At the beginning of the book it is rather unclear whether or not the focus is on a specific geographical area. The examples and data presented mostly focus on European Union Member States, Australia, and the United States. Chapter 11 discusses youth 'beyond the first world'. The author admits that literature on youth, including this book, often ignores the fact that the majority of young people are living in developing countries. It is pointed out that, because the living conditions of youth in these countries are not comparable to those living in developed countries, many theories developed in industrial countries may not apply for developing countries. Thus, it is very important, especially for a textbook, to better define from the start the scope of the publication. Who are the young people studied? The first chapter could have been better used as an introduction to both the topic as a whole and to the contributions in the book's chapters. As it stands now, different topics concerning youth studies are presented often only loosely linked with each other. An introductory 'frame' and the contextualisation of the chapters within this 'frame' are missing.

On the other hand, the book does present broad insights into the field of youth studies. This endeavour does not always leave room to cover every aspect in detail, instead presenting theories and results from sociological, political, psychological, and educational perspectives. The political implications presented at the end of each chapter highlight the timeliness and importance of youth studies. The balance between the presentation of theories from classic scholars and empirical results provides a good overview of the foundations of youth studies and its applications. In a nutshell, Furlong presents youth studies from very different viewpoints, covering perceptions of youth themselves, perceptions and misperceptions of society, and the role of the welfare state. *Youth Studies: An Introduction* offers a unique possibility for undergraduate students to become familiar with this multifaceted topic. For youth researchers, it might serve as a reminder to look beyond their own research field and to keep the multidisciplinary roots and theories of youth studies in mind.

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Dorothee Bohle and Béla Greskovits: *Capitalist Diversity on Europe's Periphery*

Ithaca, NY, 2012: Cornell University Press, 304 pp.

This extremely rich book is a landmark contribution to our understanding of the post-communist transition. I will first present an unfairly simplistic version of the main argument of the book. Then I will lay out my

disagreement with Karl Polanyi, the authors' theoretical inspiration. I will suggest that Polanyi misread history and that we can see the post-communist transition not as the second but the third instance of what he called the great transformation, and that the key to the great transformation in 19th-century England was not the market but a shift in the *scale* of the economy. I will then bring this insight back to the book, claiming that the key to the post-communist transition is the dis- and re-embedding of the economy away from the nation state, and offer a slightly different take on the last two decades.

The book presents a complex analytical history of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) since the end of communism. For obvious reasons, the list of countries covers the embedded neoliberal Visegrád countries (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary), the liberal Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia), neo-corporatist Slovenia plus Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia (leaving aside all other post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav states and Albania).

The book seeks to understand this diversity of outcomes. The authors observe not just that these countries had more diverse legacies than many assume, but that how those legacies were interpreted and utilised depended on elites, who framed them differently as assets or threats. In the Baltic states, nation- and market-building went hand in hand. Their full embrace of the market was partly a result of seeing the Soviet past including the command economy as Russian encroachment on Baltic nationhood. The Visegrád countries accepted many of the communist legacies of the welfare state and socialist industries, and used them to buffer the transition. Slovenia, after a rocky start, embraced much of Yugoslav market socialism, including its famed workers' management system, a model from which Slovenia had benefited and which had made it the most prosperous state in the Yugoslav federation. Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia were laggards with weak states. The first two eventually opted for a neoliberal course, the last settled on a more embedded approach. Elite choices mattered first and foremost.

Not just the neoliberal push but also the countermovement (Polanyi calls it the 'double movement'), society's resistance to the tyranny of the free market, was articulated through elites who responded with a varying mix of welfare protections and nationalist identity politics. The two emerged as functional substitutes—a profound and original observation.

Bohle and Greskovits correctly identify the initial phase of post-communism as a neoliberal push to build a market economy, and they draw on the works of Karl Polanyi to explain the ensuing dislocation and social and political reaction. Karl Polanyi, one of the patron saints of economic sociology, often serves as a guiding light for those who wish to criticise liberal market economies. Polanyi's main contribution in this respect is his classic book, *The Great Transformation* [(1944) 2001], which describes the social devastations of the most radical liberal experiment before Polanyi's time: post-Speenhamland England. The Speenhamland system was an outdoor relief programme for the rural poor that was abandoned to free up the labour market with the new Poor Law of 1834. *The Great Transformation* is an indictment of the destitution and social chaos that followed. Polanyi describes laissez-faire as a system imposed by the liberal state with ruthless force letting the market dictate the life of society. The temporary triumph of liberal markets that resulted in the commodification of much of everything including labour, land, and money created a terrible devastation, uprooting communities, and pauperising large segments of 19th-century British society. In countermoves, including political organisations such as the Chartrist movement, society resisted.

The analogy between CEE and England a century and a half earlier is plausible. The freeing up of markets by strong state intervention is definitely a common element. In both cases dislocation followed, even if in CEE this was less extreme. Unhappiness with the consequences of markets clearly created push back in CEE not unlike the countermovement Polanyi identified in England.

But if the analogy is plausible, is Polanyi's underlying analysis correct? Did the free market per se create the devastation of post-Speenhamland? Or was there something deeper (and possibly simpler) that just happened to be manifested in the free market at that time? Could the same type of devastation come about by state policies that are not just uninterested in imposing free markets on society but actively trying to suppress markets of any kind?

The answer is yes. In fact, this is exactly what happened during the socialist industrialisation that was imposed on CEE after the Second World War (for a detailed analysis, see Rona-Tas [1997]). The uprooting of communities, pauperisation, the forced mobility of labour, proletarianisation, etc., might have been less extreme than what people suffered in post-Speenhamland England, but the transformation socialist industrialisation sought to achieve, namely large-scale factory production and the national integration of the entire economy, was already completed to some degree in these countries. This socialist great transformation did not have to start from scratch. In countries, like post-First World War Soviet Russia, where the socialist great transformation had to start with a more backward economy, the similarities between the British and the socialist great transformation are even more pronounced.

If Polanyi misidentified the causes of social destruction, conflating its historical form and its historical essence, what was it that ruined 19th-century England and post-Second World War CEE and threatened the post-communist transition? In all three cases, a radical reorganisation of production, initiated and carried out by the state, was responsible for the suffering and social breakdown. The common thread of these transformations was that local production was forcefully reintegrated into a larger system of exchange. In 19th-century England, local peasant and artisan production was forced into national markets (and for some industrial products international ones). Communism did the same. It integrated local productions into a national planned economy. The post-communist transformation first and foremost reintegrated these economies into a global economy. The post-communist great transformation, however, had another element as well. Unlike the first two, it also re-embedded a large part of the economy in the local context, returning it from the nation state to localities. Now people can purchase food in international supermarkets but also local mom-and-pop stores. This is what one may call the *dual shift* of the post-communist transformation.

In all three cases, the great transformations were deeper and simpler than either marketisation or communist industrialisation or post-communist market transition: they were a shift in scale. In the first two instances a shift upwards, in the third a shift up and down, *away* from the national level.

If this is correct, then the main problems of the CEE countries may not be that they put in place markets. No countermovement demanded the elimination of markets even if some markets were perceived as under-regulated. No countermovement wanted to ban free labour or market competition (even if in certain areas competition was seen as less desirable than elsewhere). No countermovement attacked private property rights. No countermovement called for the return to a

state-run economy with complete nationalisation. The main problem is that now Slovak, Latvian, and Hungarian workers are concurrently part of a global consumer economy, raising expectations, and part of a global labour economy, with wages depressed by workers in poorer and distant lands. But the problem was also how to organise local economies and reinvent local production from agriculture to local services. Bohle and Greskovits illustrate this very well with their description of what they call the manufacturing miracle, where foreign manufacturers were able to successfully organise a part of their supply network of small and medium-sized companies around their main operation.

The dual shift of the third great transformation—upscaling to the global and downscaling to the local—created a new paradox for CEE capitalist democracy. The concurrent shift weakened the nation state, but at the same time democracy was construed as the popular assignment of state powers to a political party or a coalition of parties. Electoral democracy was conceived as the people, every four years, deciding who will get the reins of state power to fulfil the expectations of the electorate. CEE politicians, however, had to find out as soon as they won a national election that the nation state they now ruled over had extremely limited powers because it was constrained from above by global forces and from below by local ones. With a hollowed-out state, politicians again and again disappointed their voters, which then created a carousel of rotating governments. Voters threw out the incompetent rascals, brought in new ones, and got disappointed again. This brings forth the demise of democratic politics and a demand for a strong state. Whether this demand remains frustrated or succeeds depends on many things, including, as Bohle and Greskovits explain, how elites articulate historical legacies. But regardless of the ultimate outcome, it throws into sharp relief the real paradox of the post-communist transition: The disembedding and re-embedding of the economy requires a strong state both to carry out this concurrent shift and to cushion the dislocations it creates. The concurrent shift, however, robs the state of much of its power to do either.

If the first and the second great transformation were the disembedding of the economy from local social relations and re-embedding it in a national context, the third great transformation was the disembedding of the economy from its national context and re-embedding it in a global and local context. Bohle and Greskovits present this last, concurrent shift with great clarity and in fine detail, and its focus on the nation state is spot on. If we accept that the fundamental change in post-communism is not marketisation but the simultaneous process of globalisation and localisation, we can reassess the authors' insight that social protection and nationalism are substitutes. From this perspective, nationalism is a symbolic expression of the problem underlying the lack of social protection: the hollowing out of the nation state in a world where the nation state is the only source of protection and economic security.

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