ulation' (non-employed and non-standard workers) is higher in some Southern and Central European cases than in those with strong class challenge (Chapter 6).

In Chapter 7, Crouch shows that, based on the used indicators, countries cluster in their proximity to three ideal-typical profiles: social democratic (with strong interventions of state and associations in the economy), neoliberal (the opposite), and community governance. Community governance is found in societies in which modern institutions are absent or weak while traditional communities, such as the family, play an important role in economic life. Strong class challenge pulls countries towards the social-democratic ideal type. Countries in Southern and Central-Eastern Europe jointly lean towards community governance. This similarity is for Crouch '[p]erhaps the most surprising result of this part of the study' (p. 228), which he explains by pointing to the role of traditional communities as networks to cope with the limitations of socialist economies.

The empirical section has considerable strengths: a strong effort to maximise coverage of European (and some non-European) cases, a careful selection of indicators, as well as remarkably open discussions of their shortcomings, and compelling interpretations of empirical patterns that are grounded in Crouch's impressive knowledge about the context of his cases. The major weakness, in my opinion, is that the book is overburdened with data. On roughly 260 pages there are more than 150 tables and figures, not counting the data appendix. Particularly in the empirical chapters, the density of graphical information is so high that it is at times difficult to give justice to relevant observations. Given that the analysis includes some aspects that have been covered by previous research, less probably would have been more.

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Rogers Brubaker: *Grounds for Difference*
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Designed as a 'sequel of sorts' to *Ethnicity without Groups* [2006] (p. 1), this book delves into recent tropes of difference and inequality. It offers, somewhat more closer to the ethos and style of *Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism* [1998], a complex and intriguing set of guidelines towards (re)conceptualising social difference. Throughout its seven chapters, most of which revisit to varying degrees previous articles, this book strives to create a basis for a dynamic analytical toolkit better suited for understanding new dimensions of inequality. Brubaker astutely starts the book with the observation that the cultural and discursive turn in the study of difference seems to have come to an abrupt end as the 2008 recession re-centralised objectivist understandings of inequality (pp. 2–3). Yet, as one the key proponents of a cognitive constructivist agenda, Brubaker picks up the gauntlet. Starting from Tilly's famous work [1999], he argues that, while it is possible to show how inequality can be categorical, the process of generating inequality remains poorly researched (p. 15). This is needed because between-group differences in skills, education, and so on figure both as *explanations* of inequality and as *dimensions* of it that require explanation in their own right (p. 38). With this in mind, Brubaker argues that focusing on networks and categories is the avenue forward—on the boundary, category has primacy, but within the boundary networks are key in creating inequality (pp. 15–16). In practice, this helps shed better light on the interweaving of inequalities between categories of positions and inequalities between categories of persons (p. 39).

Chapter 2, 'The Return of Biology', represents a fascinating interdisciplinary endeavour, albeit a bit one-sided in its empirical backing, which mostly gravitates around the United States but has some ex-

ternal links as well. The key message is that the recent appeal to biological research transcends conventional 'essentialising' discourses and, when taken seriously, undermines 'groupist worldviews' (pp. 53–54). Granted, when filtered just through journalistic channels, advances in biology have indeed bestowed some new-found scientific (or putatively scientific) authority on specific objectivist understandings of race and ethnicity (p. 56). Notwithstanding, Brubaker's analysis unearths that there is still a very distinct analytical space within this research that may yield future avenues for understanding difference.

In 'Language, Religion and the Politics of Difference', Brubaker aims to dissect the ways in which claims made in the name of linguistic and/or religious groups often are similar and intertwined (if not altogether conflated) to those made in the name of nations (p. 87). Departing gradually from the US-centric focus of the opening chapters, this section seeks to map out how and why the state can be (or claims to be) neutral vis-à-vis religion, but does not have similar options available for language (p. 90). This occurs because, while the inter-generational transmission of religion requires no substantive state intervention, the transmission of language—which requires the existence of schools mandated by the state—implies a major public effort and carries a substantial opportunity cost (p. 94). Although Brubaker is undoubtedly right in signalling this difference, perhaps some more nuancing is warranted. The European Court cases vis-à-vis the display of religious symbols in schools (the Lautsi cases with their diametrically opposed verdicts, for instance) point to the intervention and role of the state in the transmission of religion. In a similar vein, Brubaker again rightly notes the qualitative difference that language tests for citizenship are routine, while a religious test would be unthinkable (p. 95). But he seems to slightly gloss over the overtly religious messages (anti-Muslim most of the time) couched in higher-order 'liberal' concerns within citizenship tests [Baubock and Joppke 2010]. Nevertheless, the chapter is accurate in identifying the key sensitive issue—within overarching neutrality there is a huge and problematic difference between internal pluralism aimed at long-standing minorities and external pluralism aimed at new migrants (p. 96).

If the first three chapters are somewhat loosely held together by Brubaker's overarching agenda, Chapters 4–7 flow more smoothly despite being the backbones of previous articles with quite different topics. 'Religion and nationalism' (Chapter 4), structured around the key avenues of nationalism-religion interaction (religion as a cause, religion and nationalism intertwined, religious nationalism as a distinct category), pursues in further depth the link between religion and nationalism outlined previously. Brubaker delves simultaneously into two highly problematic issues: are Islamist movements a type of *religious nationalism* and does modernisation require secularisation as a sine qua non condition (Casanova's well-known thesis from 1994; pp. 113–117). Concerning the first, he notes that, unless the imagined community of solidarity that is the nation is widely understood as the key locus of value, primary source of legitimacy, object of loyalty and basis of identity, one cannot identify a political movement/ideology as 'nationalism' (p. 115). Islamist movements, though sharing some features of long-distance nationalism, are shown to be quite different. Brubaker starts from the well-known assertion that nationalism is a modern phenomenon and goes on to show deep avenues of nationalism-religion interaction, which question the overarching nature of Casanova's thesis.

'The "Diaspora" Diaspora' (Chapter 5) revisits a previous appreciated article by the author from 2005 and goes further down the avenue of tearing down method-

ological nationalism. The core of the chapter revolves around the proliferation of the concept 'diaspora', which has stretched its meaning virtually beyond analytical use. Consequently, Brubaker re-states his argument that methodologically one should observe diasporic idioms and claims rather than neatly defined, putatively homogeneous groups. The added value of the chapter lies in the author's observation that, while this change has occurred in recent literature, it has been not been as 'epochal' as advertised (p. 125). More importantly, Brubaker further notes that, while diasporas have indeed been better understood as stances rather than 'real things', nation-states have still be reified within newer literature (p. 127). At the same time however, this strong claim seems to be analysed only with regards to the same classical literature that the earlier 2005 article also picked up, without in-depth attention offered to more recent studies. Some of the empirical examples are updated, but the author's dialogue with the literature is perhaps slightly less systematic than in previous chapters.

Chapter 6 unearths the polar opposite in terms of scholarly interest—by and large literature on transborder kin has focused almost exclusively on recent waves of migration rather than older ones (pp. 140–141). This chapter essentially builds on Brubaker's previous triadic nexus model (nationalising nationalism of the 'host state', external homeland nationalism, and nationalism of the minority in case) by outlining more clearly avenues of interaction between external and internal politics of belonging—reciprocally connected between states, intertwined within a particular state, and sequential links (pp. 134-135). An interesting complement to the citizenship discussion from Chapter 3 is brought back into focus now as the author distinguishes between citizenship that is formal (i.e. legal citizenship) and informal (i.e. integration into ordinary 'banal' nationhood) (p. 134).

The book's last chapter, 'Nationalism, Ethnicity and Modernity', displays a daring attempt—questioning the overarching consensus on multiple modernities. Brubaker takes great conceptual care in navigating this often highly loaded literature and strengthens the argument that 'anti-modernist' ideologies should not at all be conflated with 'traditionalist' ones, because they do in fact gravitate around highly modernising ideas (p. 146). As previously, the author builds on the consensus that nations and nationalism are modern phenomena. He argues that underneath the debate of one versus multiple modernities lies the fact that virtually everywhere modernity was associated with elevating nationhood as the key principle of structuring inclusion and equality (p. 151). This is why Brubaker's argument for a 'single modernity' understanding of nationalism is in fact referring to the process of the global diffusion of a deeply inter-related set of processes revolving around identity creation and institution building (pp. 151–152).

On the whole, *Grounds for Difference* offers an interesting mixture of updated theoretical frameworks, re-assertions of Brubaker's well-known constructivist agenda, and entirely new avenues forward. Although the shift from the initial US-centric chapters to the broader perspective in Chapters 3-7 is rather abrupt, the book is quite clearly more than a sum of articles. Brubaker's crisp style makes the gaps otherwise inherent in a book edited from previous individual articles seem minor. Furthermore, although not fully developed as an individual chapter, the analysis of gender inequalities (slightly more prominent in the opening chapters) shows great promise with regard to Brubaker's upcoming work, which focuses exclusively on sexual identities.

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Steffen Mau: ***Inequality, Marketization and the Majority Class: Why Did the European Middle Classes Accept Neo-Liberalism?***

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The ascendance of neoliberalism has left its mark on the Western European social model. Faced with continued economic pressures and an eroding ideological base, social democracy appears to be under increasing strain. Although fears of a total convergence towards the liberal model have yet to be realised, neoliberalism has nevertheless gained tremendous influence. Popular and political discourse alike has elevated market competition into the primary provider of prosperity. Private solutions have frequently superseded public ones. And, although rising inequality has yet to find broad public acceptance, it has nevertheless become accepted as a necessary evil. Neoliberalism has thus shaped not only politics and policies, but also beliefs and values. This is true even among the middle classes, who not only have been the traditional ally of the European social model, but have benefited tremendously from its policies. The seemingly contradictory position of the middle classes vis-à-vis the neoliberal turn forms the puzzle at the heart of Steffen Mau's new book: Why, despite their traditional affinity for social-democracy and the tremendous benefits they have gained from it, would the middle class not only fail to resist growing liberalisation, but even quietly acquiesce to it?

Mau's answer is as provocative as it is concise: It was the very success of social-democracy that sowed the seeds of discontentment among the middle classes. He summarises it succinctly: 'Pointedly, one could say that the broad middle class became less supportive of or even alienated from the social-democratic agenda precisely because it was the main benefactor of the collective gains form the social democratic era.' (p. x) In his argument, the collective gains of the middle class paved the way for a structural and mental transformation that made them more receptive to neoliberal ideas. This shift, although gradual, is not a descent into false consciousness or seduction by neoliberal ideologues, but rather a self-transformation that began at the zenith of the social-democratic project. Moreover, he argues that this transformation is a crucial component of the larger shift towards an acceptance of neoliberalism in Western Europe. After all, neoliberal reforms would not have been possible in European mass democracies if they had been actively resisted by the combined political clout of the middle classes. To demonstrate this transformation empirically, Mau synthesises a broad range of literatures, tracing out the broad structural patterns that facilitated the middle class's neoliberal reconfiguration.

The book begins by describing the emergence of the European welfare state, and setting the context for its subsequent erosion. During the era of post-war prosperity, the middle classes grew in tandem with the European social model and the values associated with it. The hegemonic