

the Shoah is an extremely stimulating contribution to demographic history and historical sociology. It illuminates a key demographic transition in an original and very well-documented manner and simultaneously redraws the history of Bohemian Jewry with a finely delineated description of the manifold changes it underwent. This book opens up many questions and should be the starting point for a number of future studies. The Central European University Press has moreover made this important monograph available to the scholarly public in a very attractive manner. Now the readers of this book must wait to see what Jana Vobecká's next contribution will be.

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Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik:
*Defeating Authoritarian Leaders
in Postcommunist Countries*

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Soon after the revolutions of 1989 and 1991, it seemed that the democratic future of the post-communist region was set. There were two groups of countries: the good consolidated democracies who were headed into and then joined the EU and the more authoritarian regimes who appeared to be on a road to nowhere. Then came a series of events that muddied this view. First, Slovakia in its 1998 elections rejected its strongman ruler, Vladimír Mečiar. Then, Croatia and Serbia overthrew their even more oppressive regimes in 2000. Georgia was next in line in 2003 with its Rose Revolution, to be followed by Ukraine's Orange Revolution in 2004 and Kyrgyzstan's Tulip Revolution in 2005. These so-called coloured revolutions—their causes and consequences—are at the heart of *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries*. The au-

thors, Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, are motivated by the problem of how to democratise hybrid or semi-authoritarian regimes which puzzlingly have proved to be relatively stable despite being neither fully democratic nor fully authoritarian.

Their method is an in-depth analysis of the six cases just mentioned, mostly through over 200 interviews with key actors, and a small-N comparison of these cases with several other elections that did not yield democratic breakthroughs in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus. The authors' explanation for the democratic successes is the opposition's use of what they call the 'electoral model'. This model is a set of tasks, in fact a 'to do' list, that the opposition needs to engage in when confronting a hybrid regime that allows them to contest elections. The elements of the model—the specific tasks on the 'to do' list—include the following:

- unifying the opposition,
- running an ambitious campaign,
- conducting voter registration and voter turnout drives,
- putting pressure on election commissions,
- getting civil society, youth movements, and the opposition to collaborate,
- using public opinion polls to shape strategy,
- conducting parallel vote tabulations and exit polls.

The oppositions which fulfilled most of these tasks were the ones who successfully beat authoritarian leaders in elections and forced them to leave office, while those who did not failed. While it might seem that these tasks were epiphenomenal, that they were in fact responses to weak or vulnerable regimes rather than independent causes, Bunce and Wolchik argue that they were not. In fact, these tactics worked even in hard-core regimes like Serbia and Kyrgyzstan where few expected them to succeed. Neither was it economic frailty that

distinguished the successful from the failed cases. Again, oppositions succeeded under a variety of economic conditions. Taking more wind out of these structural explanations is the fact that several of these elections were closely contested and could have gone either way. The outcomes were far from predetermined.

The theoretical point that underlies the electoral model is that hybrid regimes do not fall just because they are unpopular. Even when citizens reject the regime, it is not a given that they join the opposition. They may simply decide to tune out of politics. The opposition thus needs to persuade the public that '(1) there is an alternative, (2) change is possible, and (3) change is possible only through participation in the process, i.e., voting' (p. 67). Or, as they put it later, the opposition needs to provide both hope and organisation to channel that hope.

The fact that the electoral model includes a set of definite tasks means that it is modular—it can be transferred from one country to another. The authors find that this is in fact the case. There is international diffusion—the electoral model was born in early transitions in the Philippines and Chile, was then transferred to Bulgaria in 1990, and crystallised in Slovakia in 1998. Slovak democratic organisers, among others, were then prominent in carrying the model to new places by advising oppositions in Croatia, Serbia, and Ukraine. International organisations like USAID helped with this diffusion as did the manifest success that the model delivered.

This is a powerful argument that is notable for its practicality. The authors are close to producing a manual for would-be democratisers in hybrid regimes. And their advice is not always obvious. One particularly interesting recommendation is that 'fun stuff is important'—t-shirts, concerts, and happenings all have a place in energising the public to support the opposition. Another is that NGOs should not worry

too much about maintaining their non-partisanship and should partner with the opposition to ensure that elections are free and fair. The bottom-line is that the opposition should try their best to imitate electoral campaigns in established democracies like the United States with their polling, messaging, and voter outreach.

The question is whether this advice necessarily works as well as the authors claim. The counterfactual is key here. Would Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus (or any number of hybrid regimes) be democratic today if only their oppositions had run the sort of campaigns that Bunce and Wolchik recommend? It is far from certain that this is the case. The authors are too quick to dismiss structural factors simply because they do not precisely line up with their outcomes. They seem to be working with a fairly deterministic view of causality here when it is more likely that the effects of structural factors are probabilistic and interactive, which is hard to capture with such a small number of cases. The electoral model is certainly a good thing, but it is probably not the magic bullet as the authors portray it and its use could be manifestly dangerous in places where incumbents are still powerful.

Another worry is whether the breakthrough elections in these regimes are truly significant events. The Orange Revolution seemed like it would usher in a new era in Ukraine, but today it appears that the country quickly reverted to its old ways. The same applies to Georgia and Kyrgyzstan (but not to Slovakia, Croatia, and Serbia). The authors, to be sure, are aware of this criticism and respond to it by citing data from Freedom House's *Nations in Transit* reports showing improvements, but more analysis of the consequences of these elections beyond simple indicators is needed to prove the point.

Despite these shortcomings, this book presents a strong case for the electoral model of transition and is particularly use-

ful reading for those in the business of promoting democratic transition. The authors have codified the experience of dozens of participants in the coloured revolutions as well as their international supporters to show the nuts and bolts of a breakthrough election in a hybrid regime. One can only hope that the model is as useful and transferable as the authors claim.

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**OECD: Education at a Glance 2012:
OECD Indicators**

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The starting premise of this report is that 'investing in people, their skills and their education is key for inclusive growth and jobs—it is key for the success of economies, societies and their citizens' (p. 15). Thus, education is not just an individual characteristic, but is strongly correlated with health, labour market participation, active ageing and happiness. *Education at a Glance 2012* is already the 20th edition of the series, which aims to offer a broad set of cross-nationally comparable indicators to researchers, policymakers and leaders. Comparable data on the political economy of welfare states is often useful to investigate the role of inequalities in human capital and skill formation [Vanhuysse 2008]. The publication and the annually repeated collection of data can be considered an important contribution to improve national education systems.

The indicators covered here are built on a framework (p. 17) that takes into account three different dimensions: the different actors in education systems such as individual learners, teachers, educational institutions and education policy; the outputs and outcomes, as well as policy levers and antecedents and policy issues arising from a variation of dimensions one and

two. The first chapter focuses on the output of educational institutions, which is not just defined as educational attainment but also reviewed in the context of social mobility, labour market, social impact and economy. The following chapters then focus on the prerequisites of the output, namely, the investment in education, the access to education, the learning environment, and the education systems.

Although the presented range of data is very broad, most indicators focus on formal education and people of school and university age. However, a broad definition of education in principle may include a more differentiated approach that covers a broader target group—key word: lifelong learning—and settings outside schools and universities. Furthermore, education cannot only be pressed into formal educational certificates; an inclusive definition needs to cover informal educational components as well. The definition of education used in *Education at a Glance* is based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED 1997), which does not include informal education and settings such as vocational training, adult evening classes, or other forms of education that do not fit into the classification of primary, secondary and tertiary education. However, the focus on formal educational attainment can be considered a trade-off in favour of annually updated and international comparable data. The data used for the indicators is quantitative, easily measurable and available on a regularly updated basis, which makes it possible to present an annually updated edition of *Education at a Glance*. On the contrary, this approach also suppresses other settings such as the role of families which are an important source for informal education. Evidence from comparative social policy analysis for example suggests that the setting at home may be more crucial than a deficient situation at school in explaining the educational success of children [Vanhuysse 2008].