stručnou informaci o autorovi*. Redakce provádí jazykovou úpravu textu.

Rozhodnutí o vydání: Rozhodnutí je autorovi sděleno do osmi týdnů od data přijetí rukopisu.

Adresa redakce: Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, telefon (+420) 222 221 761, 221 183 217-218, fax 221 183 250, e-mail: sreview@soc.cas.cz

Návštěvní dny v redakci jsou pondělí a čtvrtek 10-16 hod.

Sociologický časopis
Czech Sociological Review

(ISSN 0038-0288) is published 6x annually (4 issues in Czech with abstracts and article summaries in English and 2 issues in English) by the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic in Prague.

Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review is a scholarly review focusing on the field of sociological theory and methodology, and the dissemination of the results and interpretation of sociological research. Its attention is directed towards the development of the field and its teaching, while simultaneously striving to contribute to the solution of the practical problems of Czech social and economic policy.

Manuscript Submission

The editors require three legible copies, which do not state the name or workplace of the author, in order for the review process to be anonymous on both sides. The accompanying letter should contain a complete contact address, including telephone number and e-mail address. Submission of a manuscript to another journal, while it is under review by the SÈ/CSR, is deemed unethical.

Manuscript format: Manuscripts must be typed or computer printed (12-point type preferred), double-spaced, with 30 lines to an A4 page (1800 characters). The maximum length of research and methodological essays is 20 pages, 7 pages for reviews, 5 pages for news or information, and 1 page for annotations. Manuscripts should be submitted on diskette in IBM PC format or by e-mail. Submit text and tables in Word for Windows, and graphs and illustrations as separate files in the format in which they were created; graphs preferably in Excell, illustrations preferably in TIF or EPS. Along with the manuscript please submit a twenty-line *abstract*, a complete *bibliography*, and a brief up-to-date *curriculum vitae*.

Editorial decisions: Decisions are generally made within eight weeks from the date of the manuscript's arrival.

Postmaster: Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic, fax (+420) 221 183 250, e-mail: sreview@soc.cas.cz

Editorial

Unlike the previous, thematic issue, this issue of the *Czech Sociological Review* includes a variety of different topics. First, Sylke Nissen writes about the collective European identity, the impulse behind its formation and the difficulties associated with its assertion. Data from the EC Eurobarometer are used to create a typology of the positions countries have taken towards enlargement, and to open up discussion on the issue of the real popular support for enlargement among populations, in contrast with how it is outlined and accomplished by political elites. Given the approaching date of accession, it is a very timely issue indeed.

Three articles tackle work flexibility using the comparative survey carried out within the international Households, Work and Flexibility (HWF) project. The coordinator of the project, Claire Wallace, presents a broad picture of the results in eight countries, showing that non-standard arrangements need not be only 'bad jobs' but can also be 'good' ones. Maarten Keune compares standard and non-standard employment in the Czech Republic and Hungary in the context of its meanings, patterns and the specific post-socialist development in each country. Finally, Pavle Sicherl proposes a typology of work flexibility based on Slovenian data, followed by a comparison of eight countries and a specific Czech/Slovenian comparison of work arrangements.

The last section of articles stems from a Czech project dealing with the subject of changes in fertility and family behaviour in the Czech transformation process. Dana Hamplová uses a 'dynamic approach' to test the weight of education levels for the timing and other characteristics of first marriage and reaches a neutral conclusion. Simona Pikálková focuses on the probability of a third child in the family and reveals the considerable importance of education levels in this regard. In the discussion of family policies, the examples of France and Sweden are compared with the measures applied in the Czech Republic.

To balance the scholarly approach of the analytic articles, I have also included a selection of entries drawn from the 'dictionary of Czech culture' written by Andrew Roberts (the entire work will be published as a monograph). It is based on the author's intimate knowledge of the local lifestyle and his experience of 'intercultural encounters' with Czechs. The author mastered the Czech language while living in the Czech Republic for a couple of years and collected many of the bits and pieces of cultural references that nearly everybody in the country is familiar with but which sound rather exotic to foreigners. I believe it offers both interesting and amusing reading.

The information section contains a report on an important event – the meeting of the CSR Editorial Board on 27 May 2003 at Villa Lanna in Prague. Discussions at the meeting centred on four sets of questions:

- What is the mission of the CSR – how realistic is it and how can it be met?
- What have we done so far, what has failed and what succeeded?
- Who are our readers and how can we address more people?
- What are the vital problems for the future?

A summary of the vibrant discussion and lively debate on these issues is presented in the Inforamtion section. This is followed by a list of sociological journals published in English in the region – compiled for the meeting as a background document on regional co-operation and collaboration. In keeping with the meeting's suggestion to enlarge the Editorial Board, I invited Maarten Keune to join us and I am pleased to confirm his acceptance. Maarten was active in the preparation of this issue and is willing to help us in all our activities, especially in attracting and acquiring new articles and submissions. He has vast experience, particularly in the field of labour market research – which has been and remains an extremely hot issue in the CEE region.

The appeal of the CSR – cited in the Social Science Citation Index – is growing, but slowly. There are many journals out there, and indeed they testify to the size and richness of the sociological community in this region and beyond. But there are also an infinite number of issues to be analysed and described. Thus the main message of the Editorial Board meeting clearly stands – we need more interesting articles about more issues addressing more people.

Jiří Večerník
Editor-in-Chief

Who Wants Enlargement of the EU? Support for Enlargement among Elites and Citizens in the European Union

SYLKE NISSEN*
University of Leipzig, Germany

Abstract: A collective European identity is often mentioned as important for the European Union's future. The article discusses common definitions of collective identity and proposes to add a utilitarian component to the concept. In this respect, political solidarity and, particularly, interest in and support for the coming Eastern enlargement are taken as an indicator of European identity. As a starting point for further discussion on the structure and necessity of European identity, the article examines enlargement support among political actors and citizens in EU countries and demonstrates that support for enlargement is distributed differently on these levels. It is argued that EU elite politics does little to promote the development of a collective European identity and might even get the European integration process into some difficulty.
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2003, Vol. 39, No. 6: 757–772

European identity and Eastern enlargement

The current discussion on the future of Europe frequently mentions a European identity as a decisive prerequisite for the successful development of Project Europe. "The process of European integration proceeds while the common market is extended and political decision-making authority is transferred to the European level at an accelerating pace. More and more this process needs the integration of the citizens and a change of their identity towards Europe. ... Without this change of identity the European project is in danger of failure because of the lack of people's will for co-operation" [Münch 1999: 223, my translation]. The empirical basis for these kinds of normative demands remains unexamined.

On the other hand, a number of contributions to the debate state that a collective European identity already partially exists. But hints as to the grounds for this identity and its sustainability are usually missing. The European Commission, for instance, has surveys conducted twice a year in all member states of the EU. These polls include a question on whether the citizens see themselves as Europeans only,

* Direct all correspondence to: Dr. Sylke Nissen, Institute of Sociology, University of Leipzig, Beethovenstr. 15, D-04107 Leipzig, Germany, e-mail: nissen@rz.uni-leipzig.de

or solely as members of their particular nation, or as both Europeans *and* French, Europeans *and* Britons, Europeans *and* Greeks, etc., at the same time. The Commission's Standard Eurobarometer takes the answers to this question, without any further analysis, as an expression of 'European and national identity' [European Commission 2002a: 60]. It does not say whether such a European identity consists of more than the answer to a simple question.

I intend here to consider the meaning of European identity underlying these varying standpoints and then take a closer look at the chances of a European identity being a real basis for Europe's further political development.

In my attempt to give an idea of what European identity is, I am following the concepts of collective identity that speak of a subject of identification, an object of identification, and a particular relationship between a subject and an object [Gerhards 2003]. In the discussion of the subject of identity I refer to the population of the 15 member states of the European Union. The object of identification is the European Union itself, and the relationship between subject and object consists in the people's feelings towards the European Union. It should be clear that any concept of collective identity is surely not to be understood as the physical identity of Europeans with the European Union, but rather as the cognitive identification of Europeans with the European Union. The first definition of European identity thus means a sense of closeness that unites European citizens with their spatial surroundings – here, the Europe of 15 member states.

However weak or strong this feeling may be, it cannot be taken as sufficient reassurance for political action as long as it is tied only to emotion. Feelings are subject to fluctuations and sometimes follow irrational developments. With respect to a historically young object of identification like the European Union, which is developing now alongside existing objects of identification (like the nation or a region), it is not possible to imply a distinctive emotional relationship. Especially during the current process of European integration, which is said to be in need of a European identity for its success, expressions of feelings or opinions are not enough to back and secure integration policies. The claim for European identity must apply to reliable and in a certain sense calculable support for the political process. European identity becomes more binding when the individual's relationship with Europe is connected with fulfilled – or disappointed – interests. Fulfilled expectations and interests support the growth of a sustainable identification with Europe, which can serve as a sound basis for the further development of the European project.

I should therefore complete the above-mentioned definition of collective identity towards Europe: If European identity is not to remain merely lip-service but is to be supportive to the European integration process, then the constitution of a European identity not only needs an emotional aspect but must also be completed with a utilitarian component. This means the European Union must become intensively and permanently tied to the interests of citizens. This link can result from the perception of the advantages people see in European Union membership. Or, it can be expressed through a willingness to support others in an attitude of solidarity.

In this respect, for this study I am looking at the support for the further development of Europe. Consequently, support here means not only verbal approval but also transnational solidarity, i.e. support even if engagement in favour of the community of Europeans is not to be free of charge.[1] The coming Eastern enlargement of the European Union sets a good opportunity to test the inherent sustainability of the support for Europe. Enlarging the Union by ten or twelve states will put some burden – at least a short-term one – on today's member states [Weise et al. 2001; Wernicke 2001]. If EU-Europeans support enlargement in spite of the expected costs, in terms of financial burdens, migration or labour-market problems, I will judge this as an indicator in favour of the development of a sustainable community of Europeans. As Georg Vobruba puts it: "Collective identities stand the practical test if they lead to acceptance of demands for redistribution" [Vobruba 2001: 127; my translation]. Thus the question is not only, in the words of Jürgen Habermas, whether "Swedes and Portuguese are willing to vouch for each other" [Habermas 2001: 101; my translation], but whether the solidarity of EU citizens would make Swedes and Portuguese vouch for Poles and Czechs, too.

My notion of European identity will not of course render the rather normative debate obsolete, but it will help to advance the discussion by adding the utilitarian aspect. I will begin the examination with an investigation of the support for enlargement of the European Union on two levels: on the level of political elites and on the level of citizens.

The stance the EU governments are taking towards enlargement

How are EU governments behaving in the run-up to enlargement? I shall present some contributions to the enlargement discussion and some of the strategies of political elites. As the following discussion will show, the positions I present here are typical ones. Therefore, I am not aiming at a complete documentation of all member countries, but rather concentrate on a few examples. I will start with the *German* position: the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joschka Fischer, emphasises that the EU will not integrate petitioners but a "booming region, the dynamics of which all present members will profit from" [Fischer n.d.: 2; my translation]. In his view, Germany has a vital interest in realising the enlargement as quickly as possible because of the political and economic prospects [ibid.]. The German Ministry for Economic Affairs is also convinced that in the long run Germany will enjoy economic advantages from enlargement. "The enlargement puts Germany – and especially the new *Bundesländer* – more into the centre of the European Union. The enlargement will offer the German economy great prospects" [Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie: 2002; my translation].

[1] It should be kept in mind that solidarity is not only an expression of feelings towards other humans, it also has a strong component of the pursuit of an interest [Nissen 1999].

Similar statements are made in *Austria*. The President of the Austrian Republic, Thomas Klestil, points explicitly to the advantages of enlargement for the Austrian economy and the country's security policy: "Since the opening of the East in 1989 Austria in particular gained enormously from economic relations with Central and Eastern European countries. Leading these countries up to the EU puts Austria from the so far geographically marginalised position back to the centre of a unified Europe again" [Klestil 2002; my translation]. The same interpretation can be found in the documents of the ÖVP, the Austrian conservative party and the party of Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel: "We Austrians in particular will, like the Germans, gain most from enlargement. The development of our trade balance, and the increases in export since the opening of the East clearly show this" [Stenzel 2002: 5; my translation].

The *British* government has mainly aimed at codifying the new political order that has emerged on the European continent since the fall of the Iron Curtain. Tony Blair demonstrated this, for example, in his speech on Europe's political future presented at the stock exchange in Warsaw: "Without enlargement, Western Europe will always be faced with the threat of instability, conflict and mass migration on its borders" [Blair 2000].

Blair's former FCO Minister for Europe, Peter Hain, additionally stressed that "our support for enlargement is not only based on our desire to reunite Europe after the divisions of the Cold War. It also derives from a hardheaded assessment of the benefits that enlargement will bring for the UK" [Hain 2001].

Contrary to these widely affirmative positions, *French* European politics seem to be guided mainly by a fear of the revitalisation of German predominance. At least this concern was expressed during the French presidency, when France was able to prevent Germany's revaluation in the European Council [Neunreither 2001: 190]. At the end of 2001, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hubert Vedrine, tried to reduce the pace of the enlargement process by proposing to accept the applications from Romania and Bulgaria in the first enlargement round, too. This would clearly have postponed accession for all [Oldag 2001a]. In the same manner France protracted financial revisions and hindered reform efforts concerning the common agricultural policy. The required agreement between Germany and France could only be reached in October 2002, leaving less than two months to go before the EU had wanted to come to a final agreement with the candidate countries in the negotiations on the development of agricultural policy.

The governments of Southern European member states share the French position and worry about a realignment of power in the enlarged European Union. Those fears are especially strong in Spain and Portugal, but also in Italy. They are expressed in the demand for greater emphasis on Mediterranean politics and for non-impairment of vested rights [Weise et al. 2001: 130]. Former *Italian* Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lamberto Dini, pointed to the particular role of the EU members in the South: "It is up to Italy, more than any other country, to bring the Mediterranean back to the centre of Europe, to make it understood that no Europe would be complete not only without the East but also without the South" [Dini 2000]. Today, the

Italian attitude does not seem to have become any more liberal with Silvio Berlusconi in power.

Spain's Prime Minister José Maria Aznar is leading the Southern European countries in their negotiations on the protection of acquired possessions. During recent years he has concentrated on securing the subsidies Spain receives from EU funds. His commitment to Spanish interests became particularly evident when Aznar was able to change the EU's budgeting to the benefit of his country during protracted meetings in Berlin in 1999. One year later, in Nice, he successfully bargained for Spain's share of votes in the European Council. In April 2001, he rocked the boat by hinting at the so-called statistical effect. Leaving all criteria for the distribution of subsidies unchanged after the accession of poorer countries would make Spain arithmetically 'richer' compared to the EU average and thus less entitled to receiving money from the structural and cohesion funds: "Spain thinks it is necessary to find a solution to this problem during the accession talks" [Aznar 2001]. At the same time, Spain's Prime Minister – partly assisted by the representatives of Greece, Portugal and Italy – blocked an agreement on freedom of movement for the labour force, which made the other member states accuse him of blackmail: "Madrid's claims resemble a package deal between enlargement and continued payment of subsidies" [Oldag 2001b; my translation].

Greece and Portugal, with varying intensity, have joined Spain in its strategy of protecting acquired possessions, but also follow their own paths. The *Greek* government supports enlargement, especially because of the accession of Cyprus, and it ties its vote to the consideration of Greek-Cyprian interests. With respect to the future distribution of funds, Greece doesn't have much to fear, as the country is even poorer than some of the candidate countries. Prime Minister Kostas Simitis stressed that Greece's "central minimum goals will always be: to ensure the equal participation of the country in the EU institutional system that will emerge and in particular in the inner core of the Union" and "to guarantee the necessary redistributive policies for cohesion and solidarity as well as the budget needed for the implementation of the policies. It is a matter of central importance that the social dimension of the Union be enhanced, that the European social model be reinforced and inter-regional and social inequalities be combated" [Simitis 2001: 11].

Former *Portuguese* Prime Minister Guterres offered an interesting point of view. In contrast to the political rationality that is usually shown, he pushed materialistic and short-sighted calculations into the background, while arguing in favour of enlargement. "We need a stable Europe that includes the East European countries. This is more important than EU funds for Portugal. I'd like to put it this way: It is in our own best – if you like: egoistic – interest to have a long-term stable Europe. This means we put short-term egoistic goals aside" [Guterres 1999; my translation]. In view of the country's economic problems, the Portuguese did not seem willing to follow Guterres' idea of postponing a rational short-term pursuit of interests in favour of national long-term interests. His Socialist Party lost the local elections in December 2001 in all major cities and Guterres resigned.

I will leave this point with the above examples alluding to the national positions. Adding more quotes from more countries would not increase the amount of insight into the distribution of interests on the political level. It is not my intention to give a full overview of the positions on enlargement taken by the elites, but rather to demonstrate the basic North-South distinction regarding support for enlargement that divides the European Union in its present-day profile [Weise et al. 2001: 131]. Basically all members state themselves to be in favour of enlargement. But underneath this consensus, the Southern European countries receiving subsidies fear that in the course of enlargement the redistribution of funds from *West* to *East* will in fact be a redistribution from *South* to *East*. The Southern European countries expect they will have to stand aside for the benefit of the new recipients in the East [Vobruba 2003: 41].

Citizens' opinions on European enlargement

What do people in Europe think about enlargement? Do citizens, like politicians, support enlargement in principle but differ in detail? The answer is yes, but in a way other than expected.

Twice a year the European Commission publishes the Standard Eurobarometer, which contains the main results of public opinion surveys carried out in all member countries. Although some of the East European countries applied for membership as early as 1994,[2] people in the EU were for the first time explicitly asked for a statement on enlargement in autumn 2000. In that survey – Eurobarometer 54 – an average of 44% of the respondents were in favour of enlargement and 35% voted against it. By spring 2002 (Eurobarometer 57) the support for enlargement had increased to 50%, while 30% were against it and 20% did not have an opinion (figure 1).[3]

These averages hide the substantial variations among the national results. Figures 2 to 5 show the distribution of advocates and sceptics in each member country over time.

Between autumn 2000 and autumn 2001, the highest approval of enlargement is expressed in Greece (figures 2 to 4). Only in spring 2002 were the Greeks surpassed by the Danish (figure 5). After Greece and Denmark, support is highest in Spain, Italy and Portugal, and also in Sweden and Ireland. In autumn 2001, approval rates shot up in all member states. In Greece the figure for those in favour of enlargement even reached 75%.[4] At the lower end of the scale there is a group of coun-

[2] Malta and Cyprus even applied for membership in 1990.

[3] Standard Eurobarometer 58 (autumn 2002) does not deal with enlargement issues but refers to the Flash Eurobarometer 132/2 on enlargement, released in December 2002. The latter of course has many questions on enlargement, but none that would contribute to elaborating figure 1. See note 3.

[4] The European Commission itself assumed that a change in the question might have influenced the answers but has not given any further explanation about this question so far. With

Figure 1. Support for Enlargement



Source: European Commission Standard Eurobarometer (several years)

Figure 2. Enlargement – for or against? (autumn 2000)



Source: European Commission Standard Eurobarometer 54, autumn 2000

Figure 3. Enlargement – for or against? (autumn 2000)



Source: European Commission Standard Eurobarometer 55, spring 2001

Figure 4. Enlargement – for or against? (autumn 2001)



Source: European Commission Standard Eurobarometer 56, spring 2001

Figure 5. Enlargement – for or against? (spring 2002)



Source: European Commission Standard Eurobarometer 57, spring 2002

tries that is also stable through all four waves. Germany, France, Austria and the United Kingdom bring up the rear with the smallest share of advocates. The survey results from autumn 2000 and spring 2001 show that in each of these countries the proportion of those against enlargement was bigger than the proportion of those in favour of it (figures 2 and 3). This heavy scepticism has weakened since, and only in France do more people still reject enlargement than approve it (figure 5).

If we compare people's opinions with the statements of the political elites we can see a discrepancy that might have consequences for the political future of the European Union. In most of the current member states people do *not* share the interpretations given by their governments. The only exceptions are France and Greece – each for known historical and political reasons. In most of the other

the purpose of gathering information on the public opinion of enlargement, Standard Eurobarometer 54 and 55 asked the question: 'What is your opinion on the following statement? Please tell me whether you are for it or against it: *The European Union should be enlarged and include new countries*' [European Commission 2000]. The phrasing of this particular question has been slightly changed in Eurobarometer 56: '*... the enlargement of the European Union to include new countries*' [European Commission 2002a]. These questions could be answered with 'for', 'against' and 'don't know'. Question 2 of the latest Flash Eurobarometer 132/2 asks, 'Are you, personally, totally in favour, rather in favour, rather opposed or totally opposed to the enlargement of the European Union?' [European Commission 2002b], and allows for the categories 'totally in favour', 'rather in favour', 'rather opposed', 'totally opposed', 'it depends on the country/countries', 'don't know/no answer'. Obviously this question again breaks with the pattern and makes comparability with previous samples impossible.

Figure 6. Exemplary positions towards enlargement

		citizens	
		sceptical	affirmative
political elites	sceptical	1 France	2 Spain
	affirmative	3 Germany	4 Greece

EU countries it is necessary to note that the interpretations of citizens and elites differ.[5] The table above presents a starting point for further discussion in summarising the possible constellations of citizens' and elites' opinions in four typical cases (figure 6).

According to the information in the Eurobarometer, it may be assumed that not only the political actors but also EU citizens know that enlargement will not be without its costs. Interestingly, it is particularly the people in the Southern European countries, who are highly in favour of enlargement, who also prove to be remarkably aware of the costs. The same survey in autumn 2000 that showed 70% of Greek citizens supporting enlargement also indicated that the same share of respondents expressed fears over job relocations, while 79% were afraid of disadvantages for farmers, and more than half of the Greek population said enlargement would become too expensive. Even so, two-thirds of the Spanish population and three-quarters of the Portuguese feared the onset of problems for agriculture. In both countries, more than 60% of respondents expect that the amount of EU subsidies will decrease [European Commission 2000]. In Flash Eurobarometer 132/2, not only the sceptics like Germans and Austrians, but also – and even more strongly – the major advocates like the Spanish and the Portuguese featured the highest (and a generally increasing) ratio of respondents that believe enlargement will lead to a rise in unemployment [European Commission 2002b]. This means that the knowledge of problems that might arise with enlargement does not necessarily lead respondents to reject the accession of East European countries to the European Union.

[5] In a different but related context the Swedes recently gave proof of the differing perceptions when the refendum on the Euro failed in September 2003.

The problematic distributions of advocates and sceptics

I have characterised the visible readiness that exists to accept redistribution to one's own debit in order to promote the European project as an indicator of the development of a sustainable European identity. In this respect, the data on cost-consciousness in countries like Greece or Spain could lead us to think that there is a growing collective identity of Europeans. Perhaps this observation is correct. But, on the other hand, only half of all EU citizens show some readiness to invest in enlargement, and in four countries the number of those who are sceptical towards or undecided about enlargement still exceeds the number of advocates, which means that we can hardly speak of a sustainable collective identity. In this heterogeneous atmosphere, with a widespread proportion of sceptics, politicians cannot rely on support for enlargement.

This deficiency could get the enlargement process into trouble, as the political elites and institutions need the support of the population in order to successfully bring off the accessions. According to the Amsterdam Treaty on the European Union, the decision to enlarge the EU has to be ratified by every single member state: "The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is founded which such admission entails shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements" [European Commission n.d.]. Constitutional requirements can mean that member countries ratify important European decisions concerning enlargement through national referenda. This holds true not only for the accession treaties but also for the European Constitution presented by the EU convent, which will replace all previous agreements. The Danish Constitution, for example, requires a referendum whenever national sovereignty is transferred to transnational authorities, as does the Irish Constitution with respect to international agreements. According to the EU Directorate General for Enlargement, at present no member state plans to hold a referendum on the accession treaties. But in 13 out of 15 member states national referenda are constitutionally possible, and in 9 countries the outcome of a referendum is binding [Stoiber and Thurner 2000]. In most of the countries, the holding of a referendum depends on the initiative of institutional actors. Consequently, governments or parliaments can prevent a plebiscite. Still, it is not out of the question that a particular public-political climate could render it necessary to sanction the accession treaties through a national referendum in one member country or the other. If in this case the people did not share the opinion of the elites the process of Eastern enlargement could be interrupted.[6]

In order to avoid such a threat, political actors on the EU level and in member countries could try to make strategic use of those results from the Eurobarometer

[6] The same holds true, of course, for all referenda to be held in the candidate countries. But the impact of these referenda is not the issue here.

surveys that indicate a positive attitude towards enlargement and could try to raise general attention for the numerous enlargement advocates. But, in fact, the impressing data from Greece, Spain or Sweden can hardly be used to convince the sceptics. Whoever wants to argue for enlargement by presenting affirmative majorities cannot hide the equally strong groups of waverers. One heading from a German newspaper perfectly illustrates the inherent dilemma: "One in two in favour of EU enlargement" (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, October 22, 2002). With an approval rate of 50%, it follows conclusively that every second person is likewise undecided or explicitly not in favour of enlargement.

Using the 2x2-matrix from above (figure 6) I will briefly discuss how the Eurobarometer results could be capable of getting the political actors into trouble. Countries in which both the citizens and the political elites have reservations towards EU enlargement can obviously not be used to promote enlargement (cell 1). These countries are themselves in a comparatively favourable situation, as there is a national consensus over the fact that approval is only given if the national situation does not deteriorate through enlargement. There is little interest in propagating the approving majorities elsewhere. At the moment, France seems to be the only EU member state in this constellation.

Sceptical elites with an affirmative population must be hesitant about drawing attention to the public opinion in their country (cell 2) because then their particular strategy would quite likely become the focus of international criticism: Why, for example, does the Spanish government act reservedly while the Spanish people are definitely in favour of enlargement? At the same time, sceptical elites cannot attempt to reverse the positive mood among their citizenry. With an atmosphere in Europe that is basically pro-enlargement there is no way of starting a publicity campaign against it.

The political elites who explicitly support Eastern enlargement can encounter some difficulties with the population majorities that are sceptical towards this issue (cell 3). Public opinion in such countries is neither a good advertisement in favour of enlargement nor suitable evidence that politicians are acting in accordance with the preferences of the people. Every citizen could conclude from the distribution of enlargement sceptics and advocates that political elites are acting against the will of the majority. At the same time, political actors would have to ask themselves why they are pushing enlargement forward in opposition to the majority in their country. Making references to majorities elsewhere would not solve the problem. On the contrary, this could give rise to defiance and opposition among sceptical and undecided citizens and could in general sharpen the awareness of the sceptics' motives.

Finally, countries where elites and people both show approval for enlargement are politically best off (cell 4). But, as Greece and Portugal demonstrate, the road to enlargement is primarily a strategic game. Whoever for the good of the whole argues with the overwhelming pro-enlargement majorities in their own country runs the risk of having the other EU partners take this for a willingness to pay the costs. For tactical reasons Greece and Portugal, and also other member states, may come to

the point where they link their political support to nationally oriented conditions, put forward a package deal, and finally come to act with reserve towards enlargement.

Eastern enlargement as the project of elites

These developments might not be very likely, but the thread of the arguments should give rise to a substantial discussion of credible political strategies. In the light of this constellation of problems, the limited reaction of politicians to the survey results is not surprising. Instead of promoting the currently established affirmative majorities from country to country, political actors are banking on getting more information about accession in order to increase support and think it especially important to clearly explain the enlargement process to the citizens of the EU and the accession countries [Verheugen n.d.: 26]. But information campaigns bind the rhetoric of identity to rational cost-benefit analysis. The more financial questions come to the core of the negotiations, the more clearly the burden expected from enlargement is put in figures, and the more important the reference to national advantages seems to be, the more the importance of cost-benefit-analysis will exceed the effect of political rhetoric. As long as the EU tries to keep negotiations with candidate countries behind closed doors, as long as enlargement remains the task of some diplomats and civil servants in Brussels, and as long as high-rank member state officials only meet to defend national priorities [Höltschi 2001], the credibility of enlargement rhetoric will remain under pressure and the readiness for redistribution is likely to go down. The rhetoric of collective identity may be understood as nothing more than rhetoric, and it may be put aside while calculating benefits will prevail.

Appealing to the idea of a European family can hardly conceal solid conflicts of interest. Particularly the financial controversies among the EU member states and between EU and candidate countries tend to leak out despite the closed doors, and they are capable of undermining the political rhetoric primarily for two reasons: First, the running conflicts over the distribution of enlargement burdens between the Northern European net payers and the Southern European net beneficiaries are a visible contradiction to the call for a growing community of all Europeans. So far the problem of financial burden-sharing that arose during each of the previous enlargement rounds was solved simply by increasing the existing funds or inventing new funds in order to obtain approval from those member states that were likely to experience disadvantages through enlargement [Emmerling n.d.]. This is not a viable solution today because the member states cannot see sufficient financial options open to increase the budget in order to compensate anybody for losses. Thus, bargaining for national advantages forces its way to the surface again and again during the European summits and the Council of Ministers negotiations.[7]

[7] The compromise recently found between France and Germany concerning Common Agricultural Policy does not really break with this logic. The deal only postponed the argument

Second, the negotiations between the European Union and the candidate states show that EU political elites tend to measure with two yardsticks when assessing situations. The *acquis communautaire* requires East European countries to achieve standards which in some cases, like the treatment of refugees and minorities or ecological requirements, even some EU member states do not yet fulfil. In developing the common market the EU is eager to ensure that the market access of the new members does not worsen the conditions for the old member states. This attitude must create an impression among the candidate countries that they are being fleeced until they also become members of the European Union. Consequently, polls in the candidate countries have shown sinking enthusiasm for accession, and the wariness about Europe is spreading. Public opinion polls in Latvia, Estonia and Malta resulted in less than 50% of the polled saying they would vote *for* EU membership in a coming referendum [European Commission 2002c: 57].[8] The strategies the political elites adopt to safeguard national or EU interests at the expense of others do not serve to strengthen public support for enlargement, and consequently nor do they serve the development of a sustainable European identity.

Conclusion

In this article I have attempted to provide stimulus to the discussion of the meaning and relevance of collective identity in the process of European integration. I tried to draw some attention to the fact that national and EU politicians are still pursuing enlargement as a project of the elites. Although there is a significant share of enlargement advocates among European citizens, the European Commission's survey results can hardly be adopted as a means to integrate all of Europe's public in the enlargement process. It seems too difficult to isolate the approval amidst the variety of public opinions and thereby use it to enhance the enlargement process. Consequently, political elites do not pay sufficient attention to the high level of consent that exists in some countries and do not use these favourable attitudes to the benefit of Europe's common future. Instead, they rely on a mixture of rhetoric about identity and rational cost-benefit calculations.

Although my findings are preliminary and need further examination, there is some evidence that European identity, as perceived in the Eurobarometer, is not sufficient as a reliable basis for Europe's future development. Instead, the orientation towards national interests may triumph over the feeling of European identity. This, of course, does not mean that Eastern enlargement of the European Union is doomed to fail. However, it does follow that political elites in their reference to a collective European identity and disengagement from public opinion undermine pub-

about the distribution of financial burdens and is rather an agreement not to prevent the successful conclusion of the accession talks than a solution to CAP problems.

[8] In spite of these unfavourable tendencies in all the candidate countries the majority citizens could be convinced to vote for accession in the national referenda.

lic support for enlargement. Politicians may as a result seriously endanger an enlargement process that needs extraordinary public approval, and worsen the chances for the development of collective identity in Europe, which are not too good anyway.

SYLKE NISSEN *teaches sociology and political sciences at the universities of Frankfurt/Main and Leipzig. She is co-editor of the journal* Soziologie. *Her recent publications include* Kriminalität und Sicherheitspolitik *(ed., Leske & Budrich Verlag 2003) and* Die regierbare Stadt *(Westdeutscher Verlag 2002).*

References

Aznar, José Maria. 2001. *Memorandum Regionale Politik und Erweiterung.* online: http://www.info-spanischebotschaft.de/doku/r4htm

Blair, Tony. 2000. Prime Minister's Speech to the Polish Stock Exchange in Warsaw. October 6, 2000. online: http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/page2373.asp

Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie. 2002. *Förderung der Grenzregionen zu den Beitrittsländern.* Berlin: BMWT.

Dini, Lamberto. 2000. Speech by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Rt. Hon. Lamberto Dini, at the Canova Club on the Process of European Union Enlargement. online: http://www.esteri.it/eng/archives/arch_press/speeches

Emmerling, Thea. n.d. *Von der Strukturpolitik zum europäischen Finanzausgleich?* München: Centrum für angewandte Politikforschung. online: http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/download/2002_emmerling.pdf

European Commission. 2000. *Standard Eurobarometer 54, Autumn 2000.* online: http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/standard_en.htm

European Commission. 2002a. *Standard Eurobarometer 57, Spring 2002.* online: http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/standard_en.htm

European Commission. 2002b. *Flash Eurobarometer 132/2 "Enlargement of the European Union."* online: http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion

European Commission. 2002c. *Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2001.* online: http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion

European Commission. n.d. *Treaty on European Union, consolidated version, signed at Amsterdam on 2 October 1997.* online: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/treaties_en.pdf

Fischer, Joschka. n.d. "Vorwort." In *Die Europäische Union – Fragen zur Erweiterung.* Auswärtiges Amt. Berlin: BMA.

Gerhards, Jürgen. 2003. "Identifikation mit Europa. Einige begriffliche Vorklärungen." In *Entstaatlichung und soziale Sicherheit. Verhandlungen des 31. Kongresses der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie in Leipzig 2002,* edited by Jutta Allmendinger. Opladen: Leske & Budrich (in press).

Guterres, Antonio. 1999. "Die Osterweiterung ist der Schlüssel für ein stabiles Europa." *Die WELT,* July 23, 1999.

Habermas, Jürgen. 2001. *Zeit der Übergänge.* Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp.

Hain, Peter. 2001. "The Benefits of Enlargement." Speech by FCO Minister for Europe, Peter Hain. July 24, 2001. online: http://www.fco.gov.uk

Höltschi, René. 2001. "Europäer werden dagegen sehr..." *Neue Zürcher Zeitung, NZZ-Folio: Europa – Schwieriger Weg zur Einheit.* No. 9, September 2001. online: http://wwwx.nzz.ch/folio/archiv/2001/09/articles/hoeltschi.html

Klestil, Thomas. 2002. "Veto würde dem Geist der Einigung Europas widersprechen." *Focus Europa* 1/2002. online: http://www.idm.at/publikationen/focus.htm

Münch, Richard. 1999. "Europäische Identitätsbildung." Pp. 223–252 in *Kultur, Identität, Europa*, edited by Reinhold Viehoff and Rien T. Segers. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp.

Neunreither, Karlheinz. 2001. "The European Union in Nice: A Minimalist Approach to a Historic Challenge." *Government and Opposition*: 184–208.

Nissen, Sylke. 1999. "Zu den Entstehungs- und Geltungsbedingungen von Solidarität." In *Ethik und Sozialwissenschaften*, no. 7: 224–226.

Oldag, Andreas. 2001a. "Die EU-Erweiterung gerät ins Stocken." *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, December 11, 2001.

Oldag, Andreas. 2001b. "Auf Euro-Entzug." *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, May 15, 2001.

Simitis, Kostas. 2001. Speech by Kostas Simitis, Greek Prime Minister, at the event "The Future of the European Union and Greece" organised by the EKEM. July 11, 2001. online: http://europa.eu.int/futurum/congov_en.htm

Stenzel, Ursula. 2002. "EU-Erweiterung als Jahrhundertprojekt: Im Interesse Österreichs." In *Die Erweiterung der Europäischen Union aus Sicht der ÖVP-Delegation im Europäischen Parlament.* Die ÖVP-Delegation im Europäischen Parlament. Brüssel: ÖVP.

Stoiber, Michael and Paul W. Thurner. 2000. *Der Vergleich von Ratifikationsstrukturen der EU-Mitgliedsländer für Intergouvernementale Verträge: Eine Anwendung des Veto-Spie-ler Konzeptes.* online: http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/publications/wp/wp-27.pdf

Verheugen, Günther. n.d. "Stabilität und Frieden in Europa sichern." P. 3 in *Die Europäische Union – Fragen zur Erweiterung.* Auswärtiges Amt. Berlin: BMA.

Vobruba, Georg. 2001. *Integration + Erweiterung.* Wien: Passagen Verlag.

Vobruba, Georg. 2003. "The Enlargement Crisis of the European Union: Limits of the Dialectics of Integration and Expansion." *Journal of European Social Policy* 13 (1): 35–49.

Weise, Christian, Martin Banse, Wolfgang Bode, Barbara Lippert, Ferdinand Nölle and Stefan Tangermann. 2001. *Reformbedarf bei den EU-Politiken im Zuge der Osterweiterung der EU.* Berlin: Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung.

Wernicke, Christian. 2001. 'Die Armen gegen die Ärmsten'. *Die ZEIT*, no. 37.

Work Flexibility in Eight European Countries: A Cross-national Comparison*

CLAIRE WALLACE**
Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria

Abstract: Flexibility is often attributed to the extent of de-regulation or 'a-typical' work, such as part-time employment, fixed-term contracts and self-employment. Based upon a study carried out in 2001 that compared flexibility in 8 countries (UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria) using a representative sample survey of people aged between 18 and 65 (N=10123) and on a study of policy frameworks, the article develops new ways of looking at flexibility, which focus upon the actual work practices of people in the labour market and how they undertake flexibility of time (working hours), place (where the work takes place) and conditions (contract). The article argues that, based upon these definitions, there is in fact a great deal of flexibility in European labour markets, which goes beyond 'atypical' employment alone. It explores this in the context of the different regimes of regulation found in different European countries. Furthermore, the article identifies good flexibility, associated with highly educated people being able to regulate their own working time, and bad flexibility, associated with people with low education, low income, and often with young workers and those found in rural areas. Some types of flexibility were more typical for men and some for women.
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2003, Vol. 39, No. 6: 773–794

Whilst flexibility is much discussed, it can actually mean a range of things [Pollert 1991]. Apart from the well-documented distinction between functional and numerical flexibility [Pollert 1988], for some, flexibility means the removal of the regulations and institutions protecting workers [Riboud and Silva-Jauregui et al. 2001]. For others, flexibility is defined rather narrowly in terms of the extent of part-time work, the extent of fixed-term contracts and the extent of self-employment. However, in most cases, flexibility is assumed from external variables. That is, it is assumed that if there is less regulation, people will be more flexible.

We decided to test these assumptions by looking at flexibility in terms of the working practices of people in the labour market in 8 European countries. The coun-

* Acknowledgements: I would like to thank the following for their contributions to the project: Christine Cousins, Endre Sik, Jiři Večerník, Annet Jager, Pavle Sicherl, Siyka Kovacheva and Manuela Stanculescu, Alexander Chvorostov, Petra Štepánková..
** Direct all correspondence to: Prof. Claire Wallace, Institute for Advanced Studies, Stumpergasse 56, Vienna, Austria, e-mail: Wallace@ihs.ac.at

tries were chosen because they represented different approaches to flexibility: the UK, Sweden and the Netherlands in the 'old' EU regions, and Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania in the 'new' EU regions. The project was entitled 'Households, Work and Flexibility' (abbreviated to HWF) (http:www.hwf.at) and was carried out between 2000 and 2003. The study considered flexibility in terms of *time* (working hours), *place* (place of work) and *conditions* (contractual arrangements). This report represents an overall summary of many of the findings of the HWF project rather than being an in-depth analysis of any particular kind of flexibility. Further information can be found in the project reports which are referenced throughout.

The opening of capital flows and subjection of national economies to global competition in the 1980s and 1990s forced European countries to introduce flexible labour markets in order to remain competitive. This was done rather successfully in the three North-Western countries considered here, but using different strategies. In the UK there was a de-regulatory strategy, in the Netherlands there was an agreement on increasing the workforce with more part-time and temporary work along with wage restraint, and in Sweden, flexibilisation was introduced within the policies of solidarity and full labour force participation for both men and women. In all these countries, levels of participation in the labour market are very high, and through the 1990s there was growth and prosperity, which is reflected in the optimistic and positive attitudes of respondents in the HWF survey to economic conditions. In these North-Western EU countries there has been a shift from employer-led styles of flexibility to employee-led styles of flexibility. That is, flexibility has become more individualised, reflecting employee needs.

In East Central European (ECE) countries, by contrast, the regimes of full employment which were in place until the end of the 1980s were characterised by state control of the labour market, with low wages compensated by price subsidies and high levels of social protection (for example support for working women). From the end of the 1980s, these were destroyed by the introduction of market de-regulation. This mainly took the form of employer-led flexibilisation and resulted in a deterioration in living standards and job loss for large parts of the population. It was mainly experienced by the populations of those countries as negative, although there was an increase in prosperity after the mid-1990s and the creation of new jobs and opportunities, especially for educated people. This is reflected in the fact that the vast majority of HWF respondents in Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary are dissatisfied with their economic situation and they felt that it had deteriorated even in the last five years. In Slovenia and the Czech Republic, where the impact of transition was less harsh, only just over half of respondents were satisfied with the economic condition of their household [Wallace, Nagaev and Chvorostov 2003].

Many studies have pointed to the implications of flexibility for creating a more precarious labour market for low-paid employees (often women or young people). We might term this the *pessimistic* view of flexibilisation [Dex 1997; Perrons 1998; Burchell and Day et al. 1999; Standing 1999; Beck 2000; Bradley and Erikson et al.

2000]. Others have argued for the potential in using flexibility to enhance personal development and the family-work balance. We might term this the *optimistic* view of flexibilisation [Handy 1994; Hörning and Gerhard et al. 1995; Bridges 1996; Hill and Hawkins et al. 2001; Auer 2002; Spoonley and Firkin 2002; Tietze and Musson 2002]. In other words, are people able to take advantage of flexibility to enhance their lives or are they rather the victims of flexibility?

Whilst time flexibility has been rather well documented [European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2002; Dex 1997; O'Reilly and Fagan 1998], the emphasis has been mostly on the increasingly important role of part-time and a variety of flexible-hours contracts (annualised hours, shift working, evening and weekend working, time sharing, term-time working etc.), which have enabled employees to meet the demands of longer opening hours, round the clock demand, just-in-time production and so on. However, whilst part-time work, for example, is often seen as evidence of flexibility, part-time workers can be rather 'rigid', in the sense of working only fixed hours. Part-time work need not be precarious and it has been the policy goal in countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands to introduce security for part-time workers, with conditions comparable to full-time workers [Boje and Strandh 2003; Jager 2003]. Contract flexibility has also been rather well discussed in terms of jobs, often those with fixed-term contract duration. However, flexibility of place has enjoyed much less discussion, except in the analysis of telework and IT professionals [Huws 1996; Hochgerner 1998]. Nevertheless, we can see this as another way in which the needs of the labour market and the availability of the workers come together in different ways. These are all sources of flexibility within a job. However, another source of flexibility which is seldom considered is the extent to which people might combine several jobs or several sources of income. This kind of additional flexibility can provide new opportunities for some (for example, it can be a way of venturing into self-employment) or a source of hyper-exploitation as people undertake several jobs with declining wages to make ends meet [Nelson and Smith 1999]. Additional job holding has been a common source of economic activity in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe in order to augment low or declining wages.

Methods

The HWF project used a variety of approaches to explore flexibility in each country. The first research strategy was to collect national statistics and contextual knowledge to describe and analyse the patterns of work and household behaviour in general in the target countries.

The second research strategy was to implement a standardised representative sample survey in each country (face-to-face and telephone), aiming at a representation of the working-age population between 18 and 65 in each country. The survey was designed to examine the ways in which the activities of different household

members combine, covering all forms of work, including domestic work, childcare, work in the informal economy, self-provisioning, additional casual and occasional jobs, and various kinds of regular employment, and to look at attitudes to flexibility as well as actual behaviour, the ways people arrange their work and their preparedness to be flexible (N=10123). More detailed results of the survey can be found in Wallace [2003c], Wallace [2003d], and Wallace, Nagaev and Chvorostov [2003].

The third strategy was to document and compare flexibility and family policies in different national contexts, which were then compared in a comparative report. This was done mainly by asking partners to provide accounts of labour market and family policies and by putting these accounts together in comparative tables. These can be found in the HWF reports [Wallace 2003a; Wallace 2003b] .

Regimes of regulation

The Western EU countries in the HWF project have all embraced flexibilisation as a way of modernising the labour market. However, they have used different strategies, and these take place within the context of different prevailing regimes of regulation [Regini 2000]. The regimes of regulation are based upon government policies and the different kinds of traditions of social dialogue in different countries, which are analysed in this section of the report. They are also affected by the different traditions of family policy, which integrate family and work in different ways, although this is usually ignored by regulation theorists [Lewis 1992]. However, regulation regimes are also affected by the culture of the work, and by the culture of care, and these are analysed elsewhere [Wallace, Nagaev and Chvorostov 2003].

The HWF countries can be grouped according to their labour market regulation regimes, which are summarised in table 1. In the UK, there were de-regulatory policies in the 1980s and early 1990s, characterised by a progressive removal of job protection and wage protection. Conditions for part-time workers were reduced. Dismissal was made easier and the trade unions subdued - they no longer formed part of the national negotiations over labour market policies. In the UK it is also very easy to set up a small business. After 1998 and the election of the Labour Government, this was partially reversed: a minimum wage was introduced, along with protection for part-time workers, albeit mainly in response to EU Directives on working time. In 1997 the Directive on part-time work was introduced and came into force in 2000, the 1999 Directive on fixed-term work took force in 2002, and a new Directive on temporary-work agencies has also come into force in 2003. Although the situation for non-standard workers has improved, they still do not enjoy the security and conditions that they have in the Netherlands and Sweden, which is why we have termed the UK 'partially de-regulated'.

In Sweden, flexibilisation strategies were adopted to pull the country out of the recession of the 1990s and they took the form of making work more flexible within the context of the norm of regular full-time work for both men and women.

In the Netherlands, since the 1980s a distinctive strategy has been adopted of getting more women into the labour market by encouraging part-time work. This was extended to a concern over managing the working timetable so that hours of work could be made flexible and individualised for all employees. However, this was in the context of job protection and offering job security, which has been dubbed 'flexicurity' and forms part of collective as well as individual labour negotiations. In both countries self-employment was encouraged and the situation of people on fixed-term contracts improved so that after a certain time they must be offered full-time jobs (this is also a response to the EU Directives). However, there was also legislation to protect the position of part-time employees so that they had the same entitlements as full-time employees. Both Sweden and the Netherlands therefore practice what we might call 'regulated flexibility'.

The Accession countries of ECE did not at first set themselves the goal of becoming 'flexible', nevertheless provisions for self-employment and part-time work, as well as fixed-term contracts, were introduced in the early 1990s. Indeed, at that time, the neo-liberal model of reform prevailed, which implied that it was better to get rid of all regulations and leave the market free to take its own course. There was therefore an ideological consensus against regulation. The disastrous effects of this policy in terms of unemployment, impoverishment and the criminalisation of the economy led to a backlash against market reform in some countries and the election of governments that instead put on the brakes. Once again there was no strategy for regulated flexibilisation. However, a great deal of spontaneous flexibilisation in fact took place as people moved jobs, moved professions, became self-employed or took on casual work. Informal methods of flexibilising rather the rules also took place, for example with regard to the official salaries on which social insurance was paid and the top-up salaries which were provided unofficially. At least some of this was hidden by the grey economy, as the legislation to control and incorporate economic activities often did not keep pace with the changes in economic behaviour. Where there have been progressive labour market and taxation policies, more and more activities have moved out of the grey economy and into the formal economy, as is the case in the Czech Republic and Hungary [Wallace and Haerfper 2002]. As a result, we might call these 'partially regulated flexibilisation', even if they did not embrace flexibility in the same way as the North-European countries did. Slovenia, by contrast, is a country that has been slow to introduce reforms, buoyed up by a prosperous economy and levels of GDP closer to the EU average. It could begin such reforms only after independence in 1991, and not earlier as in the Czech Republic or Hungary [Sicherl and Stanovnik et al. 2003].

In general the economies of all three of the more 'prosperous' Accession countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia – started to recover after the middle of the 1990s and have generally been improving since then. In the Czech Republic, an ideological battle between liberalisation and social protection has raged around the concept of flexibility [Večerník 2002]. Nevertheless, a range of legislation has been introduced which can aid flexibility, and its implementation was

assisted by a buoyant labour market with very low unemployment in the first part of the 1990s, enabling people to move between jobs with little risk of ending up unemployed.

Hungary embraced flexibilisation from the late 1980s, but Hungary also provides an example of how not all legislation that was introduced was successful [Kopasz 2003]. One programme introduced subsidies to encourage self-employment in 1991. By 1997 only 1–2% of the self-employed who were eligible had taken up such opportunities, and the story is the same in many other ECE countries, such as Romania. A second scheme tried to encourage employers to employ the unemployed as casual workers. Employers were given a free 'work book' and they received subsidies for their social security. The unemployed had an incentive to participate because they became eligible once more for unemployment benefits after a certain number of days work. However, the scheme was not a great success. An act to encourage part-time work by subsidising employers to make people part time rather than lay them off was introduced in 1991. This at first attracted 30 000 participants, but later the numbers fell off to just one-sixth of the original figures. In 1997 it was replaced with another, similar scheme targeted at particular groups of employees, but this was also unpopular. However, new measures were introduced through the National Employment Fund. It is possible that such flexibility measures were introduced too soon, before either employers or employees were ready for them, and that there will be more take up in future. High rates of unemployment make flexibility by employees a personal risk. There are even important differences in the way in which labour markets were flexibilised in the Czech Republic and Hungary [Keune 2003].

In Romania and Bulgaria many of the policies to encourage flexibilisation were even contradictory. For example, although it is possible to become self-employed, there is a dense forest of restrictions and permits that must be negotiated. Legislation is mainly concerned with maintaining the working week rather than with reducing it.

The fact that policies aimed at encouraging flexibilisation are not many in number and are often contradictory or not well implemented or received in ECE does not mean that there is little flexibility. Both employees and employers have found a variety of ways to create flexibility of pay, conditions, and hours on an informal basis, either by creating additional informal and casual jobs that evade the legislation, or by creating additional conditions within the existing jobs, such as 'top-up' salaries. Furthermore, the large numbers of casual and agricultural workers are forced to be flexible, since they have no alternative employment. Many live on casual jobs from day to day. Some flexibility is even a continuation of the former second economy [Stanculescu and Berevoescu 2003].

In all Accession countries, the transition led to an increasing polarisation of income, differentiation within the workforce, job loss and rising poverty. Ethnic groups such as the Roma were especially affected, but so were young people and those in rural areas. Poverty was especially acute in the two least prosperous

Table 1. Regimes of regulation

1980s	1990s and 2000s	
De-regulated flexibility	Partially de-regulated flexibility	UK
Regulated non-flexibility	Regulated flexibility	The Netherlands Sweden
Strongly regulated anti-flexibility	Partially regulated flexibility	Hungary Czech Republic Slovenia
Strongly regulated anti-flexibility	Mainly unregulated flexibility	Bulgaria Romania

Accession countries, Romania and Bulgaria, whose economies did not pick up from the transition slump until the end of the 1990s [Kovacheva and Pancheva 2003; Stanculescu and Berevoescu 2003]. This improvement affected the population in very patchy ways, with a small number prospering and large numbers remaining poor or getting even poorer. Labour market and social security reforms were slow and often inappropriate or contradictory and could not match the impoverishment of the population, so that many people fell out of coverage altogether. The result was that more activities were pushed into the informal economy as people had to make ends meet without official incomes and inadequate or absent benefits [Wallace and Haerfper 2002]. In Romania, this job loss, accompanied by land restitution, led to large numbers (many of whom had been forcibly urbanised in the recent past) returning to the land and to subsistence production as a household strategy [Wallace 2002]. This flexibility takes place in spite of the lack of reform, and so we might call this 'unregulated flexibility'. However, it is also a product of the over-regulation and over-taxation of some sectors, such as self-employment, making it very difficult for people to legally become entrepreneurs.

The process of EU integration has introduced a new dynamic into this picture by including various labour market and social policy reforms as part of the Accession negotiations. In all countries it has been necessary to set up a National Employment Action Plan in response to the EU Employment Strategy.

Traditional flexibility

Let us begin with the conventional definitions of flexibility – part-time and temporary work, sometimes called 'a-typical' employment. Starting with part-time work, table 2 shows that it is most often carried out in the North-Western EU countries and that in those countries it is mainly women who do this work. In ECE countries, part-time work is marginal and is as likely to be done by men as by women. Shift

Table 2. Types of flexible work* by sex by country

	Part time			Shift work			Self-employed			Farmer			Casual worker		
	M	F	All	M	F	All	M	F	All	M	F	All	M	F	All
UK	4	25	16	16	11	13	13	4	8	-	-	-	1	2	2
NL	*		26	4	3	4	9	7	8	1	1	1			
Sweden	6	25	16	8	6	7	11	4	8	1	-	1	3	3	3
Slovenia	1	1	1	21	25	23	8	2	5	3	1	2	4	4	4
Czech Republic	1	3	2	12	18	15	12	7	9	1	-	1	0.4	0.3	0.3
Hungary	2	3	3	7	10	8	10	4	7	2	1	1	2	1	1
Romania	4	3	4	14	18	16	6	2	4	26	16	20	11	4	7
Bulgaria	4	4	4	18	21	19	8	5	7	2	-	1	3	1	2

* In the Netherlands there is the most part-time work, done mainly by women, but in the HWF questionnaire this question was asked in a different form in the NL [see Jager 2003].

work is found more often in the ECE countries, reflecting the dominance of industry in the structure of employment. However, shift work is also quite often carried out in the UK. In the West, shift work is most often done by men, and in the East by women. Self-employment is rather common in the Western European countries and in the Czech Republic. However, it represents a small but significant share of the workforce in all countries. Men are more likely than women in all countries to be self-employed. However, whilst for some this was a way of being better off, for many people, especially in Bulgaria and Romania, self-employment meant simply doing marginal work (such as selling stuff on a market), which was an alternative to unemployment. Farmers are very unevenly distributed. In EU countries they represent only a very small number of the employed, but in Romania, 20% of the workforce are farmers, reflecting a re-ruralisation of the population, a point which is discussed further on in this report. Casual workers, like farmers, are most common in Romania, where they represent another aspect of forced flexibilisation. We can see from this table that especially part-time work, shift work and farming show very large variations between countries. However, many different forces are hidden behind these trends. Whilst in most countries farming employs a declining number of people, in Romania their numbers are increasing. Shift work reflects the structure of employment in different countries, whilst the number of fixed-term contracts is often a response to a labour market with high job protection rather than vice versa. By looking only at such data, we are not really comparing like with like in terms of flexibility across different countries. This is why we decided to broaden the picture of flexibility in our research.

New ways to look at flexibility

Traditionally, numerical flexibility is seen in terms of the removal of job protection and trades-union influence, and in terms of the ease of dismissal or the number of part-time, self-employed and temporary workers. As we have shown, the first definition is unsatisfactory because it assumes that flexible behaviour will follow from these measures. By contrast, we show that the regulation of flexibility by social partners can lead to more flexibility overall and to more sustainable flexibility in particular (meaning socially acceptable and leading to quality jobs in the long term). We also demonstrate that the definitions of part-time work and self-employed activity are so varied across East and West Europe that it is not really helpful to look at these indicators alone. Furthermore, the reasons for pursuing one or the other are highly variable and may have nothing to do with flexibility. Finally, the number of temporary workers is likely to be a response to the lack of flexibility in labour market regulations rather than its existence. For these reasons, we do not regard these conventional indicators as being very good measures of flexibility in a comparative perspective.

For this reason, we have developed some new ways of looking at flexibility by considering the actual work practices of people in the labour market. We consider flexibility to mean the way in which people will vary their place or time of work. Seen in this way, we can measure flexibility as something related to typical rather than a-typical employment. In other words, we can measure the degree of flexibility within regular, full-time jobs or part-time jobs. This is a broader notion of flexibility and closer to the variety of working patterns that do in fact exist. In addition, we take into account the extent that people can control their hours of work and their reasons for doing flexible work. Below, a more detailed explanation is given of some of these measures.

Flexibility of time

To begin with, we considered the number of hours worked per week in terms of the mean and the median. Since 'part time' means something different in every country, this is perhaps a better way to look at the length of the working week. On average, the people in the Accession countries work the longest hours, but that is because there is no tradition of part-time work in those countries. In the old EU countries, we see clear differences between men and women, reflecting the tradition of the part-time option for women. In the UK, the average working week for men is 43 hours, whilst for women it is 29 hours. In the Netherlands the difference is 40 and 26, and in Sweden the gap narrows to between 42 and 37. In the Czech Republic and Slovenia the gap between men's and women's working hours is also 5 hours, but both men and women work longer hours. This is also the case in Romania, where the longest hours are worked on average (although the median is not so different to other countries): 48 for men and 41 for women. In Bulgaria the difference is very

Figure 1. Mean hours worked per week by country



small, with 41 for men and 39 for women. Thus, only in the Netherlands is the 40-hour week the average for men: everywhere else, men work longer than 40 hours on average. The longest hours are worked by people in the middle- (prime) aged groups, who, we can assume, are often those with family responsibilities. Those with better education are generally working longer hours, although in Romania it is the reverse, reflecting the fact that many of those with long hours would be working on the land. Also a reflection of this fact was the finding that longer hours were usually associated with higher income, except in Romania.

In order to capture all forms of flexibility, we asked respondents first about the regular working schedule, Monday to Friday, and then about deviations from that schedule (assuming that the precise peculiarities of the schedule would differ from country to country). According to this question, the respondents in Sweden were most likely to have a regular working schedule, with almost two-thirds (63.2%) giving a positive response to the question. Bulgaria came next with 58.9%, and the Netherlands with 54.2%. In the UK, 51.9% of people had a regular working schedule, in Hungary 49.4%, and in the Czech Republic 49.2%. This figure fell to 46.1% in Slovenia and 39.4% in Romania. The regular Monday-to-Friday schedule was most often found among those with better educational levels and better incomes. We can assume that having a regular schedule was a privileged situation in most countries, although less so in the UK and the Czech Republic.

Figure 2. Working schedule by country



Flexitime schedules were most often found in the Czech Republic (14.1%) and Slovenia (10.7%), followed by Bulgaria and the UK (9.3%). Hungary had the least number of flexitime people, with only 1.7% (again the question was asked differently in the Netherlands, which is why it is not included here). In the Czech Republic it was most often men and those with high incomes who had this kind of freedom, whilst in Slovenia there was not much difference between the sexes but it was often those with high income who had flexitime schedules. In Bulgaria it was men, and in the UK women, who were likely to have such schedules. In most places flexitime was associated with higher incomes, so we could say that it was a privileged kind of working schedule [see Wallace, Nagaev and Chvorostov 2003].

Altogether 8.7% indicated 'other regular working schedule' as theirs. However, in the Netherlands this went up to 14.5%, in Sweden 11.6%, and in the United Kingdom 11.3%. This probably reflects the prevalence of part-time work in those countries. The ECE countries had generally fewer 'other' schedules. Slovenia, Bulgaria and Hungary had the least number of people with these kinds of schedules.

A large number of people had an irregular working schedule (around one-fifth). The highest numbers were found in Hungary (36.7%) and Romania (29.5%), substantially above the HWF mean. The lowest numbers with irregular working schedules were found in Bulgaria (7.7%). The Netherlands, the UK and Sweden were

Figure 3. Variations in working hours by country



around the same, with between 14% and 19%. The Czech Republic had 12.4% and Slovenia 15.8%. When we look at the data in this way, more than half of the respondents in four of the eight countries did not have regular working hours and in a further three countries nearly half were on non-regular schedules.

Respondents were asked if their working hours varied at all. This was another way of asking about flexibility. For the largest share of people, their hours never vary, but in all the countries, apart from Hungary and Bulgaria, more than half of the people who answered this question had varying hours. The most common were hours that varied by the week or even by the day. The most flexible in this respect were Slovenia, the UK and Sweden.

In fact, as we can see, there were many ways of varying time flexibility, both in the context of a full-time regular working week and outside of it. This indicates that it is useful to take a broader perspective based on working practices, rather than only looking at the conventional 'atypical' definitions of flexibility.

Flexibility of place

In the questionnaire we posed a series of questions about flexibility of place, which are summarised in chart 4. Many people work within the locality in which they live.

Figure 4. Place of Work



However, commuting is rather common in the Netherlands (50.3% of people), Slovenia (44.8%) the Czech Republic (40.8%) and the UK (37.7%). A small number of people worked partially or wholly at home (8.9%). This was most common in Bulgaria, although between 7% and 10% of respondents did so in most countries. Working from home was more common in the ECE countries than in Sweden or the Netherlands. In Bulgaria and Slovenia, this is likely to be people who are working in subsistence agriculture since it is they who tend to be found in rural areas, although this was not the case in the Czech Republic or Hungary. For 4.9% of the sample, their place of work was always changing, a feature most common in Slovenia (8.4%) and the UK (7.1%). The majority of people therefore still have a traditional pattern of travelling to a workplace.

Flexibility of contract

Turning to types of contract (figure 5) we can see that, whilst the majority of people have permanent contracts, there is much variation from country to country. By this definition (people least likely to have a permanent contract) we might view Bulgaria as the most flexible country, whilst in Sweden and the Netherlands, where there have been policies to encourage permanent contracts, along with flexibility within

Figure 5. Types of contract by country



them, the majority of people do indeed have permanent contracts. However, we should also take into account that large numbers in the UK, for example, have no contract and that this is also the case in many of the ECE countries. The number of fixed-term contracts is in fact a better indicator of the regulation rather than the de-regulation of the labour market, because in countries where there is little job protection there is no need to have fixed-term contracts to the same extent. In this survey, fixed-term contracts were the most un-typical form of flexibility.

Control over flexibility

A very important factor to emerge from the literature reviews is the extent to which people have control over the flexibility that they experience. Respondents were given the options 'I decide', 'employer decides', 'employer and I decide together', and 'it is outside of our control'. We asked about control over the working schedule, control over the hours of work, control over overtime hours and control over the place of work.

It was the employer who mainly controlled the hours of work in the Accession countries and also in the UK– this was the case for half or more than half of the respondents in each country. In Sweden and the Netherlands people were more likely to state that they control the hours of work or that they decide together with their

Figure 6. Control over hours of work

employer. This was especially the case in the Netherlands, where 42.3% of people claimed to be able to control their hours of work themselves. This is perhaps an outcome of the employee-led flexibilisation policies in the Netherlands. In Romania, a rather high number of people controlled their hours of work, but we can assume that this is because of the large agricultural sector rather than on account of flexibilisation policies.

Men are more likely to be able to decide on their hours than women, and older workers more than younger workers [Wallace, Nagaev and Chvorostov 2003]. Those with better education controlled their hours more than those with lower education. In all countries, the higher income groups controlled their hours the most. There seemed to be more control over the hours of work for employees in the Netherlands and Sweden, but less so in the UK. In ECE countries, lack of control over the hours of work reflects a more traditional pattern.

Almost one-quarter of respondents controlled their place of work themselves, and they were most likely to be found in Romania (33.2%), Sweden (25.5%) and the Netherlands (25.6%). The employers decided for 57.7% of respondents, and they were most often found in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and the United Kingdom. The place of work was negotiated with the employer in one in ten cases, most often in the Netherlands (17.7%), Sweden (14.7%), the Czech Republic (11.4%)

Figure 7. Control over the place of work (main activity)

Question: 'Regarding this activity, do you decide or someone else decide on: place of work?'

and Hungary (10.1%). In 9.4% of cases it was outside of everybody's control. Sweden and the Netherlands, therefore, do seem to have negotiated a flexibility in which the employee has a good deal of control. In Romania the employee also has control, but for different reasons.

Those with higher income and higher education control their place of work the most, and men control their place of work more than women [Wallace, Nagaev and Chvorostov 2003].

The ability to control flexibility is important since it helps to distinguish good flexibility from bad flexibility. One-quarter of respondents could control their hours of work, their working schedule, overtime and place of work. Generally speaking these were better-educated people, older people and people with higher incomes. Men had more control over their flexibility than women. Those in Western countries, especially Sweden and the Netherlands, had the most control (although Romania was included in those countries with the most control, which is because of the high number of farmers – Romanians were also in the category of people with the least control).

The extent of flexibility

Now we can look at the numbers for those who have time, place, and contract flexibility, to which we can add income flexibility for those with multiple income sources. *Time flexibility* is defined as people on a non-regular or irregular working schedule.[1] *Place flexibility* is defined as people working at home either the whole time or part of the time, working abroad, or with an irregular place of work (commuters were excluded). *Contract flexibility* was defined as people having anything but a permanent regular contract (i.e. no contract, fixed-term contract, on call, with a temporary-work agency, on a fee only basis, subject to performance, or on a work experience project). *Income flexibility* includes all those with more than one income source. As to the more complex flexibility measures, while *combined flexibility* covers those with time and/or place and/or contract flexibility, *cumulative flexibility* covers those characterised by all three forms of flexibility simultaneously.

Using this measure of flexibility, we find large numbers are income flexible in the United Kingdom and in the Czech Republic, with time flexibility most common in the UK and the Netherlands, and place flexibility most common in Romania, whilst contract flexibility was most common in the ECE countries and in the UK. Here we find that more than half of workers are flexible on more than one indicator in the UK, the Netherlands, Slovenia and the Czech Republic, whilst only just under half are flexible in this respect in most of the other countries.

Table 3. The rate of the different flexibility types by countries (%)

	Income flexibility	Time flexibility	Place flexibility	Contract flexibility	Combined flexibility	Cumulative flexibility	N
United Kingdom	14	41	17	33	58	7	682
The Netherlands	10	40	11	28	55	4	785
Sweden	10	20	10	20	35	2	1185
Slovenia	7	30	19	34	51	7	584
Czech Republic	24	32	16	32	50	8	1072
Hungary	6	36	14	30	49	7	745
Romania	7	39	23	36	47	18	851
Bulgaria	9	21	9	42	45	5	1012
Total	**11**	**31**	**15**	**32**	**47**	**7**	**6916**

[1] In the second table, however, time flexibility also covers those who work part-time (less than 29 hours a week).

Table 4. Correlation between flexibility (%)

	Income flexible	Time flexible	Place flexible	Contract flexible
Income flexible	1	0,088	0,079	0,080
Time flexible		1	0,196	0,243
Place flexible			1	0,150

* All correlation is significant at the p=0.01 level.

The relationship between time, place and contract flexibility

Applying a narrower definition of flexibility (excluding farmers, self-employed and part-time workers who are flexible by definition) we can use correlation coefficients to see how time, place and contract flexibility are associated. The overall association among the four forms of flexibility is a low level of positive correlation (table 4). This means that the different kinds of flexibility tend to be associated with one another and this is the general 'European' model of multiple flexibility. However, contract flexibility and time flexibility are the most strongly correlated and this is followed by place flexibility and time flexibility. Place flexibility seems to follow a different dynamic.

How flexibility relates to the life situation

In order to understand how flexibility is associated with a person's life situation, we can look at its relationship to age, sex, education, income, and the urban-rural dimension.

Flexibility, especially contract flexibility, affects younger workers more than other age groups. Young people are also most likely to combine more than one form of flexibility.

Males are more likely to be affected by all forms of flexibility than are females, except in the case of contract flexibility. Education has a strong impact on flexibility. The lowest educated are the most flexible on all dimensions, whilst the higher educated have only more time flexibility. Living in a rural area increases the chances of all forms of flexibility. Being male is more strongly associated with flexibility of all types, apart from contract flexibility. Being flexible is generally associated with being on a lower income.

This would seem to confirm the pessimistic views of flexibility – that it leads to the erosion of work conditions and particularly affects the most vulnerable in the labour market. However, looking more closely we can identify different kinds of flexibility. We could tentatively suggest that there are two divergent types of flexi-

Table 5. Types of flexibility by basic socio-demographic indicators (%, N=5316 and 4294 for income quartiles)

	Income-flexy	Time-flexy	Place-flexy	Contract-flexy	Combined-flexy	Cumulative-flexy	N
Total	**4**	**22**	**9**	**22**	**37**	**2**	**5316**
18–29 years old	3	25	10	34	46	3	1578
30–59 years old	4	20	9	16	33	2	2746
60+ years old	6	23	10	20	34	3	992
Chi-square	*0,001*	*0,000*	*0,519*	*0,000*	*0,000*	*0,024*	
Male	5	23	12	21	38	3	2867
Female	3	21	6	23	35	2	2449
Chi-square	*0,000*	*0,062*	*0,000*	*-0,038*	*0,009*	*0,120*	
Primary Education	2	27	13	31	44	4	461
Secondary Education	4	20	10	23	36	3	3648
Tertiary Education	5	24	7	14	36	1	1191
Chi-square	*0,047*	*0,000*	*0,003*	*0,000*	*0,004*	*0,005*	
Urbanized area	4	22	8	20	35	2	1697
Intermediate area	4	21	9	20	36	2	2250
Rural Area	4	23	12	27	41	4	1357
Chi-square	*0,689*	*0,276*	*0,001*	*0,000*	*0,001*	*0,000*	
Total	**4**	**22**	**9**	**22**	**37**	**2**	**4294**
Low income	5	20	10	30	37	4	996
Mid-low income	5	21	9	21	36	2	954
Mid-high income	3	20	9	19	35	2	1084
High income	3	22	8	16	35	2	1260
Chi-square	*0,097*	*0,878*	*0,544*	*0,000*	*0,700*	*0,006*	

bility: the *good flexibility* of better educated people, which is associated more with having flexibility of time, and *bad flexibility*, which is associated with lower levels of education, being male, being younger or older and living in a rural area. It is associated with contract, place and time flexibility, and with the combination of all of these.

Conclusions

The first conclusion from this project is that there is a great deal of flexibility in European countries from the point of view of the worker, even ones that are deemed 'inflexible'. This flexibility varies in its predominant forms from country to country, depending on the nature of the labour market, the division of labour between the sexes, the traditional work culture and the regime of regulation. Looking at the ex-

tent of part-time, self-employed and fixed-term contract work alone is insufficient and even misleading.

Another conclusion is that there are 'good' and 'bad' forms of flexibility. To summarise the information contained in many of the HWF reports, we find that bad flexibility is associated with low job satisfaction, with a lack of control over employment by the employee, and with low education and income. Some forms of flexibility are associated with job satisfaction, with higher wages and control over working hours. These are found most often in Western Europe and among the more middle-class groups in Eastern Europe. By contrast, bad flexibility was associated with low pay, short-term contracts, little control over work and low job satisfaction. It was found in all countries, but was most widespread in Eastern and Central Europe, where flexibility has not yet been harnessed in a positive way to labour market reform. In ECE countries, bad flexibility is associated with males, but in Western Europe it is more likely to be associated with females. Good flexibility reflects the increasing trend in Western Europe towards employee-led flexibility, allowing workers to negotiate the hours and place in their work contracts.

Flexibility is associated with certain kinds of workers, in particular with male workers (except for contract flexibility), younger workers (and to some extent with older workers), and with less educated people, with the exception of time flexibility, which is also associated with the higher educated, and with lower incomes and rural areas.

There do seem to be different kinds of flexibility (and we have not considered all of them here). Although time and contract flexibility are associated together, place flexibility seems to follow a different dynamic.

CLAIRE WALLACE *works in the Department of Sociology at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna, Austria. She is also a visiting professor at the University of Derby, UK, and currently the editor-in-chief of the journal European Societies. She has been conducting research on transformations in Eastern and Central Europe for the past decade.*

References

Beck, U. 2000. *The Brave New World of Work*. Oxford: Polity Press.

Boje, T. and M. Strandh. 2003. "Country Contextual Report: Sweden." Pp. 93–135 in *HWF Research Report #2*, edited by Claire Wallace. HWF Series of Project Research Reports. Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies.

Bradley, H., M. Erikson, et al. 2000. *Myths at Work*. Oxford: Polity Press.

Bridges, W. 1996. *Job Shift. How to Prosper in a Work Place without Jobs*. London: Nicholas Brealy Publishing Ltd.

Burchell, B., D. Day, et al. 1999. *Job Insecurity and Work Intensification: Flexibility and Changing Boundaries of Work*. Yorkshire: Joseph Rowntree Memorial Trust.

European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. 2002. "Working

Conditions in Candidate Countries and the European Union." Resume. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
Dex, S. 1997. *Flexible Employment*. London: Palgrave/Macmillans.
Handy, C. 1994. *The Empty Raincoat*. UK: Hutchinson.
Hill, E. J., A. Hawkins, J., et al. 2001. "Finding an Extra Day a Week: The Positive Influence of Perceived Job Flexibility on Work and Family Life Balance." *Family Relations* 50 (1): 49–58.
Hochgerner, J. 1998. "Flexibilisierung durch Telearbeit." Pp. 175–192 in *Flexibilisierung – Problem oder Lösung?* Edited by H. G. Zilian and J. Flecker. Berlin: Sigma.
Hörning, K. H., A. Gerhard, et al. 1995. *Time Pioneers. Flexible Working Time and New Life-styles*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag.
Huws, U., S. Podro, E. Gunnarsson, T. Weijers, K. Arvanitaki and V. Trova. 1996. *Teleworking and Gender*. Sussex: IES Report.
Jager, A., (ed.) 2003. "Country Contextual Report: The Netherlands." Pp. 43–92 in *HWF Research Report #2*, edited by Claire Wallace. HWF Series of Project Research Reports. Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies.
Keune, M. 2003. "Labour Market Flexibility in Central and Eastern Europe: An Analysis of Non-standard Employment and Working Time Arrangements in the Czech Republic and Hungary." In *HWF Survey Comparative Report, Volume 2: Thematic Papers*, edited by Claire Wallace. HWF Series of Project Research Reports. Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies.
Kopasz, M. 2003. "Country Contextual Report: Hungary." Pp. 199–238 in *HWF Research Report #2*, edited by Claire Wallace. HWF Series of Project Research Reports. Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies.
Kovacheva, S. and T. Pancheva. 2003. "Country Contextual Report: Bulgaria." Pp. 239–294 in *HWF Research Report #2*, edited by Claire Wallace. HWF Series of Project Research Reports. Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies.
Lewis, J. 1992. "Gender and the Development of Welfare Regimes." *European Journal of Social Policy* 2(3): 159–173.
Nelson, M., K. and J. Smith. 1999. *Working Hard and Making Do. Surviving in Small Town America*. Berkely, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press.
O'Reilly, J. and C. Fagan. 1998. *Part-time Prospects*. UK: Routledge.
Perrons, D. 1998. *Flexible Working and the Reconciliation of Work and Family Life – A New Form of Precariousness*. Brussels. European Commssion: Directorate General Employment and Social Affairs.
Pollert, A. 1988. "The 'Flexible Firm': Fixation or Fact." *Work, Employment and Society* 2 (3): 281–316.
Pollert, A. (ed.) 1991. *Farewell to Flexibility?* Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Regini, M. 2000. "The Dilemmas of Labour Market Regulation." Pp. 11–29 in *Why Deregulate the Labour Market?* Edited by G. Esping-Andersen and M. Regini. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Riboud, M., C. Sanchez-Paramo and C. Silva-Jauregui. 2001. "Does Eurosclerosis Matter? Institutional Reform and Labour Market Performance in Central and Eastern European Countries in the 1990s." *Labor, Employment and Social Policies in the of EU Enlargement Process*. Working Paper. Washington: The World Bank.
Sicherl, P., T. Stanovnik, et al. 2003. "Country Contextual Report: Slovenia." Pp. 135–168 in *HWF Research Report #2*, edited by Claire Wallace. HWF Series of Project Research Reports. Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies.
Sik, E. and C. Wallace. 2003. "How Much Work Flexibility Is There in Eastern and Western Europe?" *HWF Research Report #4*, edited by Claire Wallace. HWF Series of Project Research Reports. Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies.

Spoonley, P., A. de Bruin and P. Firkin. 2002. "Managing Non-standard Work Arrangements: Choices and Constraints." *Journal of Sociology* 38 (4): 425–441.
Stanculescu, M. S. and I. Berevoescu. 2003. "HWF Country Survey Reports: Romania." Pp. 395–457 in *HWF Research Report #3*, edited by Claire Wallace. HWF Series of Project Research Reports. Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies.
Standing, G. 1999. *Global Labour Flexibility. Seeking Distributive Justice*. Palgrave: London.
Štěpánková, P. 2003. "Flexibility and Labour Market Segmentation." *HWF Research Report #4*, edited by Claire Wallace. HWF Series of Project Research Reports. Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies.
Tietze, S. and G. Musson. 2002. "When 'Work' Meets 'Home'. Temporal Flexiblity as Lived Experience." *Time and Society* 11(2/3): 315–334.
Večerník, J. and P. Štěpánková 2002. Czech Republic. Critical Review of Literature and Discourses about Flexibility. Pp. 125–135 in *HWF Research Report #1*, edited by Claire Wallace. HWF Series of Project Research Reports. Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies.
Wallace, C. 2002. "Household Strategies: Their Conceptual Relevance and Analytical Scope in Social Research." *Sociology* 36 (2): 275–292.
Wallace, C. and C. Haerfper. 2002. "Patterns of Participation in the Informal Economy in East-Central Europe, 1991–1998." *The Social Impact of Informal Economies in Eastern Europe*. R. Neef and M. Stanculescu, Sofia. Aldershot: Gower.
Wallace, C. (ed.). 2003a. Comparative Contextual Reports. HWF Series of Project Research Reports. Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies: Vienna.
Wallace, C. (ed.). 2003b. Country Contextual Reports. *HWF Research Report #2*. HWF Series of Project Research Reports. Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies.
Wallace, C. (ed.). 2003c. HWF Survey Comparative Report, Volume 2: Thematic Papers. *HWF Research Report #4*. HWF Series of Project Research Reports. Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies.
Wallace, C. (ed.). 2003d. HWF Survey Report by Countries, Volume 1. *HWF Research Report #4*. HWF Series of Project Research Reports. Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies.
Wallace, C., S. Nagaev, and A. Chvorostov (eds.). 2003. HWF Survey Comparative Report, Volume 1. *HWF Research Report #4*. HWF Series of Project Research Reports. Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies.

Capitalist Divergence and Labour Market Flexibility in the Czech Republic and Hungary: A Comparative Analysis of Standard and Non-Standard Employment

MAARTEN KEUNE*
The European University Institute in Florence

Abstract The article presents a comparative analysis of standard and non-standard employment (part-time employment, fixed-term employment, self-employment and employment without a contract) in the Czech Republic and Hungary. It examines what the weight of the various types of employment is, and to what extent standard employment has the same meaning in the two countries. Also, it analyses what gender, age groups, educational groups and branches are particularly exposed to flexibility, and what the relationship is between flexibility and income. Finally, it discusses to what extent the differences observed between the two countries are linked to broader labour market developments and to diverse approaches towards the creation of post-socialist capitalism. The analysis shows converging as well as diverging tendencies between the two countries. They have similar levels of standard employment, but standard employment is constituted differently in terms of income, hours worked and working-time patterns. Also, the composition of non-standard forms of employment and their relationship to income is different. In both countries, standard employment is low in the sectors of agriculture and trade and services, as well as for the young, the old and the lowly educated. Women have higher rates of standard employment than men. The Czech labour market is however much more 'egalitarian' and the Hungarian one more 'polarised', while employment is most precarious in Hungary. The differences between the two countries are linked to the stronger market orientation of the Hungarian post-socialist reforms, as well as to the fact that during the 1990s aggregate employment in Hungary fell much more strongly than in the Czech Republic.
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2003, Vol. 39, No. 6: 795–813

* Direct all correspondence to: Maarten Keune, Department of Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute, Via dei Roccettini 9, I-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), Italy, e-mail: maarten.keune@iue.it

1. Introduction[1]

The demise of state socialism and the turn to capitalism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has presented social scientists with the question of what type(s) of capitalism(s) are emerging in this region. Studies on Western capitalist societies show that large and persistent differences prevail between national models of capitalism [Crouch and Streeck 1997; Hall and Soskice 2001], between welfare-state regimes [Esping-Andersen 1990], or between industrial relations systems [Crouch 1993]. Indeed, capitalism is no single order. And neither was CEE state socialism. State socialism revealed similarly profound differences across space and time, with a generality of experience that could be claimed only on a broad systemic level [Kornai 1992]. Based on this diversity, the CEE countries have been constructing their own variations on the general theme of capitalism. What capitalism in the various CEE countries looks like then becomes a question for comparative empirical research.

In this paper, I take a comparative view of one of the core dimensions of contemporary capitalism, labour market flexibility, in two CEE countries – the Czech Republic and Hungary. The labour market has been one of the key areas of reform in the post-1989 period, and it has been one of the areas where the dramatic changes from state socialism to capitalism have been most apparent and have had the most impact on the well-being of the countries' populations. It has also been one of the most hotly debated areas of reform in capitalist countries around the world over the past two decades, with the debate focusing again on the issue of flexibility.[2]

Little agreement exists on what types of flexibility are desirable or feasible, and in what way labour market regulation should be (re-) shaped to allow for or foster labour flexibility. In line with the capitalist diversity argument, large differences can be found between Western countries concerning the way labour market flexibility has taken shape, including the types of employment that prevail, working-time patterns, and labour market regulations [Esping-Andersen and Regini 2000; European Commission 2001]. While in all countries flexibility is constituted in a complex and multidimensional way, each has its own particular characteristic features. For example, in the USA, flexibility is largely achieved through minimal dismissal protection and decentralised wage bargaining. In Spain, it is embodied in widespread temporary employment. In the Netherlands, part-time employment is widespread. In Greece, almost half of the employed are self-employed. In Germany, labour market flexibility to a large extent originates in flexible forms of work organisation.

The aim of the analysis presented here is to contribute to obtaining an understanding of the way labour market flexibility is constituted in the Czech Republic

[1] I would like to thank Colin Crouch, Endre Sik, Jiří Večerník and Claire Wallace for valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper. I am much indebted to Bori Simonovits and Petra Štěpánková who provided me with tailor-made access to the HWF database.

[2] For some recent contributions to this debate, see e.g. Sarfati and Bonoli [2002]; Standing [1999]; Esping-Andersen and Regini [2000].

and Hungary. Some aspects of this issue have been the subject of comparative research on CEE countries elsewhere, including labour turnover and employment stability [Cazes and Nešporová 2001], and employment protection legislation and labour market policies [Riboud et al. 2002]. In this article I will focus on standard and non-standard types of employment and their characteristics, a core flexibility issue on which as yet little comparative research has been done in the CEE countries. Non-standard types of employment are at the heart of the labour flexibility debate and, as we will see below, they are increasingly seen as viable instruments for increasing labour market flexibility in the two countries under study. The discussion will be based on the results of the Households, Work and Flexibility (HWF) survey, a unique survey fielded in 2001 in eight Eastern and Western European countries, and dedicated specifically to an inter-country comparison of various types of flexibility.[3]

The questions that this article is centred on are the following:

- To what extent are the two labour markets typified by standard employment, to what extent does standard employment have the same meaning in the two countries, and what is the weight of the various more flexible types of employment (part-time employment, fixed-term employment, self-employment and employment without a contract)?
- What are the age groups, gender, educational groups and branches that are particularly exposed to flexibility, and what relationship exists between flexibility and personal and household income? To what extent do the two countries differ here?
- Are the differences observed between the two countries in terms of types of employment linked to broader labour market developments and to diverse approaches towards the creation of post-socialist capitalism?

The rest of the article is structured as follows. In section 2 I provide a brief overview of some major aspects of economic and employment policy in the Czech Republic and Hungary since 1989, along with the major changes in the labour market. In section 3, I present the results of the HWF survey concerning the incidence and character of standard and non-standard employment. In section 4, I offer a summary of my findings.

2. Post-1989 reform policy and labour market developments

Following the capitalist diversity argument, we should not start by assuming a convergence in the way labour market flexibility takes shape in the two countries. First

[3] The survey covers the population aged between 18–65 years old and has a sample size of 1556 in the Czech Republic and 1165 in Hungary. For detailed information on the survey, the questionnaire, or publications, see the Households, Work and Flexibility project web page: http://www.hwf.at

of all, they started the post-1989 period of building capitalism with quite diverse economies and labour markets. Hungary has traditionally had a smaller industrial sector, with less heavy industry than the Czech part of former Czechoslovakia (36.1% and 45.4% respectively in 1989), and a larger agricultural sector (17.5% and 11.8% respectively). Hungary was also a primary example of the reform of state socialism, including extensive decentralisation, and a relatively large second economy with small-scale private economic activity, while Czechoslovakia of that time had a more centralised economy with virtually universal state employment.

Also, although the systemic change from state socialism to democratic capitalism has had many basic elements in common in the two countries, important differences can be observed in terms of both economic and employment policy and in labour market developments.[4] In Hungary, in the early 1990s, reforms were to a large extent oriented towards the creation of a competitive market environment for enterprises, including strict bankruptcy laws and the discontinuation of much of the state support for enterprises. This caused a massive wave of bankruptcies, as well as drastic employment cuts as a result of the restructuring and rationalisation in the surviving enterprises [Köllő 1998]. In the Czech Republic, the institutional context, including continued state subsidies, soft credits, and limited enforcement of bankruptcy regulations, favoured the survival of enterprises and made restructuring and layoffs less of a priority. The Czech (and earlier the Czechoslovak) government, in co-operation with social partners, also deliberately followed a low-wage, low-unemployment strategy during the first half of the 1990s [Nešporová and Uldrichová 1997]. If we compare, for example, the number of bankruptcies in the two countries, in the period 1992–1996, in Hungary 42 124 bankruptcies were filed compared to only 8 647 in the Czech Republic [Kornai 2001: 1576–1578]. As a result, while in both countries employment fell dramatically, the decline was much deeper in Hungary than in the Czech Republic. In Hungary, aggregate employment fell by no less than 29.7% in the period 1990–2000, compared to 11.6% in the Czech Republic. In fact, the decline in employment in Hungary has been the largest in the entire CEE region, with the exception of parts of the former Yugoslavia, while in the Czech Republic it has been one of the smallest [UN-ECE 2000]. And while the employment rate in Hungary was 5.6 percentage points higher than the Czech rate in 1990, by 2000 it was 5 percentage points lower.

These diverging developments in employment also signal differences in how the labour markets function in the two countries. In Hungary, the total collapse of aggregate employment indicates the disintegration, in the early 1990s, of large parts of the internal labour markets predominant in the 1970s and 1980s, and their dissolution into occupational labour markets [Gábor 1999]. In the Czech Republic, although the scope of internal labour markets narrowed significantly, they did con-

[4] For detailed discussions of structural and institutional labour market change in the country cases, see e.g. Večerník and Matějů [1999]; [Večerník 2001a]; Keune [2002]; Fazekas and Koltay [2002].

Table 1. Employment by broad sectors, Hungary and the Czech Republic, 1990–2000

	Hungary					Czech Republic			
	Agriculture	Industry	Services	Total		Agriculture	Industry	Services	Total
1990	17.5	36.1	46.4	100	1990	11.8	45.4	42.8	100
1992	11.3	35.0	53.7	100	1992	8.6	44.8	46.6	100
1994	8.7	33.0	58.3	100	1994	6.9	42.2	51.0	100
1996	8.3	32.6	59.1	100	1996	6.1	41.5	52.3	100
1998	7.5	34.2	58.3	100	1998	5.5	40.9	53.6	100
2000	6.6	33.7	59.7	100	2000	5.1	39.5	55.4	100

Sources: CSU and KSH

tinue to function and were a significant source of over-employment and of job security for core employees [Frýdmanová et al. 1999: 23–25].

As far as gender, age and education are concerned, trends have been broadly similar in the two countries. Women were pushed out of the labour market much more harshly than men. At the beginning of the 1990s, in both countries female participation rates were 11 percentage points below male rates; by 2000, the differences between them had increased to 18.2 percentage points in the Czech Republic and 16.1 percentage points in Hungary. With regard to different age groups, it has been the old and the young that have been most affected by the changing labour market conditions [e.g. Večerník 2001a; Keune 1998]. Persons of pension age were among the first to be laid off in the early 1990s, in part because of the availability of ample early retirement provisions. They confront great difficulties in finding new employment, forcing many to opt for inactivity. As for the young, they have consistently had unemployment rates far above the average, and it is particularly difficult for young people to enter the labour market. Finally, the position in the labour market of people with low levels of education is especially difficult, as the level and type of education have in both countries gained in importance for determining access to employment and wage levels [Večerník 2001b; Kertesi and Köllő 1999].

A further element of labour market change has been the enormous shift in the sectoral distribution of employment (table 1). In the 1990s, sectoral developments included the rapid decline of the share of agriculture in employment and the more modest decline of the share of industry, combined with the strongly increasing share of services. Indeed, by 2000, in both countries agriculture has become very small while services represent by far the largest sector. However, industry continues to be an importants sector particularly in the Czech Republic.

Finally, it is important to mention the informal sector, because of its potential effects on flexibility, and because of the precariousness associated with it. This may stem from the limited effect of protective regulations, and it can also be assumed that

many (though not all) of those employed in the informal sector will have low or irregular incomes [Rossner et al. 2000]. Although there are enormous difficulties involved in defining and measuring the informal sector, comparative studies agree that this sector is much larger in Hungary than in the Czech Republic. Rosser et al. [2000] estimate the size of the informal sector for 1993–94 as 17.2% of GDP in the Czech Republic and 28.1% in Hungary. For 2000–2001, Schneider [2002] estimates its size as 18.4% in the Czech Republic and 24.4% in Hungary, and claims that out of the population aged 16–65, respectively 12.6% and 20.9% were active in the informal sector.

As far as specific policies oriented towards the creation of non-standard types of employment are concerned, when labour market flexibility was discussed in the first half of the 1990s, it was mainly in terms of dismissal regulations, adjustment of the quality of labour supply, or labour mobility. Policy debates then largely evolved around issues like the management of unemployment, training and education, wage control, or the promotion of structural changes. An exception was self-employment, the importance of which policy makers have continuously underlined as a source of dynamism and employment.[5]

However, this situation has been changing. During the second half of the 1990s, flexible types of employment have become one of the central elements of the debate on employment and labour market policy in both countries. With the ultimate goal of fostering employment creation, in both countries employers are increasingly allowed to hire labour on fixed-term, part-time or other flexible contracts. An important role in institutionalising the call for flexibility in the two countries under study is played by the EU. As part of the EU accession process, the Czech Republic and Hungary have been adopting much of the language and objectives of the European Employment Strategy, including the four-pillar framework and its call for flexible types of employment. Increasingly, policy makers propose the abandoning of open-ended, contract-based, full-time employment with stable working hours, in favour of more flexible employment forms.[6] Indeed, today there are few formal limits on flexible contracts.

[5] Self-employment is an important element in the discussion on flexibility and precariousness. One of the reasons for this is that self-employment may be the result of 'pull' factors – self-employment as an opportunity for income and personal development –and also of 'push' factors, like the lack of alternative employment opportunities or sources of income. In the latter case self-employment comes close to being a survival strategy. In addition, in many cases people are formally self-employed but are still dependent on one single employer, similarly to being in the position of employees. To illustrate this, according to a survey among small entrepreneurs in 1993, only 48% of them characterised their decision to start an enterprise as a positive decision based on good business opportunities [Laky 1996].

[6] For example, the Progress Report on the implementation of the conclusions of the Joint Assessment of Employment Policy of the Czech Republic (November 2001, Ministry of Labour: p. 2) states: "Flexible contracts could become one possible response of enterprises, shielding them against fluctuations in demand, or assisting them in bridging the periods of changes of technological equipment. Part-time and fixed-duration contracts could also be a means towards the gradual integration of vulnerable groups into the labour market".

In section 3, I will discuss the incidence and characteristics of types of employment in the two countries. From the differences and similarities in historical and more recent labour market developments and policies presented above, we would expect to find considerable differences between the two cases. Hungary's enormous decline in aggregate employment, the dissolution of internal labour markets, and the resulting weaker position occupied by employees vis-à-vis their employers, and the country's larger service sector and more extensive informal sector would suggest that there should be more flexible types of employment. Less obvious, however, is what shape the differences between the two countries could take. They may relate to the incidence and characteristics of standard employment (such as hours worked, working-time patterns, income), the incidence of flexible types of employment, or the social groups or branches most affected. In the next section I intend to shed some light on these questions.

3. Forms of employment

3.1 Forms of employment: incidence and basic characteristics

Table 2 gives an overview of the distribution of the various employment prevailing in the Czech and Hungarian labour markets in 2001. The first conclusion that can be drawn from table 2 is that in both countries the vast majority – just over two-thirds – of employed people have so-called standard employment, i.e. a permanent, contract-based and full-time job, with Hungary slightly exceeding the Czech Republic. Non-standard or flexible forms of employment thus make up 32.9% of jobs in the Czech Republic and 31.7% in Hungary.[7]

An examination of the composition of non-standard employment demonstrates, first, that it refers almost exclusively to self-employment, fixed-term full-time employment, and employment without a contract, which together comprise 80.9% of non-standard employment in the Czech Republic and 82% in Hungary. Permanent part-time employment, fixed-term part-time employment, casual jobs, on-call workers, temporary agency work and work on a fee basis play only a small part in both labour markets, and together make up 6.4% of total employment in the Czech Republic and 5.8% in Hungary. This does not, however, necessarily mean that these forms are meaningless; it is precisely in this segment that some of the more flexible and precarious jobs could be located. Second, there are important differences in the composition of non-standard employment. The most striking difference is that, in Hungary, no less than 9.9% of all employment positions are not on a contractual basis, while in the Czech Republic the figure is much lower at 5.4%. This means that in both countries a significant part of all employment falls outside the

[7] Part-time employment is defined as contract-based dependent employment of less than 30 hours weekly. Full-time employment is contract-based dependent employment of 30 weekly hours and more.

Table 2. Types of employment by gender, the Czech Republic and Hungary, 2001 (%)

	Total		Males		Females	
	CZ	HU	CZ	HU	CZ	HU
Permanent full-time employees	67.1	68.3	66.4	66.4	67.9	70.5
Permanent part-time employees	1.9	2.9	0.9	1.1	3.1	4.9
Fixed-term full-time employees	9.2	6.3	8	5.4	10.6	7.4
Fixed term part-time employees	0.9	1.3	0.4	1.3	1.5	1.2
Self-employed	12.0	9.8	13.1	12.4	10.6	6.8
Other types of contracts*	3.6	1.6	4.3	1.3	2.7	1.8
No contract**	5.4	9.9	6.9	12.1	3.5	7.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	*987*	*697*	*535*	*372*	*452*	*325*

*casual jobs, on call workers, temporary work agency, work on a fee basis

** excludes self-employed

Source: HWF survey

legally regulated sphere and lacks any formal protection or security, but in Hungary this segment is almost twice as large as in the Czech Republic, which also confirms that the informal sector is much more extensive there than in the Czech Republic.[8]

In the following section I will discuss the differences between gender, age groups, educational groups and branches in terms of types of employment in the two countries. I will for the most part limit my analysis to the four main types: permanent full-time, fixed-term full-time, self-employment and employment without a contract. Only occasionally will I refer to the other, less salient, types, which, for the sake of comprehensiveness, will be presented in the tables anyway.

As far as gender differences are concerned, a higher percentage of women than men have standard jobs, particularly in Hungary, but the differences between the genders are limited (table 2). However, as female participation rates have been falling further behind rates for males, in absolute terms more men than women have standard employment. Part-time employment, as in most parts of Europe, is more widespread among women, while self-employment is more widespread among men, with a particularly significant difference evident in Hungary. What is striking is that employment without a contract is particularly high among men, the relative weight being twice as high for men as for women in the Czech Republic, and 1.6 times in Hungary. Fixed-term full-time employment is slightly higher for women than for men.

[8] Work without a contract can have a variety of meanings. In the countries under study here the most obvious one is work in the informal sector.

Table 3. Distribution of types of employment by age, education and branches, the Czech Republic and Hungary, 2001 (%)

	N		Permanent f-t		Permanent p-t		Fixed-term full-t		Fixed-term part-t		Self-employed		Other contracts*		No contract**	
	CZ	*HU*	CZ	HU	CZ	HU	CZ	HU	CZ	HU	CZ	HU	CZ	HU	CZ	HU
Age group																
18–24	*104*	*59*	60.6	57.6	1.9	6.8	13.5	11.9	1.9	0	3.8	1.7	11.5	3.4	6.7	18.6
25–34	*255*	*208*	69.4	66.3	0.8	3.4	12.9	8.2	0.4	2.4	10.6	7.2	2.4	2.4	3.5	11.1
35–44	*258*	*173*	67.4	76.3	2.3	1.2	7	4.6	0.8	0.6	15.5	10.4	2.3	0.6	4.7	6.9
45–54	*257*	*183*	68.5	71.6	2.3	2.7	7.8	4.4	0.4	1.1	13.6	14.2	2.3	0.5	5.1	6.6
55–65	*113*	*69*	63.7	59.4	2.7	2.9	5.3	5.8	2.7	2.9	10.6	11.6	4.4	2.9	10.6	17.4
Education																
Primary	*73*	*116*	58.9	59.5	1.4	6	17.8	7.8	1.4	2.6	4.1	3.4	6.8	0.9	9.6	20.7
Vocational	*367*	*244*	66.8	67.2	0.3	2	11.4	7.4	0.5	1.2	13.4	10.7	3.8	1.2	3.8	10.2
Secondary	*398*	*220*	69.3	69.5	3	2.3	6.5	5.5	1.3	1.4	10.1	11.4	3.5	3.2	6.3	7.3
Tertiary	*149*	*117*	65.8	76.1	3.4	2.6	6.7	5.1	0.7	0	17.4	11.1	1.3	0	4.7	5.1
Branches																
Agriculture, forestry, fishing	*64*	*59*	59.4	47.5	1.6	0	12.5	3.4	0	1.7	15.6	27.1	1.6	0	9.4	20.3
Manufacturing, mining, quarrying	*315*	*185*	74.6	78.4	1	0.5	7.3	7.6	0.6	1.6	8.8	4.3	3.8	1.1	3.8	6.5
Transport and storage	*69*	*50*	92.8	78	0	2	0	6	0	0	2.9	10	2.9	0	1.4	4
Trade, repair and other services	*259*	*180*	48.6	58.9	1.2	4.4	11.2	5	0.4	0.6	24.5	16.7	4.2	1.7	10.4	12.8
Financial intermediary, insurance	*31*	*17*	71	70.6	0	0	3.2	5.9	0	0	19.4	11.8	6.5	11.8	0	0
Public admin., defence; soc. sec.	*75*	*40*	75.3	76	2.6	4	10.4	10.7	2.6	2.7	0	0	5.2	5.3	1.3	1.3
Health	*67*	*44*	73.1	77.3	1.5	2.3	13.4	9.1	1.5	0	9	6.8	0	2.3	1.5	2.3
Culture and Education	*101*	*68*	66.3	72.1	8.9	8.8	11.9	7.4	3	4.4	3	0	3	1.5	4	5.9

*casual jobs, on-call workers, temporary-work agency, work on a fee basis

** excludes self-employed

Source: HWF survey

With regard to age groups, in both countries the percentage of standard employment is low primarily in the youngest age group of 18–24 year olds, but also in the oldest age group of 55–65 year olds, the two age groups also occupying a weaker position in the labour market in terms of employment and unemployment rates (table 3). However, in Hungary the differences between the age groups are much more polarised than in the Czech Republic: in the former the youngest and oldest age groups trail the age group with the highest incidence of standard employment by 18.7 and 16.9 percentage points respectively, while in the latter the differences are 8.8 and 5.7 percentage points respectively.

The youngest and oldest age groups are thus much more involved in non-standard employment, particularly in Hungary. This is reflected in the higher-than-average occurrence of fixed-term employment among young people, at 1.5 times the average in the Czech Republic and 1.9 times the average in Hungary, a phenomenon that can be presumably linked largely to their initial entry into the labour market. Another factor is the high levels of part-time employment (Hungary) and other types of contracts (Czech Republic) among young people, both of which indicating that many combine education with employment. In addition, Hungarian young people in particular exhibit a very high incidence of employment without a contract, at no less than 18.6% of their age group. The high level of employment without a contract is also the most striking factor in the case of the oldest age group in both countries, with the situation in Hungary again being much more polarised. This clearly indicates the more precarious position of these age groups and their relatively high level of participation in the informal sector. In Hungary the oldest age group is also engaged in self-employment on an above-average level.

As far as education is concerned, in both countries the lowest levels of standard employment are found among those with only primary education. In absolute terms, this affects more people in Hungary than in the Czech Republic, given that in the former 16.6% of the sample had primary education as their maximum level, while in the latter only 7.4% did. While in the Czech Republic the differences between educational groups are fairly small, in Hungary the difference between those with primary education and those with tertiary education is noticeable, their respective percentages of standard employment being 59.5% and 76.1%. In addition, the main alternative to standard employment for the less educated in the Czech Republic is fixed-term employment (17.8%), while in Hungary it is employment without a contract (20.7%), suggesting the latter are in a much more precarious position.

If we then look at the different branches of employment, we can first identify two particularly flexible branches with very low levels of standard employment. One is agriculture, particularly low in Hungary (47.5%), but also far below the average in the Czech Republic (59.4%). The other is trade, repair and other services, which are particularly low in the Czech Republic (48.6%), but again in Hungary far below the average (58.9%). All other branches have standard employment levels clearly above the average, or close to it in the case of culture and education in the Czech Republic. Much of non-standard employment can be traced back to trade, repair and other services, the fastest growing branch of the 1990s, linking non-stan-

dard employment closely to the structural changes in the two economies. Because of its size (26.4% of total employment), this branch comprises no less than 41.3% of all non-standard jobs in the Czech Republic. In Hungary, the figure is not much lower: 37.2%. The high incidence of employment without a contract is especially indicative of the precarious nature of many jobs in this branch. Agriculture, however small a branch it may be, is responsible for 8.4% of self-employment and 11.5% of employment without a contract in the Czech Republic; the respective percentages for Hungary are much higher: 24.6% and 21.1%. In Hungary particularly this underlines the marginal position of this branch.

The above information should not lead us to the conclusion that manufacturing is of little importance in terms of non-standard employment. Indeed, manufacturing has high levels of standard employment. However, owing to its size, in the Czech Republic manufacturing also includes 25.6% of all fixed-term full-time jobs, 34.3% of other contracts, and 23.1% of employment without a contract. Likewise, in Hungary, 32.6% of all fixed-term full-time jobs, 22.2% of all other contracts, and 21.1% of employment without a contract correspond to manufacturing.

3.2 Types of employment and personal and household income

One of the implicit assumptions in the flexibility-deregulation debate is often that non-standard employment in general and certain types of it in particular not only provide less security to the person employed, something derived directly from the contractual characteristics of these forms of employment, but also come with worse conditions in terms of income and working hours. What can we say about these issues based on the HWF survey? Let's first consider the matter of income, focusing again on the four main types of employment.[9]

Looking at personal income, table 4 shows that the type of employment an individual has is indeed of great importance for his/her income position. First of all, in both countries, the percentage of those people with standard employment who fall into the lowest income group is far below the average. In Hungary, this also applies to the second income group, while there are higher than average shares of persons with standard employment in the upper two income groups. In the Czech Republic this also applies to the second-highest income group, but not to the highest income group. In Hungary, standard employment is more likely to provide relatively high incomes than in the Czech Republic. The main reason for this is the different position occupied by self-employment in the two countries. In the Czech Republic, self-employment is clearly a high-income activity, as the share of the Czech self-employed who fall into the highest personal income group is 2.3 times the average. At the same time, the corresponding shares in the two lowest personal income groups are below

[9] Some caution should be observed when interpreting the income data; on the one hand because there is quite a high number of missing values in the Hungarian sample. On the other hand, there may be cases of under-reporting, particularly in the case of the self-employed.

Table 4. Types of employment and personal and per capita household income, the Czech Republic and Hungary, 2001 (%)***

	N	**Total**	Permanent full-time	Permanent part-time	Fixed-term full-time	Fixed-term part-time	Self-employed	Other contracts*	No contract**
Czech Republic, personal income groups									
I	*81*	**8.6**	4.9	22.2	14.6	12.5	4.4	39.4	30.4
II	*210*	**22.2**	21.0	22.2	37.1	37.5	15.9	27.3	19.6
III	*207*	**21.9**	24.5	16.7	22.5	12.5	15.0	6.1	17.4
IV	*287*	**30.4**	35.0	22.2	22.5	25.0	26.5	6.1	13.0
V	*160*	**16.9**	14.7	16.7	3.4	12.5	38.1	21.2	19.6
		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Czech Republic, per capita household income groups									
I	*186*	**18.0**	16.3	21.1	23.4	22.2	12.2	21.4	36.7
II	*269*	**26.0**	26.3	15.8	28.7	22.2	25.2	38.1	15.0
III	*160*	**15.5**	15.4	10.5	18.1	22.2	16.3	16.7	10.0
IV	*201*	**19.4**	20.8	26.3	19.1	11.1	16.3	14.3	13.3
V	*218*	**21.1**	21.1	26.3	10.6	22.2	30.1	9.5	25.0
		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Hungary, personal income groups									
I	*40*	**9.1**	2.7	0.0	18.8	20.0	22.2	14.3	34.8
II	*47*	**10.7**	5.7	50.0	18.8	0.0	19.4	14.3	17.4
III	*83*	**18.9**	19.8	12.5	25.0	20.0	8.3	14.3	19.6
IV	*138*	**31.4**	37.2	12.5	21.9	40.0	25.0	42.9	8.7
V	*132*	**30.0**	34.6	25.0	15.6	20.0	25.0	14.3	19.6
		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Hungary, per capita household income groups									
I	*52*	**14.1**	10.4	33.3	17.2	0.0	16.1	11.1	31.4
II	*77*	**20.9**	21.9	25.0	24.1	50.0	25.8	11.1	5.7
III	*62*	**16.8**	16.7	0.0	13.8	0.0	16.1	44.4	20.0
IV	*86*	**23.3**	24.7	25.0	20.7	50.0	16.1	11.1	22.9
V	*92*	**24.9**	26.3	16.7	24.1	0.0	25.8	22.2	20.0
		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

* casual jobs, on-call workers, temporary-work agency, work on a fee basis

** excludes self-employed

*** The income groups represent near income quintiles for the total sample, including the unemployed and inactive.

Source: HWF survey

that of all other forms of employment. In comparison, in Hungary, self-employment tends much more to be a low-income activity, given that the share of the Hungarian self-employed who fall into the lowest income group is more than twice the average and the share of those who fall into the second-lowest income group is almost twice the average; their share in the highest income groups is well below the average. This suggests that in the Czech Republic, with its more limited employment decline over the 1990s, self-employment is more a result of 'pull' factors, that is, of positive income opportunities, while in Hungary it is more the result of 'push' factors, that is to say, it represents more of an alternative to unemployment and poverty.

Hungarian fixed-term full-time employment is also a low income activity: it has around double the average in the lowest two income groups, and represents a quite low share in the highest income groups, almost half the average. People employed without a contract in Hungary trail the average even more, which is particularly evident in that the share of them in the lowest income group is 3.8 times the average. For Hungary, then, it is possible to conclude that there is a clear divide between standard employment as a relatively high-income form of employment and the various types of non-standard employment as relatively low-income forms of employment, particularly where employment without a contract is concerned. This suggests that not only much of self-employment, but also much of all non-standard employment has the function of representing an alternative to unemployment and poverty, a situation that is closely linked to the sharp decline in aggregate employment in the 1990s.

In the Czech Republic, the situation is less clear-cut. Like in Hungary, fixed-term full-time employment is a low-income form of employment, with much higher than average percentages in the lowest two income groups and much lower than average percentages in the highest two income groups. However, as mentioned above, self-employment is the clearest type of high-income employment, more so than standard employment. As far as employment without a contract is concerned, like in Hungary, there is a very high share in the lowest income group, 3.5 times the average. However, unlike in Hungary, in the Czech Republic a significant proportion of employment without a contract is relatively well rewarded, considering that there is an above-average share of them in the highest personal income group and a well above-average share in standard employment.

To what extent does this situation concerning personal income change when we look instead at per capita household income? Are the relative earning positions of the various types of contracts confirmed in this case? An important question here is whether households have other sources of income (other employment, social benefits) which they can use to compensate for the disadvantageous position the more precarious, low-income types of employment are in.

From table 4 it is possible to conclude that, in both countries, when the per capita household income is taken into account, the distribution over the five income groups moves closer to the average for all four main types of employment. Because of the size of households and/or the presence of other types of incomes, the relative income position of the more precarious types of employment is somewhat strength-

ened and that of the better earning types of employment weakened. However, little change can be observed in what types of employment are related to higher and lower incomes, here the rank order stays the same, it is only less polarised. In the Czech Republic, self-employment is still related to the most favourable per capita household income situation, while in Hungary it remains standard employment. Also, employment without a contract continues to show a bifurcated distribution over the income groups. It is only fixed-term employment in Hungary that considerably improves its relative position in comparison with the average, suggesting that there more so than in the Czech Republic, it refers to young people living with their parents.

3.3 Types of employment and weekly working hours

A final aspect of the various types of employment concerns the number of hours worked (table 5). On average, the weekly hours worked in Hungary are 3.7 hours more than in the Czech Republic. This difference stems basically from the fact that in Hungary no less than 21.3% of the employed work more than 50 hours a week, compared to 12.8% in the Czech Republic. In both countries, men work more hours than women, and the percentage of men who work over 50 hours a week is more than double that of women. In both countries the vast majority of employed people work 36 hours or more weekly, 89.5% in the Czech Republic and 88.2% in Hungary.

When specified by types of employment, there are three particularly striking features relating to the weekly hours worked. First, in both countries self-employment stands out as the type of employment with the highest weekly working hours, and with the highest percentage of people working over 50 hours a week, particularly among men. While this is not surprising, it nonetheless underlines the fact that self-employment is highly time-intensive and that in this sense it features precarious working conditions. Second, the distribution of weekly hours worked for those working without a contract has a bifurcated character. A high percentage of this group work over 40 hours: 64.2% in the Czech Republic and 47.8% in Hungary. But there is also a high percentage of them who work less than 30 hours weekly, which would in this sense qualify them as having part-time employment: 20.7% in the Czech Republic and 24.6% in Hungary.

Third, possibly the most significant difference between the two countries concerns the large group in standard employment. In Hungary, this group on average works 4.9 hours more per week than in the Czech Republic. Also, in Hungary, no less than 20.6% of this group work more than 50 hours a week, almost three times the percentage in the Czech Republic, a difference that could possibly be linked to overtime regulations, which, if regulated through collective agreements, allow for much more annual overtime in Hungary than in the Czech Republic. This difference in hours worked may partially explain the fact that standard employment in Hungary is a relatively high income activity, while in the Czech Republic only few people with standard employment fall into the highest income group. However, it

Table 5. Types of employment and weekly hours worked, the Czech Republic and Hungary, 2001

	N		Average		0 to 14		15 to 29		30 to 35		36 to 40		41 to 50		over 50	
	CZ	*HU*	CZ	HU	CZ	HU	CZ	HU	CZ	HU	CZ	HU	CZ	HU	CZ	HU
Permanent full-time employees total	*662*	*475*	43.5	48.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.6	2.3	43.5	30.9	45.2	46.1	7.7	20.6
Males	*355*	*246*	44.6	50.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	0.8	39.2	24.4	48.5	48.0	10.4	26.8
Females	*307*	*230*	42.2	45.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.5	3.9	48.5	37.8	41.4	44.3	4.6	13.9
Permanent part-time employees total	*19*	*20*	14.3	20.2	63.2	20.0	36.8	80.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Males	*5*	*4*	11.8	14.8	80.0	50.0	20.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Females	*14*	*16*	15.2	21.6	57.1	12.5	42.9	87.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Fixed-term full-time employees total	*91*	*43*	43.7	45.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.8	4.7	38.5	32.6	42.9	55.8	9.9	7.0
Males	*43*	*20*	44.3	44.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.0	5.0	41.9	25.0	39.5	65.0	11.6	5.0
Females	*48*	*24*	43.2	45.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.4	4.2	35.4	37.5	45.8	50.0	8.3	8.3
Fixed term part-time employees total	*9*	*9*	17.7	17.1	33.3	44.4	66.7	55.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Males	*2*	*5*	16.5	14.6	50.0	60.0	50.0	40.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Females	*7*	*4*	18.0	20.0	28.6	25.0	71.4	75.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Self-employed total	*118*	*68*	49.8	54.5	3.4	5.9	5.1	5.9	5.1	4.4	8.5	16.2	40.7	30.9	37.3	36.8
Males	*70*	*46*	53.4	56.6	1.4	6.5	0.0	6.5	1.4	2.2	7.1	13.0	45.7	26.1	44.3	45.7
Females	*48*	*23*	44.5	50.3	6.3	4.3	12.5	4.3	10.4	8.7	10.4	21.7	33.3	39.1	27.1	21.7
Other types of contracts* total	*35*	*11*	33.8	44.1	17.1	18.2	20.0	18.2	8.6	0.0	14.3	9.1	25.7	18.2	14.3	36.4
Males	*22*	*5*	35.8	61.3	13.6	0.0	18.2	20.0	9.1	0.0	9.1	0.0	27.3	20.0	22.7	60.0
Females	*13*	*6*	30.6	30.7	23.1	33.3	23.1	16.7	7.7	0.0	23.1	16.7	23.1	16.7	0.0	16.7
No contract total**	*53*	*69*	45.4	43.4	9.4	17.4	11.3	7.2	1.9	11.6	13.2	15.9	32.1	21.7	32.1	26.1
Males	*37*	*43*	47.2	45.4	8.1	18.6	10.8	2.3	2.7	11.6	10.8	16.3	32.4	20.9	35.1	30.2
Females	*16*	*23*	41.1	39.7	12.5	17.4	12.5	17.4	0.0	8.7	18.8	13.0	31.3	21.7	25.0	21.7
Total	*987*	*695*	43.3	47.0	3.0	3.7	3.2	4.6	4.3	3.5	35.0	26.5	41.7	40.4	12.8	21.3
Males	*535*	*369*	45.3	49.7	2.4	4.3	1.9	2.4	2.6	2.4	31.4	21.1	44.7	41.5	17.0	28.2
Females	*452*	*326*	40.9	44.0	3.8	3.1	4.9	7.1	6.2	4.3	39.2	32.2	38.3	39.6	7.7	13.8

* casual jobs, on-call workers, temporary-work agency, work on a fee basis

** excludes self-employed

Source: HWF survey

Table 6. Types of employment and working-time arrangements, the Czech Republic and Hungary, 2001 (%)

	N		Regular		Shift work		Irregular	
	CZ	HU	CZ	HU	CZ	HU	CZ	HU
Permanent full-time employees	*661*	*472*	65.1	62.3	17.9	10.2	17.1	27.5
Permanent part-time employees	*19*	*20*	63.2	70.0	10.5	15.0	26.3	15.0
Fixed-term full-time employees	*91*	*43*	60.4	65.1	28.6	9.3	11.0	25.6
Fixed term part-time employees	*9*	*9*	77.8	33.3	0.0	0.0	22.2	66.7
Self-employed	*118*	*68*	39.0	22.1	0.8	0.0	60.2	77.9
Other types of contracts*	*34*	*11*	44.1	9.1	8.8	0.0	47.1	90.9
No contract**	*51*	*69*	35.3	24.6	2.0	7.2	62.7	68.1
Total	*987*	*727*	59.4	53.9	15.3	8.4	25.3	37.7

* casual jobs, on-call workers, temporary-work agency, work on a fee basis

** excludes self-employed

Source: HWF survey

also shows that standard employment in Hungary requires greater effort. Indeed, both in terms of income and hours worked, standard employment is not exactly the same thing in the two countries.

In addition, while in both countries the majority of the employed have regular working-time arrangements, in the Czech Republic the share of this group out of total employment is 5.5 percentage points higher than in Hungary (table 6). Also, the percentage of shift work is higher in the Czech Republic, almost double that of Hungary. The main difference between the two is in irregular patterns of working time, which make up 37.7% of Hungarian employment compared to 25.3% in the Czech Republic. As far as the four main types of employment are concerned, the main difference occurs between standard and fixed-term employment on the one hand and self-employment and employment without a contract on the other. Standard employment and fixed-term full-time employment have predominantly regular working-time patterns, at between 60–65%, while self-employment and work without a contract have predominantly irregular working time patterns, at over 60% in both countries. However, a significant share of standard employment features irregular working-time patterns, and this share is 10 percentage points higher in Hungary than in the Czech Republic. In other words, standard employment in Hungary not only has higher average weekly working hours, as discussed above, but it is also more irregular. The share of shift work in standard employment and in fixed-term full-time employment is much higher in the Czech Republic. This further confirms that standard employment does not have the exact same meaning in the two cases.

4. Concluding remarks

Building upon diverging versions of state socialism, the Czech Republic and Hungary have been constructing their particular versions of capitalism since 1989. In Hungary this process has featured a stronger market orientation than in the Czech Republic, and, in close relation to this, Hungary also experienced a much greater decline in aggregate employment during the 1990s. In this context, the analysis presented here demonstrated some of the important similarities and dissimilarities in the way one core dimension of contemporary capitalism, i.e. labour market flexibility, is constituted in the two countries in terms of types of employment. Quite similarly, in both countries, two-thirds of employment fit the definition of standard employment, which is quite a high rate in comparison with EU countries. Also, in both countries, persons with standard employment rarely fall into the lower personal income categories. However, standard employment is not entirely the same in each of the two cases: in the Czech Republic, persons with standard employment work fewer hours a week and have a much lower incidence of irregular working-time patterns than in Hungary.

Around one-third of employment is non-standard employment, but there are important differences in the weight of the various types of non-standard employment. The most noticeable difference here is the much higher level of importance in Hungary of what is most likely the most flexible and precarious type of employment, i.e. employment without a contract, which represents 9.9% of total employment, almost twice as much as in the Czech Republic (5.4%). Another interesting difference is the relationship of non-standard employment to income, in particular as far as self-employment is concerned. In Hungary, all types of non-standard employment are largely low-income activities. This is less the case in the Czech Republic, where self-employment is the clearest high-income activity, even more so than standard employment. This suggests that in the Czech Republic, which experienced a more limited decline in employment over the 1990s and has a higher employment rate, self-employment is more a result of 'pull' factors, while in Hungary it is more the result of 'push' factors.

The relative position of the various social groups and branches is for the most part similar in the two countries. In both, standard employment is particularly low in agriculture and in trade, repair and other services. In both these branches self-employment and employment without a contract are strongly over-represented, reflecting the precarious nature of a large proportion of the jobs they provide. Standard employment is also comparatively low for the lowest and highest age groups, and for the less educated. Given that these groups also have the least favourable employment and unemployment rates, and thus occupy a weaker position in the labour market, this suggests that for many of them non-standard employment is a 'forced choice' and the only alternative to unemployment. However, this line of reasoning does not apply to women. In spite of the fact that for women employment declined much faster than for men in the years 1990–2000, and that today their employment rates are considerably lower, women have a higher percent-

age of standard employment, and work less hours weekly. In other words, a weaker labour market position in terms of employment rates is not necessarily linked to higher levels of flexibility.

But, while tendencies are similar in the two countries with regard to the relative position of social groups, the differences between age groups, between men and women, and between educational groups are much more pronounced in Hungary than in the Czech Republic. In this sense, the Czech labour market is much more 'egalitarian' and the Hungarian one much more 'polarised'.

To summarise, the broad trends tend to follow similar patterns in the two countries as far as the incidence of standard and non-standard employment, and the position of social groups and branches are concerned. However, important differences prevail, which indicate the more precarious nature of employment in Hungary and the more polarised nature of the Hungarian labour market. As argued throughout this paper, such differences can plausibly be linked to the stronger market orientation of the Hungarian post-socialist reforms, and to the closely related fact that, during the 1990s, aggregate employment in Hungary fell much more than in the Czech Republic.

MAARTEN KEUNE *is a research associate at the Department of Political and Social Sciences of the European University Institute in Florence. He worked formerly for the International Labour Organization. He has published extensively on institutional change, labour market reforms, and on local development in Central and Eastern Europe.*

References

Cazes, S. and A. Nešporová. 2001. "Labour Market Flexibility in the Transition Countries. How Much is too Much?" *International Labour Review* 140 (3): 293–325.

Crouch, C. 1993. *Industrial Relations and European State Traditions.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Crouch, C. and W. Streeck (eds.). 1997. *Political Economy of Modern Capitalism, Mapping Convergence and Diversity.* London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Esping-Andersen, G. 1990. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Esping-Andersen, G. and M. Regini (eds.). 2000. *Why Deregulate Labour Markets?* Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

European Commission. 2001. *Employment in Europe 2001. Recent Trends and Prospects.* Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

Fazekas, K. and T. Koltay (eds.). 2002. *The Hungarian Labour Market. Review and Analysis 2002.* Budapest: Institute of Economics HAS and Hungarian Employment Foundation.

Frýdmanová, M, K. Janáček, P. Mareš and T. Sirovátka. 1999. "Labour Market and Human Resources." Pp. 21–43 in *Ten Years of Rebuilding Capitalism: Czech Society after 1989,* edited by J. Večerník and P. Matějů. Prague: Academia.

Gábor, I. 1999. "Post-socialist Transformation and the Labour Market in Hungary – the Quest for Institutional Realignment." *Acta Oeconomica* 50 (1–2): 103–117.

Hall, P. and D. Soskice (eds.). 2001. *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Keune, M. 1998. *Youth Unemployment in Hungary and Poland.* Employment and Training Papers. Geneva: ILO.

Keune, M. 2002. "Institutionalising Capitalism: Changing Labour Market Institutions in Hungary after State Socialism." Pp. 76–94 in *Labour Relations in Development,* edited by A. Fernandez and M. Riethof. London: Routledge.

Kertesi, G. and J. Köllő. 1999. *Economic Transformation and the Return to Human Capital: The Case of Hungary, 1986–1996.* Budapest Working Papers on the Labour Market 1999/6. Budapest: Institute of Economics.

Köllő, J. 1998. "Employment and Wage Setting in Three Stages of Hungary's Labour Market Transition." Pp. 57–108 in *Enterprise Restructuring and Unemployment in Models of Transition,* edited by S. Commander. Washington: World Bank.

Kornai, J. 1992. *The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism.* New Jersey: Princeton.

Kornai, J. 2001. "Hardening the Budget Constraint: The Experience of the Post-Socialist Countries." *European Economic Review* 45: 1573–1599.

Laky, T. 1996. *Labour Market Report 1995.* Budapest: Hungarian Foundation for Enterprise Promotion.

Nešporová, A. and V. Uldrichová. 1997. "Employment Policies and Programmes in the Czech Republic." Pp. 47–77 in *Employment Policies and Programmes in Central and Eastern Europe,* edited by M. Godfrey and P. Richards. Geneva: ILO.

Riboud, M., C. Sánchez-Páramo and C. Silva-Jáuregui. 2002. *Does Eurosclerosis Matter? Institutional Reform and Labour Market Performance in Central and Eastern European Countries in the 1990s.* Social Protection Discussion Papers Series No. 0202. Washington: The World Bank.

Rosser, J.B Jr., M.V. Rosser and E. Ahmed. 2000. "Income Inequality and the Informal Economy in Transition Economies." *Journal of Comparative Economics* 28 (1): 156–171.

Sarfati, H. G. and Bonoli (eds.). 2002. *Labour Market and Social Protection Reforms in International Perspective. Parallel or Converging Tracks?* Aldershot: Ashgate.

Schneider, F. 2002. "The Size and Development of the Shadow Economies and the Shadow Economy Labour Force of 22 Transition and 21 OECD Coutries: What Do We Really Know?" Paper presented at the Round Table Conference 'On the Informal Economy', Sofia, Bulgaria, 18–20 April 2002 http://www.csd.bg/news/bert/schneider-paper.PDF (seen 23-01-2003).

Standing, G. 1999. *Global Labour Flexibility. Seeking Distributive Justice.* Basingstoke: Macmillan.

UN-ECE. 2000. *Economic Survey of Europe 2000.* New York and Geneva: United Nations.

Večerník, J. 2001a. *Labour Market Flexibility and Employment Security: Czech Republic.* Employment Paper 2001/27. Geneva: ILO.

Večerník, J. 2001b. *Earning Disparities in the Czech Republic: Evidence of the Past Decade and Cross-National Comparison.* WDI Working Paper No. 373. Michigan: William Davidson Institute.

Večerník, J. and P. Matějů (eds.). 1999. *Ten Years of Rebuilding Capitalism: Czech Society after 1989.* Prague: Academia.

Czech Republic: The First Elections in the New Republic, 1992–1996 Analyses, Documents and Data

Edited by Zdenka Mansfeldová

Berlin: edition sigma 2003, 371 pages

This book focuses on the first two parliamentary elections following the break-up of the Czechoslovakian federation. The subject, like the others in the sigma series *Founding Elections in Eastern Europe*, is the analysis of the elections in the broader context of legislative change and political transformation. The individual authors examine the development of a competitive system of political parties, the political climate and voting behaviour, the search for social consensus, the crystallisation of cleavages and their political representation, the formation of government, and regional differentiation in election results. Attention is also devoted to the unexpected and unintended outcome of the 1992 elections, with the break-up of the Czechoslovak federation and the emergence of an independent Czech Republic, and to the Senate, discussions on bicameralism, and first experiences with a second chamber of Parliament.

The book includes an extensive series of appendices, which present the most important laws relating to these subjects, along with election results, voting preferences, and an overview of databases accessible for secondary analyses.

The book includes an Introduction from *Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Charles Lewis Taylor*, and contributions from *Lubomír Brokl, Jan Filip, Zdenek Jičínský, Tomáš Kostelecký, Zdenka Mansfeldová, Miroslav Novák, Jana Reschová, Adéla Seidlová and Vojtěch Šimíček.*

For an *Order Form* and/or more information on this publication please go to the website of **edition sigma**: http://www.edition-sigma.de Or contact their office directly at the following address:

edition sigma, Karl-Marx-Strasse 17, D-112043 Berlin

Tel: +49-30-623 23 63, Fax: +49-30-623 93 93

e-mail: Verlag@edition-sigma.de

A Tentative Categorisation of Various Types of Work Flexibility

PAVLE SICHERL*
SICENTER and University of Ljubljana, Slovenia

Abstract: The article provides a more detailed discussion of a tentative categorisation of various types of work flexibility in Slovenia on the basis of the survey from the international Households, Work and Flexibility project. It shows that there are statistically significant differences between selected flexibility categories in the ('objective') characteristics related to work, but practically no significant differences in the ('subjective') opinions on possible work/family conflicts or agreements about various household issues. In comparison with the candidate countries, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK reveal a much higher share of atypical forms of employment, but also greater satisfaction with various aspects of work. These large differences are influenced not only by institutional and policy choices, but also by general factors such as the level of development, economic structure, lifestyles and preferences. The results arising out of the 'supply side' of work show that flexible forms of employment can be both more or less favourable than typical, full-time, permanent employment with a regular schedule and one economic activity. The answer to this depends both on objective and subjective criteria. Such empirical research can be an important element in contributing to the process of building a social consensus around how to balance the benefits and costs of flexible forms for all stakeholders.
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2003, Vol. 39, No. 6: 815–839

Introduction

The article attempts to discuss a provisional categorisation of the survey respondents in the Households, Work and Flexibility project (HWF) in different categories of flexibility. The complex problem of flexibility of work has come to assume major economic, social and political importance. As Beck pointed out [2000], the risk regime prevails in every field, economy, society and polity, meaning that the future of work will involve more than one direction of development, within and across a number of different dimensions. These trends are recognised by several international organisations, though with a somewhat different emphasis. In its evaluation of the labour market performance and the OECD Jobs Strategy, the OECD finds that „high and persistent unemployment remains a major problem, with a significant role played by 'atypical forms' of employment. Part-time work has made a positive contribution in most countries, but sometimes it is a second-best choice" [OECD 1999].

* Direct all correspondence to: Prof. Pavle Sicherl, SICENTER, Brajnikova 19, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, e-mail: Pavle.Sicherl@link.si, Pavle.Sicherl@sicenter.si

The ILO states in its World Employment Report that "recent years have seen a significant growth of part-time or temporary contracts, of self-employment and of informal sector employment in developing countries. Flexible work arrangements can result in pressure to create low-skill jobs, and those accepting them may well receive less training. Similarly, those entering self-employment and informal sector work may lack basic skills and never be able to acquire them. The overall result can be a general downgrading of the skill structure of the labour force" [ILO 1998].

All these challenges will have to be addressed at three levels: the personal (worker-centred), activity (company-centred) and society levels. There is a much greater chance of a better outcome if the co-ordination of these different perspectives is achieved in a continued social dialogue rather than through the random actions of the participating agents. The statistical data on atypical forms of employment, as well as survey responses, can be interpreted as outcomes of the interactions at all three levels in different countries. However, in this article, as in the HWF project, some light can be shed on a rather detailed study of only one aspect of the overall picture, i.e. on the personal and household side.

Still, a better understanding of a partial aspect can be important in searching for better overall solutions. It is unsatisfactory to start from the black-and-white distinction that standard forms are by nature superior to flexible forms of employment or vice versa, depending on the ideological position or diverse interests of different sides involved in the policy debate. The position in this article follows the view of Sicherl and Remec [2002] that the issue of whether flexible forms of employment are good or bad jobs from the personal/household perspective is an empirical question. A similar position was taken by McGovern, Smeaton and Hill [2002] and Kalleberg, Reskin and Hudson [2000]. The final answer depends both on objective and subjective criteria, but the empirical investigation here will attempt to study what conclusions can be arrived at by looking at the 'objective' conditions of different forms of employment.

The article first presents in greater detail the results and conclusions of the grouping of the Slovenian survey respondents into selected major flexibility groups. For the Slovenian case a set of hypotheses was tested, which relate to the working assumption that some flexible forms of employment are more and others are less favourable as jobs than the standard, full-time, permanent employment with a regular schedule and one economic activity. In other words, grouping the economically active respondents into three major categories, the null hypothesis was tested that there were no statistically significant differences for the three groups with respect to variables like selected work characteristics, source of income, satisfaction with various aspects of work, and possible work/family conflicts.

Owing to the lack of space and the complexity of the analysis it is not feasible to analyse the situation in other participating countries in the same manner. As a consequence, the comparative analysis shows only the structure of respondents in the selected eight and/or three categories, the average number of activities and hours of work in the main activity for these categories, and the subjective satisfac-

tion with various aspects of work. In addition, the atypical forms of employment are also compared using secondary sources. A brief comparison of the results for the Czech Republic and Slovenia is followed by conclusions.

The grouping of Slovenian survey respondents into major flexibility groups

A possible approach to an operational definition of flexibility is that flexibility is contrasted to a standard form of arrangements. The first of the three major categories of employment will be formed out of those people permanently employed full-time, with a regular working schedule and only one economic activity. This category will be labelled 'standard pattern of employment'. This means that the rest of the cases could be labelled as flexible forms of employment.

In the Analysis of the Survey for Slovenia,[1] several subdivisions of flexible (non-standard) employment forms are used. The first set of subdivisions breaks down these forms into seven subcategories. There are advantages in doing so, but in many cases it is difficult to draw statistically significant conclusions because of the small number of cases in some of these subcategories. Therefore, the flexible (non-standard) employment forms are then combined into two major groups: 'flexible employment group A' and 'flexible employment group B'.

Flexible employment group A encompasses flexible categories of those employed full-time with more than one economic activity or with the possibility of flexitime, the self-employed, students with additional jobs, and retired people with additional jobs. This approximation is meant to indicate probable 'voluntary' or 'desirable' forms of flexibility. Flexible employment group B includes those who work shift-work, those who work irregular hours, those working with fixed contracts, part-time employment, casual workers, and those employed but laid off. In a certain way, these could be referred to as 'involuntary' or 'undesirable' forms of flexibility. Of course, without knowing the subjective evaluations of the persons involved it is impossible to be certain whether the breakdown into such categories used in this process (see tables 1 and 2) is appropriate or not. There is a wide range of situations in which some forms of flexibility are very desirable from the point of view of the respondent, while some other forms of flexibility might be imposed on him/her as unfavourable conditions, which he/she has to accept to get the job.

In the empirical work, this categorisation into three groups – flexible employment group A, flexible employment group B and standard employment group C – provides interesting results in the case of Slovenia. The preliminary results may be helpful in searching for a more precise, yet pragmatic definition of flexibility at this level of analysis. Several interesting statistically significant differences between the

[1] The Analysis of the Survey for Slovenia is available in Sicherl and Remec [2002], and a slightly revised version is available in Research Report #3, containing Country Survey Reports on the participating countries [Wallace 2003].

Table 1. Flexibility grouping into eight categories

Category	Frequency	Percent (%)
1. Full-time employment, more activities, flexitime	83	14.4
2. Full-time employment, shift and irregular work	115	19.9
3. Part-time employment	7	1.2
4. Fixed contract	60	10.4
5. Self-employed	41	7.1
6. Students and retired people with one or more activities	64	11.1
7. Others	27	4.7
8. Employed full-time, regular schedule, one activity	181	31.3
	n=578	

three groups that were established from the Slovenian survey data can provide new tentative hypotheses.

The results pertain to a subset of respondents, who answered that they had had one or more economic activities during the previous twelve months and could by this criterion be considered economically active. In the survey it seems that a number of respondents were reluctant to answer the questions about their additional kinds of work and additional income, so that some of the respective information might be less reliable. Therefore, here we are dealing mainly with a subset of less than 600 economically active respondents who provided the necessary information. One of the possible subdivisions of this set – into eight flexibility categories in the first round, and into the three above-mentioned categories in the second round – is shown in tables 1 and 2.

The major criterion in the categorisation is the employment status of the respondent, which is then combined with some other characteristics of flexibility. As mentioned, the emphasis here is on the 'objective' elements of work status and flexibility, which may or may not correspond to the subjective evaluation of the respondents with respect to these characteristics.[2] Therefore, the approach taken here has the advantage that such 'objective' elements can be compared for different social groups or different countries. However, it should obviously not be considered

[2] For instance, it is considered here that working in shifts or on an irregular schedule is a negative element of work; while in a survey by the Statistical Office of Slovenia a rather large number of those working in shifts expressed their satisfaction with such a position. Of course, it is difficult to disentangle whether, in answering that question, they were satisfied that they had a job or whether they were satisfied with the shift arrangement as such.

Table 2. Flexibility grouping into three categories

Category	Frequency	Percent (%)
Flexibility group A (1+5+6)	188	32.5
Flexibility group B (2+3+4+7)	209	36.2
Standard employment group C (8)	181	31.1
	n=578	

Source: Sicherl [2003: 50]

as a statement of the difficulty or satisfaction with a particular position with respect to a given element of work.

Some of the subdivisions in table 1 are self-explanatory. Part-time employment and fixed-contract (temporary) employment are two categories of flexible work conditions which will be compared here in time and cross-nationally. The same goes for the category of the self-employed. The major dilemma is how, according to their flexibility characteristics, to categorise those who are employed full-time, who comprise about two-thirds of the subset of economically active respondents analysed. As explained above, the first of the three major categories of employment comprises those employed full-time, with a regular working schedule and only one economic activity (standard employment group C). The other two categories of those employed full-time are then considered as categories of flexible employment, distinct from the above-mentioned standard employment category, as they exhibit some 'positive' or 'negative' elements of flexibility in their work situation. Category 1 in table 1 comprises those employed full-time that have two or more economic activities or are employed full-time and have the advantage of flexitime privileges, i.e. they can start or finish their working hours in a flexible arrangement. In category 2 in the table, those with some 'negative' characteristics of work flexibility, such as shift and irregular work schedule, are included. These two categories will be the backbone of the subdivision of those with some flexibility characteristics (as distinct from the standard employment category) into flexibility group A and flexibility group B.

The grouping of respondents into the three categories presented in table 2 is obtained from the eight categories in table 1 in the following way. Standard employment group C is a category by itself to be compared with the rest of the respondents, i.e. those with some flexibility characteristics. However, both for policy and for research considerations the latter are subdivided into the two groups used here, which can later be refined and/or amended. Flexibility group A encompasses those with some 'objective' positive characteristics of flexibility, which are in this instance a summation of categories 1, 5 and 6 from table 1. The idea is that, in addition to category 1, as explained above, one could also add to this group the self-em-

ployed, students, and retired people with one or more activities.[3] For the self-employed in Slovenia, this position may be considered to be in the majority of cases a voluntary decision aimed at more independence and flexibility in work for those who choose it, rather than a consequence of being laid off and being forced into such a status. This may be very different in some other countries, and thus in international comparisons the self-employed category should be subdivided accordingly.

Flexibility group B comprises four categories from table 1 (adding categories 2, 3, 4 and 7). The most important component is category 2, with shift and irregular work as explained above. Part-time employment, which is rather rare in Slovenia, and fixed-contract (temporary) employment are placed in this flexibility group with negative objective elements on the presumption that in the majority of cases these employees would prefer a firmer commitment on the part of the employers. The group 'others' comprises casual workers, unpaid workers in family businesses, those unemployed with additional jobs, farmers with one economic activity and those who have been laid off. The great majority of those included in the category 'others' have negative elements of flexibility associated with their work position. To sum up, there are no doubt other possible criteria for categorising respondents by various flexibility characteristics. Here an attempt is being made to bring attention to the 'objective' elements of flexibility in order to initiate a discourse on the positive and negative aspects of flexibility arrangements at work. This issue can later also be connected to work-family situations. The most important policy issue with respect to work flexibility as it is viewed here is the question of how to balance the positive and negative aspects of work flexibility on both the employees' and the employers' sides. The analysis of work characteristics, personal and social characteristics, satisfaction and decisions with various aspects of work, possible work/family conflicts and the personal perception of well-being across the three chosen flexibility groups will hopefully initiate further discussion and research on a partial aspect of the important policy issue of work flexibility.

Table 3 presents the percentage distribution for the three flexibility groups by some elements of work characteristics. The number of activities in the last twelve months is distributed as expected. Standard group C is by definition involved in only one economic activity. In flexibility group A, 40% of respondents have two or more economic activities. Similarly, this group differs distinctively from both flexibility group B and, even more so, from standard group C, in terms of working more hours in all activities (i.e. the sum of hours worked in all activities); 41% of group A work more than fifty hours per week. In standard group C, 76% work the 'standard' working week (the group from 37 to 42 hours), while only 21% of flexible group A work those hours. For all three aspects of work characteristics in table 3 (number of activ-

[3] One could argue that neither students nor pensioners must engage in an economic activity as far as their basic status is concerned, so their engagement in one or more economic activities is a voluntary decision.

Table 3. Work characteristics (%)

	Flexibility group A	Flexibility group B	Standard group C	n
Number of activities in the last 12 months *				
1	60	93	100	483
2	29	6		66
3	7	1		15
4	3			5
5	1			2
6	1			1
				572
Hours of work in all activities *				
Less than 36 hours	15	12	2	54
From 37 to 42	21	55	76	287
From 43 to 50	23	17	19	110
More than 50 hours	41	16	4	114
				565
Working schedule *				
Regular working hours: Monday morning to Friday afternoon	25	16	100	257
Shift work	12	51		124
Flexitime	30	3		59
Other regular schedule	6	7		25
Irregular, it varies	27	21		91
Not available	1			1
				557
Type of contract in main activity *				
No contract	9	7		29
Self-employed	22	2	2	45
Permanent contract	46	54	95	359
Reduced working-time contract	2	2	2	11
Fixed term	3	30		65
'On call', subject to requirements	2	2	1	9
With a temporary-work agency	8	1		15
On a fee-only basis	5	2	1	13
On a work experience project		1		1
Not available	2	2		7
				554
Place of work				
At home	8	6	1	28
Combined at home and elsewhere	11	2	2	26
Within the locality where you live	31	37	39	199
Commuting to a different locality	36	49	50	251
Abroad	1	1	2	6
Always changing	14	5	7	47
Other situation	1			1
				558

Significance level of chi-square tests: * 0.01. Source: Sicherl [2003: 53]

ities in the past twelve months, hours of work in all activities and working schedule) the percentage difference distribution among the three flexibility categories is statistically significant at the 0.01 significance level of chi-square tests. On the average, flexibility group A works in more activities, works more hours per week, and has a more flexible schedule than the other two groups. It also shows higher values in income distribution and household goods distribution.

The type of contract in the main activity also differs significantly among the three groups; it is quite uniform in standard group C and most diversified in flexibility group A. The prevailing type of contract in the main activity is a permanent contract, at about 65% of respondents. In the standard group C the percentage of permanent contracts is 95%,[4] with 54% for flexibility group B and 46% for flexibility group A. However, the distinction between flexibility groups A and B is pronounced in the other categories of contract, self-employment being the most important in flexibility group A, and fixed-term employment in flexibility group B. The differences among the three categories with respect to the place of work are somewhat less pronounced; in all categories the majority commutes to work in a different locality.[5]

Testing the percentage distributions for the three flexibility groups by their personal characteristics and the respective social groups reveals significant differences for age group, social class and occupational status, but not for gender, education, type of settlement and family composition [Sicherl and Remec 2002: 37]. In all, 75% of standard group C belong to the age group 25–49 years, 67% of flexibility group B, and 54% of flexibility group A. Also, flexibility group A has the widest distribution over the different age groups, which is most likely a result of the inclusion in this group of students and retired people with one or more activities. This also indicates that some flexibility characteristics can be used productively at both ends of the age distribution.[6] On the average, flexibility group A respondents belong to the middle and the upper middle classes, at 67% and 13% respectively. The greatest disparity is between flexibility group A and flexibility group B, for which the corresponding percentages are 52% and 3%, respectively, and of which 45% belong to the working class. If one uses the occupational status (ISCO 1 digit) as an approximation of social classes, the differences are statistically significant. Here, the distinction between flexibility group A and standard group C is not very pronounced, but between them and flexibility group B it is, as within the latter there is a heavy concentration of ISCO groups 5 and 8 (service workers, market sales workers and plant

[4] Some small percentages for this group are a consequence of the fact that the variable on employment status that was used for classification purposes was a multi-response variable.

[5] However, flexibility group A is also characterised by the widest distribution of other cases, and it has distinctly higher percentages in the elements 'working at home', 'combined at home and elsewhere' and 'always changing'.

[6] Gender differences are not so pronounced and are not statistically significant. If we compare the distribution of men among the three categories, the percentage differences are not large. With respect to women the differences are larger, with an under-representation of women in flexibility group A.

Table 4. Different incomes of respondents by flexibility category (n=578)

	Flexibility group A	Flexibility group B	Standard group C
Wage or salary *	51.6%	82.8%	100%
Self-employed earnings *	17.6%	2.9%	
Income from additional jobs (can be occasional and/or casual work) *	34.0%	11.5%	2.2%
Income from own farming or agricultural production (including produce) *	9.0%	3.8%	
Pension *	13.3%	1.4%	0.6%
Unemployment benefit *	0.5%	3.8%	
Grant or scholarship for education and training, including loans *	9.6%		1.1%
Income from investments, savings or rents from properties *	6.4%	0.5%	1.7%
Profit from a business *	8.0%	1.0%	1.1%
Private transfers (e.g. alimony, or payment from others such as parents) *	9.6%	0.5%	0.6%
Other sources	9.0%	3.8%	3.3%
Other social transfers (e.g. child allowance, parental leave)	14.9%	12.4%	21.0%
None, the respondent had no income last month	0.5%	0.5%	

Significance level of chi-square tests: * 0.01. Source: Sicherl [2003: 27]

and machine operators). To sum up, age, social class, occupational status and education exhibit statistically significant differences for the three categories. Gender differences exist but are not very pronounced, and the urban/rural classification and family composition with respect to children are not significantly different among the three flexibility categories [ibid.].

When sources of income are cross-tabulated with the three flexibility categories, it can be observed that the situation differs considerably for each of them. The group 'full-time and regular schedule, one economic activity' is practically exclusively dependent on wages and salaries (100% of responses), with the addition of other social transfers which do not depend on the conditions of work but on social security circumstances. Flexible employment group B is substantially more diversified with respect to sources of income, but still very much concentrated in the wage or salary category (82.8% of responses). Flexible employment group A has a much higher incidence of different and additional income categories: wage and salary is reported by 51.6% of respondents, 34% of respondents report income from additional jobs, and there are also important categories of answers (self-employed earnings, with 17.6% of responses, and profit from a business, for 8.0% of respondents) which are practically negligible in the other two groups.

The differences with respect to satisfaction with the stability of work are statistically significant as shown in table 5. As expected, the dissatisfaction is much higher in flexibility category B, where temporary jobs and part-time jobs are also included, along with a pronounced share of ISCO categories 5 and 8. This is an indi-

Table 5. Satisfaction with various aspects of work (%)

	Flexibility group A	Flexibility group B	Standard group C	n
General satisfaction with work *				
Dissatisfied / very dissatisfied	8	12	3	44
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	20	23	19	117
Satisfied / very satisfied	72	65	78	397
				558
Stability of work *				
Dissatisfied / very dissatisfied	9	23	7	71
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	20	20	15	98
Satisfied / very satisfied	72	57	78	368
				537
Duration of contract *				
Dissatisfied / very dissatisfied	2	19	2	37
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	11	11	3	36
Satisfied / very satisfied	87	70	95	375
				448
Hours of work *				
Dissatisfied / very dissatisfied	18	17	10	83
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	24	13	18	99
Satisfied / very satisfied	59	70	72	373
				555
Location of work				
Dissatisfied / very dissatisfied	3	6	3	24
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	13	12	7	59
Satisfied / very satisfied	84	82	90	472
				555
Earnings *				
Dissatisfied / very dissatisfied	21	34	32	160
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	28	31	35	172
Satisfied / very satisfied	51	35	33	217
				549

Significance level of chi-square tests: * 0.01. Source: Sicherl [2003: 56]

rect confirmation of a plausible element for the distinction between flexibility categories A and B. The 'objective' elements for such a distinction are here confirmed by 'subjective' opinions on a person's satisfaction with this aspect of work. Similarly, the differences in respondents' satisfaction with the duration of the contract are statistically significant and again very pronounced in the percentage of dissatisfaction in flexibility group B.

Satisfaction with respect to hours of work is again statistically significant, but with the three flexibility categories in different positions. In this case, the least satisfaction is expressed in flexibility group A, which was earlier distinctly shown as working more hours. The reverse position is observed with respect to satisfaction with earnings, where differences are statistically significant, but where the level of satisfaction is distinctly higher in flexibility group A. Consequently, flexibility group A is more satisfied with respect to earnings and less satisfied with respect to hours of work than the other two categories. The differences with respect to location of work are not significant; the high percentage in the groups 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied' (between 82% and 90%) is again rather surprising.

With respect to decisions about various aspects of work, there are again statistically significant differences between the groups: the freedom of decision-making about the number of hours of work, general working schedule, overtime and place of work is much larger for flexibility group A than for the other two groups [Sicherl and Remec 2002: 49].

The economic characteristics of the household of the respondents represent important additional information to that indicated the sections on work characteristics, personal characteristics and social groups. The differences in income distribution (by sextiles) are statistically significant and reveal that household income is the highest for flexibility group A and lowest for flexibility group B. A similar conclusion applies to personal income (by sextiles), and is also valid for the three categories of permanent household goods, where the differences between households are still important (second house or flat, internet access, personal computer). Both for income and for these durable goods the ranking is the same: flexible employment group A occupies the most favourable position, followed by standard group C, while flexible employment group B features the lowest average income and the lowest occurrence of the possession of these household goods [Sicherl and Remec 2002: 41, 23].

The analysis above shows that for practically all the analysed aspects of work characteristics, personal characteristics and social groups, satisfaction with various aspects of work, and decisions about various aspects of work, the differences between the three flexibility categories are statistically significant.[7] Thus, in terms of

[7] Among the important aspects for which the differences are not statistically significant, mention should be made of type of settlement (urban/rural) and family composition (defined as families with or without children aged 14 and less); the differences in gender and education are greater, but still not statistically significant in a comparison of the three aggregate flexibility categories.

work issues, the applied categorisation has no doubt proved to be quite relevant in bringing out the major differences among the three flexibility categories.

The next important stage of analysis is to examine the question of whether the applied categorisation also implies significantly different situations with respect to work/family conflicts, and whether such conflicts appear always, often, sometimes, rarely or never. There are two surprising findings in the analysis of this part of the questionnaire. First, a surprisingly high proportion of answers indicate that such conflicts never appear. Second, of the five aspects of possible work/family conflicts, only one – whether a person takes work home to finish – reveals significant differences between the three flexibility categories, while in the other four, the differences are not statistically significant. In addition, the same pattern is observed with respect to the degree of agreement about household finances, about allocation of household tasks, about time spent together and about time spent at work, which do not show any statistically significant differences between the three flexibility categories. Another set of subjective opinions in the survey was related to the personal perception of well-being. Four issues were addressed in the questions: how the respondent is satisfied with his/her way of life, and with the economic situation of the household, how he/she compares the economic household situation to that of five years ago, and what his/her expectations are about the economic household situation for the next year. First, with respect to the satisfaction with the way of life and the economic situation of the household, the differences between the three flexibility categories are not statistically significant. As in the earlier questions about the level of satisfaction, here, too, the level of satisfaction is rather high, and is higher with regard to the way of life than the economic situation of the household. Second, the differences are also not significant in the case of the comparison with the situation five years ago and the expectations for the next year. For both questions, the category 'stayed the same' contains the highest percentage of answers [Sicherl and Remec 2002: 40, 50, 51].

According to the answers in the survey, the three flexibility categories show very significant differences in ('objective') characteristics related to work and practically no significant differences in ('subjective') opinions about possible work/family conflicts or agreement on various household issues.

A comparative analysis of selected countries participating in the HWF project

In this section, some limited comparisons of selected countries participating in the HWF project will be provided, based both on the results of the HWF surveys as well as on some secondary sources, in order to include some general information about atypical forms and to provide some sensitivity analysis.

The countries in table 6 are ranked by the percentage value of respondents with full-time employment in categories 1, 2 and 8. An interesting observation is that two developed countries, Sweden and the United Kingdom, are placed below the HWF7 average, while all candidate countries, with the exception of Romania,

Table 6. Flexibility grouping into eight categories (%)

	HU	CZ	BG	SI	S	RO	UK	HWF7
1. Full-time employment, more activities, flexitime	10	19	7	14.6	11.7	11.1	10.5	12.1
2. Full-time employment, shift and irregular work	25.8	20.8	18.7	20.5	13.7	20.5	14.9	18.9
3. Part-time employment	4.9	2.6	5.8	1.1	17	5.8	23.8	8.8
4. Fixed contract	0.6	1.3	4.2	10.3	1.2	2.2	0.8	2.6
5. Self-employed	11.9	13.8	11.7	6.8	8.4	6.6	10.9	10.1
6. Students and retired with one or more activities	3.3	5	2.4	10.1	9.6	8.6	5.5	6.4
7. Others	3.5	3	4.8	4.4	1.7	17	1.1	5.1
8. Employed full-time, regular schedule, one activity	40	34.5	45.4	32.2	36.8	28.3	32.5	36
Employed full-time (1 + 2 + 8)	75.8	74.2	71	67.3	62.2	59.9	57.9	67
Flexibility group A (1+5+6)	25.2	37.7	21.1	31.5	29.7	26.3	26.9	28.6
Flexibility group B (2+3+4+7)	34.8	27.8	33.5	36.3	33.5	45.4	40.6	35.4
Standard employment group C (8)	40	34.5	45.4	32.2	36.8	28.3	32.5	36
n	658	1022	898	562	1119	830	631	5720

Source: Sicherl [2003: 65]

are above that average and show a greater number of people employed full-time. As a result, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands[8] all have a higher level of development, a better employment situation and higher earnings, and yet at the same time have a higher share of atypical forms of employment, especially part-time work. Whereas the situation is of course very different in different countries, in the policy discussions it is many times wrongly assumed that atypical forms of employment are necessarily inferior to the standard forms of employment. In the cross-country comparison within the HWF project the very opposite is true for various reasons; the higher share of atypical forms of employment is associated with a better employment situation and greater work satisfaction.

There are several evident departures from the average structure of the chosen categories. As far as part-time employment is concerned, the United Kingdom and

[8] The latter are not included in the table because of a different categorisation of data in the database.

Table 7. Average number of activities reported in the past twelve months (n = 5958)

	S	CZ	SI	HWF7	UK	RO	HU	BG
1. Full-time employment, more activities, flexitime	2.19	1.84	1.85	1.89	1.91	1.87	1.89	1.52
2. Full-time employment, shift and irregular work	1	1	1	0.98	1	1	1	0.9
3. Part-time employment	1.59	1.33	1.33	1.36	1.21	1.58	1.27	0.92
4. Fixed contract	2.38	1.46	1.12	1.15	0.83	1.05	1.4	0.82
5. Self-employed	1.48	1.33	1.15	1.28	1.26	1.43	1.14	1.05
6. Students and retired people with one or more activities	1.7	1.47	1.46	1.42	1.4	1.08	1.23	1.09
7. Others	1.58	1.56	1.03	1.08	0.73	1.13	0.63	1
8. Employed full-time, regular schedule, one activity	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Average	1.37	1.26	1.2	1.2	1.19	1.19	1.11	1.01
Flexibility group A	1.83	1.61	1.57	1.55	1.54	1.5	1.45	1.2
Flexibility group B	1.38	1.13	1.05	1.1	1.11	1.13	0.99	0.91
Standard employment group C	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Source: Sicherl [2003: 66]

Sweden obviously have a much higher share of this form of employment than the candidate countries. Romania has a very high share of 'others', which is generally the most disadvantaged category. Slovenia and Sweden have the highest share of 'students and retired people with one or more activities'; Slovenia also has a high share of fixed contracts. The highest proportion of standard employment group C is found in Hungary and Bulgaria.

One aspect of work flexibility relates to the average number of activities reported in the past twelve months.[9] Although there are differences among countries, there is also a clear distinction between the selected categories. By definition, standard employment group C has only one activity. As the respondents with more activities have been shifted into category 1, category 2 also has only one activity.[10] It is

[9] In international comparisons the results refer to the age group 18–65 years inclusive. In the section on Slovenia the results encompass all respondents over age 18, which may lead to some differences in the respective figures for Slovenia between the two sections.

[10] With the exception of Bulgaria, for which there may be some problems in the calculation drawn from the common database.

Table 8. Hours of work per week in the main activity for eight categories of flexibility (n = 4747)

	RO	SI	CZ	BG	HWF6	S	UK
1. Full-time employment, more activities, flexitime	44.7	43.8	43.3	38.9	42.8	42.2	42.3
2. Full-time employment, shift and irregular work	46.9	43.0	43.6	40.9	43.3	41.6	44.4
3. Part-time employment	31.5	22.8	26.2	33.5	26.4	28.6	19.5
4. Fixed contract	48.4	40.9	40.1	32.3	38.9	33.3	45.8
5. Self-employed	53.7	53.2	52.1	48.6	47.3	44.6	43.0
6. Students and retired people with one or more activities	38.7	28.7	18.9	30.5	27.0	21.6	21.9
7. Others	47.9	48.1	43.0	32.0	42.4	29.1	31.2
8. Employed full-time, regular schedule, one activity	42.4	41.9	41.3	40.0	41.3	41.9	40.8
Average	44.5	42.0	42.3	40.0	40.6	39.3	35.7
Flexibility group A	45.9	41.9	43.6	44.6	42.6	42.7	38.7
Flexibility group B	45.2	42.2	41.8	37.4	38.2	34.3	29.5
Standard employment group C	42.4	41.9	41.3	40.0	41.3	41.9	40.8

Source: Sicherl [2003: 75]

interesting that for category 1, which is the most important subgroup in flexibility group A, the average number of income activities (1.9 activity) is very similar throughout all the participating countries. This category is followed by category 6 (students and retired people with one or more activities) and category 3 (part-time employment). On the basis of the survey results Sweden is the most flexible participating country with respect to the average number of income activities in the last twelve months, followed by the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Great Britain and Romania.

Table 8 presents the hours of work per week in the main activity for eight categories of flexibility and shows that the differences for a given category between the countries are considerably smaller than the differences in the hours of work between different categories within a given country. The self-employed are those who work the longest hours in all the participating countries, with the exception of the United Kingdom. For standard employment group C the differences between the countries are small, with the average being 41 hours worked per week in the main activity, and with upward and downward variations of only one hour. Those who

Table 9. Hours of work per week in the main activity by gender (n = 4921)

	Men	Women	Average
RO	47.76	41.45	44.61
SI	44.03	39.23	41.83
CZ	43.84	39.15	41.69
BG	41.00	39.02	40.01
HWF7	43.00	35.94	39.55
S	41.67	36.54	39.25
UK	43.45	29.14	35.41
NL	40.45	26.16	33.55

Source: Sicherl [2003: 72]

work substantially fewer hours are students and retired people with one or more activities and those employed part-time.

In table 9 the differences in working hours per week are substantial and the grouping is also clear: overall working hours are higher in the candidate countries than in the three developed EU15 countries participating in the project. These differences are especially striking in the case of women in the UK and in the Netherlands. For all the countries (with the possible exception of Bulgaria), the number of working hours per week is statistically significantly higher for men than for women. We can conclude that the rather large differences in the average number of working hours per week between countries are to a great extent influenced by structural characteristics, i.e. the share of part-time employment for women and the proportion of students and retired people in income activities.

It is interesting to compare the categorisation of survey respondents by income activity presented in the above tables, which are based on the objective elements of the respondents' positions at work, with their responses regarding subjective satisfaction with various aspects of work in the main activity. Table 10 presents the weighted average of responses in the range from 1 (very unsatisfied) to 5 (very satisfied). These responses are of interest in two respects. On the one hand, a comparison between countries can be made of the results of the satisfaction with a given aspect of work, and on the other hand, a ranking of the six analysed aspects of work can be established with respect to the degree of satisfaction.

At first glance it is noticeable that the degree of the expressed satisfaction with work is high. The ranking of the participating countries is expected; the highest value is that of the Netherlands, followed by Sweden and the United Kingdom. The candidate countries show values of subjective general satisfaction with work that are below the average. With regard to subjective satisfaction with work in general

Table 10. Weighted average of responses with respect to the subjective satisfaction with various aspects of work in the main activity

How satisfied are you	NL	S	UK	HWF8	SI	BG	RO	HU	CZ
In general:	4.40	4.21	4.13	3.87	3.76	3.69	3.63	3.61	3.57
and with the:									
Duration of contract	4.64	4.53	4.45	4.11	3.90	3.71	3.77	4.09	3.84
Location of work	4.34	4.39	4.33	4.09	3.98	3.96	3.94	3.95	3.83
Stability of work	4.25	4.17	4.16	3.84	3.65	3.42	3.73		3.60
Hours of work	4.44	3.89	4.03	3.83	3.59	3.87	3.72	3.61	3.48
Earnings	3.85	3.23	3.48	3.08	3.06	2.77	2.63	2.73	2.96

Source: Sicherl [2003: 83]

among the candidate countries, it is surprising that Hungary and the Czech Republic show a slightly lower weighted average than Bulgaria and Romania.

In table 10 the countries are ordered horizontally by the value of the subjective satisfaction with work in general; while the other five aspects of work are ordered vertically in accordance with the average value of the HWF8 weighted average for the respective aspect. In the vertical direction, the respondents are on the average more satisfied with the duration of the contract and the location of work. The second area with a lower degree of satisfaction includes the stability of work and hours of work. In all countries the lowest degree of satisfaction expressed relates to earnings (the numerical value for HWF8 of 3.07 means approximately neither satisfied nor unsatisfied).

Comparisons based on secondary sources

The results of the HWF project surveys in the participating countries need to be supplemented by information from secondary sources about these countries and about their positions over time with respect to the level of development and the structure of the economy.

Table 11 is based on the statistical data presented in Employment in Europe 2002 [European Commission 2002].[11] For the year 2001, the share of total employment represented by self-employment is very similar in all the HWF project coun-

[11] One should be aware that even within the EU the comparability of employment data among all the countries and over time is an acute problem, as noted in the European Commission [2000: 17].

Table 11. Summary table for the HWF project countries for 2001

Share of total employment in three atypical forms of employment								
	NL	S	UK	SI	CZ	HU	BG	RO
Self-employment as % of total employment	13.8	5	11.7	11.8	14.6	13.9	13.7	25.7
Part-time employment as % of total employment	42.2	24.1	24.9	6.1	4.3	3.3	3.4	16.8
Fixed-term contracts as % of total employment	14.3	13.5	6.8	10.8	6.9	6.4	5.7	1.6
Distribution of employment by sectors								
	NL	S	UK	SI	CZ	HU	BG	RO
Share of employment in services	76.7	74.1	73.7	51.4	54.6	59.4	57.6	29.7
Share of employment in industry	19.8	23.3	24.8	38.6	40.5	34.5	32.7	25.8
Share of employment in agriculture	3.4	2.6	1.4	9.9	4.9	6.1	9.7	44.4

Source: European Commission [2002]

tries and is close to the EU15 average; the only two outliers are Romania on the high end and Sweden on the low end. The case of Romania can be easily explained by the high share agriculture represents out of total employment; the low value for Sweden is an interesting case for a more detailed inquiry.

The share of total employment represented by part-time employment is a different case. The Netherlands stands out with 42.2% of total employment made up of part-time employment, followed by the UK with 24.9% and Sweden with 24.1%. Even for the latter two countries the share of part-time work is more than four times higher than for the candidate countries (excluding the outlier Romania). In this category the most important differences between the group of developed and the group of candidate countries in the HWF project are established. First, the gap between the two groups is the largest at this point. Second, for the developed countries this is the largest category of atypical employment, while for the candidate countries it is the smallest. Third, in the group of developed countries the gender divide is very large, while in the candidate countries it is not yet of any important magnitude. The proportion of fixed-term contracts is highest in the Netherlands, Sweden and Slovenia; in all these countries there has been a markedly increasing trend during the past decade.

While international cross-section comparisons are not to be directly converted into policy conclusions [Sicherl 2002], the analysis presented here is nonetheless an additional warning that one should not set out from the assumption, explicit or implicit, that atypical jobs are necessarily substandard jobs, and consequently jump to the conclusion that the work situation in the three EU developed countries is in-

ferior to that of the participating candidate countries because in the former the share of atypical forms of employment is so much higher. First, in the EU15 in 2000, 59.3% of those employed part-time did not want a full-time job, and among women alone the percentage was 65.1% (the percentage of women reached as high as 80.2% in the UK, 79.3% in Germany, and 77.8% in the Netherlands, while it was 52.3% in Sweden). In the EU15 only 15.8% answered that the reason for working part-time was that they could not find a full-time job. Second, in the section on self-reported job satisfaction, in 1998 the category of very satisfied voluntary part-time employment exceeded 60% of respondents in the EU15, while for involuntary part-time employment it was around 30% [European Commission 2002]. Third, all three countries have a much higher activity rate than the candidate countries, which during the transition depression have fallen from their earlier, rather high levels, comparable to those in developed countries, and consequently their employment positions have substantially deteriorated. Fourth, the wage level is much higher in the participating EU countries. Fifth, the unemployment rate as a percentage of the labour force aged 15+ is lower in these three countries than in the candidate countries and is especially low in the Netherlands [ibid]. In sum, this study provides abundant evidence that the indiscriminate application of the assumption that atypical jobs are inferior jobs is not warranted.

As elaborated elsewhere [Sicherl 2002], there is also a very substantial gap between the three developed countries and the candidate countries in the distribution of civilian employment by sectors of activity. The share of employment in services, which can be an important factor influencing the share of atypical forms of employment, reveals substantial differences also among the developed countries. In terms of high shares of employment in the services sector, the leading developed countries among those studied are the USA and the Netherlands. Close behind them are Sweden, the UK and France, while countries such as Germany, Italy and Japan have a distinctly lower share of civilian employment engaged in services [Kalleberg 2002]. The candidate countries still have lower values for the percentages engaged in this sector, mainly because of the large share of industry, and in Romania especially because of the large share of agriculture. The EU group of HWF project countries is at the top in an international perspective in terms of the importance of the service sector, and the candidate countries are suffering from a temporal lag in this respect, even more so than in the case of GDP per capita. In addition to lagging behind on the general level of economic development, the candidate countries are the type of countries which, owing to the emphasis that has been put on industry, have made relatively less of an advance in developing services. The importance of these two factors is discussed below.

A brief comparison of the results for the Czech Republic and Slovenia

First of all, there are several differences and similarities between the Czech Republic and Slovenia as far as background factors are concerned. In terms of population, the Czech Republic is about five times larger than Slovenia. In terms of GDP per capita at purchasing power parity, in 2001 the value for Slovenia amounted to 69% of the average for the EU15, and the corresponding figure for the Czech Republic was 57%. Within the range of countries participating in the HWF project, Slovenia and the Czech Republic, together with Hungary, form the second group according to level of development, while the EU15 countries feature considerably higher values. Both the level of development and the sectoral structure of employment have an important influence on the share of atypical forms of employment that exist.

With respect to these variables the Czech Republic and Slovenia are reasonably close together. The differences between them and their differences from the EU15 average can be expressed in two ways. According to Eurostat,[12] in 2001 the level of GDP per capita (at purchasing power parity) in relation to the EU15 average amounted to 112% in the case of the Netherlands, 100% for Sweden and the UK, 69% for Slovenia, 57% for the Czech Republic, 51% for Hungary, 28% for Bulgaria, and 25% for Romania. In addition to the static measures of disparity usually used and indicated above, degrees of disparity can also be measured in a temporal perspective. Time distance generally means the difference between the points in time when two events occurred. A special category of time distance can be defined that relates to the level of the indicator being analysed. The suggested statistical measure, S-distance,[13] measures the time distance (proximity) between the points in time when the two compared series reach the specified level of indicator X. The logic in the calculation of the retrospective (ex post) S-distance can be observed if in the historical time series for the EU15 one looks for the year in which the EU15 had the same per-

[12] For the EU15 time series of GDP per capita in constant prices see the European Commission [2001b], for candidate countries see Eurostat [2002]. For an explanation of the derivation see Sicherl [2002: 14–17].

[13] The operational statistical measure of the time distance concept is a special category of time distances S-distance: for a given level of X_L, $X_L = X_i(t_i) = X_j(t_j)$ the time separating unit (i) and unit (j) is $S_{ij}(X_L) = DT(X_L) = T_i(X_L) - T_j(X_L)$. See e.g. Sicherl [1997]. Several other papers of the author of the time distance concept of measuring differences between time series can be found at http://www.sicenter.si/td.html. They provide more details on time distance methodology with empirical application to a range of problems. S-distance as a generic concept can be generalised to other types of applications – the analysis of the discrepancy between the estimated and actual values and goodness-of-fit in time series, regressions and models, forecasting and monitoring, etc. – and extended to variables other than time. The S-distance measure is a new view of the information, using levels of the variable(s) as identifiers and time as the focus of comparison and numeraire. It is theoretically universal, intuitively understandable and can be usefully applied to a wide variety of substantive fields as an important analytical and presentational tool.

centage (69%) of its 2001 value of GDP per capita as Slovenia had in 2001. This was approximately in the year 1983, which means that the retrospective time distance is about 18 years. In other words, the same value of the analysed indicator was achieved in the EU15 18 years ago (1983 compared to 2001 in Slovenia). The corresponding values are 29 years for the Czech Republic and 32 years for Hungary [Sicherl 2003: 132–136].

Another important structural difference is the share of employment in services out of total civilian employment. OECD data enable an analysis of the long-term trends for this indicator. In 1999, the highest values were around 75% in the Netherlands and the USA [OECD 2001]. The values for the two OECD countries among the candidate countries in the HWF project, Hungary with 58.4% and the Czech Republic with 47.1%, were approximately in the range of values for 2000 for Slovenia 52.7% and Bulgaria 54%, while Romania with 29% was much behind [European Commission 2001a]. Among the candidate countries the highest value in 1999 was that of Hungary, a value that had already been achieved in the Netherlands back in 1974, i.e. 25 years earlier [Sicherl 2002: 9]; the time lags for Slovenia and the Czech Republic are even larger. The conclusion is obvious: both the conventional static measure of disparity and time distance should be analysed simultaneously in order to arrive at a more realistic evaluation of the situation. In the dynamic world of today it is by no means satisfactory to rely only on the static measures of disparity.

The direct reflection of this main structural difference between the two groups of analysed countries is the relative importance industry occupies in total employment. Slovenia and the Czech Republic, as the most industrialised countries among the HWF candidate countries, feature the values that Sweden and the Netherlands were experiencing three decades ago and the UK two decades ago. In the future, these time distances can be shortened, but at present the differences are still large [Sicherl 2002: 11].

With respect to the results of the HWF survey, the Czech Republic and Slovenia feature the highest representation of flexibility group A from among the compared countries, and especially the highest proportions of respondents in category 1, i.e. full-time employment, more activities, flexitime. The share of self-employed is higher in the Czech Republic, while the share of students and retired people with one or more activities is higher in Slovenia. Standard employment group C represents about one-third in both countries, similar to the proportion in the UK and lower than the HWF7 average.

In reference to the average number of activities reported in the past twelve months, the numbers are very similar, except for two groups – the self-employed and fixed contracts – where the Czech Republic shows more activities. The most flexible country in this respect is Sweden, followed by the Czech Republic and Slovenia. The average number of hours of work per week in the main activity is very similar in the two compared countries and is considerably higher than in the other participating countries, especially in the case of women. Both the Czech Republic and Slovenia follow the general pattern that the number of weekly hours of work in

the main activity is significantly higher for men than for women. The hours of work for each of the eight categories are very similar, except that students and retired people with one or more activities work longer hours in Slovenia.

The weighted average of responses relating to the subjective satisfaction with various aspects of work in the main activity presented in table 10 indicates somewhat different results. The satisfaction with work in general is, according to the responses in the HWF survey, higher in Slovenia than in the Czech Republic. The value for the Czech Republic is the lowest of all eight participating countries. With regard to the other five aspects of work that were analysed, the subjective satisfaction in Slovenia also reveals higher values than in the Czech Republic.

One interesting point regarding potential flexibility is the readiness to accept certain conditions if, in the case of unemployment, it would be necessary to do so to get a better job. In the survey there were three possible answers to this question: 'yes', 'maybe', 'no'. In the case of the condition that a person retrain into another profession the percentage of affirmative answers was higher in the Czech Republic, while for the other four conditions (to work more than 40 hours per week, to learn a new foreign language, to move to another location, to accept less attractive work conditions) the percentage of affirmative answers is higher in Slovenia. If one were to take as one of the measures of flexibility the average percentage of negative answers to the five conditions for employment in a hypothetical case of unemployment, then Slovenia would come out as the most flexible country. The average percentage of negative answers amounts in Slovenia to only 27%; in the United Kingdom and Bulgaria the figure is 34%, in the Czech Republic 36%, in Hungary 46% and in the Netherlands 48% [Sicherl 2003: 90–91].

Comparing the weighted average of responses concerning the general satisfaction with the way of life and with the economic situation of the household, a very remarkable difference surfaces. The ranking of the participating eight countries according to the economic situation of the household is very much in line with the values of GDP per capita discussed above (only Romania and Bulgaria reverse their positions). The differences in this weighted average are statistically significant, except between Sweden and the United Kingdom. However, the weighted average of the subjective satisfaction with the way of life shows strikingly different results. The highest subjective satisfaction expressed is in the Netherlands, followed by Sweden, as expected. The values for the United Kingdom, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic are rather similar, and the differences for the expressed satisfaction with the way of life are not statistically significant [Sicherl 2003: 91–94].

Conclusion

The issue of flexible employment and the optimal balance between flexibility and security is one of major economic, social and political importance. It is a very complex problem and will be subjected to continuous adjustments to changing situa-

tions and preferences.[14] The viewpoint is that this very important issue of whether atypical jobs are good or bad jobs is to be investigated as an empirical issue.[15]

The detailed analysis of the Slovenian HWF survey case study confirms that atypical jobs are not necessarily bad jobs. Moreover, there is considerable heterogeneity in the work conditions, and, ultimately, in terms of income, flexibility, and freedom of decision-making, even in the category of full employment and permanent jobs. The survey respondents in Slovenia were first grouped into eight categories and then tentatively aggregated into three major categories: flexible employment group A, flexible employment group B and standard employment group C. Standard employment group C comprises those employed permanently full-time with a regular working schedule and only one economic activity. The respondents with some 'positive' aspects of flexibility belong to flexibility group A: on the average they work in more activities, more hours per week, have a more flexible schedule than the other two groups, have greater freedom of decisions about various aspects of work, and show higher values in income distribution and in household goods distribution. Flexible group B combines those respondents who show some 'negative objective' elements in their employment. In selected aspects some of the flexible jobs are better than the jobs in the standard employment group and some of them are worse. According to the survey for Slovenia, the three flexibility categories show very significant statistical differences in ('objective') characteristics related to work and practically no significant differences in ('subjective') opinions on possible work/family conflicts or agreement about various household issues. With respect to the former issues, the applied categorisation has no doubt proved to be extremely relevant in bringing out the major differences between the three flexibility categories.

In international comparisons there are many general factors, such as the level of development, the structure of the economy, technological progress, lifestyles and preferences, which indicate that the share of atypical or standard forms of employment is not influenced only by institutional and policy choices that result in different regulatory instruments. In the article it was shown that a higher level of development and a higher share of employment in services could facilitate the introduction of part-time employment. Smaller hours worked at higher wage levels may mean the same or even higher real income than full-time employment does in a candidate country. The insufficient level of income earned as well as the smaller share of services may mean that part-time employment, which may be one of the instruments for lowering unemployment rates, will not be increasing in the candidate countries as fast as it has in the participating EU countries in the HWF project.

[14] There are many aspects of flexibility, the broadest subdivision probably being the flexibility concerns of enterprises and the flexibility concerns of households. For the HWF study the latter are more important, although the actual implementation of policies and the realisation of intentions on both sides happens only in an interaction between the labour and production markets.

[15] McGovern, Smeaton and Hill [2002] analysed the situation in Britain in this manner; Kalleberg, Reskin and Hudson [2000] did so for the USA.

While more flexible labour market regulations may be needed, it is important to recognise that these alone do not determine the degree of labour market flexibility, which is also influenced by the behaviour of the labour market agents in the process of adjustment to new conditions. While Slovenia, for example, has rather rigid labour market regulation, in the study, the Slovenian respondents demonstrated the lowest average percentage of refusals to accept various conditions for employment in the case of unemployment. Labour market flexibility is obviously a multidimensional phenomenon and re-regulation rather than complete deregulation is the preferred option.

The brief comparison of the Czech Republic and Slovenia indicated that they have the highest share of flexibility group A among the participating countries, very similar hours of work, the highest share of employment in industry, and a very large time distance in the lag behind the developed countries with regard to the share of employment in services. It seems that individuals have been much more flexible in their adjustment to the new situation than the two countries have in executing the necessary structural adjustments. Satisfaction with various aspects of work, GDP per capita and possession of household goods are higher in Slovenia than in the Czech Republic; however, the weighted average of satisfaction with the way of life shows no statistically significant differences between the United Kingdom, Slovenia and the Czech Republic.

It is important to reiterate that, from the perspective of the 'supply side', empirical results indicate that atypical forms of employment can be both superior and inferior to the standard pattern of full-time employment. These forms are here to stay, as in many cases they enable people to deal with some household and/or enterprise problems. The important issue is to arrive at a social consensus about how to balance the benefits and costs of various forms of work flexibility for all stakeholders so that, together with other aspects and instruments of flexibility, they will serve as an important means of addressing the coming challenges and risks. An empirical analysis of these and other aspects of flexibility is required in order to provide input into this process.

PAVLE SICHERL *is the director of SICENTER and a professor of economics at the University of Ljubljana. He has also acted as a consultant to the World Bank, OECD, UN, ILO, UNIDO, INSTRAW, UNRISD, and the Harvard Institute for International Development. He has published extensively on development and on time distance as a novel measure of disparities. Partial results of his HWF research have recently been published in the book* Fleksibilnost dela – Primerjalna analiza *(Work Flexibility – A Comparative Analysis).*

References

Beck, Ulrich. 2000. *The Brave New World of Work*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
European Commission. 2000. *Employment in Europe 2000*, Employment & Social Affairs. Employment and European Social Fund. Luxembourg.
European Commission. 2001a. *Employment in Europe 2001. Recent Trends and Prospects*. Luxembourg.
European Commission. 2001b. *European Economy*. No.72. Luxembourg.
European Commission. 2002. *Employment in Europe 2002. Recent Trends and Prospects*. Luxembourg.
Eurostat. 2002. *The GDP of the Candidate Countries 2001*. Statistics in Focus. Theme 2, 41/2002.
ILO. 1998. *World Employment Report*. Geneva.
Kalleberg, A. L., B. F. Reskin and K. Hudson. 2000. "Bad Jobs in America: Standard and Nonstandard Employment Relations and Job Quality in the United States." *American Sociological Review* 65: 256–278.
Kalleberg, Arne L. 2002. "Nonstandard Employment Relations and Labor Market Inequality: Cross-National Patterns." Paper presented at the XV World Congress of Sociology. Brisbane, July 10.
McGovern, P., D. Smeaton and S. Hill. 2002. "Bad Jobs and Non-Standard Employment in Britain." Paper prepared for the Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Socioeconomics. Minneapolis, June 27–29.
OECD. 1999. *Economic Outlook*. Paris.
OECD. 2001. *Historical Statistics, 1970–1999*. CD-ROM, Paris.
Sicherl, Pavle. 1997. *A Novel Methodology for Comparisons in Time and Space*. Reihe Osteuropa No. 45. Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies.
Sicherl, Pavle. 2002. *Long Term Trends in Atypical Forms of Employment*. Working paper. Ljubljana: SICENTER.
Sicherl, Pavle. 2003. *Fleksibilnost dela – Primerjalna analiza (Work Flexibility – A Comparative Analysis)*. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede.
Sicherl, Pavle and Matija Remec. 2002. *Analysis of the Survey for Slovenia*. Ljubljana: SICENTER.
Wallace, Claire (ed.). 2003. *HWF Survey, Country Survey Reports*. HWF Research Report No. 3. Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies.

Call for Papers

The Sixth International German Socio-Economic Panel User Conference (SOEP2004)

June 24-26, 2004 at the Harnack House, in Berlin

This conference provides researchers who use the German SOEP with an opportunity to present and discuss their work with others familiar with the SOEP data. Researchers in all disciplines who use either the Public-Use version of the SOEP or the GSOEP part of the Cross-National Equivalent Files (CNEF) are encouraged to contribute. Particularly welcome are contributions from researchers who make use of the *longitudinal features* of the German SOEP, contributions on *survey statistic* issues (e.g. attrition or missing value problems), and contributions on topics of survey research (e.g. panel or mode effects).

The deadline for the submissions of abstracts (up to 300 words) is **February 29, 2004**.
Papers must be written and presented in English and only electronic submissions (MSWord or *.pdf files) will be accepted by the Program Committee.
Please email submissions to: soep2004@diw.de.
Contributors will be notified by March 15, 2004.

Shorter versions of selected conference papers will be published in a volume of conference proceedings (*Journal of Applied Social Science Studies* [Schmollers Jahrbuch], 1/2005), with the understanding that a full version of the paper may be submitted to another professional journal.

Members of the Program Committee for SOEP2004 include:
Felix Büchel (Chairperson, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, buechel@mpib-berlin.mpg.de),
Conchita D'Ambrosio (SOEP/DIW Berlin, cdambrosio@diw.de),
Joachim R. Frick (SOEP/DIW Berlin, jfrick@diw.de),
Stephen P. Jenkins (University of Essex/UK, stephenj@essex.ac.uk),
and *Patricia A. McManus* (Indiana University/USA, pmcmanus@indiana.edu).

For further information on submitting a paper, please contact:
Prof. Felix Büchel, Program Chairperson,
SOEP2004 Max Planck Institute for Human Development,
Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, Germany,
Phone +49-30- 824 06 427, Fax +49-30- 824 99 39,
Email: buechel@mpib-berlin.mpg.de

The Society of Friends of the DIW Berlin will honour the presenters of the best three papers. The SOEP2004 Program Committee will choose the best three papers and announce the selection at the end of the conference.

Travel is to be paid by the participants. In exceptional cases some partial reimbursement to a contributor may be arranged. For more information on this and for detailed updates on the preparation of the conference please refer to the DIW conference website:
www.diw.de/soep2004

Marriage and Educational Attainment: A Dynamic Approach to First Union Formation*

DANA HAMPLOVÁ**
Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague

Abstract: The article looks at the relationship between partnership formation and women's education in the Czech Republic. Education can serve as a proxy for cultural capital and earning potential. Therefore, it is expected to play a significant role in partnership formation. Analyses of data from the Family and Fertility Survey show that the level of education has an impact on the timing of the first union. However, when school enrolment is controlled, education does not play a significant role in the tendency to enter into marriage or cohabitation. It is not possible to demonstrate that the accumulation of human capital itself has an impact on union formation in the Czech Republic. Nor do data confirm the expectation that the influence of education should increase after the collapse of communism and the introduction of the market economy.
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2003, Vol. 39, No. 6: 841–863

During the second half of the 20th century, the family as one of the most important social institutions underwent some fundamental changes. Family-related norms and behaviour changed, and the previously standard model of starting a family – marriage, setting up a household, having a child – transformed, and lost its imperative character.[1] A significant number of people now give preference to a different order of events or choose not to enter into a marriage at all. The more or less tolerated, and at a certain time of life even preferred, form of partnership has become cohabitation.

The Czech Republic experienced a rapid demographic transition in the 1990s. The total number of new marriages declined by one-third (from 81 000 in 1989 to 55 000 in 2000). The mean age at the time of marriage for first marriages has risen from 24.6 to 28.9 for men and from 21.8 to 26.5 for women. Similarly, the fertility rate has declined. While in 1989 the total fertility rate (TRF) was 1.89, at the end of

* This research was made possible thanks to the support from the Grant Agency of the Academy of Sciences, Czech Republic, grant no. A7028101.
** Direct all correspondence to: Mgr. Dana Hamplová, Institute of Sociology, Jilská 1, 110 00 Prague 1, e-mail: hamplova@soc.cas.cz
[1] The fact that this model was standard does not mean that the entire population adhered to it. Concubinage, for example, has a long historical tradition. What is important, however, is that the traditional model represented an unambiguous and unquestionable standard, and other modes of behaviour were viewed as deviant.

the 1990s the TRF hovered between 1.1 and 1.2. At the same time illegitimate fertility has grown from 9% to over 20%.

Many attempts have been made in Czech sociological and demographic literature to explain the demographic changes of the 1990s. This paper focuses specifically on the connection between education and union formation. The first part presents a summary of the most important sociological theories explaining the demographic shift. Then a set of hypotheses on the influence education may have on union formation is derived. In the second part of the paper an attempt is made to verify the hypotheses using empirical data.

Theoretical explanation

The demographic changes of the first half of the 20th century led to the formulation of a number of sociological theories on the subject. These can be classified into two major groups: normative theories and rational choice theories [Friedman, Hechter and Kanazawa 1994]. *Normative theories* ascribe the changes in family life to a shift in values, aspirations and expectations. Although the normative theorists differ with regard to which of the 'modern' values is the key factor in demographic change, they all emphasise secularisation, individualism, the growing significance of autonomy, and new ideologies concerning gender roles. While normative theories do not reject the influence of structural and economic factors, they are based more on the assumption that modernisation, technological changes and the development of the social state brought about changes in values and preferences, and these led to changes in human behaviour.

Normative theories

The most influential example of a normative theory comes from Ronald Inglehart [1990]. Inglehart's approach is derived from a concept of culture as a set of beliefs and values developed by a given group to cope with external adaptation and internal integration. In Inglehart's view, during the early period of industrialisation the economic factor became central, and it was possible to interpret society using economic models. However, in the advanced industrial society, the economic factor has reached the level of diminishing returns, and values have become more important for explaining human behaviour [Inglehart 1990].

Inglehart interprets declining marriage rates and the lower percentage of people living in marriages in the context of a general shift away from 'materialist' and towards 'post-materialist' values. Inglehart's conception of 'materialism' and 'post-materialism' differs from the common usage of these words. While 'materialist' values are connected with physical well-being and a craving for security, 'post-materialist' values put emphasis on the quality of life. In Inglehart's view, the family and the emphasis on family stability are related to the need for safety and security, and

as values can thus be ranked as 'materialist'. Cohabitation or life without a partner represent a 'post-materialist' way of life, as it is only once people have a sense of security that they no longer need to worry about creating primary ties and permanent relationships, and instead place greater emphasis on independence, self-fulfilment, and self-expression.

The *theory of the second demographic transition* [Van de Kaa 1987; 1988; 1993; Lesthaeghe and Moorse 1992, cit. in Manting 1994: 20; Wiersma 1983] similarly stresses the concurrent effect of social and economic influences (particularly a weakening in the normative control of society and the rise of the economic independence of women), cultural factors (secularisation) and modern technology (contraception). These influences transformed people's preferences in favour of individualism, freedom and independence, and thus led to a decline in the rate of marriage and to the spread of cohabitation. Although Van de Kaa [1993] admits that these processes are interdependent, he attributes major importance to the change in values and assumes that modern technology could only have succeeded as a result of this value change. He points to the example of modern contraception. The discovery of contraception itself did not change behaviour, but contraception was able to spread only due to the fact that values had changed.

Anthony Giddens [1992] is also one of the authors of a normative theory. In Giddens' view, it is the principles on which relationships are founded that have changed, as the former relationship of romantic love has been displaced by a 'confluent' relationship, that is, a relationship in which two people face each other as fully independent individuals.

One example of a normative theory in Czech sociological literature is found in the work of Ladislav Rabušic [2001a, 2001b], who has applied Inglehart's theory and the theory of the second demographic transition to the case of the Czech social environment, arguing that the demographic changes that took place in the Czech Republic in the 1990s are primarily connected to value changes.

Most authors argue that the spread of 'modern' (or 'post-modern' or 'post-materialist') values has in some way been related to educational achievement. Inglehart [1990] believes that education is an indicator of security and that people with more education should therefore also be more 'post-materialistic'. This tendency is further strengthened by the fact the people with higher education are members of specific communication networks where liberal values are prevalent. Liefbroer [1991] also argues that for people with higher education autonomy and independence are more important.

Rational choice theories

The second group of theories that have attempted to explain the changes in demographic behaviour is comprised of various versions of *rational choice* theories. Unlike the previous group, these theories explain the transformation of family behaviour

through economic and institutional factors, and primarily through the changes that have occurred in the labour market. While rational choice theories do not actually reject the importance of values (preferences, utilities), they concentrate more on economic and structural factors and avoid the relatively complex problem of value specification.[2]

The theories are founded on the basic assumption that human behaviour is goal-oriented and that people adopt the kind of behavioural strategies that are intended to lead to this goal. Rational choice theories concentrate on the means whereby to reach a goal and often ignore or just postulate the goal itself. Their view is that demographic change can be attributed to a change in the price not a change in preferences. In so far as education is an important factor in defining a person's constraints, chances and economic position, rational choice theories are relevant to any analysis of the interdependence between education and family formation.

The emphasis on rationality does not mean that rational choice theories ignore the question of emotions, nor do the theories assume that people make conscious calculations regarding what they will get out of a relationship and what advantages are to be had from it. The theories base themselves rather on the idea that the institutional structure of a society influences behaviour, especially on the macro-structural level, as it defines the impulses that motivate behaviour [Coleman and Fararo 1992]. In a choice framework, the context determines the extent to which a person is free to establish priorities and to allocate time and energy accordingly. In other words, it defines the options from which a person may choose [Willekens 1989: 17]. Consequently, in most cases rational choice theories address the relationship between the social macro-structure and human behaviour, but they do not deal with the motivations of individuals.

Gary S. Becker [1972, 1973, 1996] probably developed the most influential theory within the rational choice framework (New Home Economics). He based his analyses on the concept of a marriage market and made the assumption that each person tries to do as well as possible and searches for a partner with whom they will be able to maximise utility. It is reasonable to speak about a marriage market since many men and women compete when they seek mates and their success depends on what they are able to offer [1972]. Since marriage is practically always a voluntary initiative, made by either the persons marrying or their parents, it may be as-

[2] The principal difficulty involved in specifying values derives from their unobservability. Usually, therefore, two different methods have been used to specify values, both of which are, however, problematic [Friedman, Hechter and Kanazawa 1994: 377–378]. One method is simply to ask people what their values and preferences are, while the other method is to deduce the values from their real behaviour. The problem is that declared values are often quite vague and inconsistent, and do not conform to a given situation. This is especially true of values and preferences connected with family and partnership behaviour [Heaton and Jacobson 1999; Fialová and Tuček 1997; Moors 2000; Blossfeld and Mills 2001]. Deducing values on the basis of real behaviour is equally problematic, as it is not possible to distinguish to what extent the behaviour is influenced by values and to what extent by objective constraints.

sumed that the persons marrying (or their parents) expect to increase their utility level beyond what it would be were they to remain single.

The utility from the marriage is derived not only from the goods and services purchased on the market, but also and especially from the goods produced by the household. The household production includes material commodities like meals, but also love, companionship, prestige, the quality of leisure time, and especially children. Becker believes that the main reason why men and women marry is to 'produce' children. They do so not only with respect to quantity, but in modern society also and primarily with regard to their quality. Consequently, people who want fewer children tend to postpone marriage and divorce earlier and more frequently.

According to Becker, specialisation and the division of labour is the most rational and efficient way to manage a household, so that each partner can cultivate a separate type of human capital. Becker illustrates this point with the example of two people who possess exactly the same qualifications to work in the household and the same qualifications to work in the market. Should these two people devote x amount of hours to paid employment, the result will be the same as when one of them spends 2x the amount of hours in paid employment and the other devotes time fully to the household. However, should each of them begin to invest their time in specialised capital then the effectiveness of both will rise and the total household 'product' will also increase.

The efficiency and rationality of the division of labour influences men's and women's behaviour on the marriage market. An important characteristic of any match is whether men's and women's human capital, income, time and other investments are complements or substitutes. The mating of likes is optimal when the traits are complements. Therefore, men and women do marry people who are similar in non-market traits, e.g. height, interests, appearance, intelligence. Conversely, optimal sorting with regard to market traits is negative. The utility is maximised when a high-wage person marries a low-wage person, since it corresponds with the rationality of the division of labour. The person with cheaper time can concentrate on household production while the high-wage person can specialise in the market.

Becker believes that the demographic change in the second half of the 20th century can be attributed to two factors. First, the earning potential of women is growing. The growth in women's earning power increases the value of the time spent at childcare and on other household activities, which in turn reduces the demand for children and encourages substitutions in the place of parental time. The gain to be had from marriage is reduced because a sexual division of labour within the household is less advantageous [Becker 1996: 55]. The second factor that explains the demographic change is connected with the development of the modern state and the market economy, which took over the responsibility for education and childcare, etc., from the family.

In the light of Becker's theory it can be concluded that education will play an important role in the tendency to marry in the case of both men and women. The higher earning potential of women with better education should lower their ten-

dency to marry, while the higher earning potential of men should make them more attractive and increase their chances of marrying.

Valeria Oppenheimer [1988] also ascribes the decline in the marriage rate to changes in the labour market, but she is one of the main critics of Becker's theory. In Oppenheimer's view, the postponement of marriage is wrongly interpreted as its decline. The theories that emphasise specialisation and a division of labour care only capable of explaining the decline and not the postponement of marriage. Therefore, Oppenheimer formulated an alternative theory within the rational choice framework. Her theory is also based on the concept of the marriage market, but it does not identify any universal factor that would explain the postponement of marriage for both men and women. Nevertheless, in both cases she focuses on the labour market and assumes that partner selection is more complicated that it used to be in the past.

Why do women marry later? The explanation can be found in changing gender roles. In the past, women could enter into marriage at a young age because the information on the features that were fundamental to their success in the marriage market (basic personal characteristics, physical attractiveness, religious confession, or social background) were already apparent at a young age. But according to Oppenheimer the entry of women into paid employment changed the selection criteria, and the significance of a woman's income has been growing. This means that even in the case of women it has become necessary to wait until the information on their earning potential is available. In contrast to Becker's theory, it is expected that women with higher education will marry later, but that in the end their chances of marrying will be higher.

The reason men postpone marriages is seen to lie in the deteriorating economic position of young men [Oppenheimer, Kalmijn and Nelson 1997; Oppenheimer 1994]. The first unstable career phase has extended and it takes longer to figure out what a man's earnings and lifestyle will be like. Oppenheimer claims that this factor is important among all social strata. Although the higher social classes are better off and objectively they could afford to establish a household, they also expect a higher living standard and acceptable household income.

Oppenheimer argues that cohabitation offers the advantages of both marriage and being single: it gets young people out of high-cost search activities during a period of social immaturity, but without incurring the penalties of either heterosexual isolation or promiscuity. It often provides the benefits of marriage, including the pooling of resources, while also providing some of the advantages of being single, since the long-run obligations are relatively low [Oppenheimer 1988: 583–584].

Mellinda Mills and Hans-Peter Blossfeld [2000] explain the change in family behaviour as a part of the more general globalisation theory. They point out that although the international economy at the start of the 21st century is integrated roughly to the same degree as it was before the First World War, technological developments and modernisation have altered the demands made on the labour force [Mills and Blossfeld 2000]. Today it is necessary for the labour force to be more flexible and

more dynamic, while at the same time people are faced with a less predictable future, their life courses are more diverse, and the transition between different phases in the life cycle are less clearly and sharply defined. Young people in particular are sensitive to the considerable economic insecurity surrounding social and economic roles, since they are the 'outsiders' in the labour market. Therefore, they try to put off making long-term commitments, and their rational response is to move away from marriage and towards cohabitation, which does not entail any commitments for the future [Mills and Blossfeld 2000].[3] It may be assumed that people with higher education will be better equipped to cope with these challenges and with growing insecurity. They study longer, which leads to a postponement of marriage. However, once they finish their education, they should be capable of establishing the stable career that is a necessary precondition for marriage much more quickly.

All the theories mentioned suggest a relationship between education and union formation. Education can be viewed as a proxy for human or cultural capital as well as earning potential. Thus, it should be an important predictor of union formation, especially marriage formation. In the following section, I will summarise previous research on this topic. Further, I will formulate specific hypotheses concerning relationship between education and union formation and test the hypotheses on empirical data.

The socio-demographic background – a summary of previous empirical research

It is somewhat difficult to summarise the results of the empirical research that, since the 1970s, has focused on the connections between union formation, assortative mating, and education. Although in the majority of societies the choice between marriage and cohabitation does not occur randomly, there is no universally valid pattern that the choice between the two types of union follows. Another difficulty is that the relationship between marital behaviour and socio-economic standing has changed over time. Historically, cohabitation (concubinage) was associated with the poorer strata of society [Laslett et al. 1980], but during the 20th century it began to spread from the working classes into the middle and upper classes, among whom in some countries it ultimately became even more widespread.[4]

[3] Although these tendencies are generally in evidence in all modern Western societies, the particular ways in which they develop are connected with nation-specific institutions. For example, the presence of strong job protection in a society can lead to a guarantee of stable employment for those who are a part of the labour market, but it can also block entry into the labour market for newcomers and especially young people, and thus worsen their prospects.

[4] The first studies of cohabitation in the United States used small university-based samples and thus evoked the erroneous impression that cohabitation spreads from the academic environment. Later studies on the American environment, like studies from Sweden and France, have shown however that it was the students who were imitating the lifestyle of the lower strata and not the other way around [Carmichael 1995: 54].

The connection between education and whether people choose to live in a marriage, cohabitation, or remain alone is also not universally applicable but rather nationally specific. In the United States, people with lower levels of education tend to choose cohabitation [Spanier 1983; Bumpass and Sweet 1989; Blackwell and Lichter 2000; Brown and Booth 1996; Metanahan 1995]. In France, however, studies indicate either that the connection with education cannot be confirmed, or that the reverse is true, and associate cohabitation with higher educational groups [Carmichael 1995: 63; Šalamounová 2001]. The studies from the United Kingdom have not revealed any clear pattern [Carmichael 1995: 63]. According to Kiernan [2000], in some European countries (France, Austria, and Hungary) it tends to be women with lower levels of education who enter directly into marriage without premarital cohabitation, while in other countries (e.g. former West Germany, Sweden) the trend is parabolic in form: those entering directly into marriage tend to be women with either the lowest or the highest levels of education [ibid.: 53–54].[5]

In the Czech Republic there are several studies that have focused on the issue of cohabitation. Ivo Možný [1987] analysed a specific sample of people from the city of Brno who filled out an application for a marriage license. He found that cohabitation was typical for people who had not completed even the lower levels of secondary education[6] [ibid.: 122]. Ladislav Rabušic and Ivo Možný [1992] continued this analysis in another study on a similar sample from Brno and reached similar results. Rychtaříková [1994] analysed common-law marriages in the 1991 Census, and she also found that they were a typical union among the less educated strata of the population. However, Hamplová and Pikálková [2002], whose analyses looked at pre-marital cohabitation, did not observe a similar tendency and did not find any pattern.

Hypothesis and method: the life-course approach

This study is based on the life-course approach and takes into account the timing of events. The life course is defined as the chain of closely interrelated events from various fields of life (family, study, work), which an individual goes through from birth up until death. In the analysis of the life course the order and timing of these events must be interpreted in relation to the order and timing of preceding events [Manting 1994: 35].

Empirical research on the life course therefore requires specific data samples, so-called event-history data, which record the requisite events in the life cycle and

[5] Kiernan's analyses of course use only the roughest educational categories (post-secondary, secondary, lower). [Kiernan 2000: 53]

[6] Možný presents the proportion of those in cohabitation according to a socio-professional classification. In the case of male and female unskilled workers already working working, 64% lived with their partner prior to marriage. To compare, among those who had post-secondary education, 26% of men and 31% of women had lived in a relationship of cohabitation.

their timing. Event-history data are gathered retrospectively, and unlike classic longitudinal data they do not contain any gaps between the individual waves, but cover the entire life course [see Blossfeld and Rohwer 2002].

The event-history method analyses the transitions between different states. This analysis works with a risk set: only those who can experience a transition are taken into account (e.g. once a person enters a union, he or she is no longer a part of the risk set). This is possible owing to the fact that the unit of an analysis is not a person but an episode (i.e. time period). Every episode records the beginning and end, and the original state and destination state. An episode can end in an event (e.g. marriage), or it can be 'right-censored'. Right censoring means that the episode ended (the person is no longer at risk), but no event occurred. For example, all people who did not form a first union by the time of the interview date are right-censored.

The hazard rate (sometimes called risk, risk function, hazard, transition rate) is estimated. The transition rates give a local, time-related description of how the process evolves over time. A transition rate can be interpreted as a specific state's propensity to change, but this propensity is defined in relation to a risk set. Only those individuals that have not already been through the event before time 't' can then experience the event [Blossfeld and Rohwer 2002: 33]. The hazard rate thus reflects the likelihood as well as the timing of an event.

In the case of the Czech Republic, event-history data relating to demographic events is available from the 1997 Family and Fertility Survey (FFS). The disadvantage of these data is that they represent only the female population. Consequently, in the analytical part of this paper the focus is on hypotheses specific to women alone. Primary attention is devoted to education as a measure of earning potential and human capital. The control variables are derived from the information on family origin. Below is a summary of the variables and the initial hypotheses applied in this research.

Control Variables

Among the basic factors influencing partnership behaviour is the experience drawn from the family of origin. To determine the degree of social control exercised by the parents and the quality of socialisation several variables are usually employed. They include parental divorce, size of the family, age of the mother at the time of the respondent's birth, and the size of the location in which the family resided [Manting 1994: 72]. The FFS data are able to provide information on parental divorce and on the total number of children that the mother of the respondent had.

Parental Divorce

Michael and Tuma [1985] analysed the relationship between entry into marriage and parental divorce in the United States and found that the poorer economic conditions

of children from divorced families contributed to hastening the children's entry into marriage [cit. in Manting 1994: 1972]. According to Thornton [1991], children from divorced homes are subject to less social control, are forced to take on adult responsibilities earlier and mature more quickly. Therefore, there is a higher probability that they will begin to live with a partner at an earlier age [cit. in Manting 1994: 73]. However, it would be possible to assume that the experience of the parents' divorce would reduce the willingness of the children to take on long-term commitments and to enter into marriage. *Therefore, the hypothesis in this study is that while people from divorced homes will be more likely to enter earlier into a partnership union, they will also be more inclined towards cohabitation and less inclined towards marriage.*

Size of the original family

Manting [1994] interprets the size of the family as an indicator of how much money, time and energy the parents were capable of devoting to their children. He assumes that children from small families are often led to invest more in other areas of life (work, education) and are drawn away from an early marriage [ibid.: 74]. In the Czech case this tendency may be further reinforced by the fact that large families in this country are usually families with a strong religious (especially Catholic) orientation, in which a stronger pro-family orientation is to be expected. *Therefore, the tested hypothesis is that people who grew up in smaller families will be less inclined to enter into a partnership.*

Age

Entry into marriage is closely connected with the age of a person and the given phase in the life course that they are in. The influence of age, however, is not monotonous, but is rather distributed along a bell-shaped curve: with the increase in age, the probability of entry into a union also increases, but later this tendency reverses and the probability decreases. Blossfeld and Huinink [1991: 153] therefore propose controlling the influence of age with the aid of two logarithmic functions. If we assume that people are at risk of entering into their first union between the ages of 15 and 44, then: (1) log (impact of age 1) = log (current age – 15), (2) log (impact of age 2) = log (44 – current age). Here it is necessary to measure age as a time-varying covariate.

Cohort membership

The analysis in this paper works with three age cohorts: 1952–1961, 1962–1971 and 1972–1982. A typical feature of socialist Czechoslovakia was the East European demographic regime, characterised by a high marriage rate at a low age. In the 1990s a sharp decline occurred in the marriage rate, but this decline was partially compensated by the increase in cohabitation. *Therefore, it is possible to assume that the generation born after 1971 will exhibit a lower likelihood of entering into a marriage but a higher likelihood of entering into cohabitation.*

Main explanatory variables – hypotheses

Highest completed level of education

If we consider education to be a measure of earning potential, economic independence, potential employment, and the cultural milieu within the labour market, then according to the majority of theories it should have an important influence on demographic behaviour.

According to Becker [1996], marriage brings employed, economically independent, and more educated women fewer advantages, and consequently the likelihood that they will enter into a marriage decreases. Similarly, Van de Kaa [1987] and Lesthaeghe and Moors [1992] see the economic independence of women as one of the main factors that caused a change in family behaviour [cit. in Manting 1994]. Moreover, Liefbroer [1991] points out that for people with higher education autonomy and independence are more important. This should further decrease the hazard of entering marriage for people with higher education.

Hypothesis 1: It is possible to assume that women with higher levels of education would enter into marriage less often and at a later age. The lower marriage rate could, however, in part be compensated by the fact that they are more likely to enter into cohabitation.

On the other hand, Oppenheimer expects that women with higher income have better chances of marrying. If education is a proxy for higher earning potential, it could therefore be assumed that women with higher education will marry later, but at a higher rate.

Hypothesis 2: The women with higher education will marry later, but they will have better chances to marry.

Educational enrolment

Educational enrolment is measured as a dynamic time-varying covariate. It records the point in time at which the female respondent completed her full-time studies, i.e. ended her enrolment as a full-time student. According to Carmichael [1995: 64] and Blossfeld and Huinink [1991], the status of being a student decreases the likelihood of entry into any kind of partnership, although the influence is strongest with respect to marriage. The fact of being enrolled at school has a negative impact on the hazard of entering a union because students often do not have the economic means for setting up their own household. Moreover, the cultural definition of adulthood is closely connected with the end of full-time schooling and students are often not viewed as mature enough to form a union (especially marriage) [Blossfeld and Huinink 1991].

Hypothesis 3: School enrolment will have a negative effect on entry into a partnership union and this effect will be somewhat stronger in the case of marriage.

According to some longitudinal studies [Blossfeld and Huinink 1991; Liefbroer 1991], the negative effect of education on entry into marriage stems from the longer period of school enrolment, but not from higher education as such.[7]

[7] But while this is true for entry into marriage, it does not apply in the case of the birth of a child.

According to the authors of these studies, the higher earning potential of educated women, their higher human capital, and their better employment opportunities in the labour market do not in themselves influence the formation of partnerships. As soon as more educated women complete their studies they exhibit the same likelihood of entering into a partnership union as women with lower education levels. Moreover, in accordance with Mills' and Blossfeld's globalisation theory even the reverse trend may occur, since people with higher education are better able to cope with insecurity. Once their education is finished they may more often be able – i.e. in a position – to marry.

Hypothesis 4: If it is true that the differences between educational groups stem only from the timing of events, that is, women with higher education levels simply study longer, it could be assumed that in the model that controls the end of education as a time-varying covariate the influence of education will decline, will cease to be significant, or will be reversed.

The cohort shift in the impact of education

Socialist society was artificially homogenised and allowed people to apply their education and human capital only to a limited extent. However, it could be expected that with the rise of a market economy and the development of an open society the life courses of various social groups would have gradually diversified. It is also possible that, while in the past educational differences were unable to manifest themselves, in the case of the younger cohorts space allowing this would now have opened up and differences would have begun to appear. It may now have become important how women invest in the market capital. If in today's society education is a more significant factor than it was prior to 1989, it could also be assumed that the effect of school enrolment would be stronger in the youngest cohort. The data cover only a relatively narrow time window after 1989. However, it may be possible to discover some basic tendencies.

Hypothesis 5: Both school enrolment and highest completed levels of education will have an even greater effect in the case of the youngest cohort.

Data and results

The 1997 Family and Fertility Survey (FFS) involved the participation of 1735 women aged 15–44, and for 1677 of these respondents information is available on whether and when they began living with their first partner, and whether they were married at that point in time. If people entered into marriage within a month of starting to live together they were included among direct marriages. The probability of entry into a partnership union is here modelled with the event-history (survival) analysis.

It is possible to obtain a basic idea of the rate of entry into a partnership union through survival functions, which model the likelihood that up until a certain point

Figure 1. Partnership formation by birth cohorts and age (survival function)



Source: FFS 1997

Figure 2. Partnership formation by education (survival function)



Source: FFS 1997

along an x-axis people will not form a union. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the survival functions for four educational groups and three cohorts. The graphs allow two basic observations to be made. First, people born in the years 1972–1982 exhibit an overall lower probability of union formation altogether, regardless of whether this means marriage or cohabitation. Therefore, it is not possible to confirm that the decline in the marriage rate during the first half of the 1990s was fully compensated by the spread of cohabitation. Second, women with higher education have at first a lower likelihood of entering a union, but at a later age they catch up with their less educated peers.

It is not possible to determine from the survival functions the influence of several factors at once or even the inter-cohort shift. Therefore, the use of some of the exponential transition rate models would appear to be useful here. One positive attribute of these models is that they offer the possibility to control the effect of several variables at once. A disadvantage is that the coefficients of individual variables and the transition rate reflect the influence of the variable on both the speed of the process and the likelihood that the process will occur [Blossfeld and Rohwer 2002: 99; Bernardi 2001]. If from a theoretical perspective it is necessary to distinguish between timing and the likelihood that an event will occur, it is possible to create a survival function for the given variable.

Hypotheses on the background variable

Tables 1 and 2 contain three types of models: entry into a partnership in general (table 1), and entry into marriage and entry into cohabitation as competing risks (table 2).[8] Model 1 assesses only the effect of the background variables; all of them were shown to be statistically significant. Entry into a partnership union was closely connected with age, and at the same time the influence of age was not monotonous. The number of brothers and sisters had a positive effect on entry into a partnership union. Equally, the hypothesis that those respondents whose parents were divorced begin living with a partner earlier than people whose parents were not divorced was also confirmed. While the likelihood that they will enter into marriage is the same as for people whose parents were not divorced, people from divorced families do tend to cohabit more often and at an earlier age.

Hypotheses on education:

Hypothesis 1: The negative influence of education on a woman's risk of marrying.

Hypothesis 2: The positive influence of education on a woman's risk of marrying.

Models 2 and 3 consider the effect of the highest completed level of education (as a time-constant covariate), measured both as the number of years of study and according to four educational categories. In models 2 and 3 the level of education

[8] In competing risk, marriage and cohabition are viewed as two ways in which singleness comes to an end. This means that once a woman enters a marriage, she is not at risk of cohabition and is not part of the risk set anymore. Conversely, if a woman starts to cohabit, she is not at risk of marriage.

Table 1. Union formation: all unions (exponential transition rate model)

	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3	MODEL 4	MODEL 5	MODEL 6	MODEL 7	MODEL 8	MODEL 9
								cohort	
								1952–71	1972–82
Log (current age – 15)	**2,1197****	**2,2063****	**2,1968****	**1,3533****	**1,3565****	**1,3547****	**1,3563****	**1,4882****	**1,0788****
Log (44 – current age)	**5,4553****	**5,5945****	**5,5811****	**4,3658****	**4,4287****	**4,4847****	**4,5283****	**4,8447****	**4,1001***
Parent's divorce	**0,2484****	**0,2386****	**0,2392****	**0,2444****	**0,2487****	**0,2543****	**0,2571****	**0,2727****	0,2081
Number of siblings	**0,1053****	**0,0749****	**0,0801****	**0,0627****	**0,0610****	**0,0555****	**0,0547****	**0,0506***	0,1066
Education (in years)	.	**–0,0712****	.	0,0020	.	0,0017	.	.	.
Primary (Comparison category)	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Lower secondary	.	.	**–0,1711***	.	–0,0644	.	–0,0451	–0,0132	–0,2200
Secondary	.	.	**–0,2904****	.	–0,0677	.	–0,0539	0,0245	**–0,3931***
Tertiary	.	.	**–0,6540****		0,1060	.	0,0888	0,1221	–0,3079
School enrolment	.	.	.	**–1,3479****	**–1,3737****	**–1,3432****	**–1,3653****	**–1,3034****	**–1,5561****
Cohort 1952–1961 (comparison)									
Cohort 1962–1971	.	.	.	.	.	0,0103	0,0147	.	.
Cohort 1972–1982	.	.	.	.	.	**–0,2468****	**–0,2328****	.	.
Constant	–44,1039	–44,3955	–44,8504	–34,3400	–34,6602	–34,9550	–35,1755	–37,5394	–31,7764*
Log-likelihood (starting)	–7221,91	–7215,43	–7215,43	–7142,80	–7142,80	–7142,80	–7142,80	–5740,08	–1373,84
Log-likelihood (estim.)	–6549,69	–6515,69	–6517,29	–6329,54	–6327,84	–6323,49	–6322,41	–5118,32	–1196,40
Events	1280	1279	1279	1266	1266	1266	1266	1039	227

Data: FFS 1997

**Significant at the level 0,01

*Significant at the level 0,05

Table 2. Union formation: marriage and cohabitation, competing risk (exponential transition rate model)

MARRIAGE	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3	MODEL 4	MODEL 5	MODEL 7
Log (current age – 15) (dynamic measure)	3,3147**	3,4144**	3,4016**	2,3900**	2,3981**	2,4123**
Log (44 – current age) (dynamic measure)	9,7162**	9,895**	9,8477**	7,9093**	7,9677**	8,3253**
Parent's divorce	-0,0254	-0,0344	-0,0367	-0,0200	-0,0175	0,0059
Number of siblings	0,1080**	0,0751**	0,0800**	0,0654**	0,0640**	0,0459
Education (in years)	.	-0,074**	.	0,0001	.	.
Primary (comparison cat.)	.	.	.	.	.	.
Lower secondary	.	.	-0,1688	.	-0,0795	-0,0154
Secondary	.	.	-0,2600**	.	-0,0525	-0,0017
Tertiary	.	.	-0,7439**	.	0,0387	0,009
School enrolment (dynamic measure)	.	.	.	-1,3432**	-1,3586**	-1,3373**
Cohort 1952–1961 (comparison)						
Cohort 1962–1971	.	.	.	.	.	-0,0834
Cohort 1972–1982	.	.	.	.	.	-0,8172**
Constant	-73,5443	-74,0776	-74,3563	-59,0409	-59,3741	-61,2714
COHABITATION						
Log (current age – 15) (dynamic measure)	1,0479**	1,0899**	1,0841**	0,7401**	0,7352**	0,7229**
Log (44 – current age) (dynamic measure)	1,9768**	1,9799**	2,0083**	2,1965**	2,2920**	1,9308**
Parent's divorce	0,7226**	0,7097**	0,7179**	0,7076**	0,7176**	0,7025**
Number of siblings	0,1072**	0,0802*	0,0864*	0,0675	0,0664	0,0895*
Education (in years)	.	-0,0689**	.	-0,0088	.	.
Primary (comparison cat.)	.	.	.	.	.	.
Lower secondary	.	.	-0,1931	.	-0,0785	-0,1617
Secondary	.	.	-0,3893**	.	-0,1912	-0,2520*
Tertiary	.	.	-0,4843**	.	0,1463	0,1921
School enrolment (dynamic measure)	.	.	.	-1,1407**	-1,1968**	-1,2301**
Cohort 1952–1961 (comparison)						
Cohort 1962–1971	.	.	.	.	.	0,2978**
Cohort 1972–1982	.	.	.	.	.	0,7403**
Constant	-21,2916	-20,6617	-21,3347	-20,7487	-21,2937	-19,3537
Log-likelihood (starting)	-8012,92	-8006,06	-8006,06	-7926,21	-7926,21	-7926,21
Log-likelihood (estimates)	-7282,57	-7247,22	-7247,27	-7068,25	-7065,53	-7019,46
Events						
Marriage	885	884	884	874	874	874
Cohabitation	395	395	395	392	392	392

Data: FFS 1997

**Significant at the level 0,01

*Significant at the level 0,05

has a negative effect on entry into a partnership, and the higher the level of education a woman has the lower the transition rate is. We can obtain a more insightful idea of the influence of education by transferring the coefficients to the percentage change of the transition rate:[9] women with lower secondary education have a 16% lower transition rate, those with full secondary education a 25% lower transition rate, and women with higher education even a 48% lower transition rate than women with only elementary education. At the same time, the negative influence of education is stronger in the case of marriage than cohabitation. These models seem to correspond to the rational choice theories in that they confirm the negative influence of education (and thus of earning potential and human capital applicable in the labour market) on entry into a partnership. The results correspond more to Becker's or to the normative theories, which assume that education has a negative impact on the likelihood of marriage.

Hypothesis 3: The negative effect of school enrolment on entry into a partnership and especially on the risk of marrying

Model 4 includes school enrolment 's' as a dynamic measure, time-varying covariate. As expected, it was revealed that school enrolment has a negative effect on entry into any kind of partnership and that this effect is stronger in the case of marriage. School enrolment decreases the risk of marrying by 73% and the risk of cohabiting by 68%.

Hypothesis 4: The impact of education can be explained by a longer period of attending school. Once the model controls the end of education as a time-varying covariate the influence of education ceases to be significant or may be reversed.

The important finding is that, when school enrolment is controlled in the model, education ceases to have an influence on the transition rates, both in the case of marriage and cohabitation. Thus the hypothesis that women with higher levels of education will show a tendency to reject marriage and more often opt for cohabitation is not confirmed. Data also failed to confirm the positive effect of higher education on marrying. The FFS data thus essentially correspond to the results of the studies by Blossfeld and Huinink [1991] or Liefbroer [1991], and fail to confirm that the level of education (and consequently also the accumulation of specialised human capital) in itself has a negative effect on entry into marriage (or cohabitation). However, the level of education does shift the age at which one of these events will occur.

[9] The coefficients explaining the variables can at the same time be very easily transferred to the likelihood of the change of transition rate (exp(alfa) - 1)*100.

Table 3. Union formation: marriage and cohabitation, competing risk (exponential transition rate model). Models including interactions

	MODEL 10		MODEL 11	
MARRIAGE	Marriage	Cohabitation	Marriage	Cohabitation
Log (current age - 15) (dynamic measure)	**2,409****	**0,739****	**2,412****	**0,746****
Log (44 - current age) (dynamic measure)	**8,299****	**2,050****	**8,314****	**1,966****
Parent's divorce	0,008	**0,685****	0,005	**0,674****
Number of siblings	0,046	**0,089****	**0,047***	**0,087****
Primary (comparison cat.)	.	.	.	.
Lower secondary	-0,023	-0,145	.	.
Secondary	-0,009	-0,234	.	.
Tertiary	-,008	0,352	.	.
Less than secondary education (comparison)			.	.
Secondary and more			0,027	**0,105****
School enrolment (dynamic measure)	**-1,335****	**-1,224****	**-1,336****	**-1,167****
Cohort 1972-1982	**-0,779****	**0,632****	**-0,664****	0,786
Tertiary edu*Cohort 1972-1982	0,120	-1,179	.	.
More than secondary edu* Cohort1972-1982			-0,239	**-0,653****
Constant	**-61,147****	**-20,145****	**-61,266****	**-19,787****
Events	874	392	874	392
Log-likelihood: starting values	-7926,21			
Log-likelihood: estimates	-7020,32			

Source: FFS 1997

Hypothesis 5: Both school enrolment and highest completed levels of education will have an even greater effect in the case of the youngest cohort.

Models 10–12 cover the interaction between the level of education and the cohort (table 3). It is necessary to approach the cohort differences with some caution. It must be taken into account that the youngest cohort includes respondents who are between 15 and 25 years of age. A large number of them have not yet completed their education, and thus have not yet entered the phase in the life course in which they begin to live with a partner. Equally, it is necessary to consider the fact that if the decline in the marriage rate in the 1990s stems from the postponement of marriage until a later age, this fact could not yet have manifested itself, as these women have not yet reached that 'later' age. This explains why the influence of age measured as log (44 – current age) ceased to be significant in the model for the youngest cohort, as women born in the years 1972–1982 had not yet reached the second part of the curve at the time when the data was collected.

Table 4. Union formation: marriage, cohabitation by cohorts (exponential transition rate model)

		MODEL		11	MODEL		12
	Cohort	1952–1961	1962–1971	1972–1982	1952–1971	1962–1971	1972–1982
MARRIAGE	Log (current age – 15)	**2,502****	**2,688****	**1,705***	**2,496****	**2,680****	**1,768***
	Log (44 – current age)	**7,851****	**9,865****	5,849	**7,752****	**9,861****	6,022
	Parent's divorce	0,086	0,045	–0,455	0,093	0,048	–0,447
	Number of siblings	**0,101***	0,004	0,029	**0,102****	0,005	0,015
	Education (in years)	0,001	0,000	–0,010			.
	Primary (comparison cat.)			.			.
	Lower secondary			.	–0,084	0,070	–0,186
	Secondary			.	0,080	0,000	–0,287
	Tertiary			.	–0,098	0,044	–0,020
	School enrolment	**–1,354****	**–1,256****	**–1,462****	**–1,326****	**–1,271****	**–1,456****
	Constant	–59,154	**–71,135****	–44,88	**–58,561****	**–71,101****	–46,047
COHABITATION	Log (current age – 15)	**0,482****	**1,103****	**0,945****	**0,476****	**1,062****	**0,943****
	Log (44 – current age)	**1,513****	**1,888***	**4,747***	**1,515***	**1,876***	**4,716***
	Parent's divorce	**0,668****	**0,791****	**0,585****	**0,661****	**0,828****	**0,586****
	Number of siblings	**0,155****	–0,045	**0,158***	**0,150****	–0,041	**0,163***
	Education (in years)	0,024	–0,013	**–0,088***			.
	Primary (comparison cat.)			.			.
	Lower secondary			.	–0,440	–0,046	–0,238
	Secondary			.	0,152	–0,270	**–0,498***
	Tertiary			.	0,398	0,087	–0,721
	School enrolment	**–1,516****	**–0,486***	**–1,621****	**–1,566****	**–0,593***	**–1,598****
	Constant	**–16,666****	**–20,328****	–35,079	**–16,438**	**–20,142****	–35,546
	Log-likelihood (starting)	–2877,72	–3449,96	–1529,57	–2877,73	–3449,96	–1529,57
	Log-likelihood (estimates)	–2558,10	–3095,21	–1344,34	–2255,83	–3093,73	–1342,93
	Events						
	Marriage	369	405	100	369	405	100
	Cohabitaton	106	159	127	106	159	127

Data: FFS 1997

**Significant at the level 0,01

*Significant at the level 0,05

From the separate models for the older and for the youngest cohorts it appears that, in the case of the youngest cohort, the influence of variables characterising family background (number of brothers and sisters, parental divorce), which previously hastened entry into a partnership relationship, has decreased. The cohort comparison reveals that the effect of whether a woman studied or not has no clear pattern. Even though the effect of school enrolment is stronger in cohorts born after 1971 in comparison with the 1962–1972 cohort, the same does not hold true for the 1952–1961 cohort. It seems that for the cohort born in 1962–1971 the effect of school enrolment was weaker in comparison with older and younger cohorts. The hypothesis relating to the level of completed education cannot be confirmed in these models, as the coefficients reveal very little in the way of a clear tendency. Of course, this is owing to the fact that a large portion of the women in this age group are still studying.

Models 10 and 11 cover the interaction between the highest completed level of education and the age cohort. Given the size of the sample no other interactions are incorporated into the model and education has only two basic categories. From these models it is not possible to conclude that tertiary education is beginning to influence entry into marriage among the youngest cohort. If we choose a different categorisation for the level of education attained (primary and lower secondary versus higher), it seems that in the youngest cohort the life courses of women with different levels of education are really beginning to differ, but are so in exactly the opposite direction than what was assumed in the initial hypothesis. It is women with lower education who more often choose cohabitation.

Conclusion

In the previous section I attempted to summarise the basic theories explaining the changes in demographic behaviour. I focused attention primarily on the connection between demographic behaviour and education since education may serve as a proxy for cultural capital and for the position on the labour market.

It is argued that people with higher education opt for lifestyles that give them more independence. Equally, the education and growing earning potential of women are usually viewed as an important reason for the declining marriage rates and the growing proportion of people who have never married. Marriage, the argument claims, is less advantageous for more educated women, since their education offers them more opportunities outside the traditional family setting.

Data confirmed that previous experiences drawn from the family background of an individual influence the timing of partnership behaviour, as well as whether a person chooses to enter into marriage or a relationship of cohabitation. However, the basic hypotheses concerning education and union formation could not be confirmed in the case of the Czech Republic. The data reveal that while more educated women do enter into marriage later, this deferral can be fully explained by the fact that they

study for a longer period of time. From the moment when they complete their schooling they exhibit the same transition rates as women with lower levels of education. It is equally untrue that they more often choose to enter into cohabitation.

Since education was measured as a time-constant covariate, it traces more the cultural capital and earning potential than the actual socio-economic status of the woman. Consequently, the results do not completely refute the rational choice theories, but they do indicate that the relationship between human capital and union formation is far more complicated. They lead back to the question of values and preferences. That women have a higher earning potential and have more opportunities outside of marriage does not necessarily mean that they opt for alternative life courses. On the contrary, the results from the cohort comparison indicate that better-educated women are less inclined towards cohabitation. However, this would need to be confirmed further by data that cover a longer period in the post-socialist social transformation.

DANA HAMPLOVÁ *graduated from the Faculty of Philosophy and Arts of Charles University in Praque with a degree in sociology and Czech linguistics and literature. She is currently enrolled in post-graduate studies in sociology at the same faculty. She works as a researcher at the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences (Prague) and is involved in the Globalife project of the University of Bamberg. Her main research interests are the sociology of the family and the sociology of religion.*

References

Blackwell, D.L. and D.T. Lichter. 2000. "Mate Selection among Married and Cohabiting Couples." *Journal of Family Issues* vol. 21 (3): 275–303.

Becker, G.S. 1972. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I." *Journal of Political Economy* 81: 813–846.

Becker, G.S. 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part II." *Journal of Political Economy* 82: S11–S26

Becker, G.S. 1996. *A Treatise on the Family*. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: Harvard University Press.

Becker, G.S. 1997. *Teorie Preferencí (The theory of preferences)*. Praha: Grada Publishing.

Bernardi, F. 2001. "Is It a Timing or a Probability Effect? Four Simulations and an Application of Transition Rate Models to the Analysis of Unemployment Exit." *Quality and Quantity* 35: 231–252.

Blossfeld, H.P. and G. Rohwer. 2002. *Techniques of Event History Modeling. New Approaches to Causal Analysis*. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Blossfeld, H.P. and J. Huinink. 1991. "Human Capital Investments or Norms of Role Transition? How Women's Schooling and Career Affect the Process of Family Formation." *American Journal of Sociology* 97(1): 143–168.

Blossfeld, H.P. and M. Mills. 2001. "A Causal Approach to Interrelated Family Events: A Cross-national Comparison of Cohabitation, Non-marital Conception, and Marriage." University of Bielefeld, Globalife project, Working Paper No. 14.

Brown, S. and A. Booth. 1996. "Cohabitation versus Marriage: A Comparison of Relationship Quality." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 5 (3): 668–679.
Bumpass, L.L. and J.A. Sweet. 1989. "National Estimates of Cohabitation." *Demography* 26 (4): 615–625.
Carmichael, G. 1995. "Consensual Partnering in the More Developed Countries." *Journal of the Australian Population Association* 12: 51–86.
Coleman, J.S. and T.J. Fararo. 1992. *Rational Choice Theory. Advocacy and Critique.* London: Sage Publication.
Fialová, L. and M. Tuček. 1997. "Názory na ideální počet dětí ve vybraných evropských zemích" (Opinions on the ideal number of children in selected European countries). Demografie 39: 1–12.
Friedman, D., M. Hechter and S. Kanazawa. 1994. "A Theory of the Value of Children." *Demography* vol. 31 (3): 375–401.
Giddens, A. 1992. *The Transformation of Intimacy. Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern Societies.* Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hamplová, D. and S. Pikálková. 2002. "Manželství, nesezdané soužití a partnerský vztah." (Marriage, unmarried cohabitation and partnerships). Pp. 127–147 in *Současná česká společnost. Sociologické studie*, edited by Z. Mansfeldová and M. Tuček. Praha: Sociologický ústav.
Heaton, T.B. and C.K. Jacobson. 1999. "Persistence and Change in Decisions to Remain Childless." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* vol. 61 (2): 531–540.
Kiernan, K. 2000. "European Perspectives on Union Formation." Pp. 40–58 in *The Ties that Bind. Perspectives on Marriage and Cohabitation*, edited by L.J. Waite. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Inglehart, R. 1990. *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Laslett, P., K. Oosterveen and K.M. Smith (eds.). 1980. *Bastardy and Its Comparative History.* London: Edward Arnold.
Lesthaeghe, R. and G. Moors. 1992. "De gezinsrelaties: De ontwikkeling en stabilisatie van patronen." Pp. 19–68 in *De versnelde ommekeer*, edited by J. Kerhofs, K. Dobbelaere, and L. Voyé. Lannoo: Tielt.
Liefbroer, A.C. 1991. "The Choice between a Married or Unmarried First Union by Young Adults. A Competing Risk Analysis." *European Journal of Population* 7: 273–298.
Manting, D. 1994. *Dynamics in Marriage and Cohabitation. An Inter-temporal, Life Course Analysis of First Union Formation and Dissolution.* Amsterdam: Thesis Publisher.
Michael, R.T. and N.B. Tuma. 1985. "Entry into Marriage and Parenthood by Young Men and Women: The Iinfluence of the Family Background." *Demography* 22 (4): 515–544.
Moors, G. 2000. "Values and Living Arrangements: A Recursive Relationship." Pp. 212–226 in *The Ties That Bind. Perspectives on Marriage and Cohabitation*, edited by L.J. Waite. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
McLanahan, S.S. and L.M. Casper. 1995. "The American Family in 1990. Growing Diversity and Inequality." Pp. 1–45 in *State of the Union: America in the 1990s*, edited by R. Farley. New York: Russell Sage.
Mills, M. and H.P. Blossfeld. 2000. *Globalization, Increasing Uncertainty and Changes in the Transition to Adulthood in Modern Societies.* Manuscript.
Možný, I. 1987. "K některým novým jevům v kulturně legitimních vzorcích rodinných startů" (On some new phenomena in culturally legitimate patterns of starting families). *Demografie* 29 (2): 114–123
Možný, I. and L. Rabušic. 1992. "Unmarried Cohabitation in Czechoslovakia." *Czech Sociological Review* 28 (Special Issue): 107–117.

Oppenheimer, V.K. 1988. "The Theory of Marriage Timing." *American Journal of Sociology* 94 (3): 563–591.
Oppenheimer, V.K. 1994. "Women's Rising Employment and the Future of the Family in Industrial Societies." *Population and Development Review* 20 (2): 293–342.
Oppenheimer, V.K., M. Kalmijn and L. Nelson. 1997. "Men's Career Development and Marriage Timing During a Period of Rising Inequality." *Demography* 34: 311–330.
Rabušic, L. 2001a. "Value Change and Demographic Behavior in the Czech Republic." *Czech Sociological Review* 9 (1): 99–122.
Rabušic, L. 2001b. *Kde ty všechny děti jsou? (Where are all the Children?)* Praha: Slon.
Rychtaříková, J. 1994. "Les unions informelles en République Tcheque." Praha: Acta Univesitatis Carolinae. Geographica, Supplementum: 71–85.
Spanier, G.B. 1983. "Married and Unmarried Cohabitation in the United States." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 45 (2): 277–288.
Šalamounová, P. 2001. "Mimomanželská plodnost v České republice a v Evropě" (Extramarital fertility in the Czech Republic and Europe). Dissertation, PřF UK, Praha.
Thornton, A. 1991. "Influence of the Marital History of Parents on the Marital and Cohabitational Experiences of Children." *American Journal of Sociology* 98 (4): 868–894.
Van de Kaa, D.J. 1987. "Europe's Second Demographic Transition." *Population Bulletin* vol. 42 (1), Washington D.C.: Population Reference Bureau.
Van de Kaa, D.J. 1988. "Europe's Second Demographic Transition Revisited: Theories and Expectations." *Werkstukken Planologisch en Demograpfisch Instituut* 109, December.
Van de Kaa, D.J. 1993. "Second Demographic Transtion Revisited: Theories and Expectations." Pp. 81–126 in *Population and Family in the Low Countries*, edited by G.C.N. Beets. Lisse: Swets and Zeitlinger.
Wiersma, G.E. 1983. *Cohabitation, an Alternative to Marriage? A Cross-national Study*. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Willekens, F.J. 1989. "Understanding the Interdependence between Parallel Careers." Pp. 11–31 in *Female Labour Market Behaviour and Fertility*, edited by J.J. Siegers, J. Jong-Gierveld, and E. van Imhoff. Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.

Congress Announcement and Call for Papers

Demographic Transition, Family, and Social Integration

A seminar organised by the Committee on Family Research
of the International Sociological Association (ISA), to be held
March 25-27, 2004, in Bodrum, Turkey

The demographic transition is taking place in almost all parts of the world, albeit at various stages. Based on declining fertility, increasing life expectancy, and age distance between generations, the demographic transition has strong implications for the population structure of the societies affected. Although there has been extensive debate and increasing research on the consequences of the demographic transition for the institutional regulations in welfare states, its consequences for social integration in general and for family relations in particular are not yet fully understood. The seminar intends to target these subjects and explore some of the following specific research questions:

- What are the consequences of the emerging age distribution for intergenerational relationships? Does it lead to social disintegration, inter-generational conflict or even an age-segmented society?
- What are the implications of the generational 'beanpole'-structure for intergenerational exchange and wealth-flows?
- What are the consequences of the shrinking collateral kinship for social integration? How related is intergenerational solidarity to social integration?
- Does a given welfare regime in a society make a difference to the impact of the demographic transition?
- Are there different pathways in the modernisation of intergenerational relationships in societies with kinship-based, welfare-state-based, and capital-based insurances against the risks of life?
- What are the implications of the demographic transition for the structure of social networks and the creation of social capital? What are its implications for expectations and investments in intergenerational relationships and their quality?

The conference aims to approach these questions on the basis of theory-oriented, research-based studies, both national case studies and comparative work, and it intends to focus on the different arrangements of intergenerational relationships, kinship structures and social integration at different stages of the demographic transition and as they change in the process. The seminar is conceived to incorporate the broad economic, social, and emotional aspects of family and kinship relationships and their integration in a societal context.

If you are interested in attending the conference without presenting a paper please send a formless application to the address below. The number of seminar attendants will be limited to 35 persons. For information on fees and accommodation and for general information and updates on the seminar, please see the website of the Committee on Family Research - http://www.rc06.net - or contact the address below.

Prof. Dr. Bernhard Nauck, Technische Universität Chemnitz, Institut für Soziologie
Reichenhainer Str. 41, 09126 Chemnitz, Germany
Phone: +49 0371- 531-2402
Fax: +49- 371- 531 2387
email: bernhard.nauck@phil.tu-chemnitz.de

A Third Child in the Family: Plans and Reality among Women with Various Levels of Education*

SIMONA PIKÁLKOVÁ**
Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague

Abstract: The article focuses on an analysis of the conditions and context surrounding the birth of a third child in the family, and especially on discovering the relationship between the likelihood of the birth of a third child and the level of attained education of the mother. The data in the analysis are drawn from the 'Family and Fertility Survey 1997', as one of the few available data sources enabling a more complex study of this issue. The original sample of individual data was used in the analysis, which covers 1735 women of reproductive age, between 15 and 44 years old. The first part of the paper is devoted to the relationship between the level of education of a woman and the planned number of children. A key section of the paper then focuses on an analysis of the factors that influence the likelihood of the birth of a third child, conducted using a regression model of relative risk (Cox's regression). Within the framework of observed indicators a woman's education proved itself to be the strongest predictor. A demonstrable influence on the likelihood of a third child in the family is also the fact of whether a woman practices a religious faith. The second part of the article focuses, on the one hand, on opinions about having a family and a professional career among women with various levels of education, and, on the other hand, on the broader issue of family policy, and especially its (possible?) connections with decisions concerning the number of children a woman has. The examples of Sweden and France are also presented within the analysis in the context of the discussion on family policy in the Czech Republic and its possible connections with the current process of reproductive behaviour.
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2003, Vol. 39, No. 6: 865–884

In recent years, a source of frequent discussion – and by no means among demographers alone – has been the current, historically low total fertility rate in the Czech Republic (1.14 in 2001), a situation that has persisted for approximately the past seven years. There are numerous factors counted as contributing to this situation, which is usually perceived as an unfavourable trend: from socio-cultural changes in the transforming Czech society, and the related transformation of young people's

* The study was prepared as a part of the grant 'Changes in Fertility and Family Behaviour in Connection with the Current Social Transformation in the Czech Republic', with the support of the Grant Agency of the Academy of Sciences, Czech Republic, grant no. IAA7028101.
** Direct all correspondence to: Mgr. Simona Pikálková, Institute of Sociology, Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, e-mail: pikalko@uiv.cz

values, to the unsatisfactory family policy of the state.[1] The following analysis focuses on one interesting aspect of reproductive behaviour – a third child in the family – and examines this aspect in connection with the level of education of women. The education factor merits particular interest for a number of reasons: It is well known that education acts as a relatively precise reflection of not only the social and economic capital of individuals and groups, but also of their affiliation with a certain lifestyle (including a connection with geographic characteristics – large cities versus small communities), and values and attitudes. The level of education thus represents one of the most revealing sociological and demographic characteristics, which moreover impinges on more or less all other spheres of interest to the social sciences: in any study of different areas or aspects of social life, education almost always represents a significant factor, co-influencing and shaping the attitudes and behaviour maintained by individuals and social groups.

This study also examines the attitude and value orientations women with various levels of education maintain in relation to children, the family, and a professional career. In addition, the analysis includes a brief look into the issue of family policy, which is of particular interest in this study with respect to the question of the influence it has on decisions relating to the number of children a family will have and the reproductive behaviour of women.

The study draws on the results of the 1997 Family and Fertility Survey of the Czech Republic, which involved a research sample of 1735 women aged 15 to 44 (we used the original sample of individual statements from female respondents).[2] I am, of course, aware of the fact that the analysed data are now approximately six years old and that they therefore do not reflect the most recent developments in the reproductive behaviour and the attitude orientations of women, but unfortunately no more up-to-date data are available. On the other hand, it is possible to assume that some of the characteristics that form the subject of our interest are not likely to change too much over the course of only several years. A look back into the recent past can thus represent an interesting contribution to the current debates on the family and reproductive behaviour [see Pavlík and Kučera 2002; Rychtaříková 1996]. Moreover, within the recent past it is possible to get a clear glimpse of the continuity of current trends.

[1] For a better understanding of the currently low Czech fertility rates see works by J. Rychtaříková and L. Rabušic.

[2] At the end of 1997, the 'Family and Fertility Survey' was conducted by the Czech Statistical Institute, in co-operation with the research agency Sofres-Factum. This survey was implemented as a part of the Family and Fertility Surveys project, and to date a total of 23 countries – 21 from Europe, along with the USA and Canada – have participated in it. The results for the Czech Republic were issued by the Czech Statistical Institute in the 'Reports and Analyses' series in a publication titled 'The Detailed Results from the Family and Fertility Survey (1997)'.

In accordance with internationally recommended methodology, the research work focused primarily on women of reproductive age, and the same questions were then presented to a set of men/partners.

With regard to the analysis of the results, it is necessary to realise that this is essentially an historical analysis – the women were questioned not only on their plans and expectations but also on their 'reproductive past'. Therefore, the conclusions reached in this study to a large degree relate to generations that realised their fertility during the 1970s and the 1980s.

Education and the desired number of children

For women, making and reaching decisions on the number of children to have is without doubt a complicated process and one that involves various factors. Moreover, as a woman grows older, the weight of these individual factors changes, often quite radically. Plans relating to the number of children always to a large degree reflect the actual, given situation a woman is in, which, in turn, is considerably influenced by demographic (especially age), geographic and socio-cultural characteristics (education, the character of the family background, economic situation, status strata affiliation, etc.). Among these factors, this study is interested in the level of attained education: how this very factor influences (or whether it has any influence at all?) the planned, or rather the 'desired' number of children women have?

Data on the desired number of children encompasses both women without children ('how many children would you like to have?') and women who already have children ('how many *more* children would you like to have?'). The indicator thus synthesises the changing expectations and attitudes of women along with the increase in age and the 'accumulation' of children. Out of the total sample of 1735 women in the survey, 469 were childless (27%). Out of these 469 women, more than 90% wished in the future to have a child, and only not quite 4% responded definitely that they did not want a child. The decision to not have a child was, however, in no way influenced by the level of attained education. The negligible share of women planning to remain childless corresponds with the results of the 'Young Generation 1997' survey, in which only approximately 2% of single women aged 18–30 responded that they did not plan to have any children [Fialová et. al. 2000: 92].

Table 1 shows the figures for the desired number of children among women aged 18–29 in comparison with older women aged 30–44, according to the level of the woman's education.

The analysis of the desired number of children among women with various levels of education revealed an interesting fact: the structure of responses, when differentiated according to education, differs strikingly for the women in the younger and the women in the older age categories. The data reveal that with the increase in a woman's age the planned or desired number of children evolves in a specific manner: young women, among whom there is still a considerable share of childless women (44% of women in the 18–29 age group), differ in terms of their plans and expectations from older women, who usually already have a child or children. Although in both age groups the majority of women would like two children (the ex-

Table 1. The desired number of children according to the level of attained education: women aged 18–29 and 30–44, % in the columns

Desired number of children in the family	Age category 18–29						Age category 30–44					
	Education (%)				Total		Education (%)				Total	
	Elementary, no education	Secondary without GCE	Secondary with GCE	Post-secondary	abs	%	elementary, no education	secondary without GCE	secondary with GCE	Post-secondary	abs	%
One	10.5	11.9	11.4	14.9	75	11.8	12.0	16.2	17.8	21.3	147	16.9
Two	47.4	69.6	61.6	55.3	402	63	37.0	54.8	62.3	65.7	494	56.8
Three	17.5	9.9	9.6	14.9	69	10.8	38.0	24.6	16.9	6.5	183	21.1
More than three	7.0	1.6	1.4	2.1	13	2.0	12.0	3.4	2.4	3.7	36	4.1
One or two	3.5	1.2	6.4	4.3	25	3.9	-	0.3	0.3	1.9	4	0.5
One or three	-	0.8	1.4	6.4	9	1.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Two or three	7.0	2.8	5.0	-	25	3.9	0.9	-	-	-	1	0.1
Other	-	0.4	1.4	2.1	6	0.9	-	0.3	0.3	0.9	2	0.2
Don't know, no answer	7.0	2.0	1.8	-	14	2.2	-	0.3	-	0.9	2	0.2
Total (%)	100	100	100	100	x	100	100	100	100	100	x	100
N	57	253	281	47	638	x	108	321	332	108	869	x

ception being women with elementary education), with the increase in age the proportion of those who plan only one child or plan three children changes. However, this development is distinct, or more precisely opposite in character for those women with higher levels and those women with lower levels of education.

Young women with post-secondary education, in comparison with their peers with secondary education, with relative frequency still plan to have three children – 15% of those with post-secondary education as opposed to 10% of those with secondary education – while in the older age group only 6.5% of those with post-secondary education would like to have three children, which is significantly less than among women with elementary education (38%), but substantially less than women with GCE level secondary education (17%). In the older age group, 30–44 years, a very clear trend can be observed in that with higher levels of education the share of those who would like three children declines, and does so dramatically. In addition, in this age category, as the level of education rises the proportion of women who would like only one child in the family increases also: 21% of women with post-secondary education as opposed to 12% of women with elementary education.

The exact opposite trend to that observed among post-secondary educated women can be found among the women with the lowest level of education: with the increase in age the proportion of women with elementary education who would like three or more children also increases. While in the 19–29 age group just under one-fifth of women with elementary education would like three children, in the 30–44 age group the figure is 38%. From the perspective we are looking at, women with secondary education, both with and without GCE, rank closer to women with elementary education: with the increase in age the share of women who would like three children also grows, and in this case does so most notably among those

women without GCE. Even in these two categories, however, the proportion of women who would like one child increases, though not as markedly as it does in the case of post-secondary educated women.

The analysis showed that in connection with the increase in age the plans and expectations of women with regard to the number of children in the family *change in various ways according to the level of attained education*, while women with elementary education on the one hand, and women with post-secondary education on the other form particularly distinct groups. Although with the increase in age women with elementary education more often give preference to three or even four children in the family, among women with post-secondary education the share of those who would like three children falls dramatically in favour of having two or even just one child in the family. At the time of family planning, i.e. in the young age group of 18–29, the option of having three children in the family is a more common plan among this group of women than it is in the case of women with secondary education. If we focus on post-secondary educated women alone, where the decline in the desired number of children in relation to the increase in age is most strongly evident, we must turn our attention to the question of exactly what factor or factors lie behind how this opinion develops. It would appear that something is 'preventing' women from realising their plans and expectations; how significant a role external factors play in this will be the subject of the next section of the analysis, in which we will look at some of the circumstances surrounding women's reproductive practices in fact, with specific regard to third-birth rates of women with various levels of education.

The likelihood of the birth of a third child among women with various levels of education: Cox's regression model

How are women's expectations and plans genuinely realised? The level of attained education without a doubt does have an influence on the number of children there are in a family [see Fialová 1994]. Here, however, our interest is specifically focused on the third child in a family. We are interested in what role education plays among the factors that have an effect on whether a woman has a third child. In other words, to what extent is the likelihood of the birth of a third child influenced by a woman's level of education, or is education only one of a number of factors that contribute to reproductive behaviour, with the strength of its influence comparable to that of other socio-cultural and economic characteristics?

For the analysis of these points I used Cox's regression model, and among the characteristics entered into the model, in addition to the woman's education level, I selected the following factors: generation, place of residence, membership in a religious community, the character of the background family, number of siblings, interval between first and second birth, age at the time of second birth, and the presence of a 'new partner', i.e. a partner other than that with whom the woman had the

second child. These characteristics represent, in my view, important demographic and socio-cultural factors, which I expected to be in close relationship with the probability of having a third child.

Methodology

Cox's models belong to the category of proportional hazard models and thus also to the group of (hazard) regression models. The methodology of these models is dealt with in greater detail in the appendix.

In this study, the purpose of the regression model is to measure the hazard function of the transition from the initial state, i.e. from the state in which the woman has two children to the state in which she has three children. This hazard can be expressed as the probability that a woman will experience a third birth in the next month, given her individual characteristics (independent variables – see below) and that she has not given birth within the current month. The hazard is purged of the influence of all other variables. Cox's models enable an estimation of the hazards with regard to their changing character over the course of time – the risks are estimated as changing in the observed time period.

The event studied (the dependent variable) is the occurrence of a third birth, measured as the reported date of the third birth. Within the framework of the observation period, there were 188 third births among the sample of Czech women.

The time interval between the birth of the second and the birth of the third child is measured in whole months. The period of observation starts (i.e. the woman comes under observation) with the birth of the second child and stops (i.e. the woman falls out of observation) at the time when one of the following events – whichever comes first – occurs: at the date of birth of the third child; once fifteen years have passed since the second birth; or at the time of the interview (i.e. November 1997).

Variables entered into the model

The likelihood that a woman will actually have a third child depends on many demographic and social factors, often wound up in a complex network of relations, not all of which can be determined with the aid of available statistical methods. The selection of factors is also always limited by the type and character of data. In order to grasp as well as possible the complexity of the aspect of family behaviour that the study is investigating, I entered the following factors (independent variables) into the model:

- Attained level of education: elementary (i.e. ISCED 2); secondary without GCE (i.e. ISCED 3C, reference category); secondary with GCE (i.e. ISCED 3A, 3B); post-secondary (i.e. ISCED 5A, 5B, 6)

- Generation: 1952–1959; 1960–1969; 1970–1982 (reference category)
- Place of residence: up to 9999 inhabitants; 10 000–999 999 inhabitants; 1 million or more inhabitants (reference category)
- The fact of whether the respondent is religious, i.e. whether she regularly attends religious services: she attends religious services at least once a week; she attends religious services less than once a week (reference category)
- Character of the respondent's family background: she grew up in a two-parent family; she grew up in a single-parent family, or in another situation (reference category)
- Number of children in the background family of the respondent: 5 or more children is the reference category
- Interval between first and second child (in months): 8–18; 19–24; 25–30; 31–36 (reference category)
- Age at the time of second birth: 19 years and under; 20–24 years; 25–29 years; 30 years and over (reference category)
- The fact of whether the respondent had the third child with a different partner than the second child, and in the case where she did not have a third child, the fact of whether she lives with a different partner than at the time of birth of the second child: if not = reference category

Results

The results indicated that out of all the variables observed the greatest influence on the likelihood that a woman will have a third child is exercised by the level of the woman's education and by how religious a woman is. The impact of the remaining factors entered into the model was either considerably less or did not prove to be significant.

Third-birth risk in the family declines proportionally to the increase in the level of education, and the decline is very dramatic. The relative chances that a woman will have a third child in the case of women with elementary education is 2.13 times that of women with secondary education without GCE, but only 73% in case of women with secondary education with GCE, and only 56% in case of women with post-secondary education, compared to the same reference category. Women who attend religious services at least once a week have a 2.37 greater chance of giving birth to a third child than the other women. The fact that membership in a religious community has a positive influence on the number of children in a family is nothing new [Fialová et. al. 2000: 69, 91]; it is related to the different values and lifestyle maintained by this group of women.

The number of children in the background family of the woman, or specifically the fact that she did not grow up as an only child, also has a significant influence on the third-birth risk. In relation to the reference group of women who come from fam-

Table 2. Third-birth risks for women, 1997

Factors	Categories	Exp (B)
Completed level of education	Elementary	2.13**
	(Secondary without GCE)	1
	Secondary with GCE	0.73*
	Post-secondary	0.56*
Generation	1952–1959	0.89
	1960–1969	1.07
	(1970–1982)	1
Place of residence	Up to 9 999 inhabitants	0.87
	10 000–999 999	1.24
	1 million and over	1
How religious a woman is	Participation in religious services at least 1x weekly	2.37**
	(Participation in religious services less often than 1x weekly)	1
Background family: complete & incomplete	Complete family	0.97
	(Incomplete family)	1
Number of children in the background family	1	0.72*
	2	0.96
	3	0.91
	4	1.10
	(5 a více)	1
Interval between first and second birth (in months)	8–18	1.11
	19–24	1.15
	25–30	0.98
	(31–36)	1
Age at the time of second birth	19 years or less	1.56*
	20–24 years	1.04
	25–29 years	1.00
	(30 years or over)	1
New partner[1]: yes & no	Yes	1.03
	(No)	1

method = ENTER

* Statistically significant at the level of significance 0.001

** Statistically significant at the level of significance 0.05

Reference categories are presented in brackets.

[1] 'New partner' refers to whether the woman has the third child with a partner other than that with whom she had the second child, or, in the case where she does not have a third child, whether she lives with a different partner than at the time of birth of the second child.

Figure 1. Hazard function: second & third child



ilies with five or more siblings, women who have no siblings have only a 72% likelihood of having a third child. The connection between the number of siblings a woman has and her planned and ultimate number of children has also been confirmed in other Czech [see Fialová et al. 2000] and foreign [Pinneli et al. 2000] studies.

Finally, if a woman had her second child relatively early in life, specifically by the age of 20, the chances that she will have a third child increase by 56%.

The other variables, i.e. generation, size category of the community, the fact of whether the woman comes from a two-parent or single-parent family, the interval between the birth of the first and second child, and the presence of a new partner (see methodology variables entered into the model) had no significant influence on the likelihood of the birth of a third child, i.e. the 'pure' influence of these factors on the observed event was not proved.

Among the factors that influence the likelihood of the birth of a third child in the family, *education proved to be one of the two most significant* – along with membership in a religious community. The strength of the influence of education even clearly exceeded that of traditional demographic characteristics, such as generation, age at the time of birth of the second child, and the interval between the birth of the first and the second child. Equally, other socio-cultural characteristics were found to be relatively secondary in importance in comparison with the influence education has on the third-birth risks. With regard to this dependence, the data confirmed the negative influence of increasing education on the number of children in a family, as demon-

Figure 2. Survival Function: second & third child



strated already in some older analyses [Fialová 1994]. Post-secondary educated women with two children have only a 56% chance of having a third child in comparison with women with secondary education without GCE. Conversely, with regard to the same reference category, the hazard of the birth of a third child among women with the lowest level of education is more than double. Similar evidence also emerged from the data on differential fertility in the 2001 Census [see *Sčítání lidu* 2001].

If, however, post-secondary educated women aged 18–29 relatively often indeed *want* a third child (see above), but actually have a third child significantly less often than less educated women, what are the reasons behind this fact? The increased need for self-realisation, better opportunities and the need for professional fulfilment, increased demands on the education of their children, and the different lifestyle of women with higher education, clearly rank among the factors that form the background to these trends. An analysis of these factors, including the question of whether some other realities may be added to them, forms the subject of the next section.

Opinions on the family and a professional career among women with different levels of education

Table 3 presents the degree of importance that some things relating to individual spheres of life (family life, professional career, care for the children, finance, etc.) represent for women with different levels of education. The data clearly reveal that

Table 3. How important to you are the following things? Women aged 25–44, averages on a three-point scale (1 – very important, 2 – quite important, 3 – not important)

	Education				Total	N
	Elementary, no education	Secondary without GCE	Secondary with GCE	Post-secondary		
To have enough time for me and for my interests	2.15	2.12	2.05	1.99	2.08	1200
To be appreciated outside the family, including work acknowledgement	2.16	2.14	2.09	1.99	2.10	1174
To have sufficient income	1.55	1.52	1.62	1.67	1.58	1206
To strive towards self-realisation	2.38	2.20	2.12	1.95	2.16	1161
To be able to provide sufficient care and attention to my children	1.51	1.54	1.46	1.39	1.49	1200
To have a professional career	2.73	2.65	2.54	2.29	2.57	1174
To have a full and happy family life	1.40	1.44	1.41	1.34	1.41	1197
To live in a nice, spacious home	1.83	1.90	1.92	2.03	1.92	1200
To be able to provide my children with a complete education	1.58	1.42	1.33	1.31	1.39	1205

the need for self-realisation and a professional career increases with the level of a woman's education. The differences between women with the lowest and the highest levels of education are particularly evident. Women with higher education place relatively more emphasis on the need to provide their children with sufficient care and attention, and especially the need to provide their children with a complete education, in comparison with less educated women. With the increase in the level of education the significance of the entries 'to have enough time for me and for my interests' and 'to be appreciated outside the family, including work acknowledgement' rises. Conversely, the importance of factors assessing material and financial security (to have sufficient income, to live in a nice, spacious home) declines with the increase in the level of a woman's education. The significance ascribed to 'a full and happy family life' was high among all of the groups of women and no notable differences were observed among the individual educational categories.

From the perspective of this study, what is important is that the differences that exist among the groups of women most clearly distinguished themselves in the factors relating to self-realisation, a professional career, and the need to provide children with education. With each higher level of a woman's education the need for professional fulfilment and self-realisation outside the home also increased; this need then peaked among women with a post-secondary education. These facts are even confirmed in the explicit attitudes the women maintained with regard to the questions of combining a family and a professional career and the association between satisfaction with one's life and a specific number of children (see tables 4 and 5).

The different attitudes towards combining a professional career and family life were clearly evident in the responses to the direct question, 'How many children can a person have and still manage a professional career?'. The most notable differences appeared in the category 'it doesn't depend on the number of children': while 41%

Table 4. How many children can a person have and still manage a professional career? Women aged 25–44, % in the columns

	Education				Total
	Elementary, no education	Secondary without GCE	Secondary with GCE	Post-secondary	
No children	14.8	18.1	**25.2***	20.4	20.9
One child	12.5	14.2	19.2	22.4	17.0
Two children	**10.2***	22.9	21.9	**30.6***	22.1
Three or more children	**5.5***	2.4	1.4	3.4	2.5
It doesn't depend on the number of children	**41.4***	31.2	**24.6***	**19.0***	28.2
Don't know/No answer	15.6	11.3	7.6	4.1	9.4
N	128	459	484	147	1218

* statistically significant at the level of significance 0.01

Table 5. How many children can a person have and still be satisfied with one's life and be happy? Women aged 25–44, % in the columns

	Education				Total
	Elementary, no education	Secondary without GCE	Secondary with GCE	Post-secondary	
No children	0.8	0.4	1.2	1.4	0.9
One child	3.9	8.1	6.4	8.2	7.0
Two children	20.3	29.0	28.9	21.1	27.1
Three or more children	**10.9***	7.0	**4.3***	4.1	6.0
It doesn't depend on the number of children	60.9	53.4	55.2	63.9	56.2
Don't know/No answer	3.1	2.2	3.9	1.4	2.9
N	128	459	484	147	1218

* statistically significant at the level of significance 0.01

of women with elementary education believed that if a woman wants a professional career it does not matter how many children she has, among women with secondary education with GCE the figure is only 25%, and among women with post-secondary education only 19%. Conversely, with increasing education the number of women who indicated one or two children also increased, while women with elementary education most often indicated three or more children. It is interesting that the highest share of women who believe that a person cannot have any children if they wish to have a professional career appeared among women with secondary education with GCE (25%, while for post-secondary educated women the figure is 20%, and for women with elementary education 15%). To summarise, among women with the lowest level of education there is a large portion who do not consider the

number of children as being of decisive importance in the possibility of pursuing a professional career; with the increase in the level of education the share of those women who feel this way falls sharply in favour of those who indicate no children or at most one child as feasible. The possibility of having a professional career on the condition that a woman has no children was cited most often by women with secondary education with GCE, while post-secondary educated women were more inclined to indicate the variant of having one or two children.

Differences among the women appeared even in the responses to the question 'How many children can a person have and still be satisfied with one's life and be happy?', especially in the category 'three or more children'. While almost 11% of women with elementary education believed that a person could have three or more children and still be satisfied and happy, among those with secondary education with GCE the figure is only 4.3%, and among post-secondary educated 4.1%.

It is evident that with the rise in the level of education among women there appears to be an increasing need for professional fulfilment and self-realisation (it is interesting that the need for material security rather declines – however, the reason here need not only be the weaker materialistic orientation of secondary and post-secondary educated women, but also the fact that, in comparison with less educated women, post-secondary educated women have relatively fewer problems with financial security). A higher level of education does, however, affect the women's attitudes in another sense, in that their opinions change with respect to combining a family and children with a professional career, and with respect to the relationship between the number of children one has and having a happy and satisfied life. It could be said that the more educated a woman is the clearer her attitude towards combining a career and children: the women believe with considerably greater frequency that children represent a significant factor in the professional life of a woman (i.e. the number of children matters, see table 6) and although a sort of imaginary boundary is formed by the figure of two children, a relatively large number of women with post-secondary and secondary education believe that if one wants to have a professional career a person can have only one child or even no children. In comparison with less educated women, therefore, a considerably larger portion of women with secondary and post-secondary education consider children (not only three or more, but even one or two) as an obstacle to pursuing a career. In the case of three or more children, this is even considered a factor interfering with a happy and satisfied life. However, here it is possible to assume – and the data indeed confirmed this – that more educated women have a greater need to provide children with sufficient care and attention and a complete education (which is more difficult to achieve with a larger number of children).

Family policy: a significant factor in the process of reproductive behaviour?

When observing the reproductive behaviour of women and the factors that influence this behaviour – including their attitude and opinion orientations – it is impossible to overlook a subject that undoubtedly relates to family behaviour, and that is family policy. This is an area that, in terms of its nature and the kind of role it plays in the process of reproductive behaviour, is quite specific; an analysis of family policy in relation to the reproductive behaviour of women would certainly be worthy of a separate article. But it is not our aim here to focus on family policy itself, nor would it even be possible within the aim and reaches of this study. Nonetheless, we should briefly mention one aspect of family policy that is significant for us: the role that it plays in the decision-making concerning the number of children there will be in a family.

A good example of how family policy can influence the pattern of reproductive behaviour is found in the study by D. Corman, which examined family policy as one of the factors influencing the likelihood of the birth of a third child among women and men in Sweden and in France [see Corman 2000]. The significant influence family policy has on the reproductive behaviour of men and women came to light through the factor of education. In Sweden, higher education does not represent an obstacle to the birth of a third child: women with post-secondary education have roughly the same likelihood of having a third child as women with elementary education [Corman 2000: 6]. On the other hand, French women with a university degree demonstrate the least likelihood of having a third child of all the education groups: approximately one-half as likely as women with elementary education. The weak influence of education on the likelihood of the birth of a third child among Swedish women indicates that a professional career does not represent a 'threat' to family life in places where the state facilitates and supports various forms of participation of women/mothers on the labour market (especially through part-time employment) and offers possibilities for combining a professional career with raising children.[3] In France, however, highly educated women have fewer opportu-

[3] In Sweden, there exists an advanced system of public day centres for children of pre-school age, which are provided free of charge (so-called double-socialisation, whereby children aged 3 to 4 spend a considerable part of their day outside the home in a state day-care facility for children), and this enables mothers with small children to go to work, usually on a part-time basis. At the same time, employers are motivated by the state to facilitate the participation of parents with small children in the labour market. The system of parental leave is also very generous in Sweden, where the mother or father who is at home with the child or children receives 90% of his/her monthly pay for a period of twelve months and a fixed sum for the next six months (in 1997 this was 60 SEK a day). Parents also have a right to 60 days paid leave for looking after an ill child. State family policy in Sweden is just as strongly oriented towards achieving equal opportunities for men and women: considerable flexibility in the possibility of adjusting daily or weekly working hours for parents with small children facilitates the relatively high degree of participation of fathers in raising their children [for more details see *Reconciling Work* ... 1996]

nities for combining their professional life with family life, and they are therefore less 'willing' to have more than two children.

In so far as the influence of education on the birth of a third child among men is concerned, similar evidence has emerged. In Sweden, the influence-of-education curve forms the letter U, while in France it takes the shape of a J. The relatively higher likelihood that Swedish men with a university degree will have a third child, in comparison with equally educated French men, again indicates the that there are better possibilities for combining a professional career and family life in the Swedish society than in the French. The differing curves depicting the relationship between the birth of a third child and the level of the men's education also testify to how important an influence the participation of men in raising children is for individual reproductive behaviour. The efforts that Sweden has exerted in order to 'involve' fathers in raising their children is bearing fruit in the form of the higher number of children that these men have. Conversely, in France the question of gender equality is not a priority for those responsible for determining family policy. It is interesting that the flexibility of 'working arrangements' and the possibilities for combining family and working life are taken advantage of more by so-called white-collar workers than blue-collar workers (while it is well known that these opportunities are on a higher level in Sweden than in France). In France, it is moreover men in white-collar positions who spend the most time at work, which is also evident in the fact that for them the child represents a career obstacle. In Sweden, men with the highest level of education participate in raising children relatively more often than men with lower levels of education [see Sundstrom and Stafford 1992].

Turning attention back to the Czech Republic, family policy in this country is certainly a long way off from the generous Swedish model. Combining work with raising children is (for both men and women) in the Czech lands far more difficult than in Sweden, and more educated women are often forced to choose between a career and (more) children.[4] The Family and Fertility Survey 1997 that we analysed included a section devoted to family policy – women were asked to comment on individual measures of family policy and for each to indicate whether they are for or against its implementation.[5] The measure that received relatively the best evaluation from the women was 'better conditions for maternity leave for working women who have small children', 'lower income tax for people with dependent children', 'ma-

[4] Unlike other states, in the Czech Republic the practice of part-time employment (which is particularly suitable for mothers with small children) and the state system of care for children of pre-school age are not developed, and financial benefits on maternity leave are relatively low.

[5] The measures that were suggested included: better conditions for maternity leave for working women who have small children; lower income taxes for people with dependent children; better day-care facilities for children aged up to 3 years; better day-care facilities for children aged 3 to 5; benefits to families with children scaled according to the income of the family; maternity grants on the birth of each child; parental benefits for mothers and fathers who do not want to go to work because they want to look after their small children; a significant in-

Table 6. If the measures chosen by you were introduced, would the implementation of those measures have an impact on your life? Please indicate whether you agree or not with the following statement:
If the measures chosen by me were introduced, it would be easier for me to have as many children as I want (women aged 25–44, % in the columns)

	Education				Total
	Elementary, no education	Secondary without GCE	Secondary with GCE	Post-secondary	
Agree	51.6*	58.4	55.2	65.3*	57.2
Disagree	29.7	27.5	27.9	24.5	27.5
Don't know/No answer	18.7	14.1	16.9	10.2*	15.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	128	459	484	147	1218

* statistically significant at the level 0.01

ternity grants on the birth of each child' and 'a significant increase in monthly child benefits' (more than 95% of women aged 25–44 were in favour of this measure). Large support was also given to the measure aimed at easing a mother's working life, especially 'flexible working hours for working families with small children' and 'more and better opportunities for parents with children to work part-time', which around 90% of women expressed themselves in favour of. The measures aimed at improving the combination of employment and caring for children received slightly more support from women with post-secondary education. Conversely, some of the entries relating to finance (a significant increase in monthly child benefits, lower income taxes for people with dependent children, better housing for families with children and attractive loans for newlywed couples) received relatively greater preference among women with lower education.

However, in my opinion, more interesting information than support for the individual measures of family policy was presented in the responses to the question of whether the implementation of selected measures would have an impact on the personal lives of the respondents – see table 6.

Almost 60% of the female respondents indicated that for them it would be easier to have as many children as they wished if the measures of family policy they selected were implemented. If we take a separate look at the individual categories of

crease in the monthly child benefits; after-school clubs for students, where they could spend time before and after school hours and during the holidays; flexible working hours for working parents with small children; more and better opportunities for parents with children to work on a part-time basis; a considerable reduction in the costs of education; better housing for families with children; attractive newlywed loans.

education it is clear that this opinion is shared most frequently among post-secondary educated women (65%) and least often among women with the lowest education (52%); moreover, women with post-secondary education are the clearest of all the education categories in their view on this issue (they least often responded with 'I don't know'). It seems that it is women with university degrees who are most affected by the need to make a choice between a professional career and a family, and that they are the ones who in the Czech environment most strongly feel the lack of the kind of family policy measures that would make such a decision easier.

The process of family planning is certainly in general very complex and complicated: it would be an oversimplifying approach to ascribe the main role in the considerations over whether or not to have another child to family policy alone.[6] Nevertheless, the aim of this brief probe into the area of family policy was to show the influence this area may have, from the most general point of view, on the *decision-making* concerning whether to have another child, and on actual reproductive behaviour. It is the more educated women in particular (and men, as is evident from the Swedish example) who most appreciate the opportunity to combine professional life with a family, which is given as a clear priority in the Scandinavian countries. On the other hand, in the Czech Republic these opportunities are (still?) very limited: the situation in the area of family policy is *one of the most significant factors* behind the high share of 'unrealised fertility' in this country, or in other words, behind the difference between planned and 'desired' numbers of children and the actual number of children born, especially in the case of women with post-secondary education.

Conclusion

The analysis indicated several realities affecting the relationship between the desired number of children and the ensuing actual reproduction among women with various levels of education, with an emphasis on the case of a third child in the family. Our results show that there exists a clear discrepancy between the number of children desired and the actual number of children a woman has, which is particularly pronounced among women with post-secondary level education. The example of the third child in a family is a good illustration of this discrepancy.

Education can be described as one of the most striking factors influencing the existence of a third child in the family. According to Cox's model, the likelihood that a woman will have a third child sharply declines with the increase in the level of her

[6] The factors underlying the low rates of fertility in many countries have been examined from different points of view; see for example work by Peter McDonald, who emphasises the importance of improving gender equity in family-oriented institutions to raise fertility [McDonald 2000: 10]. Other related discussions have been going on in the field of postmodernism and late modernism, for example, within the sociological 'theory of individualisation' [see Možný 1999: 200–208].

education, which means that among post-secondary educated women the likelihood is at its lowest, while among women with elementary education it is at its highest. What is interesting, however, is the *confrontation between women's actual reproduction and their plans and expectations* at the age when women usually begin or are already engaged in planning a family (18–29 years). The group of women with post-secondary education indicated with relative frequency (more often than women with secondary education) that they would like to have three children, and they also relatively often actually planned to do so. Over time, however, the share of post-secondary educated women who wanted to have three children fell dramatically and in the 30–44 age group less than one-half of the number in the 18–29 age group still felt this way. Conversely, with the increase in age the proportion of post-secondary educated women who wanted only one child also rose. It is thus clear that the attitudes of women and the decisions the make on the number of children they want to have change dramatically with age, and that this development occurs differently for women with various levels of education.

The analysis demonstrated the following: although post-secondary educated women at a young age plan relatively often to have three children (nearly as often as women with elementary education and considerably more often than women with secondary education), the likelihood that *in actual fact* they will have a third child is very low in comparison with the other educational categories of women.

We also touched on some factors that clearly lie behind this noted discrepancy between the plans and the actual behaviour of post-secondary educated women. Among them is the often-discussed need for professional fulfilment and self-realisation, which especially in the case of post-secondary educated women are factors that move most strikingly to the forefront. However, these women also believe more often than the others that it is not possible to easily reconcile a professional life with taking care of one's children, or, as the case may be, taking care of yet *another* (third?) child, and it is possible to find among them a relatively large number who indicate that a person can only have one child or even no children if she also wants at the same time to have a professional career. Here we arrive at a subject that was mentioned in the previous section of this study – family policy. Clearly, family policy functions as one relatively strong factor behind the high share of unrealised reproductive plans among post-secondary educated women: 65% of women with the highest level of education indicated that in the case of more favourable circumstances for combining a professional life with caring for one's children it would be easier for them to have as many children as they wished.

It appears that the answer to the hypothetical question, 'Why do women with a university degree exhibit the least likelihood of having a third child, even though at a young age they often wish to have three children?', lies right here, in the broader context of the state's approach to the issue of the family and the sphere of family policy. At the same time, the reference to this area involves more than just the system of financial and social assistance to young mothers and families, but also and especially includes the above-mentioned possibility of reconciling working life with

family life – or, in more general terms, the *overall attitude of society* and the state towards starting a family and raising children.

Appendix on methodology

Cox's models belong to the category of proportional hazard models. Cox Regression uses the hazard function to estimate the relative risk of failure. The hazard function *h(t)* is a rate. It is an estimate of the potential for death per unit time at a particular instant, given that the case has survived until that instant.

Cox's regression is used for determining the influence of predictor variables (covariates) on a dependent variable, by determining the relative hazard function, or the survival function respectively. Unlike other common regression models, Cox's models take into account the fact that this relative hazard changes over the course of the observation time because the influence of the individual independent variables need not necessarily be constant over time.

The model can be described in its simplest form as follows:

$$[1] \qquad h\,(t) = [h_0(t)]e^{(BX)}$$

where x is a dichotomous covariate that takes the values of 0 for control or no condition and the value of 1 for condition.

B is the regression coefficient;

e is the base of the natural logarithm;

h0(t) is the baseline hazard function when X is set to 0 (the expected risk without the condition).

If both sides of the Equation 1 are divided by $h_0(t)$, the result is:

$$[2] \qquad h(t)/h_0(t) = e^{(BX)}$$

The quantity $h(t)/h_0(t)$ is called the relative hazard or the hazard ratio. It indicates the increase (or decrease) in risk incurred by applying the condition.

If the natural log is taken of both sides of Equation 2, the result is:

$$ln[h(t)/h_0(t)] = BX$$

The quantity $ln[h(t)/h_0(t)]$ is the log relative hazard, which can be used to compare the relative risk for cases where the condition is met or, respectively, is not met.

SIMONA (VYMĚTALOVÁ) PIKÁLKOVÁ *graduated in the field of demography from the Faculty of Sciences of Charles University in 1997. In 1998 she completed the programme of study in sociology at the Faculty Philosophy and Arts of Charles University. At the present time she is enrolled in the doctoral programme in sociology at the Philosophical Faculty of Charles University, where she focuses on the study of family violence. Since 1998 she has been working at the Institute for Information on Education, where she focuses on the sociological aspects of education and the labour market. Since 1998 she has also been working at the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences, where she specialises in the demographic and family behaviour of the population. Since 2003 she has been the co-organiser and co-ordinator of the Czech branch of the project 'International Violence Against Women Survey'.*

References

Corman, D. 2000. "Family Policies, Working Life and the Third Child in Two Low-Fertility Populations: A Comparative Study of Contemporary France and Sweden." *Conference proceedings*: FFS Flagship Conference, Brussels.

Fialová, L. 1994. "Reprodukce v rodinách a mimo ně." (Reproduction in the family and outside the family) (Ze XXIV. demografické konference ČDS). *Demografie* 36 (3): 159–164.

Fialová, L., D. Hamplová, M. Kučera and S. Vymětalová. 2000. *"Představy mladých lidí o manželství a rodičovství." (Ideas of young people about marriage and parenthood)*. Praha: Sociologické nakladatelství.

McDonald, P. 2000. "Gender Equity in Theories of Fertility Transition." *Population Development Review*, 26(3): 427–439.

Možný, I. 1999. *Sociologie rodiny (Sociology of the family)*. Praha: SLON.

Podrobné výsledky Šetření reprodukce a rodiny (1997) (Detailed results of the family and fertility survey (1997)). 1998. Závěrečná zpráva. (Final Report). ČSÚ: Praha.

Pavlík, Z. and M. Kučera (eds.). 2002. *Populační vývoj České republiky 2001*. (Population development in the Czech Republic 2001). Praha: PřFUK.

Pinneli, A., A. De Rose, P. Di Giulio and A. Rossina. 2000. Interrelations between Partnership and Fertility Behaviour. *Conference proceedings*: FFS Flagship Conference, Brussels.

Reconciling Work and Family Life. 1996. Supplement to the Official Report from the Swedish Commitee on the International Year of the Family. Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, Stockholm.

Rychtaříková, J. 1996. "Současné změny charakteru reprodukce v České republice a mezinárodní situace." (Current changes in the character of reproduction in the Czech Republic and the international situation). *Demografie* 38 (2): 77–90.

Sčítání lidu, domů a bytů 2001 (Census 2001). 2001. Praha: ČSÚ.

Sundstrom, M. and F.P. Stafford. 1992. "Female Labour Force Participation, Fertility and Public Policy in Sweden." *European Journal of Population* 8: 199–215.

A Dictionary of Czech Culture*

ANDREW ROBERTS**

The selections here come from a larger dictionary of Czech culture. The aim of the dictionary is not to provide a comprehensive account of Czech history and culture, but rather to introduce the reader to some concepts – people, places, songs, slogans – known to all Czechs. These concepts generally do not appear in dictionaries, textbooks, or histories, or at least not in the form they do here. Yet all of them are well known to Czechs living in the latter half of the twentieth century. They are the furniture of his or her mental universe. Just about every Czech alludes to them when talking to friends, situates new phenomena in relation to them, and assumes them to be a natural part of the world. I thus try to explain not just their literal meaning, but also the set of associations that has grown around them.

(The arrows → refer to other entries in the dictionary.)

Armádní umělecký soubor (Army Chorus): The largest and most famous of the many choruses that sang so-called *masové písně* (mass songs) praising the communist regime. Associated with the Stalinist fifties, the repertoire of these groups included titles like *Sláva tankům* (Hurrah to the Tanks), *Za Gottwalda vpřed* (Forward with → Gottwald) or *Píseň o Fučíkovi* (A Song about → Fučík) and featured inane lyrics about the beauties of socialism and the men who built and defended it. Musically they resembled nothing if not American musicals from the era of *Oklahoma* and *South Pacific*. Performances by these choruses were a necessary component of any state holiday and the songs were a part of all school curricula. The best-known composer in the genre was Radim Drejsl whose most famous composition, *Rozkvetlý svět* (World in Blossom), features the lines "It's enough just to look around to see how much beauty surrounds us/Smoke from the factories and children in the sandbox." Upon his return from his first trip to the Soviet Union in 1953, Drejsl was so disillusioned by what he saw there that he took his own life.

Bican, Pepi (1913–2001): The greatest Czech soccer player of all-time and one of the greatest goal scorers the world has ever known. Born to a Czech family in

* The entries presented here have been contributed by the author as a sample of the 400+ entries gathered so far for the manuscript of the dictionary, which currently stands at 65 000 words and also includes an additional set of appendices with lists of the most popular books, foods, movies, etc. For more information, see the Editorial in this issue.

** Direct all correspondence to: Prof. Andrew Roberts, Department of Polical Science, Northwestern University, IL 60208, USA, e-mail: aroberts@northwestern.edu

Austria, he first gained fame as a striker with a nose for the net playing for the Vienna club Rapid. In the thirties, he transferred to Prague's Slavia, though he did not get his citizenship papers in time for the 1938 World Cup, when with the goalie František Plánička he might have delivered the title to the Czechs. His goal scoring, however, continued unabated even through the war years. He finished his career with an incredible five thousand goals (643 in league play), a total that became the title of his best-selling autobiography. The communists, however, banished him from his beloved Slavia to the backwater of Hradec Králové and after his career had ended put him to work as an ordinary laborer on the Holešovice docks. As if these humiliations weren't enough, the bureaucrats in charge of world football records voted not to make him the top goal scorer of all time (they argued that his goals under the Protectorate (→ *Protektorát*) should not count) and Czech sports fans did not choose him as the greatest player of all-time (likely because he was not sufficiently Czech for their tastes).

Bobřík (Little Beaver): *Bobříks* are tests of ability and strength for young boys and girls. They were set down in Jaroslav → Foglar's *Rychlé šípy* (Fast Arrows) books, and their name is derived from the Beaver River near which the book's young heroes had their adventures. Among the best known of the 13 *bobříks* are silence (not saying a word for 24 hours), bravery (staying alone all night in the woods), and nobility (no lying or cursing). The remaining *bobříks* are nimbleness (various running and jumping tests), precision (stone throwing), rescue, swimming, good deeds (100 must be performed), flowers (50 species of plant must be identified), loneliness (10 hours without being seen or heard), handiness (manufacturing a useful object), strength (5 pull-ups), and hunger (a day-long fast). To this day kids perform *bobříks* and sew a patch on their sleeve whenever they 'hunt' one down. *Bobříks* have even penetrated the adult world: when a politician lets slip something better left unsaid, he is said not to have held to the *bobřík* of silence.

Bony: Coupons introduced in 1957 that allowed citizens to buy imported goods – like Levis jeans, Swiss chocolate or Adidas sneakers – at special → Tuzex shops. *Bony* were obtained from the state in exchange from foreign currency which citizens were required by law to turn in to the government who needed it to cover its perpetual shortages of foreign exchange. By the eighties, black-market sellers of *bony* (→ *veksláci*) had become a common sight on street corners, whispering to passersby: "Need some *bony*" or "Wanna buy *bony*." A popular eighties film called "*Bony a Klid*" (Bony and Peace) provides a surprisingly honest look at the world of bony trading. As the politician Karel Künhl notes, prices quoted in bony were probably the only accurate prices in the country under communism.

Burian, Vlasta (1891–1962): Known to Czechs as the king of comics, Burian was the most popular star of Czech film and theater in the thirties and forties. A scrawny, mustachioed figure, Burian began as a comic actor in a theater which he owned and whose plays he wrote. As the writer Josef Škvorecký describes him, "He was

something of a Czech Groucho Marx. He had the same mercurial energy, was capable of similar verbal floods, and stupefied the audience with wise-cracks, explosive gags, aggressive conquests of women, and fantastic mimicry." With the coming of sound films, he became the country's most marketable star. Many of his films were adapted from his own plays and most involved mistaken identities. Thus in *Přednosta stanice* (The Station Master) he plays a ticketless train passenger who is taken for the stationmaster. The same kind of mix-up inspired *U pokladny stál* (where hospital staff believe he is a VIP) and *C. a k. polní maršálek* (where he is mistaken for an Austrian field marshal). Burian had the misfortune of being at the top of his career when the Nazis invaded. Though his collaboration with the invaders was of a lesser degree than many future communists – he once made fun of Czech politicians and Jews on a radio broadcast – he was hauled before a tribunal after the war. He was banned from performing and most of his great fortune was confiscated (his luxurious lifestyle was probably the real reason for his punishment). Though he eventually returned to the stage and film, he never recaptured his prior zaniness. His association with the bourgeois First Republic (→ *První republika*) also meant that his films were shown only intermittently under communism. Since the revolution, Burian's work has been enjoying a revival. Hardly a week goes by without a film of his appearing on television and his remains were recently reburied in the national cemetery → *Slavín*.

Hašler, Karel (1879–1941): The author of patriotic and popular melodies beloved to this day. Like George M. Cohan, his closest American counterpart, Hašler began as an actor and vaudevillian, but later turned to writing popular songs. The best known is his sentimental ode to Czechness, *"Ta naše písnička česká"* (Our Czech Song), whose text tells us that when our Czech music dies then we will no longer live. His compositions became folk hymns on his many journeys across the country and were published in volumes entitled "Old Prague Songs." His popularity was so great between the wars that a manufacturer of menthol candies called them *"Hašlerky"* and used the slogan "Hašler coughs, no matter/Hašlerky will cure him." The lozenges can still be found on supermarket shelves today. Hašler himself died in a Nazi concentration camp after being arrested for ignoring warnings not to perform patriotic and anti-Nazi songs. Instead of being celebrated after the war, however, the communists made him and his music into persona non grata because of his many songs hailing → Masaryk and the legionnaires (→ *legionáři*) and making fun of the inter-war communists.

Mariáš: Popular Czech card game. In just about every Czech pub you can find a table of old men playing the card game *mariáš*. The rules are somewhat similar to bridge, with players winning points by collecting tricks. Usually played by three players, the game uses a German set of 32 cards: ace, king, overknave (*svršek*), underknave (*spodek*), and ten through seven in the four suits of acorns, hearts, leaves and bells. One player makes a bid to win a given number of tricks and the other two players try to prevent him. The name comes from the French for mar-

riage, a marriage between the king and the overknave, which is worth extra points. More complex than the game itself are the betting permutations, though the stakes are usually measured in *haléři* or the Czech version of pennies. A variation of *mariáš* called *ütli* is the most popular card game in Hungary.

Maturita: School-leaving exam for students in college prep and specialized high schools (→ *gymnázium*). The main event in the process is the oral exams that take place at the end of the senior year (known as *oktáva*), when teachers hand out a set of approximately 50 questions. Students have a week – the so-called *"svatý týden"* (holy week) – in which to prepare answers, with the entire class of thirty usually pooling their knowledge. On the day of the exam, dressed in their Sunday best, students enter the room individually and pick a question out of a hat. They are then grilled orally on this question by a committee composed of their homeroom teacher, a specialist on the subject in question, and a school inspector. Failure means that the student has to go to summer school and then retake the exam or else repeat the entire year. Passing marks are often obtained through bribes or → *protekce*. During holy week, students about to sit the exam dress up in costumes and go out begging for donations to their graduation party. The party is an all-night drinking bout for students and teachers alike. The tradition of *maturita* has given Czech students a common experience for almost a century and is the subject of numerous films and novels.

MDŽ (*Mezinárodní den žen*/International Women's Day): A holiday honoring women celebrated yearly under communism on March 8. Though acknowledged by the United Nations, International Women's Day was celebrated mainly in communist countries where it was supposed to replace Mother's Day. It originated, however, in the United States in 1909 and was first organized by the Socialist Party of America. In the communist celebration of MDŽ, women were traditionally given flowers and their contributions to the building of socialism honored in schools, factories and offices. In reality, the holiday became just another excuse for Czech men to go out drinking. Today, it has disappeared completely and is gradually being replaced by Mother's Day. Another international holiday, MDD (*Mezinárodní den dětí*/International Children's Day), celebrated on June 1, has survived the revolution and continues to be marked by fun and games for the country's youngsters.

Olympic: Popular rock group. Founded in 1963 as one of the country's first rock-'n'roll bands, Olympic was initially home to a changing cast of many of the country's best rockers. Playing foreign songs, and then as a backup band in the theater → *Semafor*, Olympic became an artistic force under the leadership of vocalist and guitarist Petr Janda in the late sixties. The group's bread and butter was early Beatles-style love songs and middle-of-the-road classic rock. Their signature tune is *Dej mi víc své lásky* (Give Me More of Your Love), with the catchy refrain "My dear, give me more; my dear, give me more; my dear, give me more of

your love; there's almost nothing I want; there's almost nothing I want; I only want to caress your hair." Their list of popular singles, all of which are campfire favorites, includes *Želva* (Turtle), *Jasná zpráva* (Clear News). *Osmý den* (Eighth Day), and *Okno mé lásky* (Window of My Love). Like aging rock pioneers in the West, Olympic continues to play forty years after its founding, with the balding Janda still attracting new admirers. Its fans now range from preteens to the middle-aged and include the majority of the population. A new musical in Prague traces the group's history.

Pravopis (Grammar, literally "Correct Writing"): For a nation which professes to have a complex language, Czechs are extraordinarily sensitive about grammar. Bad spelling is frequently taken to be a sign of low intelligence. The special bane of Czech writers are → *vyjmenovaná slova* (exception words) and foreign words. The sensitivity to grammar may have to do with the fact that Czech intellectuals only began using the language in the mid-nineteenth century and made it their main instrument for awakening national feeling. Worries about *pravopis* today focus on the deleterious effects of text messaging. Some believe that because text messages and emails are written without diacritics, people will forget how to use them. As evidence of Czechs' interest in grammar, the Czech Language Institute at the Academy of Sciences runs a telephone advice line that receives upwards of ten thousand calls a year.

Protekce: A hard to translate word that includes such practices as favoritism, nepotism, string pulling, and even what we would now call networking. Though endemic under communism, its roots are much older. A classic film of the thirties stars Vlasta → Burian as a hospital patient who is mistakenly identified as a VIP and treated accordingly. After the communist coup, however, chronic shortages in everything made *protekce* a fact of daily life. It was most widespread in education, where getting into college required an inside connection who had to be paid off, but it was almost as common in healthcare, housing, and at the butcher's. Even today the tradition continues. As one car mechanic put it, "*Protekce* ended, but old buddies remained." Children of influential parents, a common phenomenon in show business among other professions, are known as *protekční děti* (protected children).

První republika (First Republic): In the eyes of most citizens the First Republic, lasting from independence day October 28, 1918 (→ *28. říjen*) to the Munich capitulation in 1938 (→ *Mnichov*), stands for hard-work, prosperity, and freedom. The communists, however, did all they could to besmirch the period as a time of poverty and exploitation in economics and oligarchical rule by a handful of powerful politicians (the → *Pětka* – the leaders of the five major parties) and large firms (especially the → *Živnostenská banka*). The truth lies closer to the former version as the First Republic was one of the world's major industrial powers and was the only country in Central and Eastern Europe to remain a democracy be-

tween the wars. Symbols of the First Republic include President → Masaryk, the writer → Čapek, and the shoemaker → Baťa. Present-day democrats and capitalists of all political stripes turn to the First Republic for inspiration and symbolic capital. Besides the First Republic, the only other numerical designation in widespread use is the Second Republic which lasted for only a few months between Munich and the Nazi occupation. Today Czechs live in either the Fourth, Eighth or even First Republic, depending on your numbering scheme.

Pyšná princezna (The Proud Princess): Most watched Czech film of all time. *The Proud Princess* is based on a fairytale by Božena → Němcová and tells the story of the headstrong princess Krasomila, who refuses all suitors until King Miroslav, disguised as a humble gardener, tames her spirit and wins her heart. In its filmed version from 1952, the story takes on communist elements, with a good empire triumphing over an evil one and manual labor the sign of the new aristocracy. The film inaugurated a Czech tradition of filmed fairytales (→ *pohádka*) with live actors. These films are produced almost annually and include such classics as *There Once Was a King, The Awfully Sad Princess,* and *Three Nuts for Cinderella.* They are shown in marathon sessions during the Christmas holidays.

Rádio Yerevan: The communist-era station broadcasting from the capital of the Soviet Republic of Armenia. It was referred to most frequently in a series of jokes popular throughout Eastern Europe. These jokes took the form of a question addressed to *Rádio Yerevan,* followed by the station's humorous answer. Their American equivalent would be knock-knock jokes. Here are a couple of examples. "Q: Is it true the poet Mayakovsky committed suicide? A: Yes, we even recorded his last words: Don't shoot, comrades." "Q: Can we introduce communism into Switzerland? A: Yes, but it would be a shame." Folklorists say that the jokes refer to Yerevan because of a long Eastern European tradition of Armenian jokes (often told in fake Armenian accents). The butt of most Czech jokes, however, are neither Armenians nor even Poles, but stupid policemen (→ VB). Humor of course flourished under communism because of the lack of other outlets for dissatisfaction and the general misery of life. Jokes have noticeably deteriorated since the revolution.

Rifle: A synonym for jeans throughout Eastern Europe. In the 1950s, the Italian Fratini brothers, Giulio and Fiorenzi, decided to challenge the American monopoly on the manufacture of blue jeans and start a factory to make their own under the label Rifle. They had their greatest success exporting the jeans to Eastern Europe. By 1986 they had sold 3 million pairs in Russia and had conquered the Czech market to such an extent that Czechs began to use the word *rifle* (pronounced ree-fleh) in place of *džíny* (jeans). Though more stylish and prized than Rifle, Levis were available only in → *Tuzex* shops and commanded top dollar on the black market. Besides being the uniform of the young, jeans are associated with the dissident movement and figures such as Václav Havel.

S tebou mě baví svět (With You the World Is Wonderful): Voted by Czechs their favorite film of all time. Its main characters are three married men preparing to take their annual men-only ski vacation. Instead, however, their wives scheme to force them to take along their children. The film's folksy humor lies in the ingenious ways the husbands find to take care of and entertain their charges without a maternal presence. Its closest Western parallel might be *Three Men and a Baby*. The film is typical both of the innocuous comedy preferred by the communist regime and of Czech tastes in popular entertainment which tend towards the sentimental and unsophisticated.

Tramping: If you ever take a Saturday morning train in the Czech Republic, you are likely to find yourself surrounded by scruffy-looking people of all ages wearing green camouflage uniforms, carrying large backpacks and lugging along guitars. They are not army reservists but "tramps". The word was borrowed from the Jack London memoir "The Road," but in the Czech lexicon it refers not to bums but to ordinary students or working people who spend every free weekend sleeping under the stars (*pod širákem* – under the wideness, in Czech). Tramps are not just individual nature-lovers, but highly organized groups with their own leader (known as a sheriff) and name (usually something in English, like Dakota, Red River, or Yukon). Each group has its own set of rules – there are attendance requirements and everyone is assigned a nickname – and usually claims a special place in the woods known as a *trampská osada* (tramp settlement). The tradition began as a fad in the twenties as an escape from urban life, but was sustained and acquired new meaning as a form of protest during the war and under communism. The tramping movement has spawned its own musical genre with songs like *Bedna od whiskey* (A Crate of Whiskey), *Rosa na koleji* (Dew on the Rails), the tramp anthem *Vlajka* (Flag), and even the Czech translation of John Denver's *Country Roads*, all of which celebrate life on the open road, exotic lands, unspoiled wilderness, friendship, and love. While most young people grow out of their tramping phase, there is a hardcore who remain tramps until they die.

Vepřo-knedlo-zelo (Pork-Dumplings-Sauerkraut): The most traditional Czech meal. It consists of a couple of slices of pork chops, four bread dumplings, and a dollop of sauerkraut. It is guaranteed to leave your tastebuds unstimulated, sit like a rock in your stomach, and clog up your arteries. For Czechs, however, it is the ultimate comfort food. It is available at every pub and restaurant and forms a staple of Sunday afternoon dinners. Czechs even refer to it in the shortened form listed here, instead of saying its full name, "*Vepřové maso s knedlíky a zelím.*"

Věstonická Venuše (Věstonice Venus): The name given to a small clay figure of a woman found during an excavation in the village of Dolní Věstonice. It has achieved notoriety both because of its age – over 25,000 years old – and its exaggerated breasts and behind. The figure appears at the beginning of all Czech history textbooks and has been giggled over by generations of students.

Vítaní občánků (Welcoming the Little Citizens): A ceremony introduced in the fifties to replace traditional christenings. Like everything else it was imported from the Soviet Union, where it was known as an October christening. During the ceremony young couples gather with their newborns at the local town hall where the babies' names are written into the town register. The mayor then presents them with gifts, for example, a book for recording milestones in the baby's life, and makes a short speech welcoming them to the community. Though christenings have become common again (they never completely disappeared under communism), *vítaní občánků* maintains its place alongside them to this day, though without the communist baggage.

Dominique Colas (ed.): *L'Europe post-communiste*
Paris 2002: Presses Universitaires de France, 694 pp.

Six experts, all giving courses at the Institute d'Études Politiques in Paris (or even having their background there) participated in creating this large volume, which deals with the post-communist transformation from various points of view. Dominique Colas writes about civil society, state and nation; Anne Gazier describes changing institutions and political life; Gérard Wild deals with the economic agenda during transition; Anatoli Vichnevski writes about varying demographic paths; Georges Mink analyses the post-communist society; and Jean-Christophe Romer depicts the re-composition of the international order.

The readers explicitly targeted by the book are not scholars and experts but university students. They receive a vast amount of data and information on the decade of transformation, complemented by a systematic and well-structured list of the main sources of literature, and even references to numerous websites covering all the main fields. The chronological overview provided at the end of the book provides an unintended retrospective on the length of the transformation period and the various changes the 'Eastern' populations experienced during that time. The multidisciplinary approach of the book enables one to grasp the transformation as a multifaceted and colourful phenomenon. If the French *ésprit* and the mostly qualitative narrative are added to all this, the reader will surely not be bored, even if he or she must face a great many pages and sometimes chapters that have an insufficiently systematic structure.

It is impossible to reproduce the vast content of the volume, even in brief. Moreover, the authors allow readers enough space to reach their own conclusions – this may be taken as inspiring, but it also raises many question marks. The same applies to the multidisciplinarity – there are many hints at the bridges between the specific approaches of political science, economics, sociology and demography, but a complex picture is missing (as a matter of fact, however, the story is not yet over). Unlike Anglo-Saxon literature, which is much more focused and discipline-specific, here the French scholars parallel different angles to arrive at one clear message – the road away from communism is not predetermined, there is no single route, and there are many detours before reaching the end – if there is any in sight.

The authors do not hesitate to go back in history to the very roots of communist ideology and practices. In various places, they are able to compensate for the almost complete absence of any study of the communist period from within. Paradoxically, there are former 'sovietologues' who feel the need for a deeper, insider's look into everyday life in 'the socialist camp' – probably more so than the scholars who lived there and thus possess intimate knowledge of the endless balancing between tacit compromises with the regime and the effort to maintain the remnants of human dignity. The reason behind this need, even if expressed on the outside, is probably that the former 'sovietologues' quite correctly expect that that is where the key to many of the puzzles operating in today's post-communist societies actually lies. Unfortunately, this period is outside the interest not only of economists (with the rare exception of János Kornai), but also of sociologists and even modern historians.

In the section on the state, nation and civil society, various paths are displayed. As Dominique Colas shows, the communist party-state may convert into either a state based on justice or a state based on power. The 'national question' also unfolds in different ways. It is not clear whether, as the author argues (pp. 25-26), in fact the national cultures that preceded the communist period really do not matter, since even the author convincingly demonstrates the process whereby pol-

itics became ethnicised in the Balkans, eventually leading to genocidal excesses.

In the section on economic adjustment, a critical approach is applied to show 'the penalties for speed' (as the Czech institutional economist Lubomír Mlčoch would call it) and the problems of privatisation – mass privatisation in particular. Gérard Wild stresses how much economic power the post-communist state has kept in its hands and how deep the incompetences of its managers were (pp. 350ff). Although the author uses the comparative tables of the EBRD, which show the considerable inter-country differences, his explanation sometimes fails to distinguish between the various country paths and their main pros and cons.

In the one hundred pages devoted to post-communist society, Georges Mink creates a vivid picture of the actors, social groups and forces of this structural change that represents an 'exceptional challenge' for sociology. In the introduction, he shows the opposite fates of two French concepts – while Alain Touraine's 'social movements' failed, despite their early and partly deliberate tailoring to anti-communist revolts, Pierre Bourdieu's concepts of 'capitals' and 'champs' appeared very useful, albeit they were used secondarily by other researchers. It is precisely his thesis on the conversion of capitals that is the most inspiring for explanations of the societal transformation – and as such it has also been applied in Czech sociological literature (in the writings of Petr Matějů in particular).

Elites certainly matter, and social classes matter as well, as Mink clearly shows. However, when enumerating the various ways of defining the middle class (by income, lifestyle, type of work), it is perhaps the crucial definition – by interests, expectations and self-perception – that is omitted. This might also be why much less space is given to the middle class in comparison with the other groupings, and their role in transition processes – recognised by some sociologists while contested by others – is not discussed thoroughly. However, the author gives a clear indication of where he stands – he points out the amalgamating function of the middle class and its indicative power for the robustness of the post-communist transformation (p. 503). Many other topics are also tackled, including social anomy, the coping strategies of households, attitudes towards the regime, and people's work and life, etc.

What may be surprising for the reader are Mink's references to the vocabulary of Georges Gurvitch. This 'ancient' (1960s) French sociologist of Russian origin (he served briefly as secretary to the prime minister in Kerensky's interim government, before escaping Bolshevik Russia) is rarely quoted now, if not nearly forgotten. Although his wording sounds very dry (owing in part to the lack of French eloquence), he indeed had a closer experience of the social upheavals than any other contemporary sociologist. His concept of social class as a 'phénomène social total' and a 'microcosm of sociability' (*Études sur les classes sociales*, Gonthier 1966) may have some quite interesting explanatory potential today, where it could readily be applied to the surviving and developing networks and strategies in the post-communist era.

Last but not least, Romer's section on the changes to the international order delivers a very detailed description of important events, conferences and documents which accompanied, framed, or even incited socio-economic changes in the region. Of course, the explanation concentrates on Russian diplomacy and NATO-related events. Indeed, as the author has in mind global order and its military aspects, only marginal attention is given to the EU enlargement process, its various circumstances and possible consequences.

As the editor Dominique Colas states, the communist period has only rarely become the subject of critical – theoretical or practical – research. The space reserved for discourse and politics is left empty and is of-

ten filled instead by nationalism. The reason is that both the ideology and practice of nationalism can be easily mobilised, even more so when supported by part of the elites (p. 109). We can only add that the Czech experience shows how the selective memory actually works and how old mythologies can re-emerge in new contexts. A thorough study of transformation is thus required which would reach deeper into the communist past without clichés and partiality. This book certainly moves in just such a highly useful direction.

Jiří Večerník

Sabina Alkire: ***Valuing Freedoms: Sen's Capability Approach and Poverty Reduction***
Oxford 2003: Oxford University Press, 240 pp.

Growing out of his brilliant *Poverty and Famines* (1981), Amartya Sen has formulated what has come to be called 'the capabilities approach' (CA) and has subsequently, in a flood of papers and books, applied this approach to issues of poverty, human well-being and development with such energy and influence that it earned him the Nobel Prize in economics. The essential argument of the approach is that the social good should be expressed in human capabilities rather than in utility or income. That argument has proved persuasive and fruitful in spite of the paradox that no one knows just what the capabilities approach is, except in very general terms.

In *Valuing Freedoms* Sabina Alkire sets out to explain it, or rather 'to operationalise it'. That she does in a dense, deep and exceedingly learned book that draws on economics, philosophy, jurisprudence, sociology and many other sources. The CA is tested theoretically in Part I and practically in Part II.

Capabilities are about functionings, and functionings are valuable beings and doings, the things a person might value. The goodness of a person's life depends on her freedom to promote/achieve/accomplish valuable functionings. That's the guts of CA, and from there the approach can move in many directions. How should it be taken forward more precisely? Sen has point-blank refused to answer. He consistently treats the approach as pluralistic and incomplete, as non-closed, and insists that it is this openness that makes it fruitful. Not surprisingly, others have been critical – and the whole intangibility of the approach is a provocation to anyone who wants theory to impose a strict order on the universe – but the influence of the approach vindicates Sen's refusal to tie it down.

There are philosophical reasons for leaving the approach open-ended. Well-being just is not made up of one thing and one thing only. Normal people value many things and not all the things we value are necessarily ordered on a neat scale from more to less wanted. It is just a mistake to reduce all the things people want to any single final value. An open-ended theory is therefore faithful to the reality people live in, and it is really at ordered and not messy theories we should aim our fire.

But there is also another reason why Sen's approach is deliberately messy – or so one comes to feel while reading Alkire. The approach is more an exercise in criticism than in theory building. Its foundation is fundamentally negative: a relentless criticism of utilitarian economics. When the approach started to emerge, utilitarianism was the foundation on which mainstream economics stood. That foundation had just the quality of order that the capabilities approach lacks: a beautifully logical edifice of utility-maximising human robots. The feeling of owning a perfect theory had persuaded the economics profession that it was right in all things when it was in fact wrong in many, including its chosen assumptions about human nature and well-being. It is dangerous to believe oneself right when one is wrong, and economics

did often err in its practical advice, not least development economics. The way to improve on a theory that believes itself to know more than it is possible to know, is not to put in another theory of the same ilk, but to face up to the fact that a good theory leaves unanswered what theory cannot answer.

The point of the capabilities approach has been more to shift the foundations of economics than to resolve this or that practical matter, and that it has done. Exit utilitarian economics. That is a point worth making in a sociological journal at a time when many sociologists want to create order in their universe with the help of 'rational choice theory' – which is just another name for the old theory that economists, with Sen's help, have for their part consigned to the rubbish heap of history.

Nevertheless, if freedom and capabilities are now to be the foundations of economic and social thinking, how do we go on to make more practical use of that very general platform? Alkire asks three questions:

1. If it's about capabilities, just what are those capabilities?
2. If capabilities are many things, and not a single vector such as utility, how do we handle this multi-dimensionality?
3. If we have to deal with some kind of list of capabilities, how can we single out those that are the most basic?

To answer the first question she identifies thirty-nine lists of dimensions of human development in the literature. These are discussed at length and summarised in a large table. Out of that discussion one can read that all these authors, who have of course worked seriously and earnestly to uncover what it is that makes for improvements in the human condition, have come to totally different answers, both philosophically and practically. Pluralism is no doubt good, but this total lack of any common ground is discouraging.

The summary table is an eye-opener. Looking through it again and again, one cannot help feeling, for no want of underlying research and books, that all these lists are taken out of thin air. Is 'sexual gratification' an element in a list of human aspirations? Some include it, others not, and some in coded language. Sen himself has not entered this competition, having decided early on in his project (in *Inequality Reexamined*, 1992) that capabilities, although the building blocks of his approach, are not directly observable.

The second question is 'the index problem'. If well-being is made up of several things, can we pull all these things together into a single aggregate measure? A single measure is useful for both analytic and political purposes, but Alkire quickly concludes that no index of capabilities is possible. This is of course central to what the capabilities approach is about, and in particular what it is against – utilitarian economics that takes material wealth to be the measure of all things – and Sen's view is that indexing is to impose on data an order that does not exist in the world. It is not the way we measure well-being that is multi-dimensional, but the reality we measure. An index would measure something that does not exist.

The way to deal with multi-dimensionality, suggests Alkire, is through participation. It is people themselves who must resolve how to weigh against each other the elements of well-being and that can only be done through participatory processes. Here I find a shortcoming in the book. It does not refer to the now extensive literature on 'deliberative democracy', which addresses exactly the question of how to move democratically from a pluralism of ends to practical decisions about means.

The third question takes us directly to the question of poverty and the literature on basic needs. If there are some capabilities that are basic, it must be those that determine poverty or not. The relative theory of poverty suggests that there is no universal list of basic capabilities in that sense. The determinants of poverty are relative to time and place. That view Sen has attacked very strongly, asserting that there is 'an irreducible core of absolute pover-

ty' in the very idea of poverty. If so, what is that core? Sen, characteristically, has not volunteered an answer directly, but Alkire has extracted a list of capabilities from his work. According to Alkire, in Sen's view, absolute poverty is the inability:

- to meet nutritional requirements
- to escape avoidable disease
- to be educated
- to be clothed
- to be able to travel

and sometimes

- to live without shame
- to participate in the activities of the community
- to have self-respect (to be happy).

Whether that list is evidence of the usefulness of the capabilities approach for poverty analysis, or of its ability to add to our practical understanding of basic needs, is perhaps not entirely obvious.

In Part II, Alkire moves to three case studies of small-scale development projects in Pakistan and explores how the capabilities approach can be used to assess their impact. Her method is to start from economic cost-benefit analysis and then ask what the CA may have to add in very practical assessments on the ground. These case studies are detailed and beautifully laid out, so it is impossible to do them justice in a brief review. Her conclusion is that the CA adds decisively to the conventional economic approach. In projects where no economic benefit is identified there may still be significant benefits in freedom, capabilities and empowerment.

However, there is no way to learn directly from the CA how to actually make that assessment. The approach offers only the typical sociological advice of considering more than straight economic factors and listening to people and their own experiences (participatory processes again), and then leave it more or less up to common sense to decide how actually to go about this.

How operational, then, is the capabilities approach? The answer must be, not very. But also that this does not matter. The approach has great power to inspire a way of thinking about well-being and human progress. That inspiration flows easily into practical application. For previous evidence see the now influential annual *Human Development Reports* of the United Nations Development Programme, inspired by the CA but not in any direct way extracted from it. Alkire's experience in project assessment is the same. The CA suggests a direction of analysis, but can tell no one just how to do it.

Stein Ringen

Jan-Erik Lane, Svante Ersson: *Culture and Politics. A Comparative Approach*
Aldershot 2002: Ashgate, 353 pp.

The idea that part of what can be observed and sometimes measured in society is the effect of culture and that this cannot be reduced to any other factor easier to operationalise, such as institutions or structures, has gained large support in the social sciences in past decades. Few of the studies belonging to the 'culturalist' tradition in recent social science research have attempted such an ambitious undertaking as that of Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson in their book *Culture and Politics*. In less than 400 pages, the authors formulate and test hypotheses about the cultural conditioning of social and political phenomena, or what they call 'outcomes', in a fairly broad range of diverse areas. Their main thesis is that cultures, or the variations among them, explain part of the variation in the political, social and economic outcomes that are observed and measured across countries, while the other, and sometimes even major, part of it is explained by external contextual factors. The authors modify this 'cultural thesis' into the formula 'Cultural Item X matters for Outcome Y', which calls for a clear specification of which cultural items might matter for which social outcomes.

Starting with cultural items, the authors distinguish four components of culture: ethnicity, religion, legacies and universal values. Following Douglas North in his analysis of the differences in economic performance between former English and Spanish colonies, by legacies they mean colonial heritages, but, relying on the work of Emmanuel Todd, they also mean family structures. Universal values are taken to be those central elements of culture that have been introduced into the culturalist literature by authors with different – and one might say at times incompatible – approaches to the problem of cultural determination. Among the universal values the book ranks Putnam's and Fukuyama's trust, Inglehart's post-materialism, and the four cultural categories of Wildavsky et al. that make up the so-called grid-group scheme.

In the area of the potential outcomes of the operation of culture, the study makes the distinction between the macro-, meso- and micro-level, on which different kinds of outcomes are brought into relationship with cultural factors. The macro-level is described by aggregate indicators of political development, affluence or poverty, social equality, gender equality and perceived corruption. Here the authors employ some of the most common and generally available indicators, such as Freedom House's country scores on democracy for political development and GDP per capita, or the Human Development Index for affluence, the Gender Empowerment Index for gender equality, and Transparency International's Perceived Corruption Index for corruption. On the meso-level, attention is focused on the cross-regional differences in electoral outcomes in a number of countries that can be considered culturally divided: Belgium, India, Russia, Spain, Switzerland and the United States. The micro-level approach concentrates on data drawn from cross-national value surveys which track the distributions of four types of individual value orientations across societies: interest in politics, involvement in politics, left-right placement and life satisfaction.

The context in which it is possible to observe the potential impact of culture on social outcomes is represented by two more variables, one measuring the geographical position of the countries under scrutiny (absolute distance from the equator), and the other used to characterise the historical path of each individual country (years since the introduction of modern political leadership). However crude and, at least in the second case, sometimes disputed these measures might be, according to the authors, they serve well as controls for the influence of space and time when it is necessary to fully focus attention on purely cultural factors.

The authors sum up the results produced by the quantitative analysis of a large set of data (larger than presented in the parts of the book preceding the concluding chapter, perhaps for reasons of space) in the following way: First, no "general and diffuse cultural determination of behavior or outcomes" exists (p. 300). Second, some specific cultural effects were disclosed, but variations in culture sometimes fail to bring about changes in outcomes. Regarding the macro-level outcomes, the authors conclude that religion matters quite a lot, and both religion and ethnic fragmentation have a negative impact on these outcomes. Conversely, universal values have less impact on the variation in outcomes than could be expected from the recent cross-national research into value orientations. Continuing on the macro-level, the authors note that although culture is important, so is context, as represented by time, social structure and institutions (but neither structure nor institutions are treated as control variables in the preceding sections of the book). Similarly ambiguous are the findings for the meso-level, where the impact of culture on regional political behaviour, as measured by electoral results, was found to vary considerably among countries. Culture proved to be a relatively weak predictor for micro-level value orientations, since of the four micro-level outcomes investigated, three – life satisfaction, left-right ori-

entations and political activity – are more strongly influenced by other factors than culture. Among cultural factors, post-materialism and individualism are the ones with the most impact on micro-level outcomes.

I have several comments to make on the book that should be taken as recommendations for further analysis of the role of culture in society. First of all, the authors are perhaps too quick in their attempt to clarify, one more time, the conceptual mess surrounding the much used and abused term of culture. The somewhat eclectic way in which different contributions to the investigation of culture are dealt with makes the precise sense of culture unclear. Sometimes, it seems to be limited to attitudes or psychological orientations, as in the *Civic Culture* tradition, while at other times, however, as with the grid-group theory, culture is employed as a name for ways of life, including both psychological orientations and behaviour.

Second, the study does address itself exclusively to the task of finding a statistical dependence between the elements of culture and the 'outcomes'. It does not attempt to explain what mediating mechanisms exist between the various aspects of culture and the outcomes on various levels, nor does it shed much light on the way in which the effects of culture combine with the effects of contextual variables. It is perhaps for this reason that the conclusions of the study are formulated so carefully as to create no space for undue generalisations.

Third, the book employs a rather disparate set of indicators, especially with respect to the macro-level outcomes, which are taken at their face value, with the result that one cannot rely more on the study's overall findings than one does on these indicators. It seems as if they were selected because they are easily available. But the subsequent effort to find statistical relationships between cultural factors and variations in these indicators creates the impression of a trial-and-error, experimental game, with few theoretical grounds for expecting any robust results. The use that the authors make of disparate data and indicators bears a certain resemblance to the collage of different Prague tourist sights on the book's cover. The individual pieces of this collage, each of which could represent the object of an exhaustive treatment in its own right, are put together to form an artificial world in which all have an impact on the viewer's imagination, but they cannot be given the kind of focused attention they deserve.

Fourth, the question can be raised of what it means to trace the relationships between culture, defined as universal values, and individual value orientations, described by the authors as micro-level outcomes. For in my view, one would be fully justified in taking all values, including such values as left-right orientations or life satisfaction, as forming part of a culture, in which case the link under investigation would be between two elements of a culture, not between culture and extra-cultural outcomes.

In spite of these critical remarks, Lane and Ersson's book provides very valuable and interesting insight into the difficult subject matter of the cultural conditioning of social phenomena. Their book can be read as one of the steps that must be taken in contemporary sociology and political science in order to establish a solid and reliable understanding of the effects of culture on society.

Marek Skovajsa

Ian Shapiro: ***The State of Democratic Theory***
Princeton 2003: Princeton University Press
183 pp.

The central concept in Ian Shapiro's treatise on democracy is 'domination'. As he sees it, in all societies there are some who are in a position to dominate and others who are in danger of being dominated. Those in danger of being dominated are always in need of

protection, and that is the business of democracy. Democracy is best '...thought of as a means of managing power relations so as to minimise domination'. What we should look for in a democracy is institutions which effectively control power. That should not mean reining in the use of collective power to the narrowest possible field (as is the libertarian response), but rather preventing the perversion of collective power to illegitimate forms of domination.

This puts Shapiro in the power school of democratic theory and from there he directs his fire at the deliberation school. He is with Schumpeter (*Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 1942) and against Rousseau (*The Social Contract*, 1762). The former argued the case of competitive politics to hold government power to answer, the latter rationality as a way of identifying the common good. Shapiro has little time for 'the common good'. If there is such a thing, it is, he says (borrowing from Machiavelli, *The Discourses*, 1517), no more than '...that which those with an interest in avoiding domination share'.

Deliberation has recently become a cult idea in democratic theory. That school recommends we look to democracies for the mechanisms for citizens to work their way through to consensus in spite of disagreement. In Chapter 1, Shapiro does an assassination job on that idea. He sees it as helplessly idealistic in face of the reality of power. But deliberation is of course a good thing, and in Chapter 2 he asks whether it may nevertheless have something to contribute to democratic efficiency. His conclusion is to think of it as a mechanism for giving a voice to those who are in danger of domination, for example, vulnerable workers against overpowering employers. This makes deliberation more an instrument of power politics than a route to consensus.

Chapter 3 deals with the two main mechanisms for keeping government power under control: competitive elections and judicial review. In Schumpeterian theory, competitive elections are simply what it's about. Elected governments are forced to respect the interests of citizens because they always live under the threat of being thrown out at the next election. Yet Shapiro has much to say about the limited power of this threat which comes from the ability of politicians and other elites to subvert elections. This is a simple observation, but a powerful one. It directs us to a simple and practical agenda for reform: to improve the democratic quality of electoral systems. On judicial review, Shapiro is reserved, ostensibly because he sees no reason to assume that appointed courts should be more capable of rational decision making than elected bodies, but possibly also because the experience he refers to is mainly from the United States, a case, as is well known, of judicial review gone mad. (Strangely, Shapiro seems to confuse judicial review as such with the presence or not of a designated constitutional court, but the latter is only one of several methods for the former.)

If you don't have democracy, how can you get it? Here the experience is that there is no single route, there are as many ways to democracy as there are democracies. Shapiro (Chapter 4) faults democratic theory for not being able to answer the question more affirmatively, but that may be a methodological fallacy. If democracy always grows out of national circumstances, the way to understand the emergence of democracy is in national case studies rather than grand comparative designs.

More is known about how to keep democracy if you have it. It does not matter if your democracy is of this or that kind, e.g. parliamentarian or presidential, but it helps very much if your country is affluent. A commitment to democratic values among both the elites and the masses is invaluable. It is a plausible hypothesis that social capital (in Putnam's meaning, i.e. vibrant local networks) is supportive of democratic stability. That is an important observation because it reminds us that democracy depends not only on national institutions but also very much on *local* institutions and structures.

In Chapter 5, Shapiro returns directly to his central concept of domination in a discussion of democracy and economic inequality. Not surprisingly, he confronts the American dilemma: why is there, in spite of the combination of great wealth and great poverty, not more downward redistribution? His conclusions here are disturbing for both democratic politics and democratic theory. He finds the failure of American democracy to deal with poverty and inequality not surprising, since a range of factors conspire against both the supply of and the demand for redistributive policies. The supply is impeded in particular by capital's power of veto, while demand is held back by ideology and mistaken beliefs.

If the point of democracy is to diminish or eradicate domination, what are we to make of a democracy that cannot prevent capital from preventing vote-seeking politicians from redistributing a bit of excessive wealth to a poor minority? The verdict here on American democracy is devastating. That verdict could be modified by changing the terms of reference - perhaps there is more to democracy than controlling dominance, for example, the protection of liberty - but in his own terms, Shapiro says of democracy in America that it does not work.

If a part of the reason democracy does not work is found in ideology and beliefs, does that not rescue deliberation from being a side-show and put it back at the heart of democracy? Capital may have the economic power to resist redistribution, but the political power of the vote nevertheless rests with the many. What good is it to give the many more power if they dare not use the power they already have? Their problem is not that of being denied the right to speak out against employers and others, but their inability to mobilise and use the power they have in the channel available to them in order to protect their interests. What seems to be needed is information, awareness, determination, co-operation, in short, the sorts of things deliberation might produce.

Like any good theorist, Shapiro is constantly reminding us of the limitations of theory. For example, on the question of the conditions for democratic transition and consolidation, he says that '...the state of democratic theory is a bit like the state of Wyoming: large, windy, and mainly empty'. Some of what he says in this vein can be seen as challenges to sociology, and two points in particular.

Democratic theory is mainly about institutional arrangements to advance some vision of the good, be it protection of the weak or consensus to override conflict. But where do good institutional arrangements come from? Shapiro notes, '...we are mainly in the dark about the cultural factors that influence democracy's viability.' That's the kind of problem the sociologist ought to have something to say about.

The reason he does not have much faith in the idea of deliberative democracy is that the theory, naively in his view, assumes that people can and will sit down and talk things over until they find common ground in spite of conflicting interests. Well, that is perhaps naive, but it is also a beautiful idea. Take the case of reconciliation in South Africa, or the need for dialogue across religions and cultures in a world threatened by the clash of civilisations. What are the conditions that can help people to be better able to sit down and deliberate on their disagreements? Sociologists should have something to say about that. They might benefit from reading more political theory in order to discover new lands waiting to be cleared with the help of their particular skills.

Stein Ringen

Work and Job Values in CEE and EU Countries

Jiří Večerník

Published by the Institute of Sociology,
Academy of Science of the Czech Republic,
Jilská 1, 110 00 Prague 1,
Tel.: +420 222 221 761
Fax +420 221 183 250
e-mail: prodej@soc.cas.cz

"Sociological Papers" SP 03:3

Abstract: The study presents a critical reading of opinion data on work and job values. Three cross-national surveys are used - the ISSP module on Work Orientations, the European Values Study and the Households-Work-Flexibility survey. In the first part, some methodological problems are described and then illustrated through previous research. In the second part, a brief presentation is made of the sources of data on work values. In the third and longest part several results are displayed. One of the main conclusions of the analysis is that there are considerable differences between Central-Eastern Europe (CEE) and the EU countries under observation in a number of indicators. CEE people appear to be less satisfied with their jobs than EU people, first and foremost owing to their low salaries. People in CEE countries also have much less control over different aspects of their work than do people in the EU countries. In the conclusion, the question is raised of the "true" value change during transition. Transition was presented as an easy journey and was often limited to merely the re-naming of former institutions and the re-labelling of previous rules and manners. The relaxed attitudes towards traditional work virtues were thus to a large extent maintained.

Minutes of the Editorial Board Meeting of the *Czech Sociological Review*

On 27 May 2003, the first meeting of the new Editorial Board of the Czech Sociological Review was held at the Villa Lanna in Prague. Board members present at the meeting were Zdenka Mansfeldová, Petr Matějů, Stein Ringen, Michael Steiner, Iván Szelényi, and Georg Vobruba; absent and excused from the meeting were Joseph S. Drew, Georges Mink and Marek Skovajsa. Jiří Večerník, Editor-in-Chief, chaired the meeting and set the agenda for discussion.

In addition to covering the regular board duties, the agenda tabled a number of specific points for discussion, including an assessment of 'where we are now' – the CSR's new mission statement, co-operation with the Czech sociological community and foreign authors, and the composition of the editorial board and the distribution of regions and specialisations – and questions relating to content, thematic orientations, determining the journal's market, ways to increase readership, the situation of other sociological journals in the region publishing in English (for a list of Central and Eastern European sociological journals in English, see p. 906), and a number of other issues of vital interest to the CSR, such as the question of the trade-off between quality and survival, whether to turn the focus more towards academic debate or policy issues, how to increase the journal's appeal, and whether to include special issues and guest editors.

The ensuing discussion was recorded in the minutes of the meeting, presented below.

Introduction

Jiří Večerník opened the meeting with a welcoming statement and asked all members present to briefly introduce themselves. Zdenka Mansfeldová welcomed board members to the meeting on behalf of the Institute of Sociology, provided a brief introduction of the Institute as the official publisher of the periodical, with background information on the Institute's structure and research projects, and apologised for the absence of the Director of the Institute, who was participating in the round table on Czech sociology held at the same time.

The mission statement of the CSR

Jiří Večerník initiated the discussion by asking members of the board to comment on the new mission statement of the CSR, how realistic it is with regard to the CSR's market and how best to fulfil the mission's aims. Copies of English-language journals published in other post-socialist countries were presented for consideration and comparison.

Proposed joint venture

Iván Szelényi tabled a proposal on behalf of the *Hungarian Review of Sociology* that the two journals pursue *a joint venture*, noting it would be easier to obtain subscriptions. It would be possible to occasionally publish special, 'national' issues. Stein Ringen cited the example of the joint Scandinavian, English-language sociology journal. He raised the question of the size of the CSR's market and said that there is a need to appeal to non-transition countries and attract names and articles beyond the limits of the Czech sociological community and transformation issues.

Georg Vobruba proposed putting off the idea of joint ventures for the time being. The CSR should be the *flagship of Czech sociology* and a platform for exchange. He questioned the longevity of transformation issues and suggested the CSR not limit itself. Petr Matějů countered that transformation issues will long continue to be relevant and one of the journal's missions could be to cover these issues. He added that if the Hungarian journal, with its larger sociological community, is sending a message to Prague, the board should take it seriously.

Contributors

Georg Vobruba noted that the intellectual exchange suggested in the mission should

mean that scholars from abroad publish in the Czech edition and scholars from the Czech community in the English edition. Petr Matějů indicated the need for Western contributors in order to increase the citation index of the journal. A specialisation in transformation issues could be a means of attracting foreign contributors. Zdenka Mansfeldová pointed out that foreign post-graduate students often must publish in their own journals. Jiří Večerník described the rather gloomy situation of the Czech sociological community, and the lack of pressure or need to publish in English (or to publish at all). He explained the rule he had introduced of including 50% Eastern and 50% Western authors in each issue. Georg Vobruba noted that there is a logical basis for using the CSR as *a platform for bridging the communities.*

Options for increasing the submissions rate and the role of the Editorial Board

Jiří Večerník raised the problem of the continuing lack of articles for publication. Petr Matějů informed the board that the success rate for submissions is 100% and that there is a need to maintain a pool of articles to choose from in order to maintain a high-quality journal, and to achieve this, the CSR must determine its market. Georg Vobruba responded that it is necessary then *to attract authors from abroad*, where there is huge pressure to publish in indexed journals like the CSR. Michael Steiner suggested stressing that the CSR is cited in the Social Science Citation Index and that it publishes on specific key issues. These could be publishing incentives for foreign students. Jiří Večerník agreed there is a need to determine the 'added value' of publishing in the CSR.

Stein Ringen suggested the CSR stress that it is publishing good papers on social issues and aiming *to introduce Czech sociology into the international mainstream*, and then any specialisation in transformation as the focus of the CSR would emerge on its own. He suggested expanding the board to include *more Czechs and more people from the region*, and maintaining constant contact with the board. Jiří Večerník cited the journal's previous experience with a larger board but with the same (if not worse) results. Georg Vobruba agreed the size of the board should be limited, and that, instead, current members of the board should be *actively engaged in the search for submissions.*

Michael Steiner noted that there might only be limited interest abroad in reading about the Czech Republic alone and suggested expanding the focus *beyond transition issues* to include for example EU integration. He proposed creating a *two-tier system* in the editorial board, with a higher group of editorial advisors, and aiming for a selection rate of 25% of submissions by: (1) using guest editors (e.g. board members); (2) targeting and contacting collaborative research projects and conferences as sources. Petr Matějů suggested that this could be the responsibility of the editorial board.

Stein Ringen agreed the board should be engaged in this and asked whether the *Czech Sociological Association* could play a role. Zdenka Mansfeldová reported that the CSA exists but is actively declining and is unable to attract young scholars. Jiří Večerník explained some of the problems in the Czech academic community that inhibit incentives to publication and noted there is no link between research and politics and a lack of practical impact. Georg Vobruba agreed this is a widespread problem and supported the idea of contacting panel and conference organisers, which should be the task of the Editorial Board. He also rejected the idea of *special issues* and suggested any focus remain implied by the selection of articles. Jiří Večerník responded that this is the existing policy. Petr Matějů noted that special issues are a useful medium for publishing work drawn from specific projects, citing the example of the June conference in Prague on higher education reform.

Michael Steiner agreed that short-term shortages of articles could be more easily

addressed with special issues. He suggested viewing the composition of the board from the perspective of regional distribution, having current board members cover different regions, but noted the existence at present of some regional gaps (e.g. Poland). He proposed drawing up a new, *more concise mission statement*. Jiří Večerník agreed and added that the board membership is not closed. He suggested determining value-added incentives for publishing in the CSR, an example of which could be a multidisciplinary focus, e.g. between fields or between science and policy.

Stein Ringen expressed the view that co-operation between the CSR and the CSA would create a better impression abroad and the CSR could take the initiative in this. He suggested publishing *short, 2–3 page articles* in the CSR and proposed considering a section on research notes, and including articles on the history of Czech sociology and biographies of former Czech sociologists as a source of local motivation. He also suggested including a 'call for papers' on the editorial page of each issue, with a list of topics requiring papers. Jiří Večerník added that there is a need to include *more book reviews*. Zdenka Mansfeldová drew the board's attention to a sociological website run by students, which covers research results in the field of sociology and which has generated a strong interest.

The next issue of the Czech Sociological Review *6/2003*

Jiří Večerník presented the contents of the next issue of the CSR and the reviews of the submitted papers. Michael Steiner reported that the article by Wilderer needed re-writing and should be re-written. Jiří Večerník reported that the article by Vetterlein would be re-written, and that the article by Nissen needs reviewers.

Journal content

Jiří Večerník tabled the issue of forming a strategy towards the information section of the CSR. He suggested that students could be asked to write book reviews. Zdenka Mansfeldová proposed circulating a leaflet with information on publishing in the journal and its search for publications. Jiří Večerník stated that he was not much in favour of having special issues when there are only two issues of the journal a year. The board decided against publishing special issues.

The CSR's market

Jiří Večerník raised the question of how to increase the CSR's level of publicity. Georg Vobruba suggested exchanging advertisements with other journals. Stein Ringen added that word of mouth is still the main medium. Petr Matějů suggested addressing policy issues and policy-makers as a potential target group. Stein Ringen agreed and suggested encouraging a running discussion of articles, either within the same issue or in subsequent issues. He cited the *Journal of Democracy* as an example of an excellent journal with a mixture of high quality papers, not all of which are strictly academic. Petr Matějů proposed distinguishing between *academic papers* (which could be sent to academics for review) and *policy papers* (which could be sent to other, non-academic reviewers), and mixing policy, research reports, and academic work, and he agreed that policy-makers could be invited to comment and publish along with other papers.

Jiří Večerník noted that in the West there is a bridge between academic and policy institutes, while in the Czech Republic there is little opportunity to co-operate. Georg Vobruba drew the board's attention to a meeting of the ASA next year on the subject of 'public sociology', intended to define what sociologists do. Zdenka Mansfeldová suggested expanding the board to include, for example, representatives from Croatia. Jiří Večerník suggested seeking out countries where no journal similar to the CSR exists, e.g. Slovenia, but added that there is no hurry to invite just anyone.

Sociological Journals Published in English in Central and Eastern Europe

Early in 2003 the *Czech Sociological Review* made a decision to initiate systematic co-operation and exchanges of periodicals with other sociological journals publishing in English in Central and Eastern Europe. The following is a list of periodicals with which the CSR has estabish-lished co-operation:

European Societies
(quarterly publication)
Institute for Advanced Studies
Editor-in-Chief: Professor Claire Wallace
Stumpergasse 56
1060-Vienna
AUSTRIA
e-mail: wallace@ihs.ac.at

Review of Sociology / Hungarian Sociologiai Szemle
(biannual publication)
Hungarian Sociological Association
Editor-in-Chief: Róbert Tardos
1014 Budapest, Orszaghaz u. 30
HUNGARY
e-mail: tardos@izabell.elte.hu

East Central Europe/L´Europe du Centre-Est
(biannual publication)
Charles Schlacks, Jr. / Collegium Budapest / Central European University
Editor-in-Chief: Julia Szalai
Szentharomsag u. 2
1014 Budapest
HUNGARY
e-mail: h214sza@ella.hu
e-mail: ece@colbud.hu

Sisyphus. Social Studies
The Intitute of Philosophy and Sociology
Polish Academy of Science
Editor-in-Chief: W. Adamski
Nowy Swiat 72
00330 Warszawa
POLAND
e-mail: publish@ifispan.waw.pl
e-mail: dmiller@ifispan.waw.pl

Polish Sociological Review
(quarterly publication)
Polish Sociological Association
Editor-in-Chief: Joanna Kurczewska
Nowy Swiat 72
00330 Warszawa
POLAND
e-mail: pts@ifispan.waw.pl

TRAMES
(quarterly publication)
Estonian Academy of Sciences
Editor-in-Chief: Urmas Sutrap
Estonia Academy Publishers
Estonia pst 7
EE-10143 Tallinn
ESTONIA
e-mail: urm@eki.ee

PROCEEDINGS OF THE LATVIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
Section A: Human and Social Sciences
(bimonthly publication)
Latvian Academy of Sciences
Editor-in-Chief: Arno Jundze
Editorial Office
Akademijas laukums 1
Riga 1050
LATVIA
e-mail: vestis@ac.lza.iv

Society and Economy in Central and Eastern Europe
(quarterly publication)
Budapest University of Economic Sciences and Public Administration
Editor-in-Chief: Attila Chikán
Fövám tér 8
HU-1093 Budapest
HUNGARY
e-mail: chikan@rektor.bke.hu

Romanian Journal of Society and Politics
(biannual publication)
Romanian Society of Political Science /
Civic Education Project
Editors-in-Chief: Annette Freyberg-Inan,
Romanita Iordache, Laurentian Stefan
Civic Education Project Office
Bd. Unirii, Nr. 376, bl. J3A, sc. A, ap. 2
Bucharest
ROMANIA
e-mail: rei@xnet.ro

Sociology: Theory, Methods, Marketing
(bimonthly publication)
Institute of Sociology
National Academy of Sciences
of the Ukraine
Editors-in-Chief: Valerij Vorona, Evgen
Golovakha
vul. Shovkovichna 12
252021 Kiev
UKRAINE
e-mail: polokhal@gu.kiev.ua
e-mail: journa@socnet.kiev.ua

Report on the 'Central European Parliaments: The First Decade of Democratic Experience and the Future Perspective' Workshop

Prague, 6–8 November 2003

On 6–8 November 2003, the project group of the Parliamentary Documentation and Information Centre of the Political Sociology department at the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic in co-operation with Research Committee No. 8 – the Legislative Specialists of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) organised the international workshop 'Central European Parliaments: The First Decade of Democratic Experience and the Future Perspective'. The organisers gathered researchers from both Central and Eastern European countries, and from Germany, Canada and the United States, who are engaged in parliamentary research in the region. The workshop was also opened to members of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, its staff (particularly from the Parliamentary Institute), and graduate and doctoral students. A total of 30 participants from 8 countries participated in the workshop.

The main aims of the workshop were to bring together scholars engaged in field research in order to replace the style of isolated research on national parliaments and their actors which dominated over the past decade with that of internationally co-operative investigations in the coming decade, and in order to assess the priorities in parliamentary research for the years to come. These aims were based upon the current trends in the Czech Parliament and the research assembled to date. Attention was primarily devoted to the role of those parliaments which are acceding to the EU, in the context of changes to the parliamentary agenda, and to the role of individual parliaments and the possible reciprocal links between the national parliaments and the European Parliament.

The conference was divided into four panels, each of which targeted current issues in parliamentary research and the methods of this research. Special attention was paid to opportunities for national and international comparisons.

The first panel – the Parliamentary Research Agenda – chaired by Drago Zajc (Slovenia, University of Ljubljana), presented current findings in empirical research on parliaments and parliamentarians in Central Europe and Germany. Michael Edinger (Germany, University of Jena) presented the results of a comparative study of East and West German parliamentary deputies, and Bernhard Weßels (Germany, WZB Berlin) reported on the results from a continual comparative study of German members of parliament and members of the European Parliament.

Further discussion was facilitated by a contribution from Zdenka Mansfeldová (Czech Republic, Institute of Sociology, AS CR), who concentrated on the description and analysis of the institutional framework and policy relations between the Czech Parliament and the Government. As the participant Jacek Wasilewski (Poland, Warsaw School of Social Psychology) pointed out, the relationship between the legislative and the executive has thus far been the subject of relatively little research in parliamentary studies.

The second panel – Parliaments and the Processes of Globalisation and Europeanisation – chaired by Werner Patzelt (Germany, TU Dresden), concentrated on the changing role and position of national parliaments in the process of transformation and globalisation. Petr Kolář and Jindřiška Syllová (Czech Republic, Parliamentary Institute, Prague) described the role played by the parliaments of the candidate countries in the process of EU enlargement. Jana Reschová (Czech Republic, University of Economics) developed this perspective further by focusing on the case of the Czech Parliament as an example of a national parliament in the framework of Europeanisation. In a comparative perspective, Drago Zajc made an analysis of the changing functions of national parliaments after joining the EU and suggested the implications for the development of Central and Eastern European parliaments in the near future. Edward Schneier (USA, Colgate University) offered an interesting look at possible comparative outlines in the analysis of the scope of legislative powers of post-communist parliaments and of parliaments with similar experience outside the region.

The third panel – The Role of Political Parties in the Parliaments – chaired by Jana Reschová, aimed at re-establishing research on political parties and their role in parliaments. David M. Olson (USA, Parliamentary Documents Center, University of North Carolina at Greensboro) presented an overview of the role of political parties in the organisation of parliament, with special attention paid to the relationship between the party clubs and committees in Central and Eastern European parliaments. Petra Rakušanová and Lukáš Linek (Czech Republic, Institute of Sociology, AS CR) introduced the case study of the Czech parliamentary party clubs from the point of view of party unity and party cohesion. Csaba Nikolenyi (Canada, Concordia University) offered an interesting view of the coalition stability in the new democracies vis-à-vis rational choice theory, and Werner J. Patzelt elaborated an explanatory model of party discipline in the German parliaments and focused on its application in an international comparison.

The fourth panel – Legislative Recruitment – chaired by David M. Olson, focused on changes in legislative recruitment and career patterns. William Crowther (USA, Parliamentary Documents Center, University of North Carolina at Greensboro) analysed legislative recruitment in Romania and Moldova, while Adéla Seidlová (Czech Republic, Institute of Sociology, AS CR) looked at recruitment patterns among the parliamentary elite. Stefan Laurentiu (Romania, University of Bucharest) presented the results of a survey on Romanian MPs, analysing their career patterns as well as their career preferences, and András Schwarz (Hungary, Budapest University of Economic Sciences and Public Administration) looked at experienced deputies in the Hungarian Parliament.

The workshop concluded with a panel discussion – Possibilities for Co-operation and the Co-ordination of Comparative Research – chaired by Darina Malová (Slovakia, Faculty of Arts, Comenius University). The main issues to be focused on in the discussion were outlined in the introduction by Lubomír Brokl (director of the Parliamentary Documentation and Information Centre at the Institute of Sociology, AS CR) and David M. Olson (chair of RC No. 8 – the Legislative Specialists of the IPSA). These issues included:

1. Evaluating the methodological approaches applied to the research on parliaments

and parliamentary elites in CEE countries and in Western European countries, along with the research strategies and data use.

2. Finding such topics for research on parliaments in the new decade that could be of common relevance and would enable the application of comparative analyses or, in an ideal case, common comparative studies.
3. Formulating and structuring issues related to the functioning of national parliaments within the EU from national and European points of view.

A very lively discussion on the possibilities and limits of co-operation resulted in a proposal to create, as a first step, an overview of all the research instruments (questionnaires) and indicators used.

A volume of papers stemming from the workshop will be published in 2004.

Zdenka Mansfeldová, Petra Rakušanová

Recenzenti statí za rok 2003
Reviewers of Articles in the Year 2003

Vladimir Borecký - Filozofická fakulta UK, Praha/Faculty of Philosophy and Arts, Charles University, Prague

Lubomír Brokl - Sociologický ústav AV ČR, Praha/Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague

Ján Bunčák - Filozofická fakulta UK, Bratislava/Faculty of Philosophy and Arts, Comenius University, Bratislava

Jiří Buriánek - Filozofická fakulta UK, Praha/Faculty of Philosophy and Arts, Charles University, Prague

Pavel Černoch - Fakulta sociálních věd UK, Praha/Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague

Jaroslav Čmejrek - Česká zemědělská univerzita, Praha/Czech University of Agriculture, Prague

Petr Dostál - Přírodovědecká fakulta UK, Praha/Faculty of Sciences, Charles University, Prague

Jakub Grygar - Fakulta humanitních studií UK, Praha/Faculty of Humanities, Charles University, Prague

Tomáš Hauer - Vysoká škola báňská - Technická univerzita, Ostrava/VŠB-Technical University, Ostrava

Hana Havelková - Fakulta humanitních studií UK, Praha/Faculty of Humanities, Charles University, Prague

Petr Hebák - Vysoká škola ekonomická, Praha/University of Economics, Prague

Michal Illner - Sociologický ústav AV ČR, Praha/Insitute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague

Jan Jandourek - Fakulta sociálních věd UK, Praha/Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague

Jan Jirák - Fakulta sociálních věd UK, Praha/Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague

Jan Kalous - CESES UK, Praha/Center for Social and Economic Strategies, Charles University, Prague

Jan Keller - Fakulta zdravotně sociální OU, Ostrava/Medico-Social Faculty, University of Ostrava

Maarten Keune - European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole

Tomáš Kostelecký - Sociologický ústav AV ČR, Praha/Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague

Jan Koucký - Pedagogická fakulta UK, Praha/Faculty of Education, Charles University, Prague

Ľuba Kráľová - Fakulta verejnej správy UPJŠK, Košice/Faculty of Public Administration, PJŠ University, Košice

Martin Kreidl - Sociologický ústav AV ČR, Praha/Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague

Alena Křížková - Sociologický ústav AV ČR, Praha/Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague

Věra Kuchařová - Výzkumný ústav práce a sociálních věcí, Praha/Research Institute of Labour and Social Affairs, Prague

Tomáš Lebeda - Sociologický ústav AV ČR, Praha/Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague

Pavel Machonin - Sociologický ústav AV ČR, Praha/Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague

Věra Majerová - Česká zemědělská univerzita, Praha/Czech University of Agriculture, Prague

Radim Marada - Fakulta sociálních studií MU, Brno/Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University, Brno

Bedřich Moldan - COŽP UK, Praha/Centre for Environmental Issues, Charles University, Prague

Ivo Možný - Fakulta sociálních studií MU, Brno/Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University, Brno

Karel Müller, Jr. - Vysoká škola ekonomická, Praha/University of Economics, Prague

Karel Müller, Sr. - Fakulta humanitních studií UK, Praha/ Faculty of Humanities, Charles University, Prague

Zdeněk Nešpor - Sociologický ústav AV ČR, Praha/Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague

Miroslav Novák - Fakulta sociálních věd UK, Praha/Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague

Miloslav Petrusek - Fakulta sociálních věd UK, Praha/Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague

Klára Plecitá - Sociologický ústav AV ČR, Praha/Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague

Libor Prudký - Fakulta humanitních studií UK, Praha/Faculty of Humanities, Charles University, Prague

Ladislav Rabušic - Fakulta sociálních studií MU, Brno/Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University, Brno

Milada Rabušicová - Filozofická fakulta MU, Brno/Faculty of Philosophy and Arts, Masaryk University, Brno

Antonín Rašek - CESES UK, Praha/Center for Social and Economic Strategies, Charles University, Prague

Irena Reifová - Fakulta sociálních věd UK, Praha/Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague

Stein Ringen - University of Oxford

Luděk Rychetník - University of Reading

Jitka Rychtaříková - Sociologický ústav AV ČR, Praha/Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague

Dan Ryšavý - Filozofická fakulta UP, Olomouc/Faculty of Philosophy and Arts, Palacký University, Olomouc

Blanka Řeháková - Sociologický ústav AV ČR, Praha/Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague

Jan Sedláček - Filozofická fakulta UK, Praha/Faculty of Philosophy and Arts, Charles University, Prague

Tomáš Sedláček - Fakulta sociálních věd UK, Praha/Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague

Markéta Sedláčková - Sociologický ústav AV ČR, Praha/Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague

Sociologický časopis
Czech Sociological Review

6

OBSAH

Sociologický ča:
Czech Sociologi

CONTENTS

ISSN 0038-0288

Cena 44 Kč / Price 14 € / 14 $